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ABSTRACT  
This dissertation addresses the question how democracies defend themselves 
from political parties and groups which profess antidemocratic values and use 
violence as one of the means to achieve their goals. In particular this 
dissertation analyses the range of formal-legal measures and provisions that 
democracies have at their disposal to constrain their non-democratic groups 
and political parties, looking at eight advanced European democracies Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. These measures and provisions are identified in constitutional 
documents, civil law, criminal law, in electoral laws, and other pertinent legal 
sources passed by the legislature and issued by courts of these countries, 
pertaining to the regulation of political freedoms, public order, and homeland 
security. On this basis, the thesis provides an encompassing and systematic 
assessment of differences and similarities between these democracies and 
thereby assesses their relative formal-legal democratic defensiveness. 
 
 
  
3 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
List of tables          8 
List of abbreviations         9 
1 Introduction           
1.1 Setting the problem and developing the research questions  11 
1.2 Organisation of the thesis       17 
 
2 The concept of defensive democracy: the theoretical background  
and prior research        
2.1 Introduction         20 
2.2 Origins of defensive democracy       20 
2.3 Distinguishing strategies of defensive democracy   23 
2.3.1 Party-based strategies to defend democracy   26 
2.3.2 Cultural-societal strategies to defend democracy  30 
2.3.3 Formal-legal strategies to defend democracy   36 
2.4 Conclusion          50 
 
3 Toward systematic assessment of variations between democracies  
in formal-legal democratic defensiveness: developing an analytical  
framework          
3.1 Introduction         53 
3.2 Defining and broadening the scope of formal-legal measures 54 
3.2.1 Rules on the ballot access as de facto constraint  
against non-democratic parties      57 
3.2.2 The role of electoral threshold in constraining  
non-democratic parties       59 
3.2.3 The role of rules constraining the access of  
non-democratic parties to direct state funding  62 
3.3 Developing the analytical framework: distinguishing three 
types of legal mechanisms      63 
3.4 Methodology: Coding procedure to assess variations  
in formal-legal democratic defensiveness    71 
3.5 Sources         77 
3.6 Basic rationale of the country selection     80 
4 
 
3.7 A first overview of formal-legal defensiveness between 
eight European democracies      81 
3.8 Conclusion          84 
 
4 Systematic assessment of variations between democracies 
in the presence of legal party and group ban      
4.1 Introduction         85 
4.2 Democracies with high defensiveness in the category of 
legal ban         86  
4.2.1 Legal ban in Austria      86 
4.2.2 Legal ban in France      87 
4.2.3 Legal ban in Germany      89 
4.3 Democracies with medium defensiveness in the category of 
legal ban         92 
4.3.1 Legal ban in the Netherlands     92 
4.3.2 Legal ban in Belgium      94 
4.3.3 Legal ban in the United Kingdom    95 
4.3.4 Legal ban in Denmark      97 
4.3.5 Legal ban in Sweden      98 
4.4 Evaluation of findings       98 
 
5 Systematic assessment of variations between democracies in  
the presence of freedom constraints  
5.1 Introduction         101 
5.2 Democracies with high defensiveness within the  
freedom constraints category     102 
5.2.1 Freedom constraints in Germany    103 
5.2.2 Freedom constraints in Austria     107 
5.2.3 Freedom constraints in France     110 
5.2.4 Freedom constraints in Belgium    114 
5.3 Democracies with medium defensiveness within the  
freedom constraints category     117 
5.3.1 Freedom constraints in the United Kingdom   118 
5.3.2 Freedom constraints in the Netherlands   121 
5.3.3 Freedom constraints in Denmark    124 
5 
 
5.3.4 Freedom constraints in Sweden    126 
5.4 Evaluation of findings      129 
 
6 Systematic assessment of variations in the presence of operational  
constraints 
6.1 Introduction         131 
6.2 Systematic assessment of variations across operational  
constraints         132 
6.2.1 Democracies with high defensiveness in  
operational constraints      133 
6.2.1.1 Operational constraints in Germany   133 
6.2.1.2 Operational constraints in the Netherlands  137 
6.2.1.3 Operational constraints in Austria    140 
6.2.1.4 Operational constraints in Belgium   144 
6.2.2 Democracies with medium defensiveness within  
the operational constraints category    147 
6.2.2.1 Operational constraints in the United Kingdom  147 
6.2.2.2 Operational constraints in Sweden   152 
6.2.2.3 Operational constraints in Denmark    154 
6.2.2.4 Operational constraints in France    156 
6.3 Summary of findings and conclusion: patterns of 
formal-legal democratic defensiveness     159 
 
7 Factors shaping formal-legal democratic defensiveness:  
theoretical perspectives   
7.1 Introduction         166 
7.2 Theorizing the influence of the type of democratic government   
on shaping formal-legal democratic defensiveness   169 
7.3 Theorizing the relationship between the historical experience  
with the breakdown and stability of democratic regime and  
formal-legal democratic defensiveness     176   
7.4 Comparing theoretical perspectives with the empirical findings 185 
7.4.1 Examining the role of the type of democratic government 
in shaping formal-legal democratic defensiveness  186  
7.4.2 The role of historical experience with the  
6 
 
breakdown and stability of democratic regime in shaping  
formal-legal democratic defensiveness   187 
7.5 Conclusion          189 
 
8 Case-study: why the United Kingdom has higher defensiveness  
than theoretically expected?  
8.1 Introduction         191 
8.2 British fascism and legal responses to it: advancing  
defensiveness in legal ban and freedom constraints   194 
8.2.1 Far right pro-fascist movements in Britain   194 
8.2.2 The enactment of the Public Order Act 1936:  
advancing defensiveness in group ban   196 
8.2.3 The threat of fascism in post-war Britain: advancing  
defensiveness on banning anti-racist speech   199 
8.3 The conflict in Northern Ireland (1968-1998): advancing  
on key indicators in legal ban dimension    200 
8.3.1 Political background of the conflict in Northern Ireland 201 
8.3.2 The legal response to the conflict in Northern Ireland:  
new framework for legal ban of extremist and terrorist  
groups        204 
8.4 The Miners’ strike (1984-1985): advancing democratic 
defensiveness in freedom constraints category   208 
8.4.1 The Public Order Act 1986: push for stricter laws 
for the control of assemblies and demonstrations  209 
8.5 Post-9/11 and 7/7: advancing defensiveness in operational 
constraints          211 
8.5.1 Legal response to terrorism:  
strengthening operational constraints    213 
8.6 Conclusion         217 
 
9 Conclusion         219 
9.1 Summary of the main findings and original contribution  219 
9.2 Theoretical and empirical implications     223 
9.3 Avenues for further research      226 
 
7 
 
10 Appendix          232 
11 Bibliography         241 
  
8 
 
LIST OF TABLES  
1 Giovanni Capoccia’s model of ‘defensive democracy’   25 
2 Ballot access requirements in selected democracies in Europe   58 
3 Formal electoral threshold at national level in eight European 
democracies          60 
4 Three analytical categories of formal-legal democratic defensiveness 65 
5 A systematic mapping of differences in formal-legal defensiveness  
between 8 European democracies      81 
6 Systematic assessment of variations in the category of legal ban 85 
7 Mapping democracies across freedom constraints     101 
8 Overview of configurations among democracies in the category of 
legal ban and freedom constraints       129 
9 Mapping of democracies across operational constraints    132 
10 Country configurations across three categories     159 
11 Overall pofiles of formal-legal democratic defensiveness among 
8 European democracies       161 
12 Theoretically expected level of democratic defensiveness of 
substantive and procedural democracies      173 
13 Overview of configurations of experience and nature of democratic 
breakdown among eight democracies      179 
14 Examining the relationship between the type of democratic 
government and the two main profiles of democratic defensiveness  186 
15 The relationship between the historical experience with the 
breakdown of democracy and the level of democratic defensiveness 187 
16 Core legislation in the UK increasing formal-legal defensiveness  193 
 
 
  
9 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AIVD  Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst 
BfV  Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Agency for the 
Protection of the Constitution)  
BNP    British National Party 
BUF   British Union of Fascists 
BVerfG Bundesverfassungsgericht  
Cf.  confer (Latin for ‘compare’) 
CPUSA  Communist Party of the United States of America 
DCRG  Direction Centrale des Renseignements Généraux 
DCT   Direction du la surveillance du territoire 
DKP   German Communist Party (Deutsche Kommunistische Partei) 
ECHR  European Convention on Human Rights  
ETA   Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom)  
EU   European Union 
FN  National Front (Front Nationale) 
FPÖ   Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs 
FRG   Federal Republic of Germany 
ICERD  International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
INLA  Irish National Liberation Army  
IRA Irish Republican Army 
IRSP Irish Republican Socialist Party 
LOPP  Organic Law on Political Parties  
MI5   Military Intelligence, Section 5 
MP   Member of Parliament 
NICRA Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association  
10 
 
NPD National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands) 
NSDAP  German National Socialist Workers’ Party (National-Sozialistische 
Deutsche Arbeiterpartei) 
NUM National Union of Mineworkers 
NRWO  Nationalrats-Wahlordnung,  
POA Public Order Act 
PTA Prevention of Terrorism Act 
SRP   Socialist Reich Party (Sozialistische Reichspartei)  
UKIP   United Kingdom Independence Party 
UM  Union Movement 
UMP   Union for Popular Movement 
UNO   United Nations Organization 
VB  Vlaams Belang (Flemish Affairs) 
WWII   World War Two 
 
  
11 
 
CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Introducing the problem and the research questions  
Throughout history democracies have often been the target for attacks by 
political parties and groups which profess antidemocratic values and use 
violence as one of the means to achieve their goals. During the 1930s and 
1940s, several democracies in Europe were destroyed at hands of Nazi and 
fascist political parties and movements. The most prominent example was the 
breakdown of the democratic Weimar Republic in Germany (1918-1933) which 
was destroyed shortly after the totalitarian NSDAP party led by Adolf Hitler was 
elected into the government. Having got the mandate to govern and backing in 
the parliament, the party quickly started to replace, through a series of legal 
manoeuvres, the democratic order by a totalitarian regime. After the end of 
World War II and the restoration of democratic regimes in Western Europe, the 
threat from non-democratic parties and groups did not dissipate. On the 
contrary, as documented in multiple studies, almost all democracies in Europe 
are once again threatened by an increase in electoral support and popularity for 
various right-wing extremist and populist political parties which under the cover 
of the rule of law and fundamental freedoms seek to challenge the existing 
democratic system and undermine the liberty and rights of others (Cf. Betz, 
2003: 71ff; Pedahzur & Weinberg, 2001: 52-53; Backes, 2007: 250; 
Minkenberg, 2009: 13; Jesse, 2004: 8; Smith, 2003: 72; Ignazi, 2003: 138-139). 
Although these parties are less dangerous as compared with the fascist and 
Nazi parties of interwar Europe, they still represent a formidable challenge for 
the stability and safety of democratic systems today. Their principal beliefs 
include the ethnic and social inequality between people, rejection of political and 
social pluralism as the fundamental feature of democratic states, and rejection 
of a multiparty system (Cf. Mudde, 2007: 63ff). Simultaneously, almost all 
democratic countries are challenged by various radical groups and social-
cultural milieus such as neo-Nazi groups, militant groups, racist organisations, 
and religious fundamentalist groups. Unlike political parties such groups often 
have no formal organisational structures, small membership base, and 
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frequently use violence as a means to intimidate national minorities and 
challenge public authorities (Cf. Griffin, 1999: 32; Virchow, 2004: 59; 
Minkenberg, 2009: 15).  
In light of these alarming occurrences, this study will focus on the question how 
liberal democracies defend themselves from these often violent non-democratic 
political parties and organisations. In the following I will refer to such groups as 
internal enemies of democracy as opposed to external enemies such as in the 
case of war (Cf. Capoccia, 2001: 2). What constitutes exactly the defence of 
democracy from its internal enemies is of course not straightforward and 
scholars have variously addressed this question in the past (Cf. Widfeldt, 2001: 
6). For instance, many scholars have paid considerable attention to the range of 
political strategies developed by mainstream democratic political parties within 
democratic political institutions. In essence, these strategies aim to marginalize 
non-democratic parties to minimize their chances of achieving success within 
parliament (Cf. Widfeldt, 2004; van Spanje J. & van der Brug W., 2007; Downs, 
2012). Despite the lack of strong evidence proving whether such party-based 
strategies are effective in continuously isolating non-democratic parties, the 
relevant literature has provided many valuable insights into the effectiveness 
and variable nature of these strategies.  
Another significant portion of scholarly works is devoted to the relevance and 
varieties of strategies developed by civil society and non-governmental 
organisations in defending democracy from non-democratic forces and 
tendencies in the society (Cf. Pedahzur, 2002; 2003; 2004; Husbands, 2002). 
Many scholars consider the civil society a powerful vehicle in fostering trust and 
intercultural understanding within vulnerable communities. With this related, 
there is also considerable research analysing the role of education, particularly 
so of civic and political education in defending democracies (Cf. Kamens, 1988; 
Putnam, 1994; Galston, 2001). Scholars believe education is an invaluable 
instrument for democratic governments and political institutions to foster 
democratic values in the society, particularly amongst young generations and 
those prone to the influence of extremist ideologies. 
The context within which the defence of democracy will be discussed in this 
study will be exclusively directed towards the range of formal-legal measures 
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and provisions that contemporary democracies have at their disposal to defend 
the democratic order from its internal enemies. From the late nineteenth century 
onward and particularly so after the end of World War II, all democratic 
countries in Europe adopted legal measures intended to defend their 
democratic institutions from abuse and subversion by non-democratic actors. 
As some scholars have argued, in this way liberal democracies sought to 
assure their own stability (Cf. Pedahzur & Weinberg, 2001: 53). The choice of 
focusing on the formal-legal side of defending democracy can be justified for the 
reason that unlike party-based and civil society strategies scholars have paid 
relatively little attention to the range of formal-legal measures that are available 
in contemporary democracies to counter the threat of non-democratic actors, as 
well as the distinct forms that such measures can take across democracies (Cf. 
Capoccia, 2005: 55-56; Issacharoff, 2007: 1415). Additionally, the analysis of 
formal-legal measures can expand our understanding of how democracies react 
to these threats, as well as the impact non-democratic actors can have on 
democratic systems in general (Cf. Widfeldt, 2001: 6).  
At present, the literature examining the range of legal mechanisms used in 
individual countries to defend themselves from their internal enemies is 
extensive. However, there are still many gaps in the literature that this study will 
endeavour to close. This study will in particular focus on answering the following 
three questions:  
 1. What formal-legal instruments are available in democratic states to defend 
the democratic order from political parties and groups that profess 
antidemocratic values and use violence as one of the means to achieve their 
goals?  
2. What differences and similarities exist between democracies in the extent to 
which they have such formal-legal instruments available?  
3. What broader features can help us to understand the differences between 
democracies in democratic defensiveness?  
The first question will focus on the variety of formal-legal measures that 
contemporary democracies have at their disposal to protect their democratic 
order from political parties and groups that seek to undermine it from within by 
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utilising the institutions, privileges and political freedoms granted to them in 
democratic states. There is an extensive body of literature attempting to 
investigate the range and varied implementations of such measures across 
individual countries. In this regard the research on the concept of ‘militant 
democracy’ will deserve my particular attention and draw critic later. The 
‘militant democracy’ concept was introduced during the 1930s and 1940s by two 
German exiled political scientists Karl Loewenstein and Karl Mannheim in 
reaction to sustained attacks on democratic regimes by various fascist and Nazi 
parties and movements (Cf. Loewenstein, 1937a; 1937b; 1938a; 1938b; 
Mannheim, 1945).  It was in particular Karl Loewenstein who systematically 
elaborated the theoretical framework of the concept of ‘militant democracy’ and 
classified the typology of anti-extremist legislation related to it (Cf. Loewenstein, 
1937b: 644ff; for a short summary Thiel, 2009: 400). These measures ranged 
from the legal ban of non-democratic parties to special provisions to ensure the 
loyalty of civil servants to the democratic state and the constitution. 
Fundamentally, the concept of ‘militant democracy’ emphasized the need for 
legal repression of all those who seek to exploit the democratic institutions and 
political freedoms as a “Trojan horse” to enter the democratic system and 
destroy it from within (Loewenstein, 1937a: 424). Since the conclusion of World 
War II, the concept of ‘militant democracy’ has become the main theoretical and 
empirical paradigm for scholars to study the range of formal-legal measures in 
contemporary democracies, as well as to capture the variations between 
democracies in the militancy of their legal structures (Cf. Klamt, 2007: 134; 
Bourne, 2011: 2).  
While the research on the concept of ‘militant democracy’ provides many good 
foundations, this concept is insufficient as a theoretical framework to study the 
range of formal-legal measures that contemporary democracies use to defend 
themselves from non-democratic threats as it focuses too narrowly on 
repressive instruments only. While drawing on recent literature examining the 
defensive efforts of contemporary democracies against political extremism (Cf. 
Sajo, 2004; Schellenberg, 2009; Thiel, 2009), it is evident many contemporary 
democracies use besides repressive legal measures also other subtle or non-
repressive instruments to maintain continuity (Cf. Mudde, 2004: 197; Thiel, 
2009: 383; Buis, 2009: 77). These instruments are particularly evident within 
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electoral legislation and party laws. In contrast to the instruments of militant 
democracy which were introduced solely to protect democratic institutions and 
political freedoms from abuse and subversion, these instruments were not 
intended by law-makers and governments as means to defend democracy from 
its internal enemies as such. Nevertheless, they assist in defending 
democracies de facto by imposing legal barriers that effectively constrain the 
presence and operation of non-democratic parties and groups in the political 
arena. Consequently, this study purposefully expands the focus of formal-legal 
measures and provisions beyond the conventional mechanisms of militant 
democracy toward those provisions which help defend democracy de facto 
rather than by the intention of law-makers only. In line with this, formal-legal 
democratic defensiveness as defined in this study will encompass those 
mechanisms that constrain directly or indirectly the presence and operation of 
non-democratic parties and groups in a democracy.  
In light of this, the second question highlights the differences and similarities 
between democracies in the extent to which they have such formal-legal 
mechanisms available within their legal arsenals. This question will build the 
core research question within this study. Despite many efforts in the past to 
examine the differences between democracies in terms of the defensiveness of 
their legal structures against political extremism, this question has remained 
largely understudied in the political science literature particularly so from a 
comparative perspective (Cf. Capoccia, 2001: 12). Many past efforts, 
particularly by scholars focusing on variations in militant democracy structures 
between democracies (Cf. Boventer, 1985; Canu, 1997; van Donselaar, 2004; 
Klamt, 2007; 2012; Thiel, 2009) were very unsystematic and focused only on a 
limited range of legal measures and provisions such as in particular the legal 
ban of political parties. As a consequence, the scholars did not move beyond 
implicit assumption that “democracies are always more or less militant” and 
lacked a systematic account of such variations in ‘militant democracy’ structures 
(Cf. Pfersmann, 2004: 53 (italics in original)). This study will endeavour to close 
this gap in the scholarly literature by providing an encompassing and systematic 
account of variations in formal-legal defensiveness between a range of selected 
democracies in Europe.  
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In order to account for differences in democratic defensiveness, this study will 
develop an analytical framework that will be used to assess systematically the 
cross-national variations between selected democracies in a broad range of 
formal-legal measures and provisions that are important legal instruments 
regularly used to defend democracy. To facilitate a systematic assessment of 
state variations in democratic defensiveness, this framework will focus 
exclusively on the presence of different formal-legal mechanisms (e.g. party 
ban), not the frequency of their usage. While the former is doubtlessly an 
important area of study, I believe that before accounting for patterns of usage, 
we first need to generate systematic insights into the formal-legal means that 
are available to a democracy. In line with this, the democratic defensiveness is 
defined in this thesis as the presence (not the usage) of those mechanisms that 
constrain the presence and operation of non-democratic parties and groups in a 
democracy. 
Lastly, the third question sheds light on broader factors that can help us 
understand the existing differences in democratic defensiveness between 
democracies. To date, there is little research indicating why democracies are 
different in terms of their formal-legal responses to their internal enemies (Cf. 
Downs, 2012: 53). This study will ascertain these determining factors by 
drawing on ‘historical institutionalism’ as an approach to the study of politics. 
Developed in the 1970s, historical institutionalism represents an attempt to 
illuminate how political struggles are mediated “by the institutional setting in 
which [they] take place”, whereby institutions are conceived either narrowly and 
include formal organisations or more broadly to include informal rules and 
procedures “that structure conduct” (Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 2).  
The ‘historical institutionalism’ provides a convenient lens for understanding the 
broader factors that drive democratic defensiveness. At its broadest, it can be 
assumed that a country’s democratic defensiveness is driven by a confluence of 
different historical, political, and systemic factors. Drawing on historical 
institutionalism, this study will examine two particular factors in their relation to 
democratic defensiveness, firstly the historical experience of internally triggered 
or supported breakdown of democratic regime during the 20th century and the 
importance of the type of democracy, either substantive or procedural. Both 
perspectives are compelling on theoretical grounds and have been frequently 
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cited by scholars as alternatives to explain how and why democracies react to 
their internal enemies (Cf. Fox & Nolte, 1995; Backes, 2006; Downs, 2012: 53; 
Bleich & Lambert, 2013: 127ff). The historical experience of the breakdown of 
democratic regime in the past emphasises the nature of a democracy’s 
response to its internal enemies today reflects the way whether a democracy 
was internally subverted in the past. The second perspective highlights the 
differences in the type of democratic system between democracies that can be 
substantive or procedural and how these differences influence democracies’ 
reactions to their internal enemies. The distinction between substantive and 
procedural democracies is whether governing majorities can amend the 
constitution in order to alter or eliminate democratic institutions (Cf. Fox & Nolte, 
1995: 24).  
1.2 Organization of the thesis  
To answer these three research questions posited above in a clear and 
analytical manner, the thesis is organised into 8 chapters which will be 
introduced here briefly. Within Chapter 2, the origins of the idea and the 
definition of defensive democracy will be outlined. For the purpose of this study 
I build on Capoccia’s definition of defensive democracy as a foundation for a 
detailed discussion of the defensive strategies encompassed in the concept (Cf. 
Capoccia, 2005: 47-48). Drawing on Capoccia these strategies will be broadly 
grouped into party-based, cultural-societal, and formal-legal strategies and will 
be followed by an analysis of the literature pertaining to each of them. This 
discussion will emphasise that among defensive strategies, the formal-legal 
strategy has remained relatively understudied in the political science, 
particularly so from a comparative perspective.  
Following this, Chapter 3 develops an analytical framework to study formal-legal 
defensiveness comparatively, discusses the primary sources, country case 
selection, and the methodology used in the empirical analysis. To facilitate the 
cross-national comparison of variations between democracies in democratic 
defensiveness this study will use an organisation-centred perspective on formal-
legal measures. This perspective will help to identify the range of protectionist 
legal measures as they affect non-democratic actors in their presence and 
operation in democracies, in line with the definition of formal-legal 
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defensiveness presented earlier. Having identified the range of relevant 
measures, I will then divide them in three analytical categories depending on 
the relative severity of constraints they impose on the presence and operation 
of non-democratic parties and groups. Moving from the most to the least 
constraining measures, I will distinguish legal ban, freedom constraints, and 
operational constraints. Chapter 3 will conclude by specifying the empirical 
scope of this study, which examines formal-legal defensiveness in 8 European 
democracies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The countries have been selected in light of 
two factors. Firstly, their different historical experiences of an internally triggered 
or supported breakdown of their democratic regimes in the past and, secondly, 
their differing constitutional foundations as clearly evident in the distinction 
between substantial and procedural democracy defined earlier. These two 
central features, according to the literature, shape the disposition of a 
democratic regime towards or against formal-legal defensiveness.  
The next Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are dedicated to the cross-national analysis of 
differences between democracies in individual indicators across three 
categories of formal-legal defensiveness distinguished in Chapter 3 (that is legal 
ban, freedom constraints, and operational constraints). This analysis will 
capture the formal-legal defensiveness as in place in 2013. After providing a 
clear analysis of the differences and similarities between democracies in formal-
legal democratic defensiveness, Chapter 7 will turn to the question which 
factors can further our understanding of the varying patterns of democratic 
defensiveness among selected democracies. Drawing on historical 
institutionalism as underlying approach to the study of politics of democratic 
defensiveness, this chapter will focus on the historical experience of the 
internally triggered or supported breakdown of a democratic regime in the past, 
and the type of democratic regime that is substantive or procedural in their 
relation to democratic defensiveness. While doing so, this chapter will find out 
that among two factors only the historical experience of the internally triggered 
or supported breakdown of democratic system in the past is the most significant 
factor while the type of democracy is less helpful. At the same time, it will also 
find that while internally triggered or supported democratic breakdown helps to 
understand some of the cross-national differences better, this perspective 
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cannot account for all kinds of variations between all democracies covered in 
this study. In particular, the analysis will find that in Denmark, the United 
Kingdom, and Sweden deviations exist with respect to historically grounded 
expectation of democratic defensiveness of these democracies. More 
specifically, the analysis will find a higher level of democratic defensiveness in 
the United Kingdom and Sweden than their past experiences (in that case long-
term democratic stability and continuity) would let us expect. By contrast, the 
analysis will find a lower level of democratic defensiveness in Denmark than its 
historical experience (in that case externally triggered but internally supported 
democratic breakdown) would suggest.  
Based on these findings, Chapter 8 provides a detailed analysis of the evolution 
of democratic defensiveness from the 1930s to 2013. This analysis is 
underpinned by the assumption that the formal-legal defensiveness of a 
democracy as of 2013 (which is the focus of the empirical chapters 4 to 6) can 
be partially accounted for by focusing on the over-time changes in dispositions 
toward developing defensive laws. In order to ascertain this assumption, the 
United Kingdom is selected as a case-study and a detailed analysis of the 
changes in its dispositions towards developing its defensive laws is recorded 
over-time. This chapter will particularly focus on four critical junctures in the 
history of the United Kingdom that could have a lasting effect on the country’s 
formal-legal defensiveness. Firstly, the rise of fascism in the 1930s, secondly 
the conflict in the Northern Ireland (1968-1998), thirdly the miners’ strike (1984-
1985), and fourthly the rise of radical Islamism and terrorism since the 
beginning of the 21st century. The argument presented in this chapter is the 
UK’s historically grounded expectation of low disposition toward democratic 
defensiveness (given the lack of the experience with the breakdown of 
democratic regime in the past) was overridden by spikes of political violence in 
the country’s history since 1930s which stimulated the British government to 
develop a higher level of democratic defensiveness than its long-term 
democratic continuity as such would suggest.  
The study will conclude with a summary and discussion of core findings in the 
concluding Chapter 9 and on this basis will identify avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
THE CONCEPT OF DEFENSIVE DEMOCRACY: THEORETICAL 
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will review the literature related to the problem of defending 
democracy from non-democratic parties and groups. The first section clarifies 
the definition of ‘defensive democracy’ and maps the typology of relevant 
defensive strategies related to it. This section is followed by a detailed 
description of each defensive strategy besides the formal-legal variety to give a 
broad understanding of all defensive strategies at a democracy’s disposal. The 
discussion in the chapter will emphasise that among defensive strategies the 
formal-legal strategies have received little scholarly attention.  
2.2 Origins of defensive democracy 
Numerous scholars and philosophers have discussed at length how a 
democracy can best defend itself from political forces who under the protection 
of democratic principles seek to destroy the democratic order and replace it with 
an autocratic state (Cf. Pedahzur, 2002: 2). According to Pfersmann, the origins 
of scholarly deliberation of the issues surrounding a defensive democracy can 
be traced back to “the very beginnings of the democratic theory itself” (Cf. 
Pfersmann, 2004: 47). Plato discussed at length the reasons for transitions from 
one form of government to another and the difficulties of stabilizing 
governments (Cf. Pfersmann, 2004: 47). Bleicken mentions the ancient 
democratic city-states in Greece had at their disposal special rules against 
popular tyranny, sedition and high treason (Cf. Bleicken, 1984: 389). It was 
finally Aristotle (384BC-322BC) who set the direction for the philosophical 
deliberation about the idea of defensive democracy for centuries to come (Cf. 
Backes, 1998: 7). Within his tractate Politics, Aristotle advocated for his best 
state form Politie which was the mixture of democratic and oligarchical 
principles the need for the limitation of an incumbents’ term in office and 
building of Ostrakismos or courts in Athens and Argos (Cf. Backes, 1998: 8; 
also cf. Forsdyke, 2000: 235ff). The later institution implied that undesired 
individuals were allowed to be expelled from the state for the duration of ten 
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years. A special attention was given to the “education to the constitution” (Cf. 
Backes, 1998: 9). In addition, every citizen had the opportunity to submit formal 
complaints to the people’s council against those who were entitled to make 
laws. Such complaints could be submitted either against the illegal form of a 
legal document or against the content of it (Cf. Bleicken, 1984: 390). With 
regard to the nature of the defensive provisions ancient Athens adopted, 
Bleicken concludes that “the Athenians in their efforts to protect their legal and 
political order, developed procedures which were comparable to ours” (Cf. 
Bleicken, 1984: 386 (own translation)).  
After times passed, the academic debate surrounding the problem of defending 
democracy from its internal enemies was re-invoked by the French revolution in 
the late 18th century. The French revolution inspired in people the will to get rid 
of state oppression and command. The revolution gave birth to a new worldview 
of a liberal state characterized by the guarantee of freedom of an individual from 
state suppression coupled with the guarantee of freedom of press and freedom 
of assembly. The birth of the new conception of a liberal state influenced 
concomitantly the origin of a new liberal notion of state defensiveness which 
later found its way into the new French constitution of 1791. According to 
Backes, its basic features can be summarized as based on three main pillars:  
institutional process, political process, and political culture (Cf. Backes, 1998: 
19). More specifically, the defense of the state on the institutional level entailed 
the need to mix and balance the state powers to ensure they were not again 
concentrated either in the hands of one person or an oligarchical group. This 
required for legally binding the executive government by law, constitution, and 
subjecting it to public control, and building an independent court. A special role 
in defending the liberal foundations of the revolution was attributed to the role of 
‘mass education’ (Cf. Backes, 1998: 15-21). Another important component of 
the new liberal state conception was the requirement to abolish judicial and 
police persecution of the people. This requirement was particularly important for 
the liberal thinkers who developed the new concept in reaction to the severe 
abuses of human rights by the previous autocratic regimes. Essentially, many of 
the ideas promoted by liberal thinkers after the revolution were driven by the 
ideas of the great French philosopher Charles Louis de Montesquieu (1689-
1755), who according to Peyre was the “spiritual father of the first two 
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revolutionary assemblies” (Cf. Peyre, 1949: 77). Within his main work “L’Esprit 
des Lois” published in 1748, in the famous Book XI, Chapter VI, dedicated to 
the English constitution, Montesquieu discussed at length the virtues of mixing 
powers and the existence of an independent judicial court in order to avoid 
abuse of power and dictatorship (Cf. Montesquieu, 2004: 455-457). Later, with 
the onset of the Napoleonic wars, this idea spread gradually across Europe until 
similar legislation to prevent power abuse and sedition was found within the 
constitutions of several German states as early as the 19th century (Cf. Backes, 
1998: 22). 
Despite its early origin, it was not until the 20th century that the problem of 
defensive democracy was approached in a more systematic and 
comprehensive way. The tragic experience involving the collapse of several 
democracies within interwar Europe at the hands of fascist and Nazi political 
parties and groups exploiting democratic institutions and freedoms, as well as 
the rising challenges of new threats emanating from political parties and groups 
contesting the democratic values after the end of World War II, have forced 
many scholars around the world to study how democracies can best defend 
themselves against all those who seek to destroy them from within (Cf. 
Boventer, 1985: 31ff; Pfersmann, 2004: 47).  
During the 1930s and 1940s, the idea originated which was popularized by two 
German exiled political scientists Karl Loewenstein and Karl Mannheim that 
democracies must become ‘militant democracy’ if they were to survive the 
threat of becoming extinct at hands of fascist and Nazi groups and political 
parties (Cf. Loewenstein, 1937a: 430-431; Mannheim, 1945: 7). It was in 
particular Karl Loewenstein who defined the concept of ‘militant democracy’ and 
systematically classified the legal measures associated with it (Cf. Boventer, 
1985: 40; Thiel, 2009c: 400). This new doctrine of militant democracy aimed at 
reinforcing the legislative apparatus of democratic states to facilitate the legal 
repression of the political and civil rights of internal non-democratic actors “even 
at the risk and cost of violating fundamental principles” (Loewenstein, 1937a: 
432). After the end of World War II, the doctrine of militant democracy remained 
popular among scholars as a paradigmatic concept in the study of democratic 
responses to non-democratic enemies (Cf. Klamt, 2007: 134; Bourne, 2011: 3; 
Capoccia, 2013: 210-211). Pfersmann, for example, defined militant democracy 
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as “a political and legal structure aimed at preserving democracy against those 
who want to overturn it from within or those who openly want to destroy it from 
outside by utilizing democratic institutions as well as support within the 
populations” (Pfersmann, 2004: 47).  
Besides legal repression through measures of militant democracy, alternative 
theoretical frameworks have been developed to supplement the knowledge of 
defensive democracy (Cf. Pedahzur, 2002: 3). For example, a great deal of 
scholarly research has been dedicated to the institutional strategies developed 
by mainstream democratic political parties. Unlike legal repression, the ‘party-
based’ strategies have a diametrically opposite goal of integrating non-
democratic political parties into the political process in the hope that it would 
abate their antidemocratic stance (Cf. Downs, 2001; 2012; Godmer & Kestel, 
2004; van Spanje & van der Brug, 2007; Bale e.a., 2010; van Spanje, 2010; 
Rummens & Abts, 2010). More recently, additional scholars have presented a 
new academic debate discussing the relevance of civil society as another 
important bulwark to counter the challenge of non-democratic actors within the 
society (Cf. Pedahzur, 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004). Thereby, with the term of civil 
society scholars refer to various ‘pro-democratic’ non-governmental 
organizations conducting civil education and trust-building activities within 
communities (Cf. Pedahzur, 2002: 8; 106ff). Against the background of the ever 
growing academic discourse about defensive democracy, the comparative work 
of Giovanni Capoccia deserves particular attention as it offers a more 
comprehensive and inclusive theory of defensive democracy (Cf. Capoccia, 
2001a; 2001b; 2004; 2005). His definition of “defense of democracy” will be 
used here as the working definition of defensive democracy and the starting 
point for the below discussion of defensive strategies related to it.   
2.3 Distinguishing strategies of defensive democracy 
According to Capoccia, defensive democracy can be defined as a concept that 
“encompasses all activities, be these formal provisions or political strategies, 
which are explicitly and directly aimed at protecting the democratic system from 
the threat of its internal opponents” (Capoccia, 2001: 2; 2005: 47-48, italics 
added to original). As argued by Capoccia, this definition excludes reactions 
against external enemies of democracy such as in the case of war as well as 
‘‘indirect’’ actions such as the promotion of economic development or literacy, 
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and the reactions to non-democratic actors developed by the civil society (Cf. 
Capoccia, 2005: 48). Drawing on this definition, Capoccia identified four main 
defensive strategies relevant for defending democracy against non-democratic 
groups and political parties: “militancy”, “incorporation”, “purge”, and “education” 
(Cf. Capoccia, 2005: 49). As he noted, each strategy was designed “to stem the 
development of an existing challenge, to prevent its snowballing – in short, to 
stop it from taking over the system” (Capoccia, 2005: 48).  
The first strategy which Capoccia defined ‘militancy’ encompasses all formal 
legislation that aims to curb “de juro or de facto” the political and civil rights of 
non-democratic actors on the grounds of their political ideology or activities that 
threaten the democratic order (Capoccia, 2005: 49). As detailed by Capoccia, in 
the realm of militant strategies fall specifically the passing and enactment of 
anti-extremist legislation, the administrative provisions of the same kind, as well 
as the “covert political influences of the state administration and the courts” 
(Capoccia, 2001: 4). Of all the strategies included in his theoretical framework 
of defensive democracy, Capoccia defined the militancy strategy as the most 
visible and effective government weapon in the fight against political extremism 
(Cf. Capoccia, 2005: 56).  
Capoccia’s second strategy ‘incorporation’ included those strategies used by 
established democratic parties to dissipate non-democratic ideologies by 
accepting into the regime parts of non-democratic establishment by building 
strategic alliances with them in the parliament, or making policy concessions, or 
leading negotiations with them (Cf. Capoccia, 2005: 63-64). As argued by 
Capoccia, the main goal of this strategy is to weaken the extremist camp and in 
so doing to increase the legitimacy of the democratic regime and the support for 
it (Capoccia, 2005: 49). Capoccia clearly outlines this strategy is a short-term 
solution and implemented when the enemy is real and imminent.  
The third strategy “purge” is aimed at ensuring the systemic loyalty of civil 
servants by either passing laws requiring civil servants to show support for the 
democratic order or aimed at excluding the members of non-democratic parties 
and groups from duty in civil service (Cf. Capoccia, 2005: 50-51). Capoccia 
states the main goal of these strategies is to reinforce the integrity of the state 
institutional and bureaucratic machinery (Cf. Capoccia, 2005: 50).  
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Lastly, the fourth strategy that Capoccia named ’education’ aims to strengthen 
democratic values and beliefs within society in general, and among parts of the 
population affected or exposed to extremist influence in particular (Cf. 
Capoccia, 2005: 53-54).  
Drawing on this classification, Capoccia arranged these four ‘polar’ strategies 
along two underlying dimensions on the basis of their repressive or inclusive 
nature, and the short-term or long-term range of their political objective (Cf. 
Capoccia, 2005: 48-49). Table 1 replicates the model of defensive democracy 
developed by Capoccia schematically.  
Table 1: Giovanni Capoccia’s model of ‘defensive democracy’ 
 
Source: Capoccia, 2005: 49 
Within the Capoccia’s theoretical framework of defensive democracy I am 
particularly interested in strategies which he called “militancy” and “purge” 
strategies. Both strategies fall in the rank of repressive strategies. What is 
common to the repressive strategies is that they fall in the realm of formal-legal 
rules in a sense that they are embodied in formal legislation, court rules, or 
administrative provisions and relate to legal constraints imposed on 
organizations or individuals that cannot be circumvented (Cf. Pedahzur, 2002: 
6-7; Husbands, 2002: 55; Capoccia, 2005: 56). For the purpose of this study I 
will refer to them under the term of formal-legal strategies.  
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The choice of focusing on formal-legal strategies can be justified for the reason 
that unlike other defensive strategies in Capoccia’s framework (“incorporation” 
and “education”), the formal-legal strategies have received relatively little 
attention in scholarly literature, particularly so in a comparative perspective (Cf. 
Capoccia, 2005: 55-56; Issacharoff, 2007: 1415). Capoccia noted himself that 
“very little effort has been devoted to the conceptualization and comparative 
analysis of those strategies that react to immediate threats posed to a 
democratic system by internal political actors” (Capoccia, 2005: 55-56; similarly 
Issacharoff, 2007: 1415). In particular, it is still unknown what formal-legal 
measures and provisions contemporary democracies have at their disposal to 
defend themselves against non-democratic groups and political parties that 
operate within them. As a consequence, cross-national differences and 
similarities between democracies in the extent to which they have such 
provisions available remain underexplored. Furthermore, if differences exist 
between democracies we know little about the factors that assist in expanding 
our understanding of these cross-national similarities and differences. 
These questions will be answered within the subsequent chapters. Before doing 
so, the remainder of this chapter discusses the defensive strategies related to 
the concept of defensive democracy more broadly (i.e. beyond the presence of 
formal-legal means). While using Capoccia’s typology of defensive strategies 
for the below discussion of each defensive strategy, I will expand this 
framework to include significant recent literature. For instance, framework 
strategies Capoccia has titled “incorporation” will be discussed under the 
broader term of “party-based strategies” as the range of party-based strategies 
have expanded in recent years to include strategies such as e.g. ‘cordon 
sanitaire’ (Cf. Downs, 2012: 30-31). Additionally, framework strategies 
previously termed “education” in recent literature have been frequently 
discussed in combination with activities of civil society. Therefore, I will analyze 
educational and civil society strategies under the term of “cultural-societal 
strategies”. After the discussion of party-based and cultural-societal strategies I 
will turn to the analysis of formal-legal strategies. Because formal-legal 
strategies will build my main focus in the next chapters I will discuss them at 
somewhat greater length. Furthermore, I will do so at the very end as a 
foundation for the chapters that follow. 
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2.3.1 Party-based strategies to defend democracy 
Party-based strategies have been intensively studied in previous literature. The 
key feature of party-based strategies is that they are informal in a sense that 
they are not legally binding for participating parties and short-term in terms of 
anticipated results (Cf. Capoccia, 2001: 4; Downs, 2012: 30). Drawing on the 
literature, the variety of party-based strategies can be divided into ‘isolation’, 
‘cooptation’, and ‘collaboration’ (Cf. Capoccia, 2005: 63ff; Downs, 2012: 31). 
The strategy ‘isolation’ has been extensively studied within party politics 
literature. As noted by several scholars, the main goal of this strategy consists 
in the negation and marginalization of non-democratic parties within the 
electoral or parliamentary arena through avoiding any cooperation with them, 
denying them media access, or otherwise obstructing them from gaining 
publicity and popularity in the public (Cf. Downs, 2001; 2012: 82-82; 
Swyngedouw & Ivaldi, 2001: 2-3; Bale e.a. 2010: 412ff; van Spanje & van der 
Brug, 2007; van Spanje J. 2010). Typically, this strategy transpires as a result of 
mainstream democratic parties signing an informal agreement committing to 
avoiding all contacts with such parties. Often this strategy is called “cordon 
sanitaire” named after the French term first used by the mainstream political 
parties in Belgium to describe the efforts of the major five Flemish parties in 
1989 to isolate the members of the right-wing extremist Vlaams Blok party from 
any involvement in the political process (Cf. Bleich & Lambert, 2013: 133)1. 
Backes and Jesse examined the effects of the cordon sanitaire strategy in 
Germany where it was frequently applied by mainstream democratic parties 
against two right-wing extremist parties The Republikaner and the National 
Democratic Party (NPD) (Cf. Backes & Jesse, 1989, Vol. II: 254-263). Eatwell 
also analyzed the cordon sanitaire strategy as it was frequently used by UK’s 
major democratic parties against the United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP) and the British National Party (BNP), the two main right-wing extremist 
parties in the country which are notorious for their anti-immigrant propaganda 
(Cf. Eatwell, 2010: 218-220). Additionally, Happold examined the effects of 
cordon sanitaire strategy within the European Union. In 2000, fourteen member-
states of the EU decided to withdraw its diplomatic representatives from Austria 
                                                          
1
 The party Vlaams Blok led at the time by Karel Dillen was notorious for its anti-Belgian and 
anti-EU sentiments, anti-racist propaganda, and anti-establishment propaganda (Cf. Ishiyama & 
Breuning, 1998: 109ff). 
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as a sign of protest against the election of the right-wing extremist Freedom 
Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) into government after 
the parliamentary elections in October 1999 (Cf. Happold, 2000: 954ff).  
The tactic of isolation or “cordon sanitaire” is not always widely adopted. 
Studies have revealed that some countries with established democratic political 
parties have instead engaged directly or indirectly with parties whose ideologies 
are considered outside the mainstream. As such, engagement strategies have a 
diametrically different goal of forcing parties to give up their opposition to 
democratic principles and become moderate through driving integration (Cf. 
Downs, 2001; Bale et. al., 2010: 415). As discussed at length by Downs and 
other scholars, such engagement could be either in form of building strategic 
alliances with extremist parties (collaboration) or mainstream parties adopting 
the policy issues which traditionally belonged to non-democratic political parties 
(co-optation) (Cf. Bale et al. 2010; Downs, 2012: 44-45). For example, while 
cordon sanitaire is consistently applied against non-democratic parties in 
Germany or the United Kingdom, it is not applied at all or not persistently in 
Italy, Austria, or the Netherlands. In Italy, for example, the party of Lega Nord 
formed in 1991 and which promoted the idea of separating the northern part of 
the country from the south was surprisingly treated as a mainstream party by 
conservative parties. The leader of this party Umberto Bossi was the Minister 
for Federal Reform within Silvio Berlusconi’s government from 2008 to 2011. In 
Austria, the Freedom Party of Austria had often sided with other mainstream 
parties in the federal government. For example, from 2001 to 2007 the Freedom 
Party filled six out of ten ministries including defence and justice (Cf. Pelinka, 
2009: 45)2. Similarly in the Netherlands, the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de 
Vrijheid) led by Geert Wilders was involved in the efforts of building a coalition 
with mainstream parties after this party became the third largest after the 
parliamentary elections of 2010 (Cf. Mock, 2010).  
Recent literature has raised the question of why some democracies ostracise 
their non-democratic counterparts, while other democracies seek to create 
strategic alliances with them (Cf. van Spanje, 2010; Bleich & Lambert, 2013). 
Several explanations have been offered to account for such differences 
                                                          
2
 It can be a coincidence that in this period there were no penal cases brought forward against 
members of radical right in Austria (Cf. Pelinka, 2009: 45). 
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between democracies. One explanation used the fundamental reason for a 
democracy to defend itself as a way of distinguishing these differences. The 
main argument is democracies must be kept safe from parties with 
reprehensible ideologies (Cf. van Spanje, 2010: 357). The legal repression, 
which will be the main focus later, represents then the most extreme option that 
democratic parties would choose if the tactic of institutional out-casting of non-
democratic parties from political process turns out to be ineffective (Cf. 
Capoccia, 2005: 55-56; Minkenberg, 2006: 26). Another argument presented 
recently by van Spanje pointed out the importance of the size and the main 
political agenda of a political party in question as the principal motivational 
factor for mainstream democratic parties to decide what approach they will 
choose towards deviant political parties (Cf. van Spanje, 2010: 355). According 
to van Spanje, if the party’s size is insignificant and its ideological position on 
issues such as immigration is more radical, it is more likely that such party will 
be ostracized or boycotted by main political parties (Cf. van Spanje, 2010: 362). 
By contrast, the more powerful a party is and the less reprehensible its 
ideology, the more likely other parties will collaborate with it (Cf. van Spanje, 
2010: 362). As noted by Capoccia and other scholars, conservative parties 
which Capoccia termed as “border parties” in a sense that their strategic 
positions are closer to extremist parties, are more likely to forge alliances with 
the later parties in the attempt to maximize the electoral gain or regain their lost 
electorate (Cf. Capoccia, 2004: 89; also Godmer & Kestel, 2004: 134; Schain, 
2006: 273; Green-Pederson et al., 2010: 421). In particular, with regard to 
immigration and economic welfare policies, conservative parties are considered 
much closer or adjacent to non-democratic parties than other democratic 
parties. Other scholars investigated the role of historical experience with the 
collapse of democratic systems in the past for determining the factors that 
contribute to defensive actions brought against non-democratic parties in the 
future. Art, for example, raised the contrasting experience with the collapse of 
the democracy in the past in Germany and Austria as building grounds for 
tolerance by Austria’s main political parties towards the Freedom Party of 
Austria on the one hand, and for outright rejection of any engagement with the 
far right parties in Germany on the other (Cf. Art, 2006; 2007: 338).   
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Another important question raised by scholars is whether cooperation with non-
democratic actors is more useful in terms of defending democracy than their 
exclusion from the political process. Generally scholars tend to emphasize that 
results vary between the political contexts. For example, while in Belgium the 
practice of maximum exclusion of the Vlaams Blok party from the political 
process was relatively successful and consistently applied, the same strategy 
applied against non-democratic parties in the Netherlands and Austria was not 
successful. According to Art, the exclusion of non-democratic parties from 
cooperation in whatever form can lead to the de-legitimization of these parties in 
the eyes of core and potential voters and in the long-term perspective to their 
internal decay because of problems to recruit new members (Cf. Art, 2007: 
335). On the other hand, however, the tactic of exclusion can also result in 
increased radicalization of an affected party’s members. For example, as noted 
by Art, the strategy of ostracism pursued by mainstream democratic parties in 
Germany against the NPD has resulted in further radicalization of its party 
members. Similar observation was made in a larger study conducted by van 
Spanje and van der Brug (Cf. van Spanje & van der Brug, 2007; also Downs, 
2012: 81). Both scholars used the results of the European Election Studies’ 
data from 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004 to conclude that “the extent to which anti-
immigration parties were excluded from “normal politics” turns out to have a 
strong, positive impact on party radicalisation” (van Spanje & van der Brug, 
2007: 1033). Among ostracised political parties examined by these scholars 
were Vlaams Belang, the National Front (both in Belgium), the Republikaner in 
Germany, Centre Democrats in the Netherlands and the National Front in 
France. The authors made the conclusion that ostracised parties show the 
tendency to be “frozen” into political extremism. By contrast, the authors found 
that ‘co-optation’ was more likely to result in a moderation of non-democratic 
parties. They made this conclusion through examining the effects of ‘co-
optation’ pursued by mainstream democratic parties toward Lega Nord in Italy, 
the Freedom Party in Austria, the People’s Party in Denmark, and the Progress 
Party in Sweden.   
2.3.2 Cultural-societal strategies to defend democracy  
Both education and political culture are recognized as important foundations for 
a stable democracy (Cf. Dewey, 1915 [2004]). It is believed that in a country 
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with a strong democratic political culture, non-democratic groups should 
experience less support from citizens and consequently should pose less of a 
threat to democracies. Many scholars have underlined that all liberal 
democracies depend on the citizens’ acknowledgement. How the citizens 
perceive the state, its institutions and its political elites is commonly viewed as a 
crucial factor for sustaining and safeguarding democracy. Almond and Verba 
referred to such attitudes as the political culture, which is a product of aggregate 
historical experiences, economic and political structure (Cf. Verba & Almond, 
1989: 16). Consequently every nation has its own individual political culture. By 
the time of the first publication of their study in 1963, the authors attested that 
only the Anglo-American nations have democratically “fit” political culture which 
they termed “civic culture”. All other nations examined in the study were inferior 
with less democratically-fit political cultures. The ‘worst’ among them were the 
Germans and Italians who a decade after the end of the World War II still 
employed attitudes and orientations “unfitting” democratic systems. At the same 
time, Almond and Verba also demonstrated that political culture could be 
significantly attributed to the level of education in a nation. Their study states 
the collapse of many democracies in interwar Europe could be powerfully 
associated with the lack of proper training among citizens in democratic values 
and principles. This conclusion largely resonates with the observation made 
earlier by Mannheim, who was one of the proponents of mass education in 
democratic societies. In his much acclaimed sociological tractate “Crisis of our 
times” he noted with regard to the collapse of first democracies that:  
“[a]lthough the causes leading to their collapse were very complex and the defects of the 
modern economic and political order were primarily to blame, no one can deny that the lack of 
mental resistance played a very large part of this breakdown. Not only was the educational 
system in those countries still unfitted for mass education, but the psychological processes at 
work outside the school were left without any real social control, and so, of necessity, led to 
chaos and disintegration” (Mannheim, 1945: 73). 
The research conducted over the last decades has confirmed the conclusion 
made in the book of Mannheim. Many scholars support his thesis that the 
support for democracy and acceptance of democratic principles and values 
increases with the level of education within the society (Cf. Duch & Gibson, 
1992: 252ff; Galston, 2001; Johnson et al., 2005).  Similarly, it has been argued 
the roots of political extremism and the level of popular support for extremist 
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ideas and movements is manifested significantly more so among social groups 
which have lower degree of education (Cf. Betz, 1994; Knutsen, 2004: Ch.5).  
With regard to education particular role is assigned to political and civic 
education. It is believed that political education can represent a powerful tool for 
instilling democratic values into citizens (Cf. Verba & Almond, 1989: 106). The 
term political education refers to a complex of state supported educational 
programs conducted and organized mostly at schools and higher education 
institutions but also in military and civil service with the principal goal of creating 
democratic awareness among citizens (Cf. Frazer, 2000: 89). Since the end of 
World War II, the subject of civic education has become a constitutive part of 
school curriculum in many western democracies although with different timing 
for its introduction (Cf. Judith et al., 1999; Capoccia, 2005: 53). Germany, for 
instance, embarked on political education as early as by the mid-1950s. The 
plan to introduce political education in the classroom built a constitutive part of 
‘de-Nazification’ program which was launched by victorious Allied forces in 1945 
(Cf. Capoccia, 2005: 53). After the strategy to purge from office all German 
officials who were known members or collaborators of the Nazi party proved 
insufficient and difficult to implement and besides resulted in public outcry, the 
German government was prompted to refocus its efforts on educational 
strategies instead to increase awareness within the nation of evils of anti-
Semitism, racism, and Nazism (Cf. Weiss, 1994: 909). The plan included 
changes in grade school and adult education curricula. In addition the 
government provided special training to teachers and leaders of youth 
organizations, and relocated funds for publishing brochures and other teaching 
aides for classroom lessons. Outside the classroom, the government created in 
the mid-1960s public displays of sites at former concentration camps (Cf. 
Weiss, 1994: 909). In other countries, political education became a key part of 
their education curriculum at a relatively later stage. In the United Kingdom, for 
example, the “citizenship education”, the official name of political education in 
this county, did not become a matter of national policy until 2002. One powerful 
reason for such a belated start is believed to be the pervasive antipathy among 
authorities both in politics and education to government interference in 
education (Cf. Frazer, 2000: 97ff). On the other hand, the decentralized feature 
of British schools in the last century and the specific attitude toward the idea of 
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citizenship also made it difficult to promulgate political education much earlier 
and on a broad scale (Cf. Frazer, 2000: 98; McLaughlin, 2000). 
The subjects particularly relevant to raising democratically minded citizens that 
are not inclined to support non-democratic ideas and thus non-democratic 
groups vary between nations. As scholars demonstrated, the relevant subjects 
of political education are very much predicated on the principal goals of political 
education in each country. In Germany the goal of political education is 
“constitutional patriotism” and is officially mandated by state authorities. The 
belief is quite strong among educators in Germany that only through fostering 
appreciation of democratic order can the state effectively protect itself from the 
threat of totalitarianism (Cf. Canu, 1996: 105). More specifically, the political 
education in Germany takes place through critical analysis of the Nazi period 
(Geschichtsaufklaerung) and the time under the Communist rule (East 
Germany) and the importance of democratic order today. In 2002, a new 
educational program was launched “Learn and Live Democracy” which ran until 
2007. The program was implemented by the federal and state governments to 
encourage young people to participate actively in civil society by democratising 
education and school life (Cf. Schellenberg, 2009: 221). In France, since Jules 
Ferry3 in the Third Republic schools have been developing their pupils in light of 
“esprit républicain” (Cf. Canu, 1996). In the United Kingdom, the principal goals 
of political education are social and moral responsibility, community involvement 
and political literacy (Cf. Frazer, 2000: 89ff).  
However, beyond scholarly appraisal of civic education for raising 
democratically minded citizens, there are many critical opinions also. One 
critical opinion discusses the importance of a comprehensive educational 
strategy to fight against radicalism. Acknowledging the growth of right-wing 
inspired violence and intolerance toward foreign citizens across European 
cities, Pelinka has argued in support of the introduction of special courses into 
school curricula that are directed against racism, xenophobia, and anti-
Semitism (Cf. Pelinka, 2009: 46). Such courses could assist in destroying the 
stereotypes of “otherness” that is widely observed among European citizens. 
                                                          
3
 According to the entry in the Wikipedia, Jules François Ferry (1832-1893) was the French 
statesman and republican. He was French prime-minister for two times (1883-1885) and 1880-
1881. 
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Such need for a common educational strategy has been recognized within the 
European Union. In 1993, the Council of Europe established the European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), the racism watchdog 
within the European Union. ECRI consists of independent experts and has 
recommended to each of its 47 member states to introduce subjects 
specializing in teaching human rights (Cf. Pelinka, 2009: 53).  
Another criticism which has been frequently raised concerns the learning 
outcomes of educational courses. Even though the outcomes differ from country 
to country, the general view among scholars is the learning outcomes from 
educational programs often fall short. A number of empirical studies found that 
the level of democratic tolerance remained below expectations, particularly so 
for those who used to be involved in extremist activities and movements. 
According to Husbands, one common explanation for this negative result is that 
the targeted groups are “too alienated to be easily retrievable through such 
means” (Husbands, 2002: 65).  
As a solution to this problem, several democracies in Europe have launched 
special programs for those who were previously affiliated with non-democratic 
groups. In many Scandinavian countries, for example, the EXIT Program was 
established for members of extreme right-wing organizations to help these 
people disengage from their organisations (Cf. Dechese, 2011: 289; general 
discussion in Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013: 99-115). Similar exit programs for former 
members of extreme right-wing organisations have been set up across 
Germany by both civil society organisations and the government. In 2000, the 
initiative “EXIT-Deutschland“ was launched with the support of the Amadeo 
Foundation and the Freudenberg Foundation, the two largest non-governmental 
organizations engaged in the area of educating and informing citizens about the 
risks of intolerance, to support former members of extreme right-wing 
organisations (Cf. Schellenberg, 2009). A similar program called “Aussteiger 
Programm” (getting-out program) was introduced in 2001 by the government of 
Gerhard Schröder which sought to provide financial incentives for conducting 
community service for those who wanted to escape the extreme right-wing 
milieu (Cf. Husbands, 2002: 65-66).  
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Furthermore, a growing number of scholars have argued that educational 
strategies must be complemented and accompanied with social strategies and 
social control outside schools (Cf. Carothers & Barndt, 1999-2000: 28-29). In 
line with this argument, a particular role is attributed to the civil society in 
instilling democratic norms and values within the society. With civil society 
scholars refer to voluntary organizations engaged in facilitation of educational 
and intercultural programs among different groups of society, particularly so 
among those who are endangered or affected by extremist views. The popular 
argument is civil society organizations make an invaluable contribution to 
strengthening the democratic foundation within society, promote peaceful 
coexistence among populations of different national, ethnic or religious 
backgrounds, foster tolerance and social and religious pluralism, and defend the 
rights of minorities (Cf. Pedahzur, 2003: 64-65). Pedahzur called such groups 
as “pro-democratic civil society” (Cf. Pedahzur, 2003: 64). 
There are three particular areas where civil society organisations have been 
particularly successful in assisting state authorities to combat extremist 
tendencies within the society. Firstly, the area of ‘education for democracy’ 
which encompasses the promotion and organization of educational programs 
and initiatives with the goal of instilling democratic values, norms and 
expectations, such as intercultural tolerance among both youths and adults, has 
been widely successful. In a number of European democracies, for example, 
there are numerous non-governmental organizations engaged in campaigns 
which promote tolerance within their society. In Belgium, the NGO Hand in 
Hand founded in 1992 is the most important civil society organisation in the 
Flemish part of the country engaging in the organisation of public campaigns in 
support of cordon sanitaire, and protection of democracy, and equal rights for all 
citizens in the country (Cf. Swyngedouw, 2009). A similar organization exists in 
the French speaking part of the country (Waloon) with the Movement against 
Racism, Antisemitism, and Xenophobia (Movement contre le racisme, 
l’antisémitisme et la xénophobie, MRAX). MRAX monitors racist acts, analyses 
complaints, observes political parties and the mass media, organizes 
conferences, debates, meetings and engages in the promotion of campaigns in 
support of diversity (Cf. Swyngedouw, 2009). In Austria, the Documentary 
Center of the Austrian Resistance (Dokumentationsarchiv des Österreichischen 
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Widerstandes) (DOEW) founded in 1963 by former members of resistance 
movements against Nazism, also offers educational programmes about Nazism 
and its atrocities in the country during the World War II, as well as public 
exhibitions (Cf. Pelinka, 2009). In France, the non-governmental organization 
the Ligue internationale contre le racisme et l’antisémitisme (LICRA) founded as 
early as 1926 has branches across many countries in Europe and is well known 
for offering educational programmes to those worst affected by racist violence 
and discrimination on the ground of racial, ethnic and religious differences. 
The second area where civil society organisations have been particularly 
successful in defending democracy is in developing initiatives and activities 
within the community. These efforts include offering aid to the victims of right-
wing inspired violence or intimidation, fundraising in favor of social programs 
against extreme right, and so forth (Cf. Pedahzur, 2003: 67ff). To give an 
example, the non-governmental organization called Hope not Hate in the United 
Kingdom is known for local campaigning, working within communities 
endangered by racist violence, empowering communities, but also campaigning 
against the British National Party in cities and towns known for the support of 
this party (Cf. Husbands, 2002; Eatwell, 2010).  
Finally, the third area of activity where civil society organizations have been 
successful includes the monitoring and juridical litigation against groups 
promoting hatred and violence within communities in an effort to stem their 
growth and popularity. A number of non-governmental organizations, 
particularly in the USA and increasingly so in Europe also, have been active in 
this area. 
2.3.3 Formal-legal strategies to defend democracy    
The final dimension of defensive democracy, which will build the main focus of 
this study, has been broadly named ‘formal-legal strategies’. This dimension 
includes all strategies in Capoccia’s framework of defensive democracy that are 
embodied in state constitutions and other legal acts and designed to defend a 
democratic state from its enemies by imposing de facto and de juro constraints 
on their activities and presence in the political arena (Cf. Capoccia, 2005: 49-
50). As stressed by Capoccia and other scholars, among defensive strategies 
the formal-legal strategy has remained relatively understudied subject in the 
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political science, particularly so from a comparative perspective (Cf. Capoccia, 
2005: 56; Issacharoff, 2007: 1415). In particular, little is known regarding the 
range of formal-legal measures that are at the disposal of contemporary 
democracies to protect democratic institutions and freedoms from non-
democratic parties and groups and, more importantly, the differences between 
democracies in terms of their formal-legal democratic defensiveness.    
As discussed previously, the concept of militant democracy has been the main 
theoretical and empirical framework among scholars to conceptualize the range 
of formal-legal measures that contemporary democracies employ in fight 
against non-democratic threats as well as to capture the state variations 
between them in terms of the militancy of their legal structures (Cf. Husbands, 
2002: 52; Capoccia, 2005: 56; Minkenberg, 2006: 27; Klamt, 2007: 134; Thiel, 
2009c: 398; Bourne, 2011: 2; Capoccia, 2013: 209-210). As mentioned earlier, 
the concept of militant democracy was introduced by two German scholars Karl 
Loewenstein and Karl Mannheim during the 1930s and 1940s (Loewenstein, 
1937a, 1937b; 1938a, 1938b; Mannheim, 1945). It was in particular Karl 
Loewenstein4 who systematically elaborated the concept of militant democracy 
and defined the range of legal measures related to it (Cf. Boventer, 1985: 40; 
Thiel, 2009c: 400). Having himself first-hand experience from the collapse of the 
Weimar democracy in Germany (Cf. Boventer, 1985: 36ff; Simard, 2012: 169ff.; 
Loewenberg, 2006: 599ff), Loewenstein criticized the principle of constitutional 
legality that the Weimar Republic (1918-1933) was founded on. The principle of 
constitutional legality implied that all political forces, irrespective of their political 
ideology, had an equal chance to participate in the political process and only 
voters were to decide through elections which political parties are represented 
in the government. According to Loewenstein, it was this principle which 
“opened the way to power for Adolf Hitler” (Cf. Loewenstein, 1937a: 427). The 
solution advocated by Loewenstein was democracies should become a “militant 
democracy” if they are to survive the challenge presented by political parties 
and groups which seek to destroy them from within by utilising democratic 
                                                          
4
 Karl Loewenstein was a professor of comparative constitutional law at the University of Munich 
before he fled from Nazis to the United States in 1933 where he became the Professor of 
Jurisprudence and Political Science at Amherst College (Massachusetts). Between 1946 and 
1947 he served for a short time as an advisor to the military administration in the American zone 
in occupied Germany. See on Loewenstein’s personality and his contribution to the 
development of comparative politics and notably so to the discussion on militant democracy in: 
Boventer, 1985: 37ff; Simard, 2012: 169ff; Loewenberg, 2006: 599ff.  
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institutions and political freedoms. To become a militant democracy, 
democracies had to adopt a legal bulwark in form of special anti-extremist 
legislation aimed to protect democratic institutions and restrict the political 
freedoms of non-democratic actors. As emphasized by Loewenstein, “fire is 
fought with fire” and democracies should not hesitate to restrain the political and 
civil rights of their enemies “even at the risk and cost of violating fundamental 
principles” (Loewenstein, 1937a: 432). Besides setting out the theoretical 
contours of the new concept, Loewenstein’s research has provided exceptional 
insight through systematically identifying and describing the typology of anti-
extremist legislation required to create a sustainable militant democracy. These 
measures ranged from a legal ban of non-democratic parties to special rules 
against subversive propaganda (Cf. Loewenstein, 1937b: 644-656; also 
Loewenstein, 1938a: 596ff; Loewenstein: 1938b; for a brief summary see Thiel, 
2009c: 400)5. 
After the end of the World War II, the concept of militant democracy has 
become the main theoretical and empirical framework in the study of democratic 
responses to the problem of political extremism (Cf. Klamt, 2007: 134; Bourne, 
2011: 2; Capoccia, 2013: 210ff). While doing so, scholars have mainly focused 
on the range of repressive measures which were outlined by Loewenstein in his 
typology of anti-extremist legislation. There is a growing body of literature, 
reviewed below, focusing on the measures and provisions of militant democracy 
in individual countries thus providing some important insights into variations 
between contemporary democracies.  
There are numerous case-studies addressing the variations between 
democracies in the enforcement of legal ban of political parties and groups 
                                                          
5
 This list contained the following fourteen legal measures and provisions: legislation against 
high treason and other seditious acts; legal ban of subversive movements; legislation against 
formation of paramilitary organizations and the wearing of uniforms; legislation against 
formation of private party militias and military bands; legislation against the wearing of weapons; 
legislation to protect democratic institutions from acts of malignant criticism and “insidious 
attacks”; legislation against inciting hatred against national minorities; legislation restricting the 
freedom of assembly; legislation protecting democratic institutions and leading personalities 
against defamation and libel; legislation against glorification of political crimes; legislation 
against political activities of members of armed forces and police as well as legislation 
protecting democratic armed forces against infiltration by subversive propaganda; legislation 
against political activities of civil servants; legislation on police surveillance of anti-democratic 
activities and movements; legislation against foreign publications of extremist character and 
political activities of members of foreign countries which are inimical to democracy (Cf. 
Loewenstein, 1937b: 644-656; see also Loewenstein, 1938a; 1938b).  
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which were found unconstitutional or violating the law (Cf. Finn, 2001; 
Issacharoff, 2007; Rosenblum, 2007; Bale, 2007; Navot, 2008; Niesen, 2012; 
Gerlach, 2012). According to scholars legal ban represents the most repressive 
provision of militant democracy (Cf. Loewenstein, 1937b: 645; Capoccia, 2005: 
59; 2013: 213; Downs, 2012: 38). Downs noted that a legal ban is a 
“democracy’s last card” which is used only when all other legal measures are 
proven futile (Cf. Downs, 2012: 38-39). Typically, the legal decision to ban a 
party or group is followed by further prohibitions upon the organisation including 
closure of offices, seizure of assets, demonstrations and meetings in public, and 
prohibition of any reorganisation in the future (Cf. Bourne, 2012: 4; Bourne & 
Casal, 2014: 3).  
 
Among individual countries, there are numerous studies dedicated to Germany 
where in the past two political parties were banned: the Socialist Reich Party 
(Sozialistische Reichspartei, SRP) in 1952 on the ground of party’s close 
association with the NSDAP party of Adolf Hitler, and the German Communist 
Party (Deutsche Kommunistische Partei, DKP) in 1956 on the suspicion of the 
party’s close links with the Soviet Communist Party (Cf. Franz, 1982: 59-62; 
Backes & Jesse, 1989, Vol. 2: 282, 287; Wise, 1998: 302-303; Jesse, 2001). 
The ban of these two parties became the subject of many scholarly debates, 
particularly so among German scholars. The focus of these debates was mainly 
the question whether the legal ban was an appropriate legal measure in a 
democracy to deal with its enemies. Thereby, while the ban of the SRP caused 
fewer objections among scholars, it was in particular the decision to ban the 
DKP that caused many discussions. Most scholars doubted the usefulness of 
the legal ban against the DKP which was in fact a small and electorally 
insignificant political party (Cf. Backes & Jesse, 1998: Volume 3: 287-288). The 
recent attempt to ban the right-wing extremist National Democratic Party of 
Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD), which failed on 
procedural grounds in 20036, has led to another resurgence of scholarly interest 
                                                          
6
 According to Minkenberg, the government’s documentation of the NPD’s unconstitutional 
nature relied partially on data that was gathered by informants who worked secretly for the 
Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) which 
is the government agency set up in 1951 to monitor non-democratic groups and political parties 
in the country. Because the agency refused to disclose the identity of its informants the court 
could not decide whether the gathered information about anti-constitutional character of the 
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in the use of party ban legislation in and outside Germany (Jesse, 2001; 
Minkenberg, 2006; Bale, 2007).  
 
Another significant portion of studies is dedicated to the question whether legal 
ban is an effective tool to deal with democracy’s enemies. After analysing 
various party bans in Germany and France, Minkenberg, for example, 
concluded the bans “have not resulted in a lasting debilitation of organizations 
across the radical-right spectrum. Instead, it provokes various organizational 
efforts and new strategies in order to prevent or avoid a ban, or to survive it” 
(Minkenberg, 2006: 41). Furthermore, Bale stated in his insightful analysis of 
party bans in Turkey, Belgium, and Spain that arguments of the futility of party 
bans are not “borne out in reality” (Cf. Bale, 2007: 143). According to Bale, 
“firstly, bans saw no accentuation of threat apparently posed to secular liberal 
democracy by the parties affected, whether it be religious, violent or racist. 
Secondly, those parties did not simply carry on as before. Thirdly, bans did not 
seem to undermine positive democratic development and achievements that 
took place prior to them coming into force” (Bale, 2007: 155).  
 
Recently, further studies have attempted to produce a comparison of party ban 
legislation across different countries (Franz, 1982; Gordon, 1986-1987). 
Gordon, for example, compared the party bans of the United States during the 
McCarthy era7 when it was first introduced through the Communist Control Act 
of 1954, with party bans in Germany. He found that the party ban rule in the US 
was rather narrow in its scope because it only targeted the Communist Party 
(CPUSA) while in Germany the phrasing of the party ban legislation was far 
more comprehensive giving the democratic government power to target all 
political parties irrespective of their political orientation or behavior provided 
they were declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court under 
Article 21(2) of the Basic Law (Cf. Gordon, 1986-1987: 377ff; also Franz, 1982: 
67-68; Kremnitzer, 2004: 161ff; Michael & Minkenberg, 2007; Navot, 2008: 
754ff).  
                                                                                                                                                                          
party was based on genuine party decisions or were supplied by the secret services in an 
attempt to facilitate the ban (Cf. Minkenberg, 2006: 25). 
7
 The term of “McCarthy era” or for short “McCarthyism” refers to Joseph Raymond McCarthy 
who was the Republican Senator in the US Congress. His name is often associated with 
hundreds of unfounded accusations of many US citizens of being the members and spying on 
behalf of the Communist Party (Cf. Gibson, 2008: 96).   
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Besides Germany and the United States, party bans within Spain have also 
been extensively studied. In this country  more than dozen political parties have 
been banned since 2003 when the Spanish government adopted the new 
Organic Law on Political Parties (LOPP) which allows the Supreme Court to ban 
those political parties which are engaged in or support terrorism (Cf. Sawyer, 
2002-2003: 1543ff; Turano, 2003: 733; Comella, 2004; Tardi, 2004: 97; Cram, 
2008; Bourne, 2010: 3-5; Bourne, 2011: 16-17; Bourne, 2012: 3-4). Additionally, 
Brems reconstructed the decision of the Ghent court in Belgium in 2004 to ban 
the Vlaams Blok party (Flemish bloc) for its persistent violation of the anti-racist 
law (Brems, 2006; also Erk, 2005). Because Vlaams Blok party proceeded to 
reincarnate itself within three months to become the Vlaams Belang (Flemish 
Affairs) party, positing itself as more moderate party, although widely believed 
to have the same political and ideological stance, Erk critically denounced this 
legislation as ineffective (Cf. Erk, 2005: 497-498). Other high-profile cases of 
party bans include studies surrounding Israel (Navot, 2008), Turkey (Macklem, 
2006; 2010), and new democracies in Eastern Europe (Brunner, 2002; Niesen, 
2002; 2010; Sajó, 2004; Bourne, 2012; Niesen, 2012). Several academic 
contributions also analysed party bans implemented outside Europe in Rwanda, 
Iraq, or South African Republic (Basedau et.al., 2007; Kemmerzell, 2010; 
Niesen, 2012).  
 
Given the number of party bans across democracies, numerous recent studies 
have attempted to create typologies of legal bans. Rosenblum, for example, 
identified four different grounds for the enactment of party bans common in 
democratic states: the association with violence, the incitement of hate, the 
existential threat to the state’s national identity, and support by a foreign power 
(Cf. Rosenblum, 2007: 43-71). Navot observed a number of democracies have 
widened their legal grounds for enactment of a party ban to include the support 
of terrorism (Cf. Navot, 2008: 748; 754-756). In his turn, Issacharof argued that 
these parties are mostly insurrectional, separatist, or antidemocratic 
majoritarian parties which are frequently banned in democracies (Cf. 
Issacharoff, 2007: 1430-1431). Fennema noted in his analysis of anti-racist 
legislation, several democracies in Europe have shifted their legal motives for 
banning political parties. During the immediate post-war era, political parties 
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were predominantly banned on the ground of their affiliation with fascist or Nazi 
parties, whereas today political parties are more frequently banned on the 
grounds of racial discrimination (Cf. Fennema, 2000: 127; also Bleich, 2011: 
Ch.5). On the other hand, Sajó noted, post-communist and transition states are 
more likely to have party ban legislation than established democracies (Cf. 
Sajó, 2004: 213ff; also Bourne, 2012: 5ff; Niesen, 2012: 553ff). As noted by 
Bourne, “new democracies face particular problems which make the option of 
proscribing a political party more compelling” (Bourne, 2012: 6). 
 
While variations in legal bans have been extensively studied, the variations 
between democracies in the enforcement of other mechanisms of militant 
democracy have remained relatively underinvestigated. In 1972 the German 
government adopted the ‘radicals’ decree’ (“Radikalenerlass”) which sought to 
improve regulations governing the political loyalty of civil servants as well as to 
keep members of non-democratic parties and groups out of duty in civil service. 
This event spurred the interest of many scholars in this provision (Cf. Capoccia, 
2013: 212). However, the bulk of such studies were single–case studies while 
there are only a few comparative works. Most of the single case-studies are 
dedicated to Germany where the measure originated first (Cf. Brinkman, 1983; 
Monson, 1984: 301-324; Kvistad, 1988: 95-125). According to Brinkmann, the 
duty of civil servants in Germany to demonstrate political loyalty to the state and 
constitution has existed at least since the end of the eighteenth century and was 
always regarded as a “traditional and binding principle of the professional civil 
service” in Germany (Cf. Brinkmann, 1983: 587; also Rudolf, 2003: 212ff). In his 
turn Rudolf argued that in Germany’s past, the duty of civil servants to abide by 
their state and the constitution was always diminished in its value by the fact 
that such duty was bound to the personal duty of civil servants to support either 
the monarch during the time of monarchy or the Führer during the Third Reich 
(Cf. Rudolf, 2003: 213ff). Rudolf states a genuine duty to demonstrate strong 
loyalty to the democratic constitution and its principles was first introduced in 
Germany during the Weimar Republic in 1922 (Cf. Rudolf, 2003: 214; cf. also 
Leggewie & Meier, 1995: 182ff). The new law demanded its civil servants to 
stand up for “the republican state form and leave all activities which do not 
conform with the status of a civil servant” (Cit. in Rudolf, 2003: 214). However, 
Rudolf asserted that the loyalty of civil servants in the Weimar Republic was 
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“not active” in a sense that the civil servants were not obligated to stand up for 
the state form and its constitution “all the time”, including outside the office (Cf. 
Rudolf, 2003: 214). 
 
A number of scholars have analysed the efficacy of the legislation. Monson, for 
example, argued that the ‘radicals decree’ was less effective because it was 
bias towards members of the Communist Party as opposed to the members of 
the right-wing extremist parties (Cf. Monson, 1984: 305). In addition to single-
case studies there are a few comparative studies analysing the differences in 
the regulation of civil service across democracies. An earlier study edited by 
Böckenförde et al. described the legal basis of employment in civil service 
across several countries including the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia 
(Böckenförde et al., 1981). He discovered that among countries, Germany was 
an isolated case in terms of strictness of its regulation toward employment of 
non-democratic actors in civil service (Cf. Böckenförde e.a., 1981: 49). By 
contrast, the laws of other countries, in particular in the United Kingdom, 
France, and Italy were “less open and less conspicuous” (Cf. Böckenförde e.a., 
1981: 38; similarly Brinkmann, 1983: 587). A recent study edited by Neuhold 
provides an up-to-date account of the delicate balance between civil service 
and politics (Neuhold et al., 2013). However, this study does not approach the 
problem from the point of view of defending democracy from political extremists 
in civil service. Lastly, the monograph of Art analysed a broader range of factors 
that affect the internal cohesion of right-wing extremist parties in democracies. 
Among them he also identified the legislation in keeping extremist out of civil 
service duty and argued within several case-studies that expelling members of 
non-democratic organisations from civil service can effectively dampen the 
chances of non-democratic parties to effectively recruit new members as the 
public will be aware of the professional and social risks in joining such parties 
(Cf. Art, 2011: Ch.3).  
 
A number of studies have also analysed state variations in the regulation of 
anti-racist legislation (Bird, 2000; Rosenfeld, 2002-2003; Bleich, 2011; Bleich & 
Lambert, 2013). Most countries in Europe adopted such legislation during the 
1960s and 1970s following the adoption of the United Nations International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) in 
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1965 (Cf. Fennema, 2000: 129; Skenderovich, 2010: 43; Bleich, 2011: 19ff; 
Bleich & Lambert, 2013: 138-139). Further studies have discovered that in the 
United States anti-discrimination propaganda is given wide constitutional 
protection while in other Western democracies it is largely prohibited and 
subjected to criminal sanctions (Cf. Appleman, 1995-1996: 425ff; Rosenfeld, 
2002-2003: 1529ff; Bleich, 2011: Ch.5; Michael & Minkenberg, 2011: 1110). 
The substantial differences between democracies in Europe and the USA is 
typically attributed to different experiences with the continuity of political 
freedoms, as the United States has been suffessfully steady whilst Western 
Europe democracies suffered a violent disruption of these freedoms and the 
upsurge of hatred toward minorities during the 1930 and 1940s (Cf. Bird, 2000: 
403ff; Oberndörfer, 2000: 237-246; Michael & Minkenberg, 2007: 1120; Backes, 
2006: 279ff). Bleich, for example, stated “[i]n the United States it is legal to have 
racist opinions; it is legal to say racist things; and it is legal to be motivated by 
racist opinions when acting to burn a cross or form a racist organization when 
those actions are seen to be intimately related to expressing an opinion” 
(Bleich, 2011: 110). 
In addition to numerous case-studies analysing variations across individual 
provisions of militant democracy, there is a number of descriptive case-studies 
examining the broader spectrum of militant democracy measures in individual 
countries (Backes & Jesse, 1989; Leggewie & Meier, 1995; Thiel, 2003; Jesse, 
2008b). However, the bulk of such case-studies are dedicated to Germany 
while the majority of other countries have remained relatively neglected. 
Typically, Germany is considered the “prototype of militant democracy” (Cf. 
Boventer, 1985: 80). As noted by many scholars, the drafters of the post-war 
German democratic state were explicit in their wish to implement the militant 
democracy doctrine in the state’s new constitutional framework. Much of the 
legal legislation originally mentioned by Loewenstein, such as the legal ban of 
political parties (article 21(2)), or the legal ban of violent groups (Article 9(2)), or 
the forfeiture of democratic rights if they are used to undermine or destroy the 
‘free basic democratic order’ (Article 18), have found a prominent place within 
the German post-war constitution, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). The current 
German state is officially termed “streitbare” or “wehrhafte Demokratie” (literally 
translated as “fortified democracy”) which is the equivalent of “militant 
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democracy”8 in German (Cf. Jesse, 2008b: 318; Schellenberg, 2009: 194; Thiel, 
2009: 117ff; Müller, 2012: 1260).  
While Germany’s model of militant democracy has been extensively analysed 
within militant democracy literature, the repertoire of militant democracy of other 
European democracies has found relatively little scholarly attention. According 
to Capoccia, one reason for such neglect is the concept of militant democracy is 
relatively foreign for many other countries outside Germany (Cf. Capoccia, 
2013: 210). For instance, in France there is still no equivalent word for the term 
of “militant democracy” (Cf. Buis, 2009: 76)9. In the United States the term of 
“militant democracy” was absent from constitutional discourse for the most 
period of time before the collapse of the Soviet Union (Cf. Tushnet, 2009: 357). 
In the United Kingdom, only few lawyers were acquainted with the term of 
“militant democracy” in the past (Cf. Mullender, 2009: 311). It is only recently, 
most likely triggered by the rise of new challenges since the beginning of the 
new millennium (Cf. Capoccia, 2013: 210), that scholars started paying more 
attention to the legal arsenals used in other democracies against non-
democratic parties and groups. From earlier works, the study of Boventer was 
the first attempt to compare the repertoire of militant democracy structures in 
the United States and France with the arsenal of legal mechanisms in Germany 
(Boventer, 1985: Ch. 3, 4, and 5). Another notable study by Canu focused on 
the differences and similarities of legal mechanisms of militant democracy in 
France and Germany (Canu, 1997: Ch. 2). While Boventer analysed tools of 
militant democracy in state constitutions, Canu provided an encompassing 
analysis of legal mechanisms preserved in both state constitutions and penal 
codes of the two countries. Widfeldt, analysed the range of legal mechanisms 
used in Sweden to support their fight against far right parties and groups 
(Widfeldt, 2001; 2004). He described the approach of Swedish authorities 
toward right-wing extremist parties and groups as a ‘diversified approach’: while 
state authorities were relatively lenient toward right-wing extremist parties such 
                                                          
8
 The expression of “wehrhafte Demokratie” or “streitbare Demokratie” was first used by the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany in its ruling banning the Socialist Reich Party 
(Sozialistische Reichspartei, SRP) in 1952. The word derives from the German translation of 
militant democracy used in the work of Karl Mannheim ‘Diagnosis of Our Time’ (Cf. Mannheim, 
1945: 7). 
9
 Buis, for example, noted that the French adjective “militante” refers to the basis of the structure 
of political parties. Thus, the term “démocratie militante” would mean a democracy ruled by 
activists. See: Buis, 2009: 76.   
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as the New Democracy, they resorted more frequently to repressive measures 
when acting against the neo-Nazi groups and movements (Cf. Widfeldt, 2004: 
155ff). Furthermore, the monograph of Pedahzur provided an excellent analysis 
of the broad range of defensive measures and strategies employed in Israel to 
counter the Jewish right-wing extremism (Pedahzur, 2002). The edited study of 
Dumont et al. in French language reconstructed the full range of militant 
democracy measures and provisions that Belgium employed against, as they 
called them, “les groupements liberticides” (‘freedom-abusing/threatening 
groups’) (Dumont et al., 2000). As noted by Velaers and other authors, in 
Belgium the relevance of militant democracy mechanisms has become 
particularly acute with the resurgence of extreme right-wing parties in the Dutch-
speaking part of the country after the end of World War II (Cf. Velaers, 2000: 
319; Gérard, 2000: 85). In addition, the edited book of Thiel has provided an 
encompassing analysis of militant democracy measures and institutions in 
sixteen countries (Thiel, 2009a). Thiel used the German model of militant 
democracy to address the question “whether Germany is an ‘isolated case’ or if 
other democracies could be qualified as militant as well” (Thiel, 2009a: 3). He 
concluded the countries studied within his book demonstrate a wide diversity of 
arrangements “regarding the problem of democratic self-defense” (Thiel, 2009c: 
382). Finally, the most recent book of Klamt in German language examined 
differences in militant democracy structures between twenty-seven EU member-
states plus Turkey (Klamt, 2012).     
Despite the fact that the research on militant democracy has expanded to 
include multiple countries, this previous research must be criticised in several 
respects. First, the vast research on militant democracy must be criticized for 
having a limited focus of legal measures and provisions that are relevant for 
defending a democracy. As the preceding analysis made clear, scholars of 
militant democracy have tended to focus on repressive legal instruments only, 
such as the legal ban of political parties. Although these studies build a good 
foundation, it should be noted that contemporary democracies use many other 
non-repressive measures to counter the threat of non-democratic parties and 
groups within their political systems besides the repressive measures 
extensively discussed. Several scholars have raised this criticism (Cf. Mudde, 
2004: 197; Buis, 2009: 77; Thiel, 2009: 383). Mudde, for example, stressed that 
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“there are many ‘anti-extremist’ measures that are more subtle, although 
nonetheless effective” (Mudde, 2004: 197). Buis also stated in her analysis of 
the range of defensive provisions used in France against democracy’s enemies 
“that list (the list of legal measures compiled by Karl Loewenstein, S.B.) is a 
useful tool to circumscribe possible measures but insufficient to investigate the 
actual French way of coping with dangers. The banning of uniforms or a training 
of a political police were possibly effective in the interwar Europe but seem to 
be outdated or unsuitable in the context of the Fifth Republic” (Buis, 2009: 77). 
Thiel also emphasized that the list of repressive measures in Loewenstein’s 
typology of anti-extremist legislation “naturally is dated and roots in a historical 
situation completely different from the present” (Thiel, 2009: 401).  
Simultaneously, scholars stressed the importance of other legal tools for 
defending democracy which were originally not mentioned in Loewenstein’s 
typology of anti-extremist legislation. Kremnitzer, for example, in his account of 
militant democracy provisions in Israel pointed out the importance of the rule on 
base of which political parties which negate the state of Israel, incite racism, or 
otherwise engage in illegal activities can be denied a formal registration for 
elections. According to Kremnitzer, the legal basis for this provision is supplied 
in Article 5 of the Israeli Party Law from 1992 (Cf. Kremnitzer, 2004: 166; also 
Pedahzur, 2002: 58). On base of this legislation, the Socialist List was excluded 
from running in parliamentary elections in 1965. The rule is still applied against 
parties built by Arab communities exploiting in turn their sense of frustration with 
the Israeli state and its democracy (Cf. Kremnitzer, 2004: 166). As noted by 
Kremnitzer, this legislation builds an important barrier protecting the Israeli 
democracy from hostile parties and movements (Cf. Kremnitzer, 2004: 160). 
Additionally, Brunner also reported the presence of a similar legislation within a 
number of post-communist democracies in Eastern and Central Europe where 
Communist Parties are formally denied the right to register for running in 
parliamentary elections (Cf. Brunner, 2002: 22-25). Bourne also noted that in 
Spain political parties may be suspended from running in elections if they 
violate the requirement “to respect the Constitution and the law” and are not 
“democratic in their internal structure and functioning”. On base of this 
provision, a political party may be suspended from participating in elections for 
3 years before a permanent ban is ruled against it (Cf. Bourne, 2011: 12-13; 
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see also Tardi, 2004: 98-99). The regulation in Canada introduced in 1993 is of 
a different nature, demanding political parties to field at least 50 candidates 
within each of its 295 constituencies in order to be registered for elections (Cf. 
Tardi, 2004: 96). This legislation was originally introduced to prevent the 
Communist Party from entering the election race, and was recently considered 
controversial among political parties in Canada leading to its abolishment in 
2004 by the Supreme Court as it contradicted the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. Now only one candidate is required for parties to field within 
each constituency in order to be eligible for election. Finally, van Donselaar and 
Wagenaar specified that the state authorities in the Netherlands use other legal 
remedies besides legal instruments of militant democracy, such as those 
enshrined in the Elections Act (Cf. van Donselaar & Wagenaar, 2009: 391). The 
relevant legislation includes the formal requirement for political parties to file a 
certain amount of signatures in support of their nominees. The authors stated 
that this provision plays an important role in preventing non-democratic parties 
in successfully placing their candidates during elections and thus helps defend 
democracy indirectly (Cf. van Donselaar & Wagenaar, 2009: 396). As argued by 
scholars, “[f]or many decades, it has been difficult for radical right-wing parties 
to collect these signatures because, in doing so, supporters come out publicly 
as party adherents” (van Donselaar & Wagenaar, 2009: 396).  
In addition, the previous research on militant democracy must be criticised for 
failing to provide an encompassing and systematic assessment of differences 
and similarities between democracies in terms of formal-legal defensiveness. 
Indeed, despite many scholarly efforts to study variations between democracies 
in terms of ‘militancy’ of their legal structures (see e.g. works of Boventer, 1985; 
Klamt, 2007; 2012; Jesse, 2008a; Thiel, 2009) scholars have not moved beyond 
implicit assumption that democracies are “always more or less militant” 
(Pfersmann, 2004: 53) italics in original)) without providing a more systematic 
account of such variations. Therefore, we still know little about variations 
between democracies in terms of the defensiveness of their legal structures 
whilst taking stock of a broader range of legal measures and provisions which 
are relevant for defending democracy. In part this omission has occurred due to 
the absence of an analytical framework that could be used to assess 
systematically the differences and similarities between democracies and the 
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defensiveness of their legal structures. This shall be illustrated below using two 
well-known analytical frameworks used by scholars to analyse state variations 
between democracies in the militancy of their legal structures in the past.   
The first such framework is the ‘lineal model’ proposed by Pfersmann (Cf. 
Pfersmann, 2004: 53ff). Using Loewenstein’s original concept of militant 
democracy, Pfersmann placed “open democracy” as an “ideal type” at the one 
end of the scale. The open democracy was defined by him as “a legal system in 
which the addressees participate in the production of the general norms by 
majoritarian decisions, directly or through the election of representatives in 
charge of enacting such general rule” (Cf. Pfersmann, 2004: 53). Well aware 
that this kind of democracy was “legally contingent on the democratic stances of 
the majority” and thus risked being easily abolished if a majority was not willing 
to maintain it, Pfersmann added that all democracies have at their disposal 
“normative legal obstacles to abolishing democratic government” (Cf. 
Pfersmann, 2004: 55). Thereby, he distinguished between “direct” obstacles, 
those “that prohibit actions against democracy under the threat of sanctions as 
well as those that impose obligations to identify anti-democratic action in a 
preventive way or to promote pro-democratic beliefs and attitudes”, and “indirect 
or higher-order obstacles”, those that prevent a modification of democratic rule 
in order to abolish the democratic state (Cf. Pfersmann, 2004: 56). Thus 
defined, he concluded all democracies are more or less militant “according to 
the intensity of the first- and higher-order obstacles” (Pfersmann, 2004: 56 
(italics added). Overall, Pfersmann’s classification framework allows readers to 
comprehend the militancy of democratic states in terms of gradation from high 
to low intensity (Cf. Thiel, 2009: 396). However, the disadvantage of 
Pfersmann’s classification framework is it does not provide a clear criterion to 
distinguish between direct and indirect obstacles. Therefore, his model is 
difficult to operationalize for conducting a systematic assessment of cross-
national variations in formal-legal defensiveness between democracies (Cf. 
Thiel, 2009: 398).  
An alternative classification framework was introduced by Jesse (Cf. Jesse, 
2008a). Using the German model of militant democracy, Jesse proposed three 
general categories to test militancy of a democracy: the normative orientation of 
political system (“Wertgebundenheit”), the will to protect the superior norms 
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(“Abwehrbereitschaft”), and the degree of anticipation of measures of protection 
(“Vorverlagerung”) (Cf. Jesse, 2008a: 342-343; translation of categories taken 
from Buis, 2009: 77). On base of the first two criteria (that is, the normative 
orientation toward superior norms in the constitution and the will to protect 
them) that he defined as the key categories, Jesse developed four main 
variants to assess a country’s degree of democratic defensiveness 
(“Demokratieschutz”). The first variant describes a democracy with a strong 
disposition toward both the normative orientation and the will to protect resulting 
in the most defensive democracy possible. As noted by Jesse, Germany 
belongs to this type of democracy (Cf. Jesse, 2008a: 354). The second variant 
is a democracy with a strong disposition toward normative orientation but no will 
to protect superior norms. According to Jesse, the examples for this type of 
defensive democracy include Spain, Portugal, and Greece (Cf. Jesse, 2008a: 
347). The third variant is a democracy with no disposition toward normative 
orientation but with a strong will to protect superior norms. The examples for 
this type of a defensive democracy can include most democracies in Eastern 
and Central Europe. Lastly, the fourth variant is a democracy which has neither 
normative orientation nor the will to protect superior norms, resulting in the least 
defensive democracy possible (Cf. Jesse, 2008a: 343). Among democracies in 
Europe, Jesse ascribed the United Kingdom and Nordic democracies in 
Scandinavia to this type of a defensive democracy. Overall, Jesse’s model is 
more useful as it provides a framework better suited for conducting a wider 
comparison (Cf. Buis, 2009: 77). However, the disadvantage of Jesse’ 
classification framework is similar to that of Pfersmann’s framework as it is 
difficult to operationalize. For example, the model of Jesse does not take in 
account that even if democracies do not acknowledge normative orientation in 
their constitution, this should not automatically imply they are less defensive 
against their enemies, notably so if they have party banning legislation.  
2.4 Conclusion  
Liberal democracies know a wide range of defensive strategies to protect 
themselves from non-democratic groups and political parties that threaten them 
from within. This chapter has introduced the concept of defensive democracy 
and discussed the relevant literature related to the broader spectrum of 
defensive strategies comprised within this concept, broadly circumscribed as 
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party-based, cultural-societal and formal-legal strategies. The critical discussion 
of these three strategies has revealed some important conclusions relevant to 
the further development of this thesis. First, among defensive strategies the 
formal-legal strategies represent the most effective in defending democratic 
institutions and values against non-democratic threats. However, despite their 
importance the problem of defending democracies using legal measures has 
remained relatively understudied within the political science. As previously 
argued, while there is significant knowledge surrounding party-based and 
cultural-societal strategies available, there is scarce evidence verifying the 
range and the distinct forms of those formal-legal measures and provisions that 
contemporary democracies have at their disposal to counter the threat of non-
democratic groups and political parties.  
This chapter has emphasized the concept of militant democracy, which has 
been the main paradigmatic concept in the study of democratic responses to 
democracy’s enemies, is no longer sufficient as a theoretical and empirical 
framework to study both the range of legal mechanisms contemporary 
democracies employ against non-democratic parties and groups and is 
ineffective in capturing the variations between them in terms of formal-legal 
democratic defensiveness. First, it was argued the concept of militant 
democracy focuses too narrowly on repressive legal instruments only, while 
contemporary democracies use many other, non-repressive instruments also. 
Thus, in order to generate a plausible assessment of state variations in formal-
legal democratic defensiveness, a broader focus must be adopted by looking 
beyond the conventional arsenal of measures of militant democracy. Second, it 
was argued comparative scholars studying the differences between 
democracies in the militancy of their legal structures have failed to provide an 
encompassing and systematic assessment of variations between democracies 
in terms of the formal-legal democratic defensiveness. This issue has partially 
arisen because scholars relied on analytical frameworks which were not suited 
to developing a systematic assessment of state variations in formal-legal 
defensiveness. This chapter illustrated this issue using two well known 
analytical frameworks developed by Pfersmann and Jesse. Although these 
previous analytical frameworks provide good foundations, they suffer 
weaknesses as they do not provide clear-cut criteria to systematically define 
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which democracy is more or less defensive. I believe these are the questions 
where the previous research on militant democracy can be fruitfully expanded. 
Considering these gaps in the literature, the remainder of this dissertation will 
endeavor to provide an encompassing and systematic assessment of state 
variations in terms of the degree of formal-legal democratic defensiveness. As 
the first step, the next chapter turns to the task of developing an analytical 
framework that will be used for a cross-national assessment of differences and 
similarities in formal-legal democratic defensiveness between a range of 
European democracies.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
TOWARD SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF VARIATIONS 
BETWEEN DEMOCRACIES IN FORMAL-LEGAL DEMOCRATIC 
DEFENSIVENESS: DEVELOPING AN ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK  
3.1 Introduction 
The main goal of this dissertation is to provide a systematic assessment of 
differences and similarities in formal-legal democratic defensiveness between 
eight European democracies. The previous chapter discussing the literature 
surrounding formal-legal strategies has made clear that prior research into 
militant democracy has failed to provide an encompassing and systematic 
assessment of state variations in democratic responses to non-democratic 
parties and groups (Cf. Pfersmann, 2004: 53). The purpose of this chapter is to 
provide an analytical framework to assist in identifying and mapping the 
differences between democracies in formal-legal democratic defensiveness 
which is defined as the presence (not the usage) of those mechanisms that 
constrain the presence and operation of non-democratic parties and groups in a 
democracy. This chapter is organised as follows. The first section will outline 
which formal-legal measures will be included or excluded from the comparative 
assessment. Using the organisation-centred perspective on formal-legal 
measures as a starting point, I will expand the focus of formal-legal measures 
beyond the conventional measures of militant democracy countering so the 
criticism often expressed toward the concept of militant democracy that it is 
focused too narrowly on the repressive instruments while unduly overlooking 
the non-repressive mechanisms democracies adopt to defend themselves from 
non-democratic parties and groups. On this basis, the second section will 
develop an analytical framework that would enable me to comparatively assess 
the differences in formal-legal defensiveness between the democracies 
selected, while focusing on a broader spectrum of formal-legal measures. Using 
the organisation-centred perspective on formal-legal measures as an underlying 
approach I will divide the broad spectrum of formal-legal measures and 
provisions into three analytical categories depending on the severity of 
constraints they impose on the presence and operation of non-democratic 
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parties and groups in a democracy: legal bans, freedom constraints and 
operational constraints. The remainder of this chapter will introduce the 
methodology underpinning the empirical analysis to follow in subsequent 
chapters, discusses the selection of country-case studies and primary and 
secondary sources used to measure variations. The chapter will conclude with a 
first overview of variations in formal-legal defensiveness between eight 
democracies covered in this study.  
3.2 Defining and broadening the scope of formal-legal 
measures  
Before I move on to present my analytical framework to study formal-legal 
democratic defensiveness, it is necessary to firstly address the question what 
formal-legal measures shall be included or excluded from my comparative 
analysis. As discussed within the previous chapter, the concept of militant 
democracy was the former main theoretical framework used to determine the 
range of defensive rules and provisions employed by democracies to counter 
their internal threats whereby researchers focused on the key propositions of 
anti-extremist legislation, which was systematically elaborated by Karl 
Loewenstein during the 1930s (see for details the previous chapter) (Cf. 
Capoccia, 2005: 56; Klamt, 2007: 135; Bourne, 2011: 2). While the typology of 
anti-extremist legislation of Loewenstein is useful as it proposes a 
comprehensive list of legislative measures and provisions against non-
democratic parties and groups, it was noted that Loewenstein’s typology of anti-
extremist legislation has been criticised by several scholars for being insufficient 
as a theoretical framework to analyse the broader spectrum of formal-legal 
measures that are available in contemporary democracies to counter their 
internal enemies (Cf. Capoccia, 2005: 62; Thiel, 2009: 400: Buis, 2009: 77). As 
mentioned earlier, one frequent point of criticism was that defending democracy 
is not confined to repressive legal instruments of militant democracy only and 
can also include many other, more subtle or non-repressive instruments as well 
(Cf. Pedahzur, 2004: 109; Mudde, 2004: 197; Thiel, 2009: 387; van Donselaar 
& Wagenaar, 2009: 391; Rummens & Abts, 2010: 651ff). 
In line with this critic it is important that we first define the categories of formal-
legal measures that will be included in the comparative analysis of differences 
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in formal-legal defensiveness between the selected democracies. To facilitate 
the selection of relevant formal-legal measures this chapter will use the 
organisation-centred perspective on formal-legal measures, which is derived 
from previous research focusing on the cross-national differences in the legal 
regulation of voluntary organisations such as non-governmental organisations, 
interest groups, non-profit organisations, and other civil society organisations 
(Cf. van Biezen, 2012; Bloodhood et al., 2013; Bolleyer et al., 2013: 243ff; 
Bolleyer & Skirmuntt, 2014). The organisation-centred perspective starts out 
from the proposition to look at legal regulations from the perspective of the 
constraining effect they impose on the presence and operation of voluntary 
organisations within democracies (Cf. Bolleyer & Skirmuntt, 2014: 6). For 
instance, Bolleyer and Skirmuntt used this approach to establish variations 
between 18 advanced democracies to ascertain if they have enabling or 
constraining regulatory frameworks toward three types of voluntary 
organisations such as political parties, non-profit organisations, and public-
benefit organisations (e.g. charities) (Cf. Bolleyer & Skirmuntt, 2014). 
The principal advantage of using the organisation-centred perspective on 
formal-legal measures is that it permits to look at formal-legal measures which 
are applicable for defending democracy not primarily from the point of view 
whether they belong to militant democracy’s arsenal or not, but from the 
perspective of the constraining effect they impose on the presence and 
operation of non-democratic parties and groups within a democratic system. In 
other words, a formal-legal measure is defensive if it formally constraints the 
presence and operation of non-democratic groups and political parties in a 
democracy. Thus, using the organisation-centred perspective the focus of 
formal-legal measures as applicable for constraining the non-democratic parties 
and groups in their presence and operation in a democratic system would 
include not only militant democracy mechanisms which were intended by law-
makers to defend democratic institutions and freedoms from non-democratic 
threats but also those which were not intended to be defensive but help defend 
democracies de facto by putting operational constraints on non-democratic 
parties and groups10. In line with this, formal-legal democratic defensiveness is 
                                                          
10
 To give an example, looking from the organisation-centred perspective the electoral threshold 
is defensive because it constraints the presence of non-democratic parties by making it difficult 
for them to obtain a representation in the parliament. While doing so the electoral threshold, 
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defined within this thesis as a concept that encompasses not only those legal 
mechanisms of militant democracy that interfere directly with political rights and 
freedoms of non-democratic parties and groups but also those legal measures 
that help defend democracy de facto by constraining the presence and 
operation of non-democratic groups and political parties in a democracy. In the 
following I will refer to the range of such relevant instruments as de facto 
constraints.  
What formal-legal measures and provisions can be defined as relevant de facto 
constraints? While we are already familiar with the range of militant democracy 
measures and provisions, in what follows I introduce and systematically 
describe the range of relevant de facto constraints that will be included in my 
analytical framework. Drawing on a careful examination of literature focusing on 
legal barriers in electoral systems (Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Adebi, 2004: Ch. 
4; Norris, 2005: 83ff; Carter, 2002: 127-137; 2005: 147-197; Arzheimer & 
Carter, 2006) the range of relevant de facto constraints can be identified in the 
electoral laws and party finance laws of democratic countries. Electoral laws 
refer broadly to a set of laws that govern political parties and elections in 
democratic states (Cf. Mozaffar & Schedler, 2002: 7; Janda, 2005: 4; Karvonen, 
2007: 438). Party finance laws refer to statutory laws governing the funding of 
political parties (Cf. Janda, 2005: 5; van Biezen, 2012: 194). Drawing on 
previous literature, the following legal measures and provisions have been 
identified as relevant de facto constraints: the special rules for ballot access 
(such as collecting voter signatures and paying electoral deposit), the electoral 
threshold, and special rules governing the access of non-democratic parties to 
direct state funding (Cf. Fisichella, 1984: 183ff; Adebi, 2004; 90-91; Norris, 
2005: 83; Carter, 2005: 148ff; van Donselaar & Wagenaar, 2009: 391; 
Swyngedouw, 2009: 71). Before discussing each mechanism in greater detail, it 
is important to stress that most of these legal rules were introduced for other 
purposes than defending democracy and were not intended as defensive by 
law-makers and governments. For instance, the electoral threshold was 
originally introduced to prevent party system fragmentation and government 
instability (Cf. Boix, 1999: 614; Carter, 2002: 131-132). Similarly, the ballot 
                                                                                                                                                                          
particularly if it is high, helps defend democracy de facto. For more discussion of electoral 
threshold and how it helps defend democracy de facto see Section 3.2.2.  
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access rules were introduced to bring more order to the electoral market (Cf. 
Norris, 2005: 83). However, in reality and this is what some scholars have 
pointed out in their analyses, these mechanisms represent important indirect 
constraints on the presence and operation of non-democratic parties in a 
democratic system by making it impossible or more problematic for such parties 
to enter political institutions or making them the access to the financial 
resources more problematic or contingent on specific requirements such as 
showing commitment to democratic principles. While doing so, and so is my 
argument here, these measures help defend democracy de facto.  
Drawing on these insights, the following sections will now give greater detail of 
the range of selected de facto constraints. These sections will elaborate on the 
question how these measures, even though not necessarily introduced with the 
purpose of fighting or weakening non-democratic groups or parties, de facto 
constrain their presence and operation in a democracy, in line with my 
conceptualization of formal-legal democratic defensiveness presented earlier. 
3.2.1 Rules on the ballot access as de facto constraint against 
non-democratic parties       
The recent literature on electoral systems and how they shape the competition 
of political parties in democracies has revealed the formal rules regulating the 
nomination and registration of candidacies of political parties for parliamentary 
elections can represent formidable barriers for non-democratic parties to 
successfully place their candidates on ballot lists thus constraining their 
presence and operation on the political arena (Cf. Norris, 2005: 87; Carter, 
2005: 163ff). Two types of ballot access requirements tend to be particularly 
common in contemporary democracies:  the payment of an official deposit prior 
to election, and the collection of a certain number of valid signatures per 
candidate or party list (Cf. Massicotte et. al., 2004: 61-64; Abedi, 2004: 92ff; 
Norris, 2005: 89; Carter, 2005: 163; Downs, 2012: 34-35). Table 2 reflects the 
extent to which the eight European democracies studied in this thesis use these 
two types of ballot access requirements discussed.  
Table 2: Ballot access requirements in selected democracies in Europe  
Country  Collection of signatures  Payment of deposit 
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Austria Yes  No  
Belgium Yes  No  
Denmark Yes  No  
France No  No  
Germany Yes  No  
Netherlands Yes  Yes  
Sweden No  No  
United Kingdom Yes  Yes  
Source: Information of the ballot access requirements was compiled using the data from the 
website of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) PARLINE database on national parliaments at: 
http://www.ipu.org/parline/ parlinesearch.asp  (accessed 02.11.2013).   
According to table 2 the majority of democracies studied in this thesis compel 
their political parties to either file a certain number of signatures in support of 
their nominees or to pay a monetary deposit in order to appear on the ballot list. 
France and Sweden are the only democracies that do not adopt either ballot 
access requirement. As detailed in greater detail later, the remaining 
democracies differ in terms of the amount of deposit political parties are 
required to pay or the amount of signatures they are required to collect before 
they appear on the ballot (Cf. Norris, 2005: 89-90). Whatever the differences 
between democracies in the use of these two requirements, it was frequently 
argued by scholars that both the requirement to collect signatures or to pay 
monetary deposit can represent formidable challenges for many non-democratic 
political parties to cope with (Cf. Carter, 2005: 163; Norris, 2005: 83; van 
Donselaar & Wagenaar, 2009: 396). Each requirement can convert a non-
democratic party’s participation in an electoral race into a very costly endeavour 
(Cf. Carter, 2005: 167; Norris, 2005: 89). The principal reason for this is the fact 
that most non-democratic political parties tend to have a relatively small 
membership base, implying they have less financial resources, and are usually 
less popular among voters as compared with established democratic political 
parties (Cf. Betz, 1994; Carter, 2005: 167; Ignazi, 2006). Therefore, it should be 
particularly difficult for them to cope with such requirements. For example, 
collecting signatures is often a costly process and higher signature 
requirements imply that larger funds are required to collect them (Cf. Stratmann, 
2005: 62; Carter, 2005: 167; Bischoff, 2006: 68). Focusing on right-wing 
extremist parties, Carter argued ballot access rules are very important in that 
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they either encourage or discourage such political parties to present their 
candidates in all districts. While doing so, the ballot access rules can 
significantly impact on the overall right-wing extremist party vote (Cf. Carter, 
2005: 163).  
Besides limited resources, another barrier for non-democratic parties appears 
as voters are often hesitant to put their signatures in support of a political party 
which is known for its malignant ideology or violent actions. Often, in order to 
submit their lists with signatures political parties are required to enclose the 
personal information about their signatories such as the full address, voter 
registration number, social security number, and workplace to verify the 
signatures are real. These formalities often scare potential voters away. For 
example, van Donselaar and Wagenaar stated with regard to the Netherlands’ 
current requirement for political parties to submit at least 30 signatures in each 
of its 19 constituencies that “[f]or many decades, it has been difficult for radical 
right-wing parties to collect these signatures because, in doing so, supporters 
come out publicly as party adherents” (van Donselaar & Wagenaar, 2009: 396; 
see also Bernard & Kaufmann, 2013). Similar arguments have been presented 
with regard to the requirement for political parties to pay a monetary deposit. As 
noted by scholars, the need to pay a deposit can make it difficult for non-
democratic parties to participate in the election and thus helps reduce the 
presence of unwanted candidates in the electoral race (Cf. Stratmann, 2005: 
63).  
To summarise, ballot access rules represent important indirect constraints on 
the presence and operation of non-democratic parties within a democracy by 
making their access to the political institutions more costly and demanding. 
While doing so they help defend democracies de facto.  
3.2.2 The role of electoral threshold in constraining non-
democratic parties   
In addition to special ballot access rules, a significant number of scholars have 
discussed electoral threshold as another important de facto constraint on non-
democratic political parties, since high thresholds prevent the latter from 
entering parliament. The term of electoral or legal threshold refers to the 
minimum percentage of votes that a party or a group participating in an election 
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needs to obtain in order to secure a seat in the legislature (Cf. Carter, 2005: 
148; Norris: 2005: 119). This constraint has been clearly used since the 
conclusion of World War II, at first as a strategic weapon in the hands of ruling 
parties to maintain and maximize their representation in the parliament, while 
recently becoming a broader strategy for mainstream political parties either to 
hinder non-democratic political parties from entering the political system or 
otherwise to isolate them from the political process (Cf. Boix, 1999: 614ff). The 
legal thresholds of the eight democracies studied within this thesis are detailed 
within Table 3 below. 
Table 3: Formal electoral threshold at national level in eight European 
democracies  
Country  Legal threshold 
Austria 4% 
Belgium 5% 
Denmark 2% 
France 12.5%  
Germany 5% 
Netherlands 0.67% 
Sweden 4% 
United Kingdom No legal threshold  
Source: Information on electoral threshold was obtained from the website of the Inter-
Parliamentary Union PARLINE database on national parliaments at: 
http://www.ipu.org/parline/parlinesearch.asp (accessed 02.11.2013).   
Table 3 reveals the eight democracies studied within this thesis are diverse in 
the minimum number of national votes required for their political parties to 
obtain a seat in parliament. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands are the 
only democracies where a seat can be won with less than 1% of the national 
vote. The remaining countries have a minimum threshold, which tends to 
impose higher barriers such as in France, Belgium and Germany (Cf. Downs, 
2012: 38).      
As noted by several scholars, high electoral thresholds can effectively dampen 
the chances of non-democratic political parties to enter parliament (Cf. Boix, 
1999: 614; Carter, 2005: 132; Carter & Arzheimer, 2006; Downs, 2012: 34; 
Jackman & Volpert, 1996: 515; Norris, 2005: 121-122). Van der Brug et al. 
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stated the main reason for this is non-democratic parties usually have low 
“electoral potential” in a sense that they are less popular amongst the electorate 
(Cf. van der Brug e.a., 2005: 546). Jackman and Volpert found that “increasing 
electoral thresholds dampen support for the extreme right as the number of 
parliamentary parties expands” (Jackman & Volpert, 1996: 501). This resonates 
with Norris’ findings that “the existence of high legal vote thresholds (…) exerts 
an important mechanical brake on the radical right share of seats” (Norris, 2005: 
255). Similarly, Downs argued “[s]etting minimum requirements on electoral 
support is one means of controlling access to parliamentary representation, and 
it can serve as a significant barrier to entry by pariah parties” (Downs, 2012: 
34).  
It is particularly important to ascertain the high and low dimensions of an 
electoral threshold to support the subsequent analysis. Several scholars have 
come to share an observation after studying the electoral fortunes of non-
democratic parties and groups in different countries, that a threshold of 3 per 
cent represents a “threshold of relevance” whereby a party passing it breaks 
through from a “fringe” to a “relevant” party (Cf. Norris, 2005: 53; also Ellinas, 
2007: 365). Drawing on this observation, it can be stated a threshold above 3 
per cent is ‘high’ while an electoral threshold below 3 per cent is ‘low’. Using the 
dimension 3 per cent as a boundary between a high and low threshold also 
corresponds with the recommendation of the Council of Europe to use 3 per 
cent as a threshold for parliamentary elections11.  
In conclusion, if an electoral threshold is higher than 3 per cent, it represents a 
significant de facto constraint for non-democratic parties and groups to 
participate in parliamentary elections, as access to political institutions, given 
their low electoral potential as defined above, will be difficult if not impossible.  
                                                          
11
 See Paragraph 58 of the resolution which reads “In well-established democracies, there 
should be no thresholds higher than 3% during the parliamentary elections. It should thus be 
possible to express a maximum number of opinions. Excluding numerous groups of people from 
the right to be represented is detrimental to a democratic system. In well-established 
democracies, a balance has to be found between fair representation of views in the community 
and effectiveness in parliament and government”. See the full text of the Resolution of the 
Council of Europe, 1547 (2007), available at: http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/ 
Documents/AdoptedText/ta07/ERES1547.htm (accessed 07.11.2013) 
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3.2.3 The role of rules constraining the access of non-
democratic parties to direct state funding  
The third important de facto constraint is a special provision in law that gives 
state authorities the right to deny or suspend non-democratic political parties 
from access to direct state funding (Cf. Swyngedouw, 2009: 71-72; van 
Donselaar & Wagenaar, 2009: 395). Direct state funding refers to state cash 
grants given to either all political parties, or depending on the results of previous 
elections, or the number of candidates participating in an election (Cf. Casas-
Zamora, 2005: 28; Carter, 2005: 176; Nassmacher, 2007: 122). There is 
another source of state funding called indirect state funding, referring to in-kind 
subventions such as access to state-owned broadcasters, public buildings or 
publicly printed material (Cf. Casas-Zamora, 2005: 28; Carter, 2005: 176). 
However, this form of state funding is less important for political parties as 
compared with direct state funding which often represents the primary source of 
income for political parties (Cf. Piccio, 2014: 224). Therefore this section will 
focus on the restrictions to direct state funding for non-democratic parties. 
Following the recent study by van Biezen (Cf. van Biezen, 2008: 316), all eight 
democracies analysed within this thesis provide direct state funding to their 
political parties. However, not all of them have legal provisions that constrain 
the non-democratic parties in their access to direct state funding.  
There are several studies suggesting the importance of direct state funding for 
political parties. Generally, it is widely believed that direct state funding plays an 
important role as a principal source for political parties to develop their 
organisational strength (Cf. Katz & Mair, 1995: 6; van Biezen, 2004: 702; 
Carter, 2005: 176ff; van Biezen & Kopecky, 2007: 238ff; van Biezen, 2008: 345-
346). Carter stated the direct state funding “enable(s) parties to field more 
candidates, buy more advertising space in the press or more time on television, 
print more campaign literature and, generally, reach a greater number of voters” 
(Carter, 2005: 176). Particularly over the last few decades, political parties in 
Europe have become even more dependent on the direct state funding. As it 
was noted by van Biezen and other scholars, in contemporary democracies 
political parties struggle with declines in their membership base and as a 
consequence suffer decreasing revenues due to less membership fee 
receivable and private contributions, which has increased the importance of 
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direct state funding as an alternative income source (Cf. van Biezen, 2004: 702; 
van Biezen, 2008: 347; Piccio, 2014: 224).  
Typically the eligibility of receiving state funding is based on the number of 
votes a party is able to attract or sometimes the number of seats it is able to 
attain in parliament. In some democracies, non-democratic political parties 
cannot access direct state funding at all or their state funding can be withdrawn 
after being received, due to carrying out activities directed against the 
democratic state or violating democratic norms (Cf. van Donselaar & Wagenaar, 
2009: 395). For example, Swyngedouw in his analysis of strategies used in 
Belgium against right-wing extremism stated that the law on financing political 
parties passed by the Belgian parliament in 1989 and amended in 1999 has 
been “highly relevant in containing the extreme-right political parties and 
groups” in the country (Swyngedouw, 2009: 71). In 2004, when the state court 
in Belgium ruled that the far-right political party Vlaams Blok violated the anti-
racism law, the party automatically lost its entitlement to receive state funding 
which in effect caused the shutdown of this party (Cf. Erk, 2005: 494; Brems, 
2006: 705ff). Similar observations regarding the importance of laws regulating 
the state party funding have been made in the Netherlands (Cf. van Donselaar 
& Wagenaar, 2009: 395).    
To summarise, the right to withdraw direct state funding from political parties in 
case if they are found to violate democratic norms represents another important 
de facto constraint on the presence and operation of non-democratic parties in 
a democracy.  
3.3 Developing the analytical framework: distinguishing three 
types of legal mechanisms 
Thus far, the previous sections have demonstrated that the defence of 
democracy is not confined to the designated measures of militant democracy, 
but also expands to include non-militant democracy tools such as electoral 
threshold or special ballot access rules which assist in defending democracies 
de facto. This section will now address the question how can we meaningfully 
compare and classify different types of defensive democracies? A look at 
previous research studying variations between democracies in terms of 
militancy of their legal structures can be of little help. As argued earlier, the 
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previous research has failed to provide clear criteria to assess systematically 
the variations in the formal-legal democratic defensiveness between 
democracies.  
Consequently, I suggest here an alternative approach. Before going into details, 
it is important to stress the legal measures which have been deemed important 
constraints on the presence and operation of non-democratic parties and 
groups are different in terms of their severity. For example, legal bans are more 
severe than state surveillance. While a legal ban completely dissolves a political 
party or group as an organisation, state surveillance does not destroy them 
altogether but only undermines their organisational capacity to be active. 
Similarly, the requirement to pay a monetary deposit is different in terms of the 
constraining effect it imposes on non-democratic parties as compared with a 
legal provision that denies members of a non-democratic party the right to 
organise a public demonstration. While the former measure constrains non-
democratic parties indirectly through increasing the threshold for them to enter 
the parliament, the latter rule interferes directly with their right to the freedom of 
association (Cf. Preuss, 2012: 952). The list of such differences can go on. 
Importantly, it should be acknowledged that legal measures and provisions are 
not similar in terms of the severity of constraints they impose on the presence 
and operation of non-democratic parties and groups within a democracy. Such 
considerable differences between individual defensive measures can have 
important consequences for an assessment of formal-legal democratic 
defensiveness. We cannot, for example, consider democracies equally 
defensive if one has no regulation for party ban but the other does. In essence, 
this implies that we need to specify the boundaries between different formal-
legal measures and provisions that are relevant for constraining the non-
democratic parties and groups.   
While building on these insights, I will use again an organisation-centred 
perspective on the formal-legal measures as a starting point for constructing the 
analytical framework. The principal advantage of using this perspective is it 
allows to divide the entire range of formal-legal measures into three analytical 
categories depending on the severity of constraints they impose on the 
presence and operation of non-democratic parties and groups in a democracy. 
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Moving from the most constraining to the least constraining category, these 
categories are as follows: 
1. Legal ban 
2. Freedom constraints 
3. Operational constraints   
 
The principal advantage of this categorisation is it allows to capture qualitative 
differences in the degree of democratic defensiveness between democracies 
more accurately. In essence, the relative formal-legal defensiveness of a 
democracy can be captured in a decreasing order from 1 to 3. That means that 
a country which allows banning political parties and groups (1) is more 
defensive than a country that only employs operational constraints (3). Table 4 
describes the three analytical categories of democratic defensiveness with their 
corresponding individual legal measures in detail.  
Table 4: Three analytical categories of formal-legal democratic defensiveness 
Category Types of legal constraints Goal  
 
1. Legal ban  1. Legal ban of political parties 
 
To permanently dissolve a non-
democratic party or a group as 
formal or informal organisation.  2. Legal ban of groups 
 
2. Freedom 
constraints  
1. Constraints on public 
demonstrations 
 
 
To limit the chances of non-
democratic actors to threaten the 
democratic order through 
unlawful actions or antidemocratic 
propaganda. 
2. Constraints on the freedom of 
assembly 
 
3. Constraints on the formation of 
military organizations (party militia, 
militant groups, etc.) 
 
4. Constraints on the wearing of arms 
 
5. Constraints on the wearing of 
uniforms  
 
6. Constraints on hate propaganda  
 
7. Constraints on anti-Holocaust 
propaganda 
 
8. Constraints on propaganda 
degrading or delegitimizing 
democratic authorities 
 
9. Constraints on propaganda 
delegitimizing democratic 
institutions 
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3. Operational 
constraints 
1. Constraints of state surveillance 
 
 
To put indirect constraints on the 
presence and operation of non-
democratic parties and groups. 
2. Constraints on the employment in 
civil service 
 
3. Constraints on the ballot access 
 
4. Constraints of electoral threshold 
 
5. Constraints on access to direct 
state funding for non-democratic 
political parties 
 
Source: Legal constraints have been compiled using Loewenstein, 1937: 644ff; Capoccia, 2005: 
58; Carter, 2005: 163ff; Norris, 2005: 87ff. 
As Table 4 portrays, the framework includes a broad range of formal-legal 
measures representing the legal constraints upon the presence and operation 
of non-democratic parties and groups in a democracy. More specifically, the 
framework includes the majority of legal measures that were originally included 
in the concept of militant democracy12. Therefore, the original typology of anti-
extremist legislation of Loewenstein was used as a guide to select the individual 
categories of legal constraints (Cf. Loewenstein, 1937b: 644ff). Besides the 
instruments of militant democracy, this framework also includes legal rules and 
provisions used to constrain the presence and operation of non-democratic 
parties and groups de facto. In what follows I specify each defensive category in 
turn. 
The first category legal ban represents the most constraining dimension 
including the two most punishing provisions democracies employ to constrain 
the presence and operation of non-democratic parties and groups: legal ban of 
non-democratic parties and legal ban of non-democratic groups (Cf. Capoccia, 
2005: 59; Downs, 2012: 38). In the context of this study, a legal ban is defined 
                                                          
12
 Note that I do not consider emergency legislation. Typically, the enactment of emergency law 
leads to the delegation of extraordinary powers to the head of state or head of government to 
deal with an emergency and is often accompanied by a temporary suspension of individual 
liberties (Cf. Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004: 216-217; Capoccia, 2005: 57; Tushnet, 2007: 275; 
Dyzenhaus, 2012: 448ff). However, following Canu and other scholars, the emergency law has 
no relevance today for defending democracies (Cf. Canu, 1997: 116; Ferejohn & Pasquino, 
2004: 216-217). For example, as noted by Ferejohn and Pasquino, the emergency powers were 
rarely used in contemporary democracies. Only France has used emergency rule in the recent 
past (1961), which was due to the Algerian crisis (Cf. Buis, 2009: 93). Other democracies 
preferred to deal with common emergency situations including terrorism by ordinary legislation 
rather than by special emergency rules (Cf. Ferejohn & Pasquino, 2004: 216-217; also Tyulkina, 
2011: 77). In addition, as argued by Capoccia, virtually all states have emergency rule in one 
form or another and thus focusing on it might not prove very useful analytically (Cf. Capoccia, 
2001: 16).  
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as the right of state authorities to dissolve a party or group permanently as a 
formal or informal organisation. Typically, the decision to dissolve a party or 
group is followed by further prohibitions upon their organisational life such as 
carrying out demonstrations, wearing uniforms and other insignia in public, 
seizure of assets, criminalisation of leadership, and closure of offices, all of 
which implies their freedom of association is severely constrained (Cf. 
Capoccia, 2005: 57; Issacharoff, 2007: 1429; Downs, 2012: 38; Bourne, 2012: 
4; Bourne & Casal, 2014: 3). Thus defined the focus excludes other forms of 
legal bans such as non-registration and rights denial as these are weaker forms 
of exclusions of non-democratic parties and groups from the political process 
because they work towards undermining rather than the elimination of a non-
democratic organisation and thus do not qualify as legal ban as per the 
definition described (Cf. Bourne, 2012: 4; Bourne & Casal, 2014: 3). Non-
registration, for example, involves only the denial of a new party’s right to 
formally acquire legal recognition as a political party, acquire associated 
privileges such as direct state funding, or participate in elections. Even if an 
organisation was formally denied a registration as a political party, it can remain 
active as a non-registered association and thus continue to enjoy the freedom 
of association granted within a democratic state13. Similarly, rights denial 
involves only the withdrawal of rights and privileges, such as the right to stand 
in elections, which can be a temporary provision, while a party or group might 
not be formally dissolved (Cf. Bourne, 2012: 4; Bourne & Casal, 2014: 3).  
The second category freedom constraints is visibly larger and comprises of 
formal-legal measures that place direct constraints upon the political rights and 
freedoms of non-democratic parties and groups. When comparing to the legal 
ban category, it is evident this category is less severe in terms of the constraints 
imposed upon the presence and operation of non-democratic actors. As 
detailed within Table 4, this category comprises 9 legal constraints. They have 
been compiled using the original typology of anti-extremist legislation by 
Loewenstein. These measures can be divided into two groups dependent upon 
                                                          
13
 In addition, as noted by Brunner, most European democracies, with the exception of Spain 
and Portugal, do not impose special restrictions upon the right to register a political party (Cf. 
Brunner, 2002: 22).  
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whether they constrain freedom of assembly and association (constraints from 1 
to 4)14 or freedom of expression (constraints from 5 to 9)15.  
More specifically, the first provision constraining the freedom of assembly and 
association includes legislation used to constrain the rights of non-democratic 
party and group members to organise public demonstrations. This legislation 
targets the operations of non-democratic parties and groups directly, as it 
undermines their organisational capacity to organise demonstrations in public 
and use them as a platform to demonstrate their internal strength, to intimidate 
the public, and to create the sense of solidarity within the group (Cf. Eatwell, 
2010: 224-225; Pedahzur, 2003: 66-67).  
The second direct constraint to the freedom of assembly represents the 
provision that imposes legal constraints on the rights of non-democratic actors 
to gather together in public places such as, for example, parks, squares, pubs, 
or libraries (Cf. Taeusch, 1952: 35; Emerson, 1964: 1; Preuss, 2012: 952ff). 
Non-democratic parties and groups use such organised events to voice their 
antidemocratic claims to the wider public, to recruit new members, and to create 
networks. Therefore, by constraining this right, the state directly undermines 
their operation.  
The third constraint prohibits the formation of military organisations such as 
paramilitary groups, private armies, or militia. This legislation interferes directly 
with the right of non-democratic actors to form associations. A paramilitary 
organisation has a similar organisational structure to the professional military 
but is not part of the state’s formal armed forces.  
The final provision constraining the freedom of assembly and association is 
legislation that prohibits the wearing of arms during public demonstrations and 
assemblies. By constraining this privilege, the state undermines the capacity of 
                                                          
14
 Freedom of assembly and association can be defined as the freedom to organize and attend 
meetings for the purposes of information or the expression of opinion or for any other similar 
purpose (Cf. Preuss, 2012: 952-959; Taeusch, 1952: 33). 
15
 The Article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) defines 
the freedom of expression as the right which includes “freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the 
form of art or through any other media of his choice” (UN General Assembly Resolution, 1966). 
In common law countries the later freedom is often referred to as the freedom of speech while in 
civil law countries the freedom is termed as freedom of expression (Cf. Barendt, 2012: 893).  
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non-democratic parties and groups to militarise their ranks and in doing so, 
ensures the state monopoly of power (Cf. Loewenstein, 1937b: Capoccia, 2005: 
60). 
The remaining legal constraints within this category interfere directly with the 
freedom of expression for non-democratic actors. The individual measures 
include, on the one hand, legal rules that prohibit members of non-democratic 
parties and groups the wearing of uniforms and other insignia. As Loewenstein 
stated, often such outer insignia serve as a tool for non-democratic actors to 
foster a common identity or to intimidate the general public (Cf. Loewenstein, 
1937b: 648-649). Although these rules target explicitly the individual members 
of non-democratic parties and groups, the latter are directly affected in their 
operation as their capacity to radiate the political affiliation of their members to 
wider public is undermined, making it thus difficult for them to maintain inner 
solidarity within the group (Cf. Loewenstein, 1937b: 649).  
The next constraint to the freedom of expression is legislation prohibiting verbal 
expressions or written materials inciting hatred and discrimination toward 
groups of people on the grounds of their racial, ethnic, or cultural differences. 
Within contemporary democracies, such laws are typically referred to as anti-
discrimination or anti-racist laws (Cf. Hare, 1997: 417; Bleich, 2011: 18; Herz & 
Molnar, 2012: 5). Although these laws do not explicitly target non-democratic 
parties or groups, they can directly affect their membership base if, for example, 
one or several of their members are imprisoned or fined for violating anti-
discrimination laws.  
Another constraint to the freedom of expression includes legislation that 
undermines the ability of members of non-democratic parties and groups to 
delegitimise democratic institutions or democratic authorities. It is well-known 
that some European interwar democracies allowed fascist parties to ascend to 
power by allowing the spread of distrust through doubting the legitimacy of 
democratic institutions, eventually escalating into a landslide support for such 
political parties, particularly so among disenchanted groups in the society (Cf. 
Loewenstein, 1937: 650-651). Within contemporary democracies, the instances 
of antidemocratic propaganda are less conspicuous or often rely on a minimal 
support within their societies. Despite this, quite often this propaganda is used, 
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notably so during elections, as a tool to gain further popularity, particularly 
amongst those disenchanted with their democracy or angry at the lack of 
economic performance by the current government (Cf. Capoccia, 2005: 59). 
The final constraint to the freedom of expression within this category is 
legislation which imposes legal restrictions on the dissemination of speech and 
writings which deny, ridicule, or otherwise diminish the crimes committed during 
World War II against the Jewish population. Within contemporary democracies, 
such legislation is usually referred to as ‘Holocaust denial’ law (Cf. Markovits & 
Hayden, 1980: 54; Kahn, 2004: 4). As the result of the enormous suffering 
inflicted upon the Jews during World War II, many European democracies have 
enacted such laws prohibiting anti-Holocaust propaganda although, as we will 
see later, not every country in Europe has done so.       
The third category groups together operational constraints. In comparison with 
the first two categories, this category is the least severe in its implications upon 
the operation of non-democratic actors. Among individual rules this category 
includes, for example, special rules for state surveillance of non-democratic 
parties and groups. State surveillance includes gathering information on 
activities and members of non-democratic political parties and groups, by 
special government agencies or specially trained police forces (Cf. More, 1984; 
Preuss, 2012: 964). Often the practice involves infiltration of suspect parties and 
groups by undercover agents (Cf. Marx & Fijnaut, 1995: 3). Although state 
surveillance belongs to the classic canon of militant democracy, this constraint 
undermines the presence and operation of non-democratic parties and groups 
rather indirectly. According to Art, when a party or a group is put under state 
surveillance, it can effectively deter or discourage people from joining such 
organisations due to the fear that such actions could result in problems in one’s 
professional life (Cf. Art, 2007: 102-103).  
The second operational constraint includes special rules that formally deny a 
member of a non-democratic party or a group the right to work in civil or public 
service. As argued by scholars, the existence of this restriction represents a 
powerful indirect constraint upon the presence of non-democratic parties and 
groups within a democratic state. Refusing members of a non-democratic 
organisation an entry in civil service or requiring the members of civil service to 
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disclose their political affiliation renders an intense pressure on non-democratic 
actors, making all efforts to increase the membership base or enticing their 
members to remain active voice within their organisation extremely difficult. 
Therefore this measure contributes indirectly to the drain of antidemocratic 
parties and groups within a democracy (Cf. Brinkmann, 1983: 588; Corby, 1986: 
171; Kvistad, 1988; Rudolf, 2003; Art, 2011: 192; Preuss, 2012: 964). As a 
result, non-democratic parties or groups forcefully lose their members 
considerably limiting so their chances to field enough candidates during 
elections, to reach wider groups of voters within their society, and to organise 
public events. (Cf. Art, 2011: 192; Preuss, 2012: 964).       
Apart from state surveillance and constitutional restrictions to the right to work in 
civil service, this category also includes all de facto constraints detailed earlier 
within this chapter. As discussed, such de facto constraints include special rules 
on ballot access (requirements for signature collection and payment of a 
monetary deposit), the electoral threshold, and special rules for the withdrawal 
of direct state funding from parties that threaten the democratic constitutional 
order. These de facto constraints belong to this category because they are the 
least severe in terms of constraints they impose on the presence and operation 
of non-democratic parties. 
3.4 Methodology: Coding procedure to assess variations in 
formal-legal democratic defensiveness   
After the three dimensions of democratic defensiveness and the respective 
formal-legal constraints have been broadly introduced, this section will address 
the underlying coding procedure that will be used to assess variations in formal-
legal democratic defensiveness between eight democracies.  
In order to facilitate a cross-national assessment of the state variations in 
formal-legal democratic defensiveness, I will exclusively assess the presence or 
absence of specified legal mechanisms. Therefore I will not assess whether and 
how democracies use these mechanisms in practice. As previously argued, 
while focusing on the usage of legal mechanisms may represent an important 
methodological approach to assess how defensive a democracy is compared to 
another, it is important first to generate systematic insights into the differences 
and similarities between democracies in the availability of such tools before 
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accounting for patterns of their usage. By focusing on the availability of legal 
tools, this study will bridge a significant gap that currently exists in defensive 
democracy literature, as no other study has analysed this extensive array of 
defensive tools as this study will. The presence or absence of specified 
measures will be identified based on an in-depth analysis of primary legislation 
as specified further below in this chapter and, where necessary, complemented 
by secondary literature. In order to capture the differences, for each category 
dummy variables of 1 and 0 will be used to identify the presence or confirm the 
absence of a specific legal constraint. To put simply, where a specific legal 
constraint is present, the country is coded 1; alternatively, where the legal 
constraint is absent, the country is coded 0. The relative formal-legal 
defensiveness of a democracy will then be calculated by adding up the total 
scores for each category. On this basis, an index will be constructed for each 
category capturing the defensiveness of a country ranging from 0 to 1 
expressed as a percentage. On this basis, the democracies will be ranked 
depending on the standardized score they achieve for each category, dividing 
them up into three groups respectively of low defensiveness (scores 0-0.3), 
medium defensiveness (0.4-0.6) and high defensiveness (0.7-1). For instance, if 
Germany receives an index of 1 for the first category of legal ban (that is having 
both a regulation for party and group ban) while Belgium receives 0.5, since it 
has only group ban within this category, Germany’s level of relative democratic 
defensiveness in this category will be defined as ‘high defensiveness’ while 
Belgium’s level of defensiveness will be defined as ‘medium defensiveness’. 
This procedure will be applied to assess state variations within the remaining 
two categories also. The following section will discuss the specification of 
indicators used for each category.  
 
3.5 Operationalization of variables  
To facilitate the assessment of variations between democracies across all three 
categories, the individual constraints will be operationalised as described below 
in turn. 
1. Legal ban  
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Legal bans that are applied to non-democratic parties and groups will be 
measured through the following two indicators:  
(1) legal ban of political parties  
(2) legal ban of groups 
Party bans and group bans will be assessed separately as the majority of 
democracies have distinct laws for party bans and group bans (Cf. Thiel, 2009: 
403). Therefore, when focusing on the first indicator of party ban, I will look 
whether the law explicitly refers to political parties as targets. Alternatively, 
where the focus is on the second indicator of group ban, I will look whether the 
law refers to groups (militant groups, paramilitary groups, terrorist groups, 
private militia) as targeted actors. It should be noted that there are democracies 
where a political party can be considered as a form of association and therefore 
be banned on the basis of laws prohibiting associations. This is however very 
unusual and does not happen frequently. In addition, distinguishing if a political 
party can be banned on the basis of association law or not, would require 
another measurement and is beyond the scope of this analysis. 
Freedom constraints 
The political freedoms constraints applied to non-democratic parties and groups 
will be described through the following nine indicators: 
(1) Constraints on public demonstrations 
In assessing the state variations in this constraint, I am particularly interested 
whether democracies have such legal provisions which require non-democratic 
parties and groups to formally request permission to organise a demonstration 
and whether such permission can be denied. Consequently, democracies 
where this permission is required and thus can be denied will be coded 1, while 
democracies where no permission is required will be coded 0. The typical 
grounds for preventive bans can include considerations of public order and 
safety, vicinity to public buildings, or negative experiences in the past (Cf. Canu, 
1995: 121).  
 (2) Constraints on the freedom of assembly  
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My aim in assessing the state variations in this constraint is to assess whether a 
state can disband or prohibit unlawful assembly or not. Consequently, if a state 
has the right to disband or prohibit unlawful assemblies they will be coded 1, 
whereas states which have no such right will be coded 0. An unlawful assembly 
is a gathering organised by members of a party or a group prohibited by 
executive authorities or the legal court or one which is likely to breach the public 
order (Cf. Canu, 1995: 121).  
(3) Constraints on the formation of military organisations 
In assessing the variations in this constraint I am interested whether a state has 
special regulations in law giving it the right to prohibit the formation of military 
organisations such as militant groups, para-military organisations, terrorist 
groups, violent groups, and private militia. Consequently, states which have 
such law will be coded 1, while states without such rule will be coded 0.    
(4) Constraints on the wearing of arms    
In looking for variations in this constraint I am interested whether a democracy 
has special provisions in law to prohibit the wearing of arms and weapons 
during demonstrations and in assemblies. Consequently, where a state has 
such provisions available within its law it will be coded 1, while a state which 
has no such legal provisions available will be coded 0.  
(5) Constraints on the wearing of uniforms  
In assessing the state variations in this constraint, the focus is the presence or 
absence of legal rules that prohibit the wearing of uniforms and other insignia of 
prohibited or unlawful political parties and organisations, such as Adolf Hitler’ 
NSDAP party. Democracies with such rules will be coded 1, while democracies 
without such rules will be coded 0.   
(6) Constraints on hate propaganda 
My goal in assessing the state variations in this constraint is to assess the 
differences between democracies in the availability of legal measures and 
provisions that prohibit the distribution of materials either in speech or writing 
inciting discrimination against other groups of people on the ground of their 
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racial, ethnic, religious, or cultural differences. Consequently, where a state 
possesses such regulations they will be coded 1, while a state devoid of such 
rules will be coded 0.   
(7) Constraints on anti-Holocaust propaganda 
The target set for this constraint is to look for the presence or absence of legal 
measures prohibiting the distribution of propaganda material which refutes, 
minimizes, or otherwise trivializes the Holocaust of Jewish people during World 
War II. Consequently, a state which has such measures available will be coded 
1, while a state without such provisions will be coded 0.    
(8) Constraints on propaganda degrading or delegitimizing democratic 
authorities 
In assessing the variations in this constraint I will be looking for differences 
between democracies in the presence or absence of legal rules prohibiting the 
dissemination through speech or publication of propaganda material seeking to 
delegitimize or otherwise express contempt of democratic authorities. A state 
which has such rules available will be coded 1, while a state without such rules 
will be coded 0. 
(9) Constraints on propaganda delegitimizing democratic institutions 
The goal in assessing the state variations in this indicator is to look for the 
availability of such provisions in law which prohibit the distribution of 
propaganda materials aimed at delegitimizing the democratic form of the 
government, democratic institutions, or state insignia in the eyes of general 
public. Following the coding procedure, democracies which have such 
provisions available will be coded 1, while democracies without such provisions 
will be coded 0.     
2. Operational constraints 
The operational constraints applied to non-democratic political parties and 
groups will be measured through the following five indicators:  
(1) State surveillance 
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In assessing the variations in this constraint across eight democracies, this 
study will focus on the availability of such provisions in law which authorize the 
state to conduct surveillance and gathering intelligence about the activities of 
non-democratic political parties and groups by special forces in police or other 
relevant state bodies set up for this purpose. As noted by Preuss, “the 
undercover observation and infiltration of a political party through state agents is 
a serious mode of state interference which requires not only a distinct 
authorization by law but, in addition, a special justification which meets the 
standards of the principle of proportionality” (Preuss, 2012: 964). Consequently, 
states where such law exists will be coded 1 while states which do not authorize 
state surveillance will be coded 0. 
(2) Constraints on the employment in civil service 
In assessing the state variations in this constraint this study will focus on the 
presence or absence of specific law on base of which members of non-
democratic parties and groups can be denied or suspended from civil service. 
Such conditions can include a membership in a party or group which are 
considered harmful to the stability of democratic state, or a breach of loyalty to 
the state and its constitution. Consequently, democracies where such law is 
present will be coded 1, while democracies without such law will be coded 0. 
(3) Constraints on ballot access 
As previously argued, barriers to participate in elections can be erected through 
different legal means. The literature on electoral systems points to signature 
requirements and deposit payments as alternative means to prevent groups 
from participating in elections. To distinguish in form of a simple clear-cut proxy, 
I will distinguish systems that do not resort to such two mechanisms 
constraining ballot access from those that do. Thus, countries will be coded 0 if 
they do not require signatures or deposit payments, while countries that do 
require these mechanisms will be coded 1. 
(4) Electoral threshold 
As emphasised earlier, another means to protect a democracy from its non-
democratic parties is the electoral threshold. Following the suggestion made 
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earlier by some scholars to take 3 per cent as a boundary between high and low 
threshold (Cf. Norris, 2005: 53; also Ellinas, 2007: 365), I consider democracies 
with an electoral threshold above 3 per cent as more defensive (thus coded 1) 
than democracies with an electoral threshold below 3 per cent or no electoral 
threshold at all (thus coded 0).   
(5) Constraints on access to direct state funding for non-democratic 
political parties 
Finally, the focus in assessing the state variations in this constraint is to identify 
the presence or absence of rules that allow state authorities to deny or withdraw 
direct state funding from non-democratic political parties, if they violate the law 
or threaten the democratic order. As with the other variables, democracies with 
the presence of such rules will be coded 1, while democracies without such 
rules will be coded 0.  
3.5 Sources 
The study is based on a document analysis method as an approach to start 
with. Bowen defined a document analysis as “a systematic procedure for 
reviewing or evaluating documents – both printed and electronic (computer-
based and Internet-transmitted) material” (Bowen, 2009: 27). The main rationale 
for adopting this approach is that formal-legal strategies, which are the main 
focus of this study, are based on legal documents such as state constitutions, 
penal and civil codes, electoral codes, party laws, and other pertinent laws 
passed by the legislation and issued by courts (Cf. Capoccia, 2005: 48-49)16. 
The relevant laws were examined as of the end of 2013 either in their original 
form or in form of an official English translation that could be retrieved or 
accessed from official government websites. For Germany, the original source 
of information was the following website www.dejure.org, which contains all 
legislation in Germany sorted according to the area of legislation. Another 
helpful source was the website run by the Federal Ministry of Justice in 
cooperation with Juris GmbH (www.juris.de) which provides online access to 
most relevant legislation. The original source of information surrounding 
Swedish law was found using the Swedish government website which provides 
                                                          
16
 For the overview of legal sources used see Appendix. 
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access to non-official translation of most Swedish statutes ordered in areas of 
legislation (http://www.government.se/). The relevant source of information used 
to find relevant legislation in Denmark was the Danish government website 
(https://www.retsinformation.dk/). In the United Kingdom, the recently created 
database managed by The National Archives on behalf of the government 
publishes online all legislation in the United Kingdom since 1991 
(www.legislation.gov.uk). For Belgium, the original source of information used 
was the access portal of Moniteur Belge which gives access to Belgian law on-
line (www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/doc/rech_f.htm). Another helpful source of 
information was World Law Guide website which contained legislation 
information for many of the eight countries covered in this study 
(http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/). Additionally, the online legislation service run by the 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
(http://legislationline.org/) was particularly useful. According to the information 
on the website, the “Legislationline.org provides direct access to international 
norms and standards relating to specific human dimension issues as well as to 
domestic legislation and other documents of relevance to these issues. These 
data and other information available from the site are intended for lawmakers 
across the OSCE region”. However, the website’s usefulness was limited as it 
mostly only contains the extracts from relevant legal documents.  
I could consult German, French and English primary sources in their original 
and coded all legal texts in these three languages respectively without relying 
on translations. The Swedish legislation was mostly available online in the 
English language. The legislation from Denmark and Netherlands were mostly 
available in their original language which has presented some difficulties during 
the coding of legal sources from these two countries. Where there was no 
English translation of original legal documents in Denmark and the Netherlands 
available, I relied on Google Translate (www.google.com) to code the 
respective legislation.  
The data used for my empirical analysis came primarily from the following 
sources. Firstly, the state constitutions of countries included in my study were 
extensively consulted. All current state constitutions have been sourced from 
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the Internet from websites of national governments or parliaments. For each 
country I used English translations of state constitutions accessible on the 
relevant government websites. The multi-volume compendium by Blaustein and 
Gisbert Constitutions of the Countries of the World provides a comprehensive 
English translation of constitutions of some European countries (Cf. Blaustein & 
Franz, 1971). The state constitutions were primarily consulted as they represent 
an important source of the legal foundation of political organisations and contain 
rules that give powerful clues regarding the relationship between state and 
political parties, and how the latter should behave in order to comply with 
democratic fundamentals of a state in question (Cf. van Biezen, 2012: 190). 
Additionally some constitutions contain explicit rules outlining the conditions 
required to allow a state to restrict freedoms, as, for example, in Germany which 
contains many provisions relevant for defending democracy within its state 
constitution, the Basic Law.  
A lot of information used to analyse state regulation of non-democratic political 
parties and groups has been sourced from the penal codes of selected 
countries. Penal codes contain important information regarding the range of 
repressive measures that democracies employ to combat extremism and 
violence. Canu, for example, defined the penal code “as the oldest mechanism 
of protecting the state against extremists” (Canu, 1997: 116). Penal codes were 
mostly sourced from the internet (see the Appendix for details). For earlier 
versions of penal codes, the American Series of Foreign Penal Codes was 
consulted as a source for accurate English translations for penal codes of some 
European countries (Cf. Mueller, 1960; Rayar & Wadsworth, 1997; West & 
Shuman, 1966). However, this source contains older versions of penal codes 
and therefore must be used with caution. In some countries it was necessary to 
consult civil codes, specifically the Netherlands where many rules pertaining to 
the formal regulation of political parties and other associations are contained 
within its civil code. In case with the Netherlands, a recently published official 
translation of its civil code was particularly useful (see Warendorf et al., 2009).  
Another original source of information pertaining to lawful restrictions upon 
political parties, were the electoral codes and party laws of respective countries. 
In this respect, the richest source of information used was the online service 
created and led by the research group at the University of Leiden (The 
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Netherlands) led by Professor Ingrid van Biezen on The Constitutional 
Regulation of Political Parties in Post-War Europe and Re-Conceptualizing 
Party Democracy (http://www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl/). According to its 
homepage, their online portal contains a searchable database on the party laws 
in post-war European democracies. 
Finally, secondary literature was extensively used, mostly to draw on individual 
case-studies on militant democracy, as well as the recent literature on 
countering extremism within a democracy (e.g. Boventer, 1985; Canu, 1997; 
Schellenberg, 2009; Thiel, 2003, 2009). The legal periodicals such as Hasting 
Constitutional Law Quarterly and Hein Online Collection of Law Periodicals 
have also been very useful sources of secondary literature. In some cases, 
such as in the United Kingdom, it was also necessary to consult court rulings 
and case law.   
3.6 Basic rationale of the country selection 
In an effort to capture the state variations in democratic defensiveness along 
the variables described above, 8 advanced European democracies have been 
selected for comparative analysis: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The focus on 
advanced democracies only was first driven by the need to assure basic 
comparability since I need to be able to assume that in these democracies the 
rule of law is well established and the implementation of formal-legal measures 
can be taken as a given (implying their practical relevance for non-democratic 
political actors they target), an assumption that is more difficult to maintain 
when studying relatively young democracies. Additionally, the selection of these 
particular countries was also driven by their variation in two particular factors, 
which are considered crucial for democratic defensiveness in the literature. The 
first factor is the varied historical experiences of an internally triggered or 
supported breakdown of democratic regime in the past. The eight democracies 
selected for this study represent different constellations regarding experiences 
of an internally triggered or supported breakdown of their democratic system in 
the past. Germany, for example, represents a case-study where democratic 
regime was subverted internally by non-democratic forces nourished within the 
society. By contrast, Austria, France and Denmark, represent case-studies 
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where the breakdown of democratic regime was triggered externally but with 
support of internal non-democratic forces. On the other hand, Belgium and the 
Netherlands represent case-studies where the breakdown of their democratic 
regime was also triggered externally but, in contrast to the previous group of 
countries, without active support of internal non-democratic forces. Finally, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom represent case-studies which have no 
experience in suffering a democratic breakdown.  
The second factor of variation is determinant upon the type of democracy that 
can be either substantive or procedural. As detailed later, the key difference 
between these two forms of democracy lies in the possibility for governing 
majorities to amend the core democratic principles within the constitution in 
order to abolish or destroy democracy (Cf. Fox & Nolte, 1995: 14ff). The 
selected democracies vary greatly across these two types of democracy. 
Germany and France, for example, are substantive democracies while other 
remaining democracies represent procedural democracies. These two broad 
factors will be theorized and examined in detail and linked to patterns of 
defensiveness in Chapter 7 after I have described patterns of defensiveness 
along the described dimensions in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
3.7 A first overview of formal-legal defensiveness within eight 
European democracies 
Based on the variables and coding methodology described previously, this 
section will present a first overview of the differences and similarities between 
the eight democracies selected across the three categories of formal-legal 
democratic defensiveness. Table 5 maps out the eight democracies along the 
variables within each defensive category respectively. Since each category 
includes constraints of varying strictness regarding their implications for the 
presence and operation of non-democratic parties and groups, the countries will 
be assessed across each category separately. 
Table 5: A systematic mapping of differences in formal-legal defensiveness 
between 8 European democracies  
Indicator / Country DE AT FR BE NL DK SE UK 
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Note: 1 = legal mechanism is present; 0 = legal mechanism is absent. The standardized score 
reported for each category expresses, in percentages, the relative proportion of the available 
provisions to the total number of regulations in the category as a whole. Legend: AT-Austria, 
BE-Belgium, DE-Germany, DK-Denmark, FR-France, NL-Netherlands, SE-Sweden, UK-United 
Kingdom 
 
Table 5 reflects the defensive frameworks adopted by democracies are fairly 
diverse, with all democracies being defensive to a certain degree with no 
country falling in the ‘low defensiveness’ range (that is falling in the range from 
0.3-0), which underlines the general tendency among democracies studied to 
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adopt fairly constraining legal frameworks against non-democratic actors. Since 
the three categories contain constraints of varying strictness, it is problematic to 
draw conclusions about the degree of their democratic defensiveness from 
simply adding up all three standardized scores in each category to have one 
country score (i.e. given that the legal ban is more severe than the operational 
constraints it would be problematic to weigh up scores in both dimensions as 
equally severe). On the other hand, Table 5 reveals significant differences 
between the eight democracies in terms of their disposition towards certain 
categories making it difficult to assess their relative defensiveness 
straightforwardly unless a more detailed account of the state variations across 
each category was provided separately. As Table 5 suggests, there are only a 
few cases where a democracy developed the tendency to have the same level 
of formal-legal defensiveness across each category. For example, Germany 
and Austria tend to range as high defensive (that is having a standardized score 
ranging between 1-0.7) across all three categories which indicates these two 
democracies are more defensive than the other countries covered in my study. 
Alternatively, democracies such as Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom 
tend to range as medium defensive across all three categories (that is having a 
standardized score ranging between 0.6-04). However, Belgium, France, and 
Netherlands range higher in one dimension and lower in another which makes it 
difficult to assess straightforwardly their relative defensiveness. For instance, 
France tends to range high defensive in the first two categories but ranges 
medium defensive within the third category, operational constraints. Belgium 
also ranges medium defensive in the first category, legal ban, but high 
defensive within the remaining two categories, freedom constraints and 
operational constraints. Finally, the Netherlands tends to range medium 
defensive in the first two categories, legal ban and freedom constraints, but has 
high defensiveness regarding operational constraints.  
To sum up, this first overview of the relative differences in democratic 
defensiveness across the democracies analysed indicates that a more detailed 
analysis of variations in each individual category is required before a more 
plausible reconstruction of their relative differences in the degree of formal-legal 
democratic defensiveness can be offered. This analysis will be done throughout 
chapters 4, 5 and 6, each looking at one of the three categories in turn. While 
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doing so, these chapters will also provide a more detailed account of the 
defensive legislation within each democracy.  
3.8 Conclusion 
The main purpose of this chapter was to present an analytical framework that 
can be used to map and systematically identify the differences in formal-legal 
defensiveness of democratic countries included in this study. This chapter 
started out from a critic of the concept of militant democracy for being 
insufficient as a theoretical framework to cover the range of defensive measures 
contemporary democracies have at their disposal to counter the threat of non-
democratic parties and groups. On this basis, I used the organisation-centered 
perspective on formal-legal measures to expand the range of formal-legal 
measures as applicable for constraining the presence and operation of non-
democratic parties and groups beyond the conventional measures of militant 
democracy toward those mechanisms which assist in defending democracy de 
facto. The range of such de facto constraint has been identified within electoral 
laws and party finance laws. On this basis, I presented in the next step an 
analytical framework to assess the differences between democracies in formal-
legal defensiveness. Drawing on the organization-centered perspective toward 
legal measures, I divided the entire range of formal-legal measures into three 
analytical categories depending on the severity of the constraints they impose 
on the presence and operation of non-democratic parties and groups in a 
democracy. After discussing the key constraints within each category, 
specifying the sources used to form the analysis and providing the rationale 
behind the country selection, I was able to then analyse the eight European 
democracies within the context of the analytical framework presented, and 
highlight the existing cross-national variations in democratic defensiveness. The 
subsequent chapters 4, 5 and 6 will discuss each category separately in greater 
detail, beginning with the first category, legal ban, and followed by the second 
and third categories, freedom constraints and operational constraints, 
respectively.  Once this detailed discussion is provided, it will then be possible 
to return to a more detailed comparative analysis of differences and draw 
further significant conclusions.  
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CHAPTER 4:  
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF VARIATIONS BETWEEN 
DEMOCRACIES IN THE PRESENCE OF LEGAL PARTY AND 
GROUP BANS 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has made clear that democracies vary in terms of 
dispositions they have toward individual categories. This chapter will expand the 
first category of legal ban to ascertain the state variations within this category. 
As previously stated, this category is the most severe within my analytical 
framework. In order to assess the state variations in party and group bans, I 
focused on the presence or absence of the right to dissolve political parties 
and/or groups respectively. Table 6 maps the eight democracies systematically 
across these two types of constraints. As specified earlier, the standardised 
score reported for each category expresses, in percentages, the relative 
proportion of the available provisions to the total number of regulations in the 
category as a whole.  
Table 6: Systematic assessment of variations in the dimension of legal ban 
Country /  
Indicator 
Legal ban of 
non-democratic 
political parties 
Legal ban of 
non-democratic 
groups 
Standardised 
score 
Level of defensiveness 
in this dimension 
Austria 1 1 1 High defensiveness 
France 1 1 1 High defensiveness 
Germany 1 1 1 High defensiveness 
Belgium 0 1 0.5 Medium defensiveness 
Denmark 0 1 0.5 Medium defensiveness 
Netherlands 0 1 0.5 Medium defensiveness 
Sweden 0 1 0.5 Medium defensiveness 
United 
Kingdom 
0 1 0.5 Medium defensiveness 
Note: 1 = legal mechanism is present; 0 = legal mechanism is absent. Grey shading is added to 
indicate democracies in high defensiveness category.  
Table 6 reflects that countries range between high defensiveness and medium 
defensiveness, while there is no democracy falling in the low defensiveness 
range within this category which underscores the relative importance of the 
legal ban mechanism among the eight democracies studied. Democracies such 
as Austria, France, and Germany build the first group of countries having high 
defensiveness within this category with a score of 1. In comparison with the 
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remaining democracies, these three countries have specific legal provisions for 
both party and group bans. Meanwhile, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom fall in the group of countries with medium 
defensiveness within this category. In comparison with the first group of 
countries, these democracies have no right to ban political parties but have 
special rules for banning groups. The following section will describe these 
differing levels of defensiveness in greater detail with particular focus on the 
legal situation within each democracy.  
4.2 Democracies with high defensiveness in the category of 
legal ban 
According to the table, Austria, France, and Germany fall in the range of 
democracies with high defensiveness within this category, having specific legal 
provisions for party and group bans in their legal arsenals. In the following 
sections I analyze the legal situation in these countries.   
4.2.1 Legal ban in Austria 
The first country in this group is Austria. There are at least three laws that 
qualify this country for a high defensiveness within this category. The most 
important law is the Verbotsgesetz 1947 (Prohibition Act) that was enacted few 
weeks after the declaration of state independence on 27th April 194517. 
According to Article 1 of this law, all political parties and organisations 
resembling the National Socialist party or its militant subdivisions and affiliated 
groups are prohibited18. The creation of parties in the spirit of National-
Socialism is strictly forbidden. These criminal offenses are set out within Articles 
3 to 3i and fall within the expressive jurisdiction of the court. According to Article 
3a, the establishment or active support of a National Socialist organisation is 
subject to an imprisonment up to 20 years. Thereby the law applies 
indiscriminately against all parties and groups that function in the spirit and are 
guided by ideas of National Socialism (Cf. Auprich, 2009: 47).  
                                                          
17
 Verbotsgesetz 1947 Stf: Stgbl. Nr. 13/1945, available at: http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Geltende 
Fassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10000207 (accessed 03.04.2013) 
18
 Article 1 of the law reads that “the NSDAP, its militant groups (Wehrverbände) (SS, SA, 
NSKK, NSFK), its subdivisions and affiliated groups as well as all National Socialist 
organisations and formations (Einrichtungen) on the whole are dissolved; the new formation of 
these groups is forbidden” (own translation).  
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Another relevant provision is stipulated within the State Treaty adopted on May 
15, 1955 proclaiming the formation of a sovereign Austrian state19. Article 9 
Paragraph 1 to 3 of this treaty documents that all organisations including 
political parties and groups which engage in activities that contravene the 
principles of the United Nations Organisation or try to strip people of their 
democratic rights must be dissolved20.  
The third law is the Law on Associations (Vereinsgesetz, VerG) enacted in 2002 
which stipulates in Article 29 Paragraph 1that any association can be prohibited 
if it violates the penal code, its own statute, or does not conform to the terms of 
its legal status21. Besides these provisions, Article 246 of the Penal Code 
stipulates that building of an organisation is prohibited whose goals violate the 
provisions of the Penal Code, or which aim to destroy the independence, state 
form, and the constitutional order of Austria22. 
4.2.2 Legal ban in France 
France’s repertoire of legal provisions relating to legal ban also qualifies it for a 
high defensiveness within this category. Similar to Austria, the law in France 
contains several rules that can be used for banning non-democratic groups and 
political parties. The conditions for a legal ban of political parties are set forth in 
the constitutional charter although the constitutional text does not explicitly refer 
                                                          
19
 Staatsvertrag betreffend die Wiederherstellung eines unabhängigen und demokratischen 
Österreich,  Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik Österreich, Vienna: 30. Juli 1955, available at:  
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Dokumentnummer=NOR300
02357 (03.04.2013) 
20
 The original text reads “alle Organisationen faschistischen Charakters aufzulösen, die auf 
seinem Gebiete bestehen, und zwar sowohl politische, militärische und paramilitärische, als 
auch alle anderen Organisationen, welche eine irgendeiner der Vereinten Nationen feindliche 
Tätigkeit entfalten oder welche die Bevölkerung ihrer demokratischen Rechte zu berauben 
bestrebt sind“ (cursive is mine, S.B.). 
21
 Law on Associations (Vereinsgesetz, VerG), Article 29 Paragraph 1 reads “(1) Jeder Verein 
kann unbeschadet des Falls nach Art. 2 Abs. 3 bei Vorliegen der Voraussetzungen des Art. 11 
Abs. 2 der Europäischen Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten, 
BGBl. Nr. 210/1958, mit Bescheid aufgelöst werden, wenn er gegen Strafgesetze verstößt, 
seinen statutenmäßigen Wirkungskreis überschreitet oder überhaupt den Bedingungen seines 
rechtlichen Bestands nicht mehr entspricht“. The Bundesgesetz über Vereine (Vereinsgesetz, 
VerG)  is available at:  https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung/Bundesnormen/20001917/ 
VerG%2c%20Fassung%20vom %2019.02.2014.pdf (accessed 05.04.2013) 
22
 Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch), available at: http://www.jusline.at/Strafgesetzbuch_(StGB). 
html Paragraph 1 of the article reads “Wer eine Verbindung gründet, deren wenn auch nicht 
ausschließlicher Zweck es ist, auf gesetzwidrige Weise die Unabhängigkeit, die in der 
Verfassung festgelegte Staatsform oder eine verfassungsmäßige Einrichtung der Republik 
Österreich oder eines ihrer Bundesländer zu erschüttern, ist mit Freiheitsstrafe von sechs 
Monaten bis zu fünf Jahren zu bestrafen“. (accessed 07.04.2013) 
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to the procedure for banning such parties (Cf. Finn, 2001: 57; Buis, 2009: 88-
89). Article 4 of the French Constitution commits political parties and political 
groups (“les partis et groupements politiques”) to a requirement to respect 
democracy and territorial integrity23. According to this provision the state is 
empowered to ban any political party or group which does not abide by these 
principles (Cf. Fox & Nolte, 1995: 27; Minkenberg, 2006: 39).  
Other provisions stipulating conditions on the basis of which political parties or 
groups can be banned can be found within the statutory law. For example, the 
Law on Associations adopted in 1901, besides setting out the legal conception 
of what is an association, stipulates the conditions that can lead to a formal 
dissolution of political parties and groups (Cf. Buis, 2009: 89)24. According to 
Article 3, any association including political parties “which intends to infringe on 
the republican form of the government is null and void”25.  
Finally, as a result of a grown threat from paramilitary groups before World War 
II, the French government adopted in 1936 the Law on Combatant and 
Paramilitary Groups that targeted specifically military and paramilitary 
organisations in the country (“les groupes de combat et milices privées”)26. 
According to Boventer, the law was enacted because of the inability of the 
previous Law on Associations of 1901 to effectively suppress the various fascist 
and Nazi groups in the country. The key weakness of the previous legislation 
was that it targeted only officially registered associations and did not apply to 
informal political groups (Cf. Boventer, 1985: 164). The law of 1936 is still in 
force and remains the main juridical instrument to control radical groups in the 
country (Cf. Boventer, 1985: 155; Buis, 2009: 90). According to this law, a group 
                                                          
23
 Constitution de la République Française du 4 Octobre 1958, available at: 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/constitution.asp. Article 4 reads « Les partis et 
groupements politiques concourent à l’expression du suffrage. Ils se forment et exercent leur 
activité librement. Ils doivent respecter les principes de la souveraineté nationale et de la 
démocratie ». (accessed 14.03.2013) 
24
 Loi du 1er juillet 1901 relative au contrat d’association, version consolidée au 6 mai 2009, 
available at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006069570& 
dateTexte=20090506. Article 1 defined an association as “An association is an agreement by 
which two or more people are sharing, permanently, their knowledge or activity for a purpose 
other than sharing profits. It is governed as to its validity by general principles of law applicable 
to contracts and obligations” (own translation). (accessed 10.03.2013) 
25
 Article 3 reads “[t]oute associations fondée sur une cause ou en vue d’un objet illicite, 
contraire aux lois, aux bonnes moeurs, ou qui aurait pour but de porter atteinte à l’intégrité du 
territoire nationale et à la forme républicaine du gouvernement est nulle et de nul effet”.   
26
 Loi du 10 janvier 1936 sur les groupes de combat et milices privées, available at: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=3CFAD2B681F1BDB366E7E67A153977
0A.tpdjo12v_1?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000325214&dateTexte (accessed 10.03.2013) 
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is banned by a presidential decree taken by the Council of Ministers after 
hearing a report from the Minister of the Interior (Cf. Camus, 2009: 148). More 
specifically, according to Article 1(1-7) the President of the Republic is 
empowered to dissolve any group which provokes armed demonstrations, is of 
a paramilitary nature, or aims at dismemberment of the territorial state, or aims 
at forceful overthrow of the republican form of the government, or incites to 
racial hatred and discrimination of other groups, or supports acts of terrorism, or 
collaborates with an enemy (Cf. Mathieu, 1999; Camus, 2009: 148)27. In 
addition, Articles 431-15 and 431-17 of the Penal Code contain special 
provisions against combattant groups, that is “any group of persons holding or 
having access to weapons”28. Such groups can be banned by a court decision.  
4.2.2 Legal ban in Germany 
Germany’s arsenal of legal provisions also qualifies this democracy for a high 
defensiveness within this category. Germany has several legal provisions that 
can be used to ban non-democratic political parties and groups. The key 
provision is contained within the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), the state constitution 
of Germany. According to Article 21 Paragraph 2, political parties that “by 
reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to undermine or 
abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the 
Federal Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional”29. According to this 
article the court can ban any political party if it violates the ‘free democratic 
basic order’ or engages in activities directed against the sovereignty and 
integrity of the German state. The fundamental characteristics of the free 
democratic basic order have been defined in the judgment of the Federal 
Constitutional Court leadng to the ban of the Reich Socialist Party 
(Sozialistische Reichspartei) in 1952 as encompassing “[a]t the very least, 
respect for the rights of man as set forth in the Basic Law, above all respect for 
                                                          
27
 Until 1995, on the basis of the law 69 groups were banned. Among them were, for example, 
Ordre Nouveau in 1973, the Fédération d’Action Nationale et Européenne (FANE) in 1980 and 
again in 1985 and 1987. More recently, the law was used to ban the Unité Radicale (2002), 
Elsass Korps (2005), Tribu Ka (2006), and Jeunesse Kémi Séba (2009). Sanchez mentions that 
under the law of 1936, 80 organizations were outlawed between 1936 and 2003 (Cf. Canu, 
1997: 148-151; Fennema, 2000: 128; Sanchez, 2003: 5; Bleich & Lambert, 2014: 131).   
28
 Article 431-15 and Article 431-17 of the French Penal Code, available at: 
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ content/download/1957/13715/.../Code_33.pdf (accessed 16.03.2013)       
29
 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, available at: http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gg/ (accessed 02.02.2013) 
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the rights of one individual to life and free development, the sovereignty of the 
people, separation of powers, the accountability of the government, 
administration according to law, the independency of the judiciary, the 
multiparty principle, with equal opportunity for all political parties, including the 
right to constitutionally acceptable development, and opposition” (quoted in 
Franz, 1982: 57)30. An important characteristic of the legal ban in Germany is 
that the Federal Constitutional Court can outlaw a political party even if there is 
no likelihood that this party would ever realize its unconstitutional aims in future 
(Cf. Niesen, 2005: 169).  
Additionally, the Law on Political Parties adopted on July 24, 1967 sets out the 
rules for the enforcement of a formal decision by the Federal Constitutional 
Court that a political party is unconstitutional31. According to Articles 32-33, 
pursuant to the order of the Federal Constitutional Court the formation of 
substitute organisations is prohibited. Furthermore, according to Articles 84 to 
86a of the German Criminal Code (Deutsches Strafgesetzbuch, StGB)32 the 
maintenance and continuation of a political party which has been declared 
unconstitutional is subject to an imprisonment up to five years or a fine. The 
usage of symbols and the dissemination of any propaganda material of a 
banned party is punished by three years of imprisonment or a fine.  
The procedures pertaining to cases for a legal ban of political parties are 
prescribed in the Federal Constitutional Court Act (Bundesver-
fassungsgerichtsgezetz, BVerfGG)33. According to Article 43 of this Act, the 
Federal Constitutional Court may launch a legal proceedure for a legal ban of a 
political party only after the Bundestag (lower house of the German parliament), 
the Bundesrat (upper house of the German parliament), the federal 
government, or the land government in case if the organisation of a party 
affected was confined to the territory of one single land has made an application 
to that effect. If the the Federal Constitutional Court found that a party is 
                                                          
30
 The decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court banning the SRP (BVerfG, 
23.10.1952, 1BvB1/51) is available at: http://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung? 
Gericht=BVerfG&Datum=23.10.1952&Aktenzeichen=1%20BvB%201/51 (accessed 18.02.2013) 
31
 Part VII, Articles 32-33 of the Law on Political Parties, available at: 
http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/parteien/downloads/parteiengesetz_engl.pdf (accessed 16. 
02.2013) 
32
 German Criminal Code, available at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/ 
(accessed 18.02.2013) 
33
 Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz (BVerfGG) (Federal Constitutional Court Act), available at: 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/bverfgg/gesamt.pdf (accessed 15.02.2013) 
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unconstitutional (‘verfassungswidrig’), such decision entails automatically the 
withdrawal of party assets and the prohibition of building of subsequent 
organisations (‘Ersatzorganisationen’).    
Besides rules for banning political parties, Germany has also several provisions 
that can be used to ban non-democratic groups. Such provisions can be found 
within the Basic Law and the special Law on Associations (Vereinsgesetz, 
VerG), adopted in 1964 and amended in 2007 (Cf. Gerlach, 2012: 98)34. These 
two documents contain a similar provision which stipulates that “[a]ssociations 
whose aims or activities contravene the criminal laws or that are directed 
against the constitutional order or the concept of international understanding, 
shall be prohibited”35. Another provision was adopted after the terrorist attacks 
against the United States of America on September 11, 2001. Following this 
event the German government adopted the new Law on Combatting the 
International Terrorism (Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz) in 200236 which 
sought to amend the Law on Associations by adding in Paragraph 14 religious 
and international organisations to the list of prohibited organisations in 
Germany, if they were concerned in acts related to terrorism or acts linked to 
efforts of violent subversion of constitutional order (Part IV, Article 14) (Cf. 
Katzenstein, 2003: 749).  
Unlike the legal ban of political parties where the Federal Constitutional Court is 
granted the exclusive jurisdiction to decide, the hurdle for banning a non-
democratic group is set lower. According to Article 3 Paragraph 2 of the law the 
right to ban a non-democratic group is assigned to the executive, that is either 
so to the state inner ministers if the activities of an organisation were confined 
to a particular state (Länder) and to the federal inner minister if the activities of a 
group affected were confined to the whole state territory (Cf. Thiel, 2009: 122)37.  
                                                          
34
 Gesetz zur Regelung des öffentlichen Vereinsrechts, VerG (Law on regulation of the right of 
public associations), available at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/vereinsg/ 
gesamt.pdf (accessed 05.02.2013) 
35
 See Article 9 Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law. Also see Part II, Article 3 Paragraph 1 of the Law 
on Associations (Vereinsgesetz, VerG) (accessed 08.02.2013) 
36
 Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus (Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz), 9 
January 2002, Bundesgesetzblatt, Vol. 2002, Part I, Nr. 3, pp.361-395, available at: 
http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Gesetzestexte/Terrorismusbekaempfungs
gesetz_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (accessed 15.02.2013) 
37
 Part II, Article 3 Paragraph 2 of the Law on Associations (accessed 17.02.2013) 
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Like in case with political parties, several provisions within the Penal Code 
prescribe various penalties for an attempt to continue an association which was 
declared unconstitutional. According to Article 85 of the Penal Code, the 
maintenance and continuation of an association that was found unconstitutional 
is punished by five years of imprisonment or a fine. Using symbols and 
dissemination of propaganda material of unconstitutional association is liable to 
an imprisonment up to three years or a fine.     
4.3 Democracies with medium defensiveness in the category of 
legal ban  
According to Table 5, five democracies have a medium defensiveness within 
the category of legal ban. These democracies include Belgium, Denmark, 
Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. In contrast to democracies with 
a high defensiveness, these countries have no special provisions for banning 
political parties, but have specific provisions that can be used to ban non-
democratic groups. The following sections analyse the legal situation within 
these five countries in turn.  
4.3.1 Legal ban in the Netherlands 
There is no law in the Netherlands that would empower the state to ban political 
parties (Cf. van Donselaar & Wagenaar, 2009: 393). The existing provisions 
relating to a legal ban do not speak specifically to political parties as targets. 
However, the Dutch law has several provisions that can be used to ban non-
democratic groups. Firstly, the Dutch Civil Code38 stipulates in Article 2:20 that 
“a legal person the activities of which are contrary to the public order” can be 
prohibited and dissolved by a District Court upon the request of the Public 
Prosecution Service39. According to Paragraph 2, the district court may grant a 
legal person “for a specific period of time the opportunity to adjust its purpose 
                                                          
38
 Civil Code of the Netherlands, available at: http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/civilcodebook022. 
htm (accessed 20.04.2013). The official English translation of the Dutch Civil Code can be 
found in Thomas et al., 2009.  
39
 Book 2, Title 2 reads “1. Where the activities of a legal person are contrary to public order, the 
District Court shall prohibit and dissolve that legal person upon the request of the Public 
Prosecution Service. 2.  Where the purpose (objective) of a legal person, as defined in its 
articles of incorporation, is contrary to public order, the District Court shall dissolve that legal 
person upon the request of the Public Prosecution Service. Before the dissolution, the District 
Court may grant the legal person for a specific period of time the opportunity to adjust its 
purpose (objective) in such a way that it no longer is contrary to public order”. 
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(objective) in such a way that it no longer is contrary to public order”. However, 
this rule does not apply to organisations pursuing or engaged in terrorism40.   
The second provision empowering the state to ban groups can be found in the 
law introduced in 1944 called the ‘Resolution concerning the Dissolution of 
Treasonable Organisations’ (Besluit ontbinding landverraderlijke organisaties) 
(Cf. Bleich & Lambert, 2013: 134). According to Bleich and Lambert, this law 
was adopted with the goal to set off the process of ‘de-nazification’ in the 
country by banning those organisations which collaborated with the Nazis 
during World War II. According to Article 1 Paragraph 1 of this law, the National 
Socialist Movement of the Netherlands and other Nazi and fascist organisations 
which were included in the list annexed to the document were subject to a 
formal dissolution. In total, forty-one organisations were defined as ‘treasonable 
organisations’ and banned in the aftermath of the passage of this law (Cf. Bleich 
& Lambert, 2013: 134). According to Article 2, the Minister of Justice is 
authorized to add any other organisation to the list of proscribed groups if she is 
found to act in the spirit of proscribed organisations41.  
                                                          
40
 Paragraph 3 states that all kinds of organizations listed in Article 2(3) of the Regulation of the 
EU Council  2580/2001 of the European Council of 27 December 2001 (OJEC L 344), in Annex 
I of Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of the European Council of 27 May 2002 (OJEC L 139), or 
that is mentioned and marked with a star in the Annex to the Common Position No. 2001/931 of 
the European Council of 27 December 2001 (OJEC L 344) are “prohibited by law and not 
authorized to perform juridical acts”. The EU Council Regulation 2580/2001 from 27 December 
2001 was issued in efforts to combine counter-terrorism measures across the EU.  Article 2(3) 
recommends that following organizations are banned: “ (i) natural persons committing, or 
attempting to commit, participating in or facilitating the commission of any act of terrorism; (ii) 
legal persons, groups or entities committing, or attempting to commit, participating in or 
facilitating the commission of any act of terrorism; (iii) legal persons, groups or entities owned or 
controlled by one or more natural or legal persons, groups or entities referred to in points (i) and 
(ii); or (iv) natural legal persons, groups or entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of one 
or more natural or legal persons, groups or entities referred to in points (i) and (ii)”. See the 
Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures 
directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, (OJEC L 344), 
available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:344:0070:0075: 
EN:PDF (accessed 20.05. 2013) 
41
 The copy of the resolutions and the names of organizations banned on basis of this rule can 
be found on the website supported by the Dutch Ministry of Interior at: 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0002010/geldigheidsdatum_20-01-2014 (accessed 22.05.2013). 
So far, the law affected 41 pro-fascist and Nazi organizations. Such organizations included e.g. 
Weather division, Germanic SS of the Netherlands, National Youth Storm, National Socialist 
Women's Organizations, National Socialist Officers Corps, National Socialist Student Union, 
National Socialist Front Right, Medical Front, Dentists Front, Pharmacists Front, Veterinarians 
Front, Economic Front, Front for Easy and Crafts, Carriers Front, Educators National Socialist 
Guild, Technically Guild, etc. 
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4.3.2. Legal ban in Belgium 
Belgium has also a medium defensiveness within the first category of legal ban. 
The state authorities in Belgium have no clear right to ban political parties (Cf. 
Swyngedouw, 2009: 71). In 1944, when the option for banning two pro-fascist 
parties Rexist Party of Belgium and the Flemish National Union (Vlaamsch 
Nationaal Verbond, VNV) was first discussed in the Council of Ministers, this 
solution was straightforwardly abandoned as the opinion dominated within the 
Cabinet, as expressed by the then Belgian Prime-Minister Marie-Eugène Hubert 
Pierlot, that “a dissolution would not reach its goal; these parties will reform, in 
fact, under other names” (Cf. Nandrin, 2000: 48 (own translation)).  
Some scholars view the lack of a party ban law in Belgium as an indispensable 
part of the Belgian attitude to the place and role of political parties within a 
democratic system. Nandrin described its main features as follows: “[t]he devil 
is surrounded, encircled, dismissed; ostracized but never eliminated. Belgian 
democracy would be measured at this price” (Nandrin, 2000: 50 (own 
translation)). 
However, there are several provisions within the Belgian law that give the state 
the right to ban groups if they are found to incite violence and try to substitute 
army or police. Firstly, the Law on Private Militia (Loi interdisant les milices 
privées) adopted on July 29, 1934 authorizes the state to ban paramilitary 
groups42. At the time of its introduction, the law was enacted with the goal to 
counter the militarization of political parties. In its original form the law was 
targeted specifically against paramilitary groups of the main radical right-wing 
political parties in Belgium before World War II (Cf. Swyngedouw, 2009: 71). 
According to Article 1 of this law, any private military group and any 
organisation of private individuals built with the goal to use violence, trying to 
substitute the army or police, or otherwise interfering with their activities is 
prohibited and must be dissolved (own translation)43. During the 1930s, the law 
                                                          
42
 Loi interdisant les milices privées, 29 Juillet 1934. Coordination officieuse en langue 
allemande, in: Belgisch Staatsblad, 30.05.2012, Ed. 3, Moniteur Belge, 30995, available at: 
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/arch_a1.pl?=&sql=(text+contains+(''))&rech=1&language
=fr&tri=dd+AS+RANK&numero=1&table_name=loi&F=&cn=1934072930&caller=archive&fromta
b=loi&la=F&ver_arch=005 (accessed 03.05.2013) 
43
 Article 1 of the law reads “Jede Privatmiliz und jede andere Organisation von Privatpersonen, 
deren Zweck es ist, Gewalt anzuwenden, die Armee oder die Polizei zu ersetzen, sich in ihr 
Handeln einzumischen oder an ihre Stelle zu treten, ist verboten“. 
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was applied in more than 50 instances of unlawful formation of private militant 
groups (Cf. Nandrin, 2000: 44). Today the law exists in its original version to 
fight against violent and combatant groups. According to Article 2, the building 
of such groups is subject to an imprisonment from one month to one year or a 
fine from 26 to 300,- Euro.  
Another provision which allows the state to ban non-democratic groups can be 
found within the Belgian anti-racist legislation. The Law prohibiting certain acts 
inspired by racism or xenophobia (Loi tendant à réprimer certains actes inspirés 
par le racisme ou la xénophobie) adopted in 1981 and sometimes called the 
‘Moureau law’ after the name of its initiator, the Justice Minister of Belgium 
Phillip Moureaux, allows to ban groups “that clearly and repeatedly practice or 
advocate discrimination or segregation” (Cf. Fennema, 2000: 128; Brems, 2006: 
703; Bleich & Lambert, 2013: 133)44. According to Article 22 of this law, a 
membership in a group advocating racial discrimination is punished by an 
imprisonment from one month to one year.  
4.3.3 Legal ban in the United Kingdom 
The next democracy with a medium defensiveness within the first category of 
legal ban includes the United Kingdom. Similar to democracies analysed 
previously, there is no special legislation in the UK for banning political parties 
(Cf. van Donselaar, 2003: 270; Mullender, 2009: 329). Despite this the state has 
a series of statutory laws that can be used to ban non-democratic groups. 
Firstly, the Public Order Act adopted by the British government in 1936 in 
response to the grown threat from the presence and activities of quasi-military 
fascist groups in the country during the 1930s contains specific provisions for 
banning paramilitary groups (Cf. Davis, 2000: 55)45. According to Section 2(1), 
any group or association of people “organized or trained or equipped for the 
purpose of enabling them to be employed in usurping the functions of the police 
or of the armed forces of the Crown” or “organized and trained or organized and 
equipped either for the purpose of enabling them to be employed for the use or 
                                                          
44
 Title IV, Articles 21 to 23 of the Loi tendant à réprimer certains actes inspirés par le racisme 
ou la xénophobie, available at: http://legislationline.org/topics/country/41/topic/84 (accessed 
10.06.2013) 
45
 Public Order Act 1936, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Edw8and1Geo6/ 
1/6/contents (accessed 10.06.2013) 
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display of physical force in promoting any political object” shall be prohibited 
(italics added, S.B). In this case, according to Section 2(2), the consent of 
Attorney-General is needed to start the prosecution process before the High 
Court.  After the end of World War II, the Public Order Act of 1936 remained the 
key legal instrument in the hands of the British government to enforce a 
proscription of several neo-Nazi groups such as the Spearhead or Free Wales 
Army (Cf. Davis, 2000: 55; van Donselaar, 2003: 268).  
Other relevant provisions in the UK for banning non-democratic groups can be 
found within its counter-terrorism legislation. In particular, the conflict in 
Northern Ireland (1968-1998), commonly referred to as the years of Troubles46, 
promted the British government to enact a series of laws which introduced a 
new legal framework that can be used to ban non-democratic groups. The first 
such law was the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) adopted in 1974. This law 
gave the Secretary of State additional powers to ban any organisation which 
“appears to [Secretary of State] to be concerned in, or in promoting or 
encouraging, terrorism occurring in the United Kingdom and connected with the 
affairs of Northern Ireland” (Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989, Section 1(2))47 
(Cf. Walker, 1992: 33-39; Davis, 2000: 55-56; Mullender, 2009: 316-317). The 
PTA was amended several times (1984, 1989, and 2000). The last PTA 
adopted by the British government in 2000 has consolidated all former counter-
terrorism legislation in one single act48. Under the new PTA 2000, proscription is 
no longer applied separately to Northern Ireland or Great Britain as it was 
previously but applies throughout the whole of the UK (Cf. Legrand & Jarvis, 
2014: 4). According to Part II Section 3(5) of the Act, the Secretary of State is 
empowered to ban any group which commits or participates in acts of terrorism, 
                                                          
46
 The conflict in and around the territorial situation of the Northern Ireland in the UK and which 
is commonly referred to as ‘The Troubles’ began with a civil rights march in Londonderry on 5 
October 1968 and was only concluded three decades later with the Good Friday Agreement on 
10 April 1998. The violent conflict took lives of 3600 people (Cf. Finn, 1991: 47ff). See for details 
Chapter 7. 
47
 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, Chapter 4, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/4/contents Section 1(2) reads “Any organization for 
the time being specified in Schedule 1 to this Act is a proscribed organization for the purposes 
of this Act; and any organisation which passes under a name mentioned in that Schedule shall 
be treated as proscribed, whatever relationship (if any) it has to any other organization of the 
same name. (3) The Secretary of State may by order add to Schedule 1 to this Act any 
organisation that appears to him to be concerned in terrorism occurring in the United Kingdom 
and connected with Northern Irish affairs, or in promoting or encouraging it”. (accessed 
14.06.2013) 
48
 Terrorism Act 2000, Chapter 11, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/ 
11/contents (accessed 17.06.2013) 
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prepares for terrorism, promotes or encourages terrorism, or is otherwise 
concerned in an act of terrorism. Moreover, the terrorist bombing of the London 
underground transportation system on July 7, 2005 prompted the British 
government to further expand its counter-terrorism legislation. The new 
Terrorism Act of 2006 empowers the state to dissolve any organisation which 
glorifies terrorism (Part II, Section 21)49.   
The last document that can be used by the British government to ban non-
democratic groups is the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1991 
(EPA). The act permits the state to proscribe any organisation which appears 
“to be concerned in terrorism or in promoting or encouraging it”50. Under this law 
a number of radical organisations, particularly so those which were connected 
with the conflict in Northern Ireland, were already prohibited51. 
4.3.4 Legal ban in Denmark 
Denmark’s arsenal of legal tools also qualifies for a medium defensiveness 
within the first category of legal ban. Similar to other democracies within this 
group, the Danish state has no specific law for banning political parties but has 
a special provision for banning non-democratic groups.  According to Article 78 
Paragraph 2 of the Danish Constitutional Act,  “associations employing 
violence, or aiming at the attainment of their object by violence, by instigation to 
violence, or by similar punishable influence on persons holding other views, 
shall be dissolved by court judgement”52 (Cf. Schubert, 2011: 65; Klamt, 2012: 
60-61).  
                                                          
49
 Terrorism Act 2006, Chapter 11, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2006/11/ 
pdfs/ukpga _20060011_en.pdf (accessed 19.06.2013) 
50
 Article 28 Paragraph 3, Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991, Chapter 24, 
available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1991/24/contents. The article reads “(3) The 
Secretary of State may by order add to Schedule 2 to this Act any organisation that appears to 
him to be concerned in terrorism or in promoting or encouraging it”. 
51
 Article 28 Paragraph 7 lists several organisations such as Red Hand Commando, Ulster 
Freedom Fighters (both banned 1973), Ulster Volunteer Force (banned 1975), Irish National 
Liberation Army (banned 1979), and Irish People’s Liberation Organization (1990).  (accessed 
17.06.2013) 
52
 The Constitutional Act of Denmark of June 5, 1953, available at: http://www.thedanish 
parliament.dk/democracy/the_constitutional_act_of_denmark.aspx (accessed 24.06.2013) 
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4.3.5 Legal ban in Sweden 
The last democracy within the group of democracies with a medium 
defensiveness includes Sweden. Similar to democracies analysed previously, 
the Swedish law does not give the state authorities a clear right to ban political 
parties, but authorises them to ban non-democratic groups (Cf. Widfeld, 2004: 
163; Björk, 2005: 317; Lööw, 2009: 450; Klamt, 2012: 68). Although Article 21 of 
the Constitution53 (The Instrument of Government) states “no limitation [to the 
freedom of association, S.B.] may be imposed solely on grounds of a political, 
religious, cultural or other such opinion”, this right is restricted to military or 
paramilitary groups. Following Article 24 of the Constitution, “Freedom of 
association may be limited only in respect of organisations whose activities are 
of a military or quasi-military nature, or constitute persecution of a population 
group on grounds of ethnic origin, colour, or other such conditions”. According 
to Lööw, the scope of a legal ban outlined within this article refers to any group 
including racist groups, subversive and paramilitary groups (Cf. Lööw, 2009: 
450). 
4.4 Evaluation of findings 
This chapter has provided a systematic assessment of the variations between 
the eight democracies studied in the presence or absence of the right to ban 
non-democratic political parties and/or groups. As specified earlier, this 
category is the most severe among the three categories analysed in terms of a 
constraining effect on the presence and operation of non-democratic parties 
and groups. Two distinct groups have been identified with Austria, Germany, 
and France falling in the range of democracies with a high defensiveness with 
legal mechanisms for banning both parties and groups, while Belgium, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom having a medium 
defensiveness with legal mechanisms against non-democratic groups only. 
Therefore, there is no democracy having a low defensiveness regarding legal 
bans which underlines the significance of this legal mechanism in the fight 
against the non-democratic parties and groups within the democracies studied.  
                                                          
53
 The constitution of Sweden consists of four fundamental laws: the Instrument of Government, 
the Act of Succession, the Freedom of the Press Act, and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of 
Expression. The Constitution of Sweden is available in English at: http://www.riksdagen.se/en/ 
Documents-and-laws/Laws/The-Constitution/ (accessed 20.06.2013) 
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The clustering of countries observed within this category was found to be similar 
to earlier studies, which focused on the cross-national variations in legal ban 
regulations among the democracies studied. For instance, Germany has a 
reputation of actively using legal bans by its government as a means against its 
non-democratic parties and groups (Cf. Franz, 1982: 52ff; Backes, 2006: 275; 
Michael & Minkenberg, 2007). On the other hand, the evidence also echoes 
previous studies which focused on the enforcement of legal ban measure in 
France (Cf. Canu, 1997: 108; Backes, 2006: 275; Camus, 2009: 148).  
However, scholars have stressed that unlike Germany, the legal bans used 
within France are less severe as they can only be enforced against those 
conducting violent actions, while in Germany legal ban can be used against 
groups and parties if they engage in both violent actions and promote non-
democratic ideas (Cf. Backes, 2006: 277; Minkenberg, 2007: 36-37). This 
distinction in severity of legislation was also apparent in earlier studies focusing 
on the use of legal bans within Austria (Cf. Boventer, 1985: 189ff; Auprich, 
2009; Pelinka, 2009: 39ff). Additionally, the United Kingdom is known within 
earlier literature for its lack of legal party ban mechanisms but regularly uses its 
legal group ban provisions against groups engaged in violence and terrorism 
(Cf. Klamt, 2007: 136; Mullender, 2009: 325; Eatwell, 2010: 213ff). Similarly, the 
evidence is in line with a portrayal of the use of a legal ban in Belgium (Cf. 
Swyngedouw, 2009:71; Nandrin, 2000: 42-44). Swyngedouw, for example, 
stated “there is no legal ban on extremist parties, whether from the right or from 
the left. A law prohibiting private militia, however, has existed since 1934” (Cf. 
Swyngedouw, 2009: 71; also Nandrin, 2000: 42-44; Erk, 2005; Brems, 2006). 
The findings regarding Sweden are also consistent with earlier studies, as Lööw 
stated “There is no party prohibition in Sweden, but there is a law against 
organizing paramilitary organisations. If convicted, the organisations can be 
banned” (Lööw, 2009: 450; also cf. Widfeldt, 2004: 163-164). Therefore, the 
earlier literature surrounding these democracies supports the findings of the 
empirical analysis conducted. 
However, the findings of this empirical analysis regarding Denmark did not 
support earlier literature, but instead expanded out understanding of the 
availability of legal bans within this country. Typically, Denmark had a reputation 
within earlier literature for its lack of legal ban mechanisms. Meret, for example, 
100 
 
stated “in contrast to other European countries, Denmark has no constitutional 
prohibition against the formation of political parties and movements having 
contentious ideology and program” (Meret, 2009: 99). The results from this 
empirical analysis reveal a different perspective as Denmark assigns the legal 
ban mechanism a constitutional rank, similar to Germany, allowing its 
Constitutional Court to ban groups who use violence to achieve their goals or 
who instigate violence under Article 78 Paragraph 4 of the Danish Constitution.    
The next chapter will conduct a systematic assessment of the variations across 
individual constraints within the freedom constraints category. It will be 
particularly interesting to ascertain whether the patterns of defensiveness we 
observed in the legal ban category are enhanced or becoming more complex 
when analysing these two categories simultaneously.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF VARIATIONS BETWEEN 
DEMOCRACIES IN THE PRESENCE OF FREEDOM 
CONSTRAINTS 
5.1 Introduction 
While the previous chapter described the variations between the eight 
democracies in the presence or absence of the right to ban non-democratic 
parties and groups, this chapter will analyse the cross-national differences 
between them within the second category of freedom constraints. As detailed in 
Chapter 3.3, this category contains 9 legal constraints which variously limit the 
non-democratic actors in their exercise of freedom of assembly and association 
(constraints 1-4) and freedom of expression (constraints 5-9). Table 7 
systematically maps the eight democracies across these constraints following 
the methodology discussed earlier (for details see Chapter 3.4).   
Table 7: Mapping democracies across freedom constraints   
Country / Indicators DE AT FR BE UK NL DK SE 
1. Constraints on 
public 
demonstrations 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
2. Constraints on the 
freedom of 
assembly 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
3. Constraints on 
building militant 
organisations 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
4. Constraints on the 
wearing of arms 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
5. Constraints on the 
wearing of uniforms 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
6. Constraints on hate 
propaganda 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
7. Constraints on anti-
Holocaust 
propaganda 
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
8. Constraints on 
propaganda against 
democratic 
incumbents 
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
9. Constraints on 
propaganda against 
democratic 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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institutions 
Standardized score: 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 
Level of defensiveness 
in freedom constraints  
High defensiveness Medium defensiveness 
Note: 1 = legal mechanism is present; 0 = legal mechanism is absent; Note: the countries are 
ordered according to the standardized score they achieved across individual indicators. Grey 
shading indicates high defensiveness category. Legend: AT-Austria; BE-Belgium; DE-Germany; 
DK-Denmark; FR-France; NL-Netherlands; SE-Sweden; UK-United Kingdom.  
 
Table 7 indicates that the eight democracies studied have either high 
defensiveness or medium defensiveness within this category, while there is no 
democracy falling in the low defensiveness range. More specifically, Germany, 
Austria, France, and Belgium fall in the range of democracies with a high 
defensiveness having a strong presence of all or the majority of freedom 
constraints within their legal arsenals available, as depicted in Table 7. The 
remaining democracies the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, and 
Sweden have a medium defensiveness within this category, as their legal 
arsenals contain fewer legal constraints on political rights and freedoms of non-
democratic actors. As evident from the table, these democracies tend to have 
more constraints upon the freedom of assembly and association than 
constraints upon the freedom of expression. The subsequent discussion will 
describe each country by category while focusing on the specific set of 
legislative measures in place. 
5.2 Democracies with high defensiveness within the freedom 
constraints category   
Germany, Austria, France and Belgium have strong presence of all or the 
majority of the freedom constraints within their legal arsenals and therefore are 
more defensive than the remaining democracies within this category. The 
following sections discuss the specific regulations in place within each of the 
four countries starting with two more restrictive cases (Germany and Austria) 
followed by the (relatively speaking) less restrictive ones (France and Belgium). 
5.2.1 Freedom constraints in Germany  
The law in Germany has all relevant provisions to constrain the political 
freedoms of its non-democratic actors. With regard to the constraints upon the 
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freedom of assembly and the right to demonstrations Germany has several laws 
that can be used to constrain these freedoms. According to Article 18 of the 
Basic Law, the state can forfeit its non-democratic actors of a range of political 
freedoms, including the freedom of assembly and association and freedom of 
expression if they are used to “combat the free democratic basic order”54. 
According to Article 36 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act, in this case the 
federal government, the state governments, and the Bundestag (lower house of 
the parliament) can file a request with the Federal Constitutional Court to forfeit 
these freedoms55. The Federal Constitutional Court has a sole responsibility to 
declare the right of forfeiture and to define the extent of it56. Furthermore, Article 
8(2) of the Basic Law also stipulates that the right to organise an outdoor 
demonstration can be restricted.  
Several provisions constraining the freedom of assembly and the right to 
demonstrations can also be found within the statutory law. Article 1(2) of the 
Law on Associations and Processions (Versammlungsgesetz, VersG) states 
whoever was forfeited of his political freedoms according to Article 18 of the 
Basic Law, or if a political party or a group have been declared unconstitutional 
by the Federal Constitutional Court according to Article 21(2) and 9(2) of the 
Basic Law, they have no right to organise demonstrations and meetings in 
public places57. Additionally, according to Part III Article 14 of this law, open-air 
                                                          
54
 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Article 18 reads “Whoever abuses the 
freedom of expression, in particular the freedom of the press (paragraph (1) of Article 5), the 
freedom of teaching (paragraph (3) of Article 5), the freedom of assembly (Article 8), the 
freedom of association (Article 9), the privacy of correspondence, posts and 
telecommunications (Article 10), the rights of property (Article 14), or the right of asylum (Article 
16a) in order to combat the free democratic basic order shall forfeit these basic rights”. (cursive 
added S.B.)  
55
 Article 36 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichts-Gesetz, 
BverfGG), available at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/bverfgg/gesamt.pdf 
(accessed 20.02.2013) 
56
 However, the article has not been used yet in the past. One example when the government 
requested to enforce this provision was the case of Gerhard Frey, who was the chairman of the 
right-wing extremist party Deutsche Volksunion (German People’s Union). The Constitutional 
Court has finally stopped the process as it found that the grade of danger to the public 
presented by this party was insufficient (Cf. Thiel, 2003: 141; Backes, 2006: 278). 
57
 Article 1(2) of the law reads “(1) Jedermann hat das Recht, öffentliche Versammlungen und 
Aufzüge zu veranstalten und an solchen Veranstaltungen teilzunehmen. (2) Dieses Recht hat 
nicht: wer das Grundrecht der Versammlungsfreiheit gemäß Artikel 18 des Grundgesetzes 
verwirkt hat, 2. wer mit der Durchführung oder Teilnahme an einer solchen Veranstaltung die 
Ziele einer nach Artikel 21 Abs. 2 des Grundgesetzes durch das Bundesverfassungsgericht für 
verfassungswidrig erklärten Partei oder Teil- oder Ersatzorganisation einer Partei fördern will, 3. 
eine Partei, die nach Artikel 21 Abs. 2 des Grundgesetzes durch das Bundesverfassungsgericht 
für verfassungswidrig erklärt worden ist, oder 4. eine Vereinigung, die nach Artikel 9 Abs. 2 des 
Grundgesetzes verboten ist“. The full text of the Gesetz über Versammlungen und Aufzüge 
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demonstrations require prior permission of state authorities and following the 
regulation stipulated within Article 15 can be banned if such gatherings take 
place in proximate vicinity of Jewish graves and memorials, or if the police 
believe that there is a serious threat to the public order and security. In general, 
outdoor demonstrations organised by non-democratic parties and groups can 
be prohibited on the level of police and ordinary courts (Cf. Minkenberg, 2006: 
39). According to van Donselaar and other scholars, in Germany the formal 
bans of marches of non-democratic groups and political parties have become 
“the rule rather than exception” (Cf. van Donselaar, 2009: 394; also 
Minkenberg, 2006: 39). 
Moreover, several German states have specific rules that can be used to 
prevent non-democratic actors to rent indoor facilities for their meetings. 
Typically, in Germany the indoor meetings are regulated on the level of state 
and municipal authorities. For example, one regulation in the state of 
Mecklenburg stipulates that state authorities are allowed to deny extremist 
groups to hire rooms for public meetings if there is a suspicion that rooms will 
be used for extremist activities58.  
As regards the next constraint upon the right to wear arms during public 
demonstration, this privilege is strictly prohibited according to Articles 113 (2.1) 
and 125a of the German Criminal Code. The act of wearing of arms during 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(VersG) (Law on assemblies and processions) is available at: http://legislationline.org/topics/ 
country/28/topic/15 (accessed 10.02.2013) 
58
 The document which is an administrative ruling is called „Merkblatt ‘Vermietung von 
öffentlichen Einrichtungen an rechts- oder linksextremistische Gruppen‘ (letting public premises 
to right-wing and left-wing extreme groups)“. The document can be viewed at: 
http://www.thueringen.de/imperia/md/content/tmwta/wirtschaft/wirtschaftsverwaltung/2006_06_1
9_merkblatt_extremismusbekaempfungffeinrichtungen.pdf (accessed 20.02.2013). Similar 
provisions exist in other German states also. For example, see a similar provision in the state of 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern available at: http://www.regierung-mv.de/cms2/Regierungsportal_ 
prod/Regierungsportal/downloads/IM/ImmobilienrunderlassMinister.pdf. Furthermore, the 
Business Act (Gewerbeordnung), in §35 prohibits commercial and industrial buildings such as 
pubs be used by extremists. It is enough to launch a case if the director of the pub lets such 
meetings happen in his building („§ 35 Gewerbeuntersagung wegen Unzuverlässigkeit“). For 
example, see the ruling of the Administration Court in Weimar which prohibited the use of a 
public premise to a right-wing extremist group. The ruling from 25.07.2006 (8 E 850/06) can be 
viewed at: http://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Gericht=VG%20Weimar& 
Datum=25.07.2006&Aktenzeichen=8%20E%20850/06 (Cf. Richwin, 2012: 12-15). (both 
accessed 16.02.2013) 
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demonstration is classified as an aggravated crime of rioting and is punished 
with a maximum of 10 years of imprisonment59.  
Moving to the next constraint, several articles within the Law on Assemblies and 
Processions prohibit the wearing of uniforms during public demonstrations and 
in open-air gatherings60. 
As regards the next constraint prohibiting the building of militant organisations, 
this right is prohibited according to Article 9(2) of the Basic Law which stipulates 
that “Associations whose aims or activities contravene the criminal laws, or that 
are directed against the constitutional order or the concept of international 
understanding, shall be prohibited”61. Furthermore, several provisions within the 
Criminal Code also prohibit the building of militant and other radical groups. 
According to Section 127 of the Criminal Code, the building of armed groups is 
prohibited. Additionally, Section 129 of the Code prohibits any other illegal 
organisation aiming at committing offences62. Such crimes are punished by a 
maximum of five years of imprisonment.  
Besides having robust legislation for constraining the right of assembly and 
association, Germany has at its disposal also several laws that can be used to 
constrain the freedom of expression of non-democratic actors. The relevant 
regulations are contained within the Criminal Code. Articles 130 and 131 of the 
Code prohibit speeches inciting hatred against people on the base of their 
cultural and religious descent (“Volksverhetzung”). This provision was 
introduced in 1960, in reaction to a wave of synagogue and cemetery 
desecrations across several places in Germany (Cf. Bleich, 2011: 20). The full 
formulation forbids inciting hatred, calling for violence or arbitrary measures, or 
assaulting human dignity by insulting, maliciously maligning, or defaming 
segments of the population in a manner that is capable of disturbing the public 
                                                          
59
 German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB), available at: http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_stgb/ (accessed 13.02.2013) 
60
 Article 3(1) reads “It is forbidden to wear in public or in a meeting uniforms and similar 
garments as an expression of common political beliefs”.  
61
 Basic Law for the Federal Republc of Germany, Article 9(2). 
62
 Article 127 of the Penal Code reads “Whosoever unlawfully forms or commands a group in 
possession of weapons or other dangerous instruments or joins such a group, provides it with 
weapons or money or otherwise supports it, shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding two 
years or a fine”. Article 129 reads “Whosoever forms an organization the aims or activities of 
which are directed at the commission of offences or whosoever participates in such an 
organization as a member, recruits members or supporters for it or supports it, shall be liable to 
imprisonment not exceeding five years or a fine”. 
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peace. In the beginning of the 1970s, Article 130 was expanded to forbid the 
publication of any materials inciting against racial and religious groups63. 
Moving to the next constsraint forbidding anti-Holocaust propaganda, the 
relevant provision was introduced in the Criminal Code in 1994. According to 
Article 130 Paragraph 3, “Whosoever publicly or in a meeting approves of, 
denies or downplays an act committed under the rule of National Socialism of 
the kind indicated in section 6 (1) of the Code of International Criminal Law, in a 
manner capable of disturbing the public peace shall be liable to imprisonment 
not exceeding five years or a fine”64.  
Several articles within the Criminal Code aim to protect the democratic 
institutions and its incumbents against anti-democratic and malicious 
propaganda. Article 86 of the Criminal Code prohibits the dissemination of 
propaganda material of organisations which were declared unconstitutional by 
the Federal Constitutional Court65. The public display of symbols of prohibited 
parties and organisations is forbidden according to Article 86a of the Criminal 
Code (Cf. Stegbauer, 2007: 2007, 174)66. Article 90(a) forbids the desecration 
of the state flag and a defamatory propaganda against the German state67. 
                                                          
63
 Specifically, Article 130 prohibits writings that incite hatred, violence, or arbitrary measures, or 
which assault the human dignity of others by insulting, maliciously maligning, or defaming 
“segments of the population or a national, racial or religious group, or one characterized by its 
folk customs”.  
64
 Criminal Code, Article 130(3). 
65
 Section 86 is entitled ‘Dissemination of propaganda material of unconstitutional organisations’ 
and reads “(1) Whosoever within Germany disseminates or produces, stocks, imports or exports 
or makes publicly accessible through data storage media for dissemination within Germany or 
abroad, propaganda material 1. of a political party which has been declared unconstitutional by 
the Federal Constitutional Court or a political party or organisation which has been held by final 
decision to be a surrogate organization of such a party; 2. of an organization which has been 
banned by final decision because it is directed against the constitutional order or against the 
idea of the comity of nations or which has been held by final decision to be a surrogate 
organisation of such a banned organization; 3. of a government, organization or institution 
outside the Federal Republic of Germany active in pursuing the objectives of one of the parties 
or organizations indicated in Nos 1 and 2 above; or 4. propaganda materials the contents of 
which are intended to further the aims of a former National Socialist organisation, shall be liable 
to imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine”. 
66
 Article 86a reads “(1) Whosoever 1. domestically distributes or publicly uses, in a meeting or 
in written materials (section 11(3)) disseminated by him, symbols of one of the parties or 
organisations indicated in section 86(1) Nos 1, 2 and 4; or 2. produces, stocks, imports or 
exports objects which depict or contain such symbols for distribution or use in Germany or 
abroad in a manner indicated in No 1, shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years 
or a fine. (2) Symbols within the meaning of subsection (1) above shall be in particular flags, 
insignia, uniforms and their parts, slogans and forms of greeting. Symbols which are so similar 
as to be mistaken for those named in the 1st sentence shall be equivalent to them”. 
67
 Article 90a (1-3) of the Criminal Code reads “(1) Whosoever publicly, in a meeting or through 
the dissemination of written materials (section 11(3)) 1. insults or maliciously expresses 
contempt of the Federal Republic of Germany or one of its states or its constitutional order; or 2. 
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Specifically, the law forbids speeches and written material that insult or 
maliciously express contempt against the Federal Republic of Germany, any of 
its states, or against its democratic constitutional order. Furthermore, Article 
90(b) of the Code punishes defamatory speech directed against the 
constitutional organs of the German state or propagating against its 
constitutional principles68. Lastly, the defamation of the state president is 
prohibited according to Paragraph 90 of the Code.  
5.2.2 Freedom constraints in Austria 
Austria’s arsenal of freedom constraints also qualifies this democracy for a high 
defensiveness within this category. As regards the constraints upon the 
freedom of assembly and association, Austria has several provisions within the 
Law on Assemblies (Versammlungsgesetz, VersG), introduced in 1953, that 
constrain this freedom69. According to Article 2 of this law, any meeting is 
subject to a prior notification with responsible state authorities and can be 
banned if they believe that such an assembly can represent a threat to the 
public order or violate the law70. Furthemore, according to Article 11, any 
gathering of people has to appoint a responsible to observe the order and that 
no unlawful expressions are used during the meeting. Moreover, state 
                                                                                                                                                                          
insults the colors, flag, coat of arms or the anthem of the Federal Republic of Germany or one of 
its states shall be liable to imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine. (2) Whosoever 
removes, destroys, damages, renders unusable or defaces, or otherwise insults by mischief a 
publicly displayed flag of the Federal Republic of Germany or one of its states or a national 
emblem installed by a public authority of the Federal Republic of Germany or one of its states 
shall incur the same liability. The attempt shall be punishable. (3) The penalty shall be 
imprisonment not exceeding five years or a fine if the offender by the act intentionally supports 
efforts against the continued existence of the Federal Republic of Germany or against its 
constitutional principles”.  
68
 Article 90b of the Criminal Code reads “Anti-constitutional defamation of constitutional organs 
(1) Whosoever publicly, in a meeting or through the dissemination of written materials (section 
11(3)) defames a constitutional organ, the government or the constitutional court of the 
Federation or of a state or one of their members in this capacity in a manner  detrimental to the 
respect for the state and thereby intentionally supports efforts against the continued existence 
of the Federal Republic of Germany or against its constitutional principles, shall be liable to 
imprisonment from three months to five years. 
69
 Versammlungsgesetz 1953 (Law on Assemblies), available at: http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/ 
GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10000249&ShowPrintPrevi
ew=True (in German) (accessed 12.04.2013) 
70
 Article 6 states that “Meetings whose purpose runs counter to the criminal law or the holding 
of which represents a threat to the public safety and public welfare shall be banned by the 
authorities”. Articles 13 and 14 add that “(1) If a meeting is held in contravention of the 
provisions of this, it shall be banned by the authorities (Articles 16 and 17) or be solved. (2) 
Similarly, an assembly must be dissolved - even if it is held legally – if it occurs that during such 
meeting illegal actions take place or when the meeting assumes public order threatening 
character”. The arrangements of Articles 13 and 14 shall also apply to public marches and 
demonstrations“ (own translation). 
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authorties have the right to send one or more representatives to be present and 
observe the meeting, and in case if the authorities apprehend that such 
congregations contradict the law or likely to stir a breach of the public order they 
are authorized to dissolve it (Articles 12 and 13)71.  
Concerning the next constraint restricting the right to wear arms during public 
demonstration, this freedom is prohibited according to Article 9a of the Law on 
Assemblies also. The relevant provision states „At meetings mentioned in 
Section 2 it is prohibited to participate while carrying weapons. Likewise it is 
prohibited to anyone to carry items that can be appropriate and be used to exert 
violence against other people or damage property” (own translation)72.  
Moving to the next constraint, it is prohibited to wear uniforms and any other 
symbols associated with National-Socialism according to the Law on Badges 
(Abzeichengesetz) introduced in 196073. According to Article 1(1) of this law, 
„Badges, uniforms or parts of uniforms of a prohibited organisation in Austria 
must not be worn or put on display, shown or distributed to the public. 
Emblems, symbols and labels are also be regarded as badges”. According to 
Article 3 of this law, whoever violates its provisions is punishable with 
imprisonment of one month and a fine of 4.000 Euro.  
Moving to the constraint upon the building of militant organisations, according to 
Article 246 of the Penal Code the formation of organisations hostile to the state 
(‘staatsfeindliche Verbindungen’) is prohibited. This includes all organisations 
aiming to destroy the democratic form of government74.  
                                                          
71
 For example, in 2006 the right to the freedom to demonstrate was denied to a group led by 
the “Documentation Centre of the Welser Defence” (Dokumentationszentrum des Welser 
Widerstandes). The demonstration was planned to demonstrate under the slogan “Multikulti 
beenden. Für unser Heimatland!” (End to the multi-culti. For our homeland). The Federal 
Constitutional Court declared in 2006 that it was not unlawful to ban the demonstration on the 
basis of Article 6 of the Law on Assemblies. The copy of the jurisdiction (B1954/06-7) can be 
viewed at: http://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Gericht=VfGH%20%D6sterreich 
&Datum=16.03.2007&Aktenzeichen=B%201954/06 (accessed 17.04.2013) 
72
 Law on Assemblies, Article 9a.  
73
 Bundesgesetz vom 5. April 1960, mit dem bestimmte Abzeichen verboten werden 
(Abzeichengesetz 1960). StF: BGBl. Nr. 84/1960, available at: 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=1
0005262  
74
 Article 246 of the Penal Code titled ‘Staatsfeindliche Verbindungen’ (state hostile 
organizations) states “Whoever establishes an organisation whose if not exclusive purpose is to 
undermine the independence, or in the State Constitution defined state constitutional order or 
any government institution of the Republic of Austria and one of its provinces shall be punished 
with imprisonment from six months to five years” (own translation).  
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Austria is in a similar position to that of Germany as far as the constraints on the 
freedom of expression are concerned. The main provisions are stipulated within 
its Penal Code. According to Article 302 of the Code, the state authorities have 
the right to punish discriminatory speech against national minorities. The article 
states ”Whoever requests, prompts, or attempts to induce others to commit 
hostilities against the various nationalities (ethnic groups), religious groups or 
other organisations, specific classes or segments of the civil society or against 
authorized corporations or in general requests, prompts or attempts to induce 
the inhabitants of the state to hostile partisanship among themselves, commits 
a gross misdemeanour insofar as the act does not constitute a more severely 
punishable deed”75. Furthermore, several articles within the Penal Code (Article 
283 (incitement to discrimination; ‘Volksverhetzung’), Article 302, and Article 
321 (genocide; ‘Völkermord’)) provide legal tools that can be used to forbid 
racist propaganda and actions directed against individuals or groups of other 
ethnic, racial, or cultural backgrounds76.  
Moving to the next constraint upon the distribution of anti-democratic 
propaganda in public, Austria has specific provisions within its Penal Code that 
can be used to punish the distribution of malicious propaganda and contempt 
for constitutional organs and democratic authorities77. Similarly, there are 
several provisions within the Penal Code to protect the state form and state 
symbols against disgraceful propaganda78. According to Article 248 of the 
                                                          
75
 Penal Code, Article 302. 
76
 Article 283(1) reads „Whoever publicly, in a manner that is likely to endanger the public order, 
or who incites to violence against a church or religious community or another groups of people 
on the ground of race, color, language, religion or belief, nationality, or national or ethnic origin, 
gender, disability, age or sexual orientation is punished with imprisonment up to two to years”. 
Article 321(1) reads „Whoever has the intention to kill or inflict serious damage to a group of 
people in whole or in part because of their membership in a specific church or religious 
community, or because of their membership in another race, or tribe, or a specific social group 
(Article 84 Paragraph 1) or causes them harm that are likely to cause the death of all the 
members or part of the group, or imposes measures aimed to prevent births within the group, or 
children of the group by force or threat of violence shall be punished with imprisonment for life“ 
(own translation).  
77
 Article 116 of the Penal Code entitled ‚Public insults of a constitutional organ, or of armed 
forces, or of an official body‘ gives the right to punish „Acts which are defined according to 
Article 111 as defamation (üble Nachrede, S.B.) or which are defined according to Article 115 
as libel (Beleidigung, S.B.) are also punishable, if they are directed against National Council 
(Nationalrat), or the Bundesrat, the Federal Assembly (Bundesversammlung) or a Landtag, or 
the Armed forces, or against an official body (Behörde) and committed in public. 
78
 Article 248 of the Penal Act reads „(1) Whoever insults or belittles in a hateful way the 
Republic of Austria and one of its provinces is to be punished with imprisonment up to one year. 
(2) Whoever insults, belittles or otherwise expresses himself in a hateful way about the flag of 
the Republic of Austria or one of its provinces shown at a publicly accessible event, or an 
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Code, such acts are punished either with an imprisonment up to six months or a 
fine.  
Lastly, Austria prohibits any speech and propaganda material denying 
Holocaust. The relevant provision was introduced by the Prohibition Law 
(Verbotsgesetz) in 1992 (Cf. Fennema, 2000: 137). According to Paragraph 
3(h) of this law whoever, publicly through speech or writing, denies the crimes 
against humanity committed by National-Socialism during World War II is 
punished with an imprisonment from 1 year up to 20 years (Cf. Bailer, 2011: 
43)79. Over the past decades, this law was frequently used to punish the 
members of the right-wing extremist Freedom Party of Austria for denying the 
Holocaust (Cf. Pelinka, 2009: 45).  
5.2.3 Freedom constraints in France  
France’s legal arsenal of constraints upon political freedoms of non-democratic 
actors also qualifies this democracy for a high defensiveness within the second 
category. However, France has no legislation that can be used to protect its 
democratic institutions against anti-democratic propaganda, which makes it 
(relatively) less defensive than the countries already discussed.  
Regarding the range of constraints on the freedom of assembly and 
association, France’s regulations are very robust. According to Article 431-3 of 
the French Penal Code all assemblies require a prior permission of the French 
authorities, and any unlawful assembly can be banned if the state authorities 
believe that it can represent a serious threat to the breach of a public order80. A 
                                                                                                                                                                          
authority emblem, or the national anthem is punished with imprisonment up to six months or a 
fine up to 360 daily rates” (own translation).   
79
 Article 3h of the Prohibition Law (Verbotsgesetz) reads “Nach §3g wird auch bestraft (...) wer 
in einem Druckwerk, im Rundfunk oder in einem anderen Medium oder wer sonst öffentlich auf 
eine Weise, daß es vielen Menschen zugänglich wird, den nationalsozialistischen Völkermord 
oder andere nationalsozialistische Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit leugnet, gröblich 
verharmlost, gutheißt oder zu rechtfertigen sucht“. 
80
 Article 431-3 of the French Penal Code stipulates that any unlawful assembly that is one that 
is likely to violate the public order can be disbanded. The article reads “An unlawful assembly is 
any gathering of persons on the public highway or in any place open to the public where it is 
liable to breach the public peace. An unlawful assembly may be dispersed by the forces of 
public order (…) by the prefect, the sub-prefect, the mayor or one of his deputies, any judicial 
police officer in charge of public safety, or any other judicial police officer, bearing the insignia of 
their office”. The official English translation of the French Penal Code is available at:  
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/1957/13715/.../Code_33.pdf (accessed 12.03.2013). 
Further provisions in the Penal Code prohibit the organization of unlawful assembly (Article 430-
6). Article 431-9 states that “„[t]he following offences are punished by six months' imprisonment 
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participation in an assembly that was previously prohibited is punished by a fine 
of 15.000 Euro (Article 431-4). Numerous provisions within the Penal Code 
prohibit the organisation and participation in an unlawful demonstration, that is 
one which was previously prohibited or which was not lawfully notified81. A 
participation in an unlawful assembly whilst carrying a weapon is punished by 
three years of imprisonment and a fine of 45.000 Euro (Article 431-5). In the 
past, several members of non-democratic groups were punished on base of this 
provision (Cf. Canu, 1997: 122).  
Furthermore, the law prohibits the wearing of uniforms and symbols of 
prohibited and unlawful organisations, particularly those using the symbols of 
National-Socialism. Article R645-1 of the Penal Code states “Whoever wears or 
exhibits a uniform, insignia or emblem reminiscent of the uniforms, insignia or 
emblems that are worn or displayed either by members of a criminal 
organisation declared under Article 9 of the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal annexed to the London Agreement from August 8, 1945, or by a 
person convicted by a French or international court of a crime or crimes against 
humanity under Articles 211-1 to 212-3 mentioned by law No. 64-1326 of 26 
December 1964 is punished by a fine for offenses of the fifth class” (Cf. Errera, 
1991: 15)82.  
Regarding the next constraint prohibiting the formation of militant organisations, 
Articles 412-3 and 412-4 of the Penal Code stipulate that the building of 
“insurrectional movements” which aim to usurp the lawful authority is strictly 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and a fine of €7,500: 1° the organization of a demonstration on the public highway without filing 
a prior notice pursuant to the conditions laid down by law; 2° the organization of a 
demonstration on the public highway which has been prohibited pursuant to the conditions laid 
down by the law; 3° drawing up an inaccurate or incomplete notice liable to mislead about the 
objective or conditions of the proposed demonstration”. Article 431-3 authorizes the relevant 
authorities “to disperse any unlawful assembly”.  
81
 See Articles 431-9 to 431-12 of the Penal Code. For example, Article 431-9 states that “The 
following offences are punished by six months' imprisonment and a fine of €7,500: 1° the 
organisation of a demonstration on the public highway without filing a prior notice pursuant to 
the conditions laid down by law; 2° the organisation of a demonstration on the public highway 
which has been prohibited pursuant to the conditions laid down by the law; 3° drawing up an 
inaccurate or incomplete notice liable to mislead about the objective or conditions of the 
proposed demonstration”. 
82
 Article R645-1 of the Penal Code, available at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode 
Article.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000006419560&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719 (in French) 
(accessed 19.03.2013).  
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forbidden83. Furthermore, according to Section IV Articles 431-13 to 431-17, a 
participation, maintenance and re-establishment of a combatant group is 
punished by three years of imprisonment and a fine of 45.000 Euro84.  
France has the majority of provisions that can be used to constrain the freedom 
of expression of non-democratic actors although its arsenal is less expansive 
compared with democracies analysed previously. Notably so, France has 
numerous laws that prohibit verbal or print propaganda inciting racial 
discrimination, hatred and violence. According to Bird, the anti-racist legislation 
in France is among the strictest and most vigorously enforced of any other 
country in Europe (Cf. Bird, 2000: 400). The first anti-racist law was introduced 
in 1881 and was enshrined within the freedom of press act which forbade verbal 
or print expressions insulting and defaming other people on the ground of their 
racial or ethnic origin85. During the post-war period, two new laws were 
introduced to combat racist propaganda, the Pleven Law and the Gayssot Law, 
both named after the names of their drafters René Pleven and Jean-Claude 
Gayssot86.  
The anti-racism ‘Pleven’ law was ratified in 1971 and implemented in July 1972 
(Cf. Fennema, 2000: 127)87. Similar to Germany, the adoption of this law was 
elicited by a resurgence of racial violence across the country. One of the 
drafters of this law, the Minister of Justice Jean Foyer (1962-1967), stated to 
justify the introduction of this law, “it is nevertheless true that racist inspired acts 
are particularly odious and that it may therefore be useful to foresee a specific 
punishment against them” (quoted in Bleich, 2011: 21). The new law contained 
extensive provisions against racist speech. According to the new law, it became 
                                                          
83
 According to Article 412-3 an “insurrectional movement” is a movement which “consists of any 
collective violence liable to endanger the institutions of the Republic or violate the integrity of the 
national territory”. 
84
 According to Article 431-13 of the Penal Code, a combatant group is “any group of persons 
holding or having access to weapons, which has an organised hierarchy and is liable to breach 
of the public peace”.  
85
 Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse (Law on the freedom of the press), available 
at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070722&dateTexte 
=20080312 (in French) (accessed 22.03.2013) 
86
 According to entries in Wikipedia, René Pleven (1901-1993) was the French Justice Minister 
during 1969-1973. Jean-Claude Gayssot was a member of the French Parliament (1986-1997) 
for the Communist party. From 1997 to 2002 he was the French Transport Minister under the 
government of Lionel Jospin.  
87
 Law of Pleven Loi n° 72-546 du 1 juillet 1972 relative à la lutte contre le racisme, available at: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000864827 (accessed 23. 
03.2013) 
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illegal to incite racial hatred or to use language that was racially defamatory, 
contemptuous, or offensive (Cf. Bird, 2000: 399).  
The Gayssot law, passed by the parliament on July 13, 1990, was introduced to 
further strengthen the existing anti-racism legislation in France. Article 1 of this 
law declared “[a]ny discrimination based on membership or non-membership of 
an ethnic group, nation, race or religion is prohibited”88.  
Another law to prohibit racist propaganda is the Toubon Law89, introduced in 
September 1996 and named after Jacques Toubon, the Minister of Culture at 
that time. The law was introduced to regulate the use of the French language in 
public, academia, telecommunication, and business. According to Fennema, 
this law became “the culmination point of anti-racist legislation in France” (Cf. 
Fennema, 2000: 129). One of the key functions of this law was to outlaw any 
message against any person or group purported to insult their dignity, honour or 
consideration for the reason of origin, ethnicity or nationality (Cf. Fennema, 
2000: 129). The law foresees heavy fines and imprisonment.  
The most recent law, the Lellouche Law, named after the parliamentary deputy 
Pierre Lellouche and enacted in 2003, is broader in focus as it forbids also 
crimes motivated by racism90. Lastly, Article R624-3 of the Penal Code 
stipulates that defamation of any person on the ground of ethnic, national, 
racial, or religious difference is punishable91.  
Moving to the constraint on anti-Holocaust propaganda, the relevant law was 
introduced during the 1990s within the press law of 1881. According to Article 
24bis of this law, it is forbidden to contest the existence of crimes against 
                                                          
88
 Loi n° 90-615 du 13 juillet 1990 tendant à réprimer tout acte raciste, antisémite ou 
xénophobe, available at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000 
000532990 (in French). (accessed 23.03.2013) 
89
 The full text of the Toubon Law can be viewed at the website of La Délégation Générale à la 
Langue Française at: http://www.dglf.culture.gouv.fr/droit/loi-gb.htm (accessed 26.03.2013) 
90
 Loi n° 2003-88 du 3 février 2003 visant à aggraver les peines punissant les infractions à 
caractère raciste, antisémite ou xénophobe (1) (Lellouche law), available at: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000781920&dateTexte=&
categorieLien=id (accessed 30.03.2013) 
91
 Article R624-3 of the Penal Code stipulates that “La diffamation non publique commise 
envers une personne ou un groupe de personnes à raison de leur origine ou de leur 
appartenance ou de leur non-appartenance, vraie ou supposée, à une ethnie, une nation, une 
race ou une religion déterminée est punie de l'amende prévue pour les contraventions de la 4e 
classe”.  
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humanity committed by the Nazis during World War II, including revisionist 
speeches (Cf. Troper, 1999: 1239)92.  
As previously mentioned, France does not have a law protecting its democratic 
institutions against antidemocratic propaganda. The existing provision within the 
Penal Code is limited to the protection of the official symbolic of the state, such 
as the national anthem or tricolor from insulting in public (Article 433-5-1)93.  
However, there is a provision in law that aims to protect the democratic 
incumbents from contempt94. According to Article 433-5 of the Penal Code, the 
contempt is defined as “words, gestures or threats, written documents or 
pictures of any type not released to the public, or the sending of any article 
addressed to a person discharging a public service mission, acting in the 
discharge or on the occasion of his office, and liable to undermine his dignity or 
the respect owed to the office that he holds”. According to this article, the 
contempt against public authorities is punished by a six months of an 
imprisonment or a fine of 7.500 Euro. 
5.2.4 Freedom constraints in Belgium 
The last democracy within the group of democracies with a high defensiveness 
in freedom constraints category includes Belgium. Belgium’s arsenal of legal 
constraits is similar to that of France analysed previously. Like France, Belgium 
                                                          
92
 Article 24bis reads «Seront punis des peines prévues par le sixième alinéa de l'article 24 
ceux qui auront contesté, par un des moyens énoncés à l'article 23, l'existence d'un ou 
plusieurs crimes contre l'humanité tels qu'ils sont définis par l'article 6 du statut du tribunal 
militaire international annexé à l'accord de Londres du 8 août 1945 et qui ont été commis soit 
par les membres d'une organisation déclarée criminelle en application de l'article 9 dudit statut, 
soit par une personne reconnue coupable de tels crimes par une juridiction française ou 
internationale». 
93
 “The act of publicly insulting the national anthem or tricolour flag at a demonstration 
organised or regulated by the public authorities is punished by a fine of €7,500. Where it is 
committed as a group action, the insult is punished by six months' imprisonment and a fine of 
€7,500”. 
94
 Article 433-5 stipulates that “Contempt is punished by a fine of €7,500. It consists of words, 
gestures or threats, written documents or pictures of any type not released to the public, or the 
sending of any article addressed to a person discharging a public service mission, acting in the 
discharge or on the occasion of his office, and liable to undermine his dignity or the respect 
owed to the office that he holds. When it is addressed to a person holding public authority, 
contempt is punished by six months' imprisonment and a fine of €7,500. When it is addressed to 
a person discharging a public service mission and the offence is committed inside a school or 
an educational establishment, or in the surroundings of such an establishment at a time when 
the pupils are arriving or leaving the premises, contempt is punished by six months' 
imprisonment and by a fine for €7,500. When committed during a meeting, contempt under the 
first paragraph is punished by six months' imprisonment and a fine of €7,500, and the contempt 
set out in the second paragraph is punished by one year's imprisonment and a fine of €15,000”. 
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has no legislation to protect its democratic institutions from malicious 
propaganda. 
Starting with the constraints upon the freedom of assembly and association, 
according to the Law on Public Safety and Convenience of Passage all public 
meetings and processions in France are subject to a prior permission of the 
public authorities95. Thereby, according to the Law on Private Militia adopted as 
early as in 193496, the public marches of groups which have the appearance of 
military troops or which threaten the public order are strictly forbidden97. 
According to the of the Law on Working of Police Forces (‘Loi sur la fonction de 
police’) adopted in 1992, the police forces are charged to disperse the 
gatherings of groups as specified within the Law on Private Militia98.  
The wearing of uniforms of militant and paramilitary organisations as well as the 
appearance in the public with offensive weapons are subject to either an 
imprisonment from eight days to six months or a fine from 26 to 200 Euro 
according to Article 2bis99. The building of militant or para-military organisations 
                                                          
95
 Article 31 of the law states that “Tout rassemblement, manifestation ou cortege, de quelque 
nature que ce soit, sur l'espace public ou dans les galeries et passages etablis sur assiette 
privee, accessibles au public, est subordonne a l’autorisation du bourgmestre”. Loi de la 
securité publique et de la commodité du passage (Law on Public Safety and Convenience of 
Passage), available at: http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/41/topic/15 (in French) 
(accessed 23.04.2013) 
96
 Loi interdisant les milices privées, 29 Juillet 1934. Coordination officieuse en langue 
allemande, Belgisch Staatsblad, 30.05.2012, Ed. 3, Moniteur Belge, 30995 (available 
at:http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/arch_al.pl?=&sql=(text+contains+(''))&rech=1&languag
e=fr&tri=dd+AS+RANK&numero=1&table_name=loi&F=&cn=1934072930&caller=archive&fromt
ab=loi&la=F&ver_arch=005) (in German) (accessed 23.04.2013). According to Nandrin, the 
adoption of the law was a response to increased upsurge of militant and para-military 
organizations across the country in the 1930s (Cf. Nandrin, 2000: 42). 
97
 Article 1(1) of the law reads that “das Auftreten in der Öffentlichkeit von Privatpersonen in 
Gruppen, die entweder durch die Übungen, die sie machen, oder durch die Uniform 
beziehungsweise Ausrüstungsteile, die sie tragen, wie militärische Truppen aussehen“ are 
prohibited.  
98
 Chapter IV, Article 22 of the law reads “Les services de police sont chargés de disperser les 
attroupements qui s'accompagnent de crimes et de délits contre les personnes et les biens ou 
d'infractions à la loi du 29 juillet 1934 interdisant les milices privées”. See the full text of Loi sur 
la fonction de police, 1992 (Law about the Working of Police Forces), available at: 
http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/41/topic/15 (available in French, German, and 
English) (accessed 12.03.2013). 
99
 Article 2 of the Law on Private Militia states “Die Uniformen und Abzeichen der Milizen oder 
Organisationen oder derer, die in der Öffentlichkeit auftreten, sowie die Waffen, das Material 
und alle Gegenstände, die ihnen dienen oder dazu bestimmt sind, ihnen zu dienen, werden 
beschlagnahmt. Das Gericht ordnet die Einziehung der im vorliegenden Artikel erwähnten 
Gegenstände an, selbst wenn sie dem Verurteilten nicht gehören”. Article 2bis adds that „Wer 
bei oder anlässlich einer Kundgebung oder bei oder anlässlich einer Versammlung im Besitz 
eines Gegenstands entdeckt wird, der eine Gefahr für die öffentliche Sicherheit darstellt, wird 
mit einer Gefängnisstrafe von acht Tagen bis zu sechs Monaten und mit einer Geldbuße von 
sechsundzwanzig bis zu zweihundert [EUR] oder mit nur einer dieser Strafen bestraft“. 
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is also prohibited. Article 1 of the Law on Private Militia states clearly “[a]ny 
private militia and any other organisation of individuals whose purpose is to use 
force in order to replace the army or the police or in order to interfere in their 
actions or to take their place, is prohibited” (own translation).  
Belgium has the majority of legal measures to constrain the freedom of 
expression. The hate and racist propaganda is prohibited according to the 
Moureaux Law which was adopted in 1981 and named after the Minister of 
Justice Philippe Moureaux. Similar to other European countries, this law was 
adopted to implement the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) (Cf. Fennema, 2000: 137). The law 
was tightened in 1993 and 1994 respectively. According to Part III Article 12 of 
this law, “[i]n matters within the scope of this Act, any form of discrimination is 
prohibited. For the purposes of this title, discrimination means: direct 
discrimination; indirect discrimination; instruction to discriminate; harassment” 
(own translation)100. This law also punishes a membership or support of groups 
and organisations which propagate or engage in discrimination and segregation 
(Cf. Fennema, 2000: 128; Bleich & Lambert, 2013: 133). In the past, this law 
was applied several times, although, as Fennema noted, the enforcement of the 
anti-discrimination legislation in Belgium was not as severe as it was in 
Germany or France (Cf. Fennema, 2000: 129).  
Similar to France discussed previously, Belgium has no provisions in its law to 
protect the state and its democratic institutions against a malicious anti-
democratic propaganda101. However, there are several provisions within the 
Belgian Penal Code102 which aim to protect the democratic authorities from 
defamation and libel. According to Article 275 of the Penal Code, any 
outrageous act, be it through a speech or behaviour, directed against 
democratic incumbents is punished with an imprisonment from fifteen days to 
                                                          
100
 Loi tendant à réprimer certains actes inspirés par le racisme ou la xénophobie (Law aiming 
at punishing certain acts inspired by racism and xenophobia), 30 July 1981, available at: 
http://legislationline.org/topics/country/41/topic/84 (in French) (accessed 23.03.2013) 
101
 Nandrin mentioned that during World War I, a Royal Decree was passed on 11th October 
1916 which aimed to protect the democratic government from a malicious anti-democratic 
propaganda spread by Communists, Trostkists, and Nazi movements across the country. 
However, this law was in force only for the time of war and repudiated after the end of WWI (Cf. 
Nandrin, 2000: 45). 
102
 Code Pénale, 8 June 1867, available at: http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_ 
lg.pl?language=fr&la=F&table_name=loi&cn=1867060801 (in French) (accessed 29.03.2013) 
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six months and a fine from 50 to 300 Euro103. Furthermore, according to Articles 
445 and 446 the spreading of defamatory news (“une dénonciation 
calomnieuse”) against state incumbents is forbidden104.  
Similar to other democracies with a high defensiveness, Belgium has a specific 
legislation which punishes any propaganda materials that negate or ridicule the 
Holocaust against Jewish people during World War II, as well as other crimes 
against humanity. The majority of these provisions are outlined within the Penal 
Code105. Additionally, the state has adopted a special Holocaust Denial Law on 
March 23, 1995, further extended in 1999. According to Article 1 of this law, 
“Whoever (…) denies, grossly minimises, attempts to justify, or approves the 
genocide committed by the German National Socialist regime during World War 
II, shall be punished by an imprisonment from eight days to one year and a fine 
from twenty six francs to five thousand francs”106.  
5.3 Democracies with medium defensiveness within the 
freedom constraints category 
Unlike Germany, Austria, France and Belgium, the remaining four democracies 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden fall in the range of 
                                                          
103
 “Sera puni d'un emprisonnement de quinze jours à six mois et d'une amende de cinquante à 
trois cents [euros], celui qui aura outragé par faits, paroles, gestes ou menaces, un membre des 
Chambres législatives dans l'exercice ou à l'occasion de l'exercice de son mandat, un Ministre, 
un membre de la Cour constitutionnelle ou un magistrat de l'ordre administratif ou un membre 
de l'ordre judiciaire ou un officier de la force publique en service actif, dans l'exercice ou à 
l'occasion de l'exercice de leurs fonctions” 
104
 Article 447 of the Penal Code states “Le prévenu d'un délit de calomnie pour imputations 
dirigées, à raison des faits relatifs à leurs fonctions, soit contre les dépositaires ou agents de 
l'autorité ou contre toute personne ayant un caractère public, soit contre tout corps constitué, 
sera admis à faire, par toutes les voies ordinaires, la preuve des faits imputés, sauf la preuve 
contraire par les mêmes voies. S'il s'agit d'un fait qui rentre dans la vie privée, l'auteur de 
l'imputation ne pourra faire valoir, pour sa défense, aucune autre preuve que celle qui résulte 
d'un jugement ou de tout autre acte authentique. Si le fait imputé est l'objet d'une poursuite 
répressive ou d'une dénonciation sur laquelle il n'a pas été statué, l'action en calomnie sera 
suspendue jusqu'au jugement définitif, ou jusqu'à la décision définitive de l'autorité compétente. 
(Dans le cas où l'action publique ou l'action disciplinaire relative au fait imputé est éteinte, le 
dossier concernant cette action est joint au dossier de l'action en calomnie et l'action en 
calomnie est reprise. Dans le cas d'une décision de classement sans suite ou de non-lieu quant 
à l'action relative au fait imputé, l'action en calomnie est reprise, sans préjudice d'une 
suspension de cette action si l'enquête relative au fait imputé connaît de nouveaux 
développements judiciaires”. 
105
 See in particular Articles 136bis, 136ter, 136quater, 136sexies and 136septies within the 
Penal Code. 
106
 Loi tendant à réprimer la négation, la minimisation, la justification ou l'approbation du 
génocide commis par le régime national-socialiste allemand pendant la seconde guerre 
mondiale, 23 March 1995, available at: http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl 
?language=fr&la=F&table_name=loi&cn=1995032331 (accessed 30.03.2013) 
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democracies with a medium defensiveness within this category. Compared to 
the four highly defensive countries, the legal arsenals in these democracies 
cover fewer of regulations based on which political freedoms could be 
constrained. The subsequent sections will analyse the legal situation within 
these countries in greater detail. 
5.3.1 Freedom constraints in the United Kingdom 
The UK’s arsenal of legal constraints entitles this democracy for a medium 
defensiveness within the freedom constraints category. Regarding the 
constraints on the freedom of assembly and association, the UK has several 
provisions within its law that can be used to constrain these freedoms. The key 
legislation is the Public Order Act of 1936 (afterwards POA 1936), which was 
already analysed within the previous chapter focusing on the legal bans. As 
stated previously, this law was introduced in reaction to the grown activities of 
various non-democratic groups in the United Kingdom during the 1930s. The 
act provides the government with several provisions to control the assemblies 
and public processions of the non-democratic groups in the country (Cf. Ewing 
& Gearty, 1990: 86). According to Section 3 Paragraph 1 and 2 of this act, all 
public demonstrations and meetings are subject to a prior notification of the 
police authorities. After the receipt of such notification, the senior police officer 
has the right to either impose conditions concerning the route or the places 
where the demonstration or meeting take place, or prohibit them at all, if the 
police officer apprehends that such event might “occasion serious public 
disorder”. According to Ewing and Gearty, this provision was extensively used 
during the government of Margaret Thatcher (1979 - 1990) to ban anti-
government marches organised by miners’ trade unions during 1984 - 1985 (Cf. 
Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 86, 113).  
Furthermore, Section 2(3) of the POA 1936 gives the police authorities the right 
to search in and even disband the properties and premises where the non-
democratic groups gather107. A similar provision is contained within the Equality 
Act 2006108. According to Article 57(4) of this Act, a minister can „restrict the 
                                                          
107
 Public Order Act, 1936 (1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6. Ch.6), available at: http://www.legislation. 
gov.uk/ukpga/Edw8and1Geo6/1/6/contents (accessed 02.06.2013)      
108
 Equality Act 2010, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/15/pdfs/ukpga_ 
20100015_en.pdf (accessed 05.06.2013) 
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provision of goods, facilities or services in the course of activities carried on in 
the performance of his functions in connection with or in respect of an 
organization to which this section relates”. This article refers primarily to 
religious and belief organisations.  
Additionally, Section 1 of the POA 1936 prohibits the wearing of uniforms “in 
any public place or at any public meeting” that could signify a person’s 
association with any political organisation or with a promotion of any political 
goal109. During the 1930s, this provision was used against the British Nazi 
groups to prohibit their members to wear the black shirts. More recently this 
provision was used against the party Sinn Fein to prohibit its members to wear 
the Basque berets (Cf. Eatwell, 2010: 214). Furthermore, according to Section 
4(1) of the POA 1936 the wearing of arms during meetings and public 
demonstrations is forbidden110. Section 2 forbids the building of paramilitary 
organisations.  
Another key legislation used frequently by the British government to constrain 
its non-democraric groups in the exercise of the freedom of assembly and 
association is the Public Order Act of 1986 (afterwards POA 1986)111. 
According to some scholars, the POA 1986 has significantly expanded “the 
extensive list of police public order powers” (Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 117-118). In 
essence, the Act extended the preventive powers of the police to impose a total 
ban on meetings and demonstrations if a concern arises for a “serious public 
disorder”112. According to Section 11(1) of the Act, all proposals to hold a public 
demonstration or a meeting should be submitted to the police for its approval at 
least six days before the planned event and can be rejected if “the chief officer 
                                                          
109
 Public Order Act 1936, Secton 1. 
110
 Section 4(1) reads “Any person who, while present at any public meeting or on the occasion 
of any public procession, has with him any offensive weapon, otherwise than in pursuance of 
lawful authority, shall be guilty of an offence”. 
111
 Public Order Act 1986 (Chapter 64), available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/1986/64 (of particular relevance to the freedom of assembly are sections 11, 12, 13, 14, 
14A, 14B, 14C, 15 and 16 of the Act) (accessed 04.06.2013). 
112
 Section 13, for example, says that “If at any time the chief officer of police reasonably 
believes that, because of particular circumstances existing in any public district or part of a 
district, the powers under section 12 will not be sufficient to prevent the holding of public 
processions in that district or part from resulting in serious public disorder, he shall apply to the 
council of the district for an order prohibiting for such period not exceeding 3 months as may be 
specified in the application the holding of all public processions (or of any class of public 
procession so specified) in the district or part concerned”.The article 13 of the POA 1986 was 
often used in the past to prohibit marches of the far right group English Defence League.  
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of police reasonably believes” that such demonstration may cause a public 
disorder.  
Besides the POA 1936 and POA 1986, another key legislation to control the 
freedom of assembly and association is the Serious Organized Crime and 
Police Act of 2005. This act has given the police additional powers to disband 
meetings and demonstrations taking place within the vicinity of the British 
parliament under Section 132 to 135113. Anyone seeking an authorization from 
the police to organize a demonstration in a designated area must give a written 
notice to the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis not less than 6 days 
before the day on which the demonstration is to start (Section 133).  
Unlike democracies with a high defensiveness within the freedom constraints 
category, the United Kingdom has fewer provisions for constraining the freedom 
of expression. For example, the UK has no provisions to protect its democratic 
institutions and authorities from subversive propaganda and libel. Although the 
UK’s defamation law includes several acts114, the existing law does not explicitly 
punish verbal or written expressions used to delegitimize its democratic 
institutions or incumbents. Furthermore, in comparison with democracies within 
the first group, the UK does not have a law prohibiting an anti-Holocaust 
propaganda. According to the current law, the denial of Holocaust is not a crime 
in the UK. 
However, the UK has several laws that can be used to punish a dissemination 
of propaganda materials inciting hatred and discrimination against other groups 
of people on the ground of their ethnic, religious, or cultural origin. According to 
Bleich, the UK has “the most highly developed antidiscrimination institutions in 
Europe” (Bleich, 2011: 121). According to Part III Section 18(1) of the POA 
1986, “any person who uses threatening, abusive, or insulting words or 
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 Section 132 to 135 of the Serious Organized Crime and Police Act of 2005, Chapter 15, 
available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/15/pdfs/ukpga_20050015_en.pdf   
According to the Section 132 the parliament falls in so called “designated area”. (accessed 
12.07.2013)   
114
 The defamation law in the UK is regulated by several parliamentary acts. The first act was 
adopted in 1952 and can be viewed at:  http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1952/66/ 
pdfs/ukpga_ 19520066_en.pdf. This act was amended in 1996 to expand the definition of 
‘malicious falsehood’ used within the previous law. The Defamation Act of 1996 is available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 1996/31/introduction. In 2013, the government adopted 
another Defamation Act, primarily with the goal to set forth the definition of a ‘serious harm’ 
used within the previous defamation law. This act can be viewed at: 
http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2012-13/defamation.html. (accessed 18.07.2013)   
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behaviour, or displays any written material which is threatening, abusive, or 
insulting, is guilty of an offence if (a) he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, 
or (b) having regard to all the circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred 
up thereby”115. Section 21 of the Act adds whoever distributs, shows, or plays 
any visual images or sounds which are threatening, abusive or insulting is also 
guilty of an offence. Furthermore, Section 22 prohibits broadcasting of programs 
in cable program service with abusive and insulting content. According to 
Section 23, it is an offence to possess “racially inflammatory material”. 
Another key legislation used to constrain the non-democratic actors in using 
racial discrimination and violence is the Race Relations Act which was adopted 
in 1965 in reaction to grown instances of racial violence in the country (Cf. 
Mullender, 2009: 331; Bleich, 2011: 120-121). This act was amended several 
times. In 1968, Sections 3 and 5 were added to prohibit discrimination in the 
employment and housing116. In 1976, the Act was amended again, mainly to 
emulate the much harder anti-racism legislation of the United States (Cf. Bleich, 
2011: 121). The Race Relations Act of 1976 prohibits any form of racial 
discrimination based on color, race, nationality, or ethnic origin, and provides a 
more effective mechanism for its enforcement (Cf. Bleich, 2011: 121)117. More 
recently, the government adopted the new Racial and Religious Hatred Act 
2006 which made it an offence to use words or behavior or display of a written 
material with an intention to stir up racial hatred or if in the circumstances racial 
hatred is likely to be stirred up118.  
5.3.2 Freedom constraints in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands belongs also in the ‘medium defensiveness range within the 
freedom constraints category. The Dutch legal arsenal with regard to the 
constraints upon the freedom of assembly and association is relatively wide 
ranging and similar to those found in the UK. Looking at the first constraint, 
public demonstrations and meetings are subject to a prior notification under 
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  Public Order Act 1986, Part III, Section 18(2)  
116
 Race Relations Act 1968, Chapter 71, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 
1968/71/enacted (accessed 15.07.2013)   
117
  Race Relations Act 1976, Chapter 74, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 
1976/74 (accessed 15.07.2013)   
118
 Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, Chapter 1, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/2006/1/contents (accessed 17.07.2013)   
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Section 2 of the Public Assemblies Act which was adopted in 1988 and 
amended in 1994119. According to Section 5 of this Act, after a formal 
notification was submitted, the municipal authorities can deny their permission if 
they have a concern that such event can lead to a public order risk or endanger 
the public health, or if they deem it necessary in the interest of traffic120. 
According to van Donselaar, since the end of the 1970s “virtually any attempt by 
the extreme right to call a demonstration has been regarded as an 
unacceptable public order risk” (van Donselaar, 2003: 267). 
Moving to the next constraint, a building of militant and paramilitary 
organisations is punished by two important provisions within the Dutch Penal 
Code121. According to Article 140 Paragraph 1 and 2, a membership in such 
organisations is considered a criminal offense and is punished by an 
imprisonment up to six years122. Likewise, if someone participates in an 
organisation which was banned by a final court decision or by law is punished 
by an imprisonment for up to one year or a fine123. A formation or participation in 
an organisation whose goal is to commit terrorist offenses is considered a crime 
of a greater offense. According to Article 140a of the Penal Code, such act is 
punished with an imprisonment up to fifteen years or a heavy fine124.  
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 Public Assemblies Act, Act of 20 April 1988, Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 157 containing 
provisions concerning the exercise of the right to profess a religion or belief and of the right of 
assembly and demonstration, as last amended by Act of Parliament of 22 June 1994, Bulletin of 
Acts and Decrees 573 (entered in force 27-04-1988), available at: http://legislationline.org/ 
documents/action/popup/id/4703 (accessed 12.05.2013)   
120
 Section 5 of the Act reads “The power to restrict the right (…) of assembly and 
demonstration (…) may be exercised only to protect health, in the interest of traffic and to 
combat or prevent disorder”. (accessed 10.05.2013)   
121
 Dutch Penal Code in Dutch language is available at: http://wetten.overheid.nl/ 
BWBR0001854/geldigheidsdatum_22-08-2014 (accessed 21.05.2013). Excerpts in English can 
be viewed at: http://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/4693  
122
 “(1). Participation in an organisation whose purpose is to commit crimes, shall be punished 
with imprisonment not exceeding six years or a fine of the fifth category” 
123
 Article 140(2) of the Penal Code reads “Participation in the continuation of the activities of an 
organisation that has been banned by final court decision or by law is prohibited or for which an 
irrevocable declaration referred to in Article 122, first paragraph, of Book 10 Civil Code was 
issued, punished with imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine of the third category”. 
124
 Article 140a reads “1. Participation in an organisation whose object is to commit terrorist 
offenses, shall be punished with imprisonment not exceeding fifteen years or a fine of the fifth 
category. 2. Founders, leaders or directors are liable to life imprisonment or a term of 
imprisonment not exceeding thirty years or a fine of the fifth category”. 
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As far as the wearing of uniforms is concerned, it is prohibited on the basis of 
Article 435a of the Penal Code125. This provision was introduced within the 
Penal Code during the 1930s. After the end of World War II, this provision was 
maintained and according to van Donselaar and Wagenaar was frequently used 
to put members of radical groups under arrest due to their outer appearance 
(Cf. van Donseelaar & Wagenaar, 2009: 392). Additionally, the Arms and 
Ammunition Act adopted in 1997126 prohibits the carrying of a firearm in a plain 
view in any public place.  
The Netherlands has several laws to constrain the freedom of expression of its 
non-democratic actors. Several articles within the Dutch Criminal Code prohibit 
any form of discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, or culture. The legal 
basis is provided through Article 137 of the Penal Code. According to Article 
137c, it is prohibited to use a discriminatory defamation. The use of 
discrimination is punished by an imprisonment up to one year or a fine. 
Whoever makes it a habit or repeats it occasionally is liable to an 
imprisonement for a term up to two years. Furthermore, according to Article 
137d whoever uses hate propaganda is punished with an imprisonment up to 
one year. Likewise, if someone repeats such delicts or makes it to a habit, is 
liable to an imprisonment for up to two years. A publication of printed materials 
containing any discriminatory remarks or displays of discriminatory character is 
forbidden according to Article 137e. From 1992 on, this provision also applies to 
sending of discriminatory publications (Cf. van Donselaar & Wagenaar, 2009: 
391). Furthermore, according to Article 137g, anyone who is in his official 
capacity, profession or business, intentionally discriminates against other 
people on the ground of their race is liable to an imprisonment of not more than 
6 months or a fine. A defamation used against public authorities is also covered 
by several regulations within the Criminal Code127. However, as previously 
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 “Whoever wears and carries in public garments or visible signs signifying a particular political 
objective, is liable to a term of detention of not more than twelve days or a fine of the second 
category”.  
126
 Arms and Ammunition Act 1997, available at: http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0008804/ 
geldigheidsdatum_06-05-2014 (accessed 16.05.2013). Article 27 of the act states that “it is 
prohibited to carry weapons of categories II, III and IV”. These categories include firearms, 
bladed weapons, and any other weapons.   
127
 Articles 111-113 of the Dutch Penal Code to protect the royal dignity (“Intentional defamation 
of the King is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of the 
fifth category”). Article 267 punishes defamation of public authorities, a public body or a public 
institution. The article reads “The punishments prescribed in the preceding articles of this title 
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mentioned, there are no legal rules within the Dutch law protecting its 
democratic institutions from a delegitimising or disgraceful propaganda. Similar 
to the UK, the Netherlands has also no rules forbidding an anti-Holocaust 
propaganda.  
5.3.3 Freedom constraints in Denmark 
Denmark also falls within the range of democracies with a medium 
defensiveness, although it has fewer constraints than the UK and the 
Netherlands discussed previously. Regarding the constraints upon the freedom 
of assembly and association, Denmark has no specific provisions available 
within its law that can be used to disband or prohibit the meetings and 
demonstrations organised by its non-democratic parties or groups. In general, 
the Danish law is relatively lenient toward the need of suppressing the freedom 
of assembly. Unlike democracies analysed previously, the right to organize an 
assembly or to run a demonstration is not subject to a prior permission by 
municipal or police authorities128. Similarly, the Danish law has no provision to 
prohibit the wearing of uniforms and any other symbols of prohibited or 
outlawed organisations. However, the wearing of arms is prohibited at any time 
during a public demonstration and meeting. The building of paramilitary and 
violent organisations is prohibited according to Article 78(2) of the Danish 
Constitution129. Any participation within an organisation which was dissolved 
through a court judgment is punished with an imprisonment up to two years, 
according to Article 132 of the Danish Penal Code130.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
may be increased by one third, where the defamation is made with regard to: (1) the public 
authorities, a public body or a public institution; (2) a public servant during or in connection with 
the lawful execution of his duties; (3) the head or a member of the government of a friendly 
nation.”  
128
 Article 79 of the Danish Constitution states that “citizens shall, without previous permission, 
be at liberty to assemble unarmed”.  
129
 “Associations employing violence, or aiming at the attainment of their object by violence, by 
instigation to violence, or by similar punishable influence on persons holding other views, shall 
be dissolved by court judgment”. In addition, Article 114f of the Danish Penal Code punishes 
any person who participates or provides financial support and any other support to any corps, 
group or association, which intends, by use of force, to exert influence on public affairs or give 
rise to disturbances of the public order. 
130
 Criminal Code of Denmark is available at: www.legislationonline.org/documents/ 
action/popup/id/17600 (in Danish) (accessed 28.05.2013). Article 132 of the Penal Code states 
that “a person who participates in the continuation of an association's business after it was 
provisionally banned by the government or dissolved by judgment shall be punished by fine or 
imprisonment up to 2 years”.  
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As for other constraints, the Danish law has several provisions that can be used 
to punish verbal expressions harming other people on the ground of their racial, 
ethnic, and cultural background. According to the Act of Equal Treatment which 
was adopted to implement the European Council Directive from June 29, 2000 
calling for equal treatment between people irrespective of their racial or ethnic 
origin, no person in Denmark “may subject another person to direct or indirect 
discrimination on grounds of the latter’s or a third party’s racial or ethnic origin” 
(Part 1, Article 3(1))131. Furthermore, Paragraph 266b of the Danish Penal Code 
punishes serious discriminatory or racist statements made at a public meeting 
with an imprisonment up to 2 years or a fine (Cf. Meret, 2009: 99)132. 
Furthermore, according to Articles 139 and 140 of the Penal Code speeches 
insulting or ridiculing any religious community, or religious doctrines or worship 
are punished with an imprisonment of 4 months or a fine (Cf. Meret, 2009: 
100)133.   
Similar to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands analysed previously, 
Denmark has no provisions to protect its democratic institutions from non-
democratic propaganda. However, it has special measures to protect the 
personal honour of its democratic incumbents. According to Article 267 of the 
Criminal Code, the dissemination of false information and libel disparaging 
leading democratic authorities is punished with an imprisonment of 4 months134. 
Furthermore, according to Article 115 this punishment can double if the libel 
was directed against the royal family or the regent. Lastly, according to Article 
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 Act on Ethnic Equal Treatment, available at: http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/ 
eur/lxweden.htm (accessed 16.05.2013)   
132
 “Any person who publicly or with the intention of dissemination to a wide circle of people 
makes a statement or imparts other information threatening, insulting or degrading a group of 
persons on account of their race, color, national or ethnic origin, belief or sexual orientation, 
shall be liable to a fine, simple detention or imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years”. 
Part two added in 1995 added “It aggravates the sentence if this has a character of 
propaganda”. The paragraph can be applied toward print material if the latter contains antiracist 
information”. 
133
 The provision was however never used. In 1938, the High Court of Eastern Denmark (0stre 
Landsret) convicted a number of Danish Nazis for blasphemy under section 140 of the Danish 
Criminal Code for having, among other things, distributed media that falsely stated that the 
Talmud permitted Jewish men to force non-Jewish girls to engage in sexual intercourse. 
According to Lagoutte, this was the first and the last time when these articles were handed 
down to convict non-democratic groups (Cf. Lagoutte, 2008: 379-380). 
134
 Danish Criminal Code, Article 267 reads “A person who violates another's honor by insulting 
words or actions or by making or spreading allegations of a relationship that is likely to reduce 
the victim of fellow esteem, punishable by fine or imprisonment for up to 4 months”. Article 121 
adds that “any person who with scorn, abuse or other abusive aim assaults any of the persons 
mentioned in Article 119 in the discharge of his service or duty or in respect of the same shall 
be punished by a fine or imprisonment up to 6 months” (transl. by Google translator) 
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121 of the Penal Code anyone who assaults a public authority “with scorn, 
contempt, or other abusive expression” is punished with an imprisonment of 6 
months. Similar to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, a denial of 
Holocaust against Jewish people during World War II is not punishable in 
Denmark (Cf. Bilefsky, 2007). 
5.3.4 Freedom constraints in Sweden   
The last democracy with a medium defensiveness within this category includes 
Sweden. With regard to the constraints upon the freedom of assembly and 
association Sweden has several provisions to constrain its non-democratic 
actors in the use of this freedom. According to Chapter 2, Section 22-24 of the 
Public Order Act of 1994, anyone who organises a demonstration or meeting 
must notify the police beforehand and a permit is required135. Section 4 states 
“public meetings and public events may not, without permission be organized in 
public places”. Upon the receipt of a notification, the police may impose 
conditions such as concerning the timing and/or the place necessary to ensure 
the security and maintain the public order. Anyone who organises a 
demonstration must ensure that public order is maintained according to Chapter 
2, Section 16 of the Act. Furthermore, the police are given wide powers to 
cancel or disperse a demonstration under Chapter 2, Section 23 of the Act, if 
serious disorder arises or in connection with a meeting136. Serious disorder 
during a demonstration or meeting refers to an atmosphere that is riotous, 
causing considerable danger to those present, or a serious disruption to the 
traffic. Article 24 of the Swedish Constitution states the “[f]reedom of assembly 
and freedom to demonstrate may be limited in the interests of preserving public 
                                                          
135
 Chapter 2, Section 22-24 of the Public Oder Act states that “a public assembly may be 
dispersed if a serious disturbance of public order occurs at the place of assembly, or, as a direct 
consequence of the assembly, in its immediate vicinity, or if it entails a serious risk to those 
present, or serious disruption to traffic”, and “a public event may be dispersed if it involves 
something that is forbidden by law or if it results in disorder, danger to those present or serious 
disruption to traffic. A public event, as well as a public assembly for the presentation of artistic 
work, may be dispersed”. Public Order Act (1993: 1617), available at: 
http://legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/7308 (accessed 16.06.2013)   
136
 Chapter 2, Section 22-24 of the Public Oder Act states that “3. a public assembly may be 
dispersed if a serious disturbance of public order occurs at the place of assembly, or, as a direct 
consequence of the assembly, in its immediate vicinity, or if it entails a serious risk to those 
present, or serious disruption to traffic, and 4. a public event may be dispersed if it involves 
something that is forbidden by law or if it results in disorder, danger to those present or serious 
disruption to traffic. A public event, as well as a public assembly for the presentation of artistic 
work, may be dispersed”. 
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order and public safety at a meeting or demonstration, or with regard to the 
circulation of traffic. These freedoms may otherwise be limited only with regard 
to the security of the Realm”137. Furthermore, the Penal Code foresees 
penalties for the organisers and participants of such events in case if a riot 
outbreaks or disobedience to public authority occurs under Chapter 16, Section 
1-3 and 9138. Additionally, the building of paramilitary organisations is prohibited 
according to Chapter 18, Sections 4 and 5 of the Penal Code139. The building of 
such organisations is punished with an imprisonment for a maximum of two 
years or a fine. 
Sweden imposes fewer constraints on the freedom of expression. For example, 
Sweden has no provisions to prohibit the wearing of military uniforms and other 
visible signs of prohibited organisations, although such law was adopted as 
early as in 1933 and amended in 1947 to include clothes and symbols. 
However, this law was repealed in 2002, as it conflicted with the protection of 
the freedom of expression guaranteed within the constitution (Cf. Widfeld, 2004: 
163).  
Furthermore, Sweden has no legislation that would protect its democratic 
institutions and the form of the government against antidemocratic propaganda. 
The provision enshrined within Chapter 16 Section 7 of the Penal Code which 
punished the speeches insulting the Swedish flag, was repealed in 1970 (Cf. 
Brush, 1968: 80). Similarly, there is no legislation that could be used to protect 
the democratic authorities from defamation and libel140. The current provisions 
within the Penal Code refer only to spreading of a socially harmful rumour 
(‘false alarm’) (Chapter 16 Section 15). Section 6 within Chapter 17 of the Penal 
Code on base of which spreading false rumours calumniating public authority 
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 The full text of the Swedish Constitution is available at: http://www.government.se/ 
sb/d/2707/a/15187 (accessed 18.06.2013)   
138
 The Penal Code, Chapter 16, Section 1 - 3, and 9, available at: http://www.government.se/ 
sb/d/3926/a/27777 (accessed 10.06.2013)   
139
 Chapter 17, Section 4 and 5 of the Penal Code, available at: http://www.government.se/ 
sb/d/3926/a/27777 (accessed 18.06.2013). Section 4 reads “A person who founds or 
participates in an association which must be considered to constitute or, in view of its character 
and the purpose for which it has been organized, is easily capable of developing into, an 
instrument of force such as a military troop or a police force, and which does not with due 
authority reinforce the national defence or the police, or who on behalf of such association deals 
in arms, ammunition or other like equipment, makes available a building or land for its activity or 
supports it with money or in other ways, shall be sentenced for unlawful military activity to a fine 
or imprisonment for at most two years”.  
140
 The relevant section in the Penal Code dealing with defamation (Chapter 5) is only 2 pages 
long. 
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was repealed in 1976. Moreover, there is no law in Sweden that would prohibit 
the anti-Holocaust propaganda.  
However, Sweden has special provisions to outlaw speeches inciting a 
discrimination and hatred against people of other ethnic or cultural 
backgrounds. The major incentive to adopt such provision was the upsurge of 
racist violence in the country during 1980s and 1990s (Cf. Björgo, 1993: 31; 
Lööw, 1993: 62ff). According to the estimation of the European Monitoring 
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) Sweden had the second highest 
level of racist and right violence within the EU after Germany (Cf. Widfeld, 2004: 
162). As result of increased racist violence, the antidiscrimination legislation 
which existed in the country since 1948 was amended several times, in 1970, 
1982 and 1988 (Cf. Widfeld, 2004: 163). At present, the main provisions against 
verbal expressions inciting racism and discrimination are supplied within 
Chapter 16 Section 8 of the Penal Code, which prohibits the incitement to hate 
on the basis of colour of skin, religion and sexual orientation, as well as ridicule 
and contempt141. In addition to insulting speech, Chapter 5 Section 5 of the 
Penal Code punishes “insulting behaviour towards a person with allusion to his 
or her race, colour, national or ethnic origin or religious belief” (Cf. Bull, 2012: 
85). Furthermore, the Discrimination Act of 2008 prohibits any form of 
discrimination defined in Section 4 of this Act as a direct discrimination, indirect 
discrimination, harassment, sexual discrimination, and instructions to 
discriminate in employment, education, military and civil service142. Moreover, 
Chapter 5 Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code prohibits a defamation of other 
national groups. The incitement to seditious acts, defamation and discrimination 
of certain population groups on base of their racial, ethnic or cultural origin can 
also be punished under the Swedish Freedom of the Press Act of 1949. 
Chapter 7 Article 4 specifies that print materials promoting or inciting high 
treason, sedition, war, defamation and contemptuous agitation against a 
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 The chapter reads “A person who, in a disseminated statement or communication, threatens 
or expresses contempt for a national, ethnic or other such group of persons with allusion to 
race, colour, national or ethnic origin or religious belief shall, be sentenced for agitation against 
a national or ethnic group to imprisonment for at most two years or, if the crime is petty, to a 
fine”.  
142
 Discrimination Act (SFS 2008:567), available at: http://www.government.se/sb/d/3926/a/ 
118187 (accessed 06.06.2013) 
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population group with allusion to race, colour, national or ethnic origin, religious 
faith or sexual orientation are punishable under criminal law143.  
5.4 Evaluation of findings 
This chapter has provided a systematic assessment of the variations in legal 
constraints to the freedom of assembly and association and freedom of 
expression available in the eight democracies studied. As it was stressed 
earlier, this category is less severe as compared with the first category of legal 
ban. The following Table 8 presents an overview of the configurations found 
among these democracies when analysing the first two categories of legal ban 
and freedom constraints simultaneously followed by a descriptive analysis of 
the results found. 
Table 8: Overview of configurations among democracies across the categories 
of legal ban and freedom constraints 
                       Freedom   
                      constraints 
Legal ban  
1-0.7 
High 
defensiveness 
0.6-0.4 
Medium 
defensiveness 
0.3-0 
Low 
defensiveness 
1-0.7 
High defensiveness 
Germany 
Austria 
France 
  
0.6-0.4 
Medium 
defensiveness 
Belgium United Kingdom 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Sweden 
 
0.3-0 
Low defensiveness 
 
  
 
 
 
 
When these two categories are analysed simultaneously, it is clear the majority 
of democracies captured in this study (7 out of 8) exhibit the same pattern of 
defensiveness across the two categories: grouping either within the high 
defensiveness (Germany, Austria, and France) or medium defensiveness (UK, 
Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden) groups. Additionally, once again no 
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 “With due regard to the purpose of freedom of the press for all under Chapter 1, the following 
acts shall be deemed to be offences against the freedom of the press if committed by means of 
printed matter and if they are punishable under law (…) agitation against a population group, 
whereby a person threatens or expresses contempt for a population group or other such group 
with allusion to race, colour, national or ethnic origin, religious faith or sexual orientation”. The 
Freedom of the Press Act, available at: http://www.riksdagen.se/en/How-the-Riksdag-
works/Democracy/The-Constitution/The-Freedom-of-the-Press-Act/(accessed 08.06.2013). 
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democracies fell into the low defensiveness group, which provides further 
support towards the argument expressed earlier that the eight democracies 
studied tend to have fairly constraining legal frameworks against non-
democratic parties and groups (for details see Chapter 4.4). These similarities 
in country constellation between the two categories suggests there is a certain 
trade-off pattern whereby democracies which have both party and group bans 
as two distinct legal mechanisms also have the most constraining legal 
frameworks including strong freedom-constraints. Also, the democracies which 
adopt only group bans tend to have less constraining legal frameworks with 
fewer restrictions upon political freedoms.  
That said, however, Belgium exhibits a differing defensiveness pattern across 
the two categories. As shown in Table 8, Belgium combines a medium 
defensiveness within the legal ban category with a high defensiveness within 
the freedom constraints category, which makes it more similar to the group of 
democracies with a high defensiveness (Germany, Austria and France). This 
difference in defensiveness across the two categories is quite possibly due to 
the fact (see for details Chapter 4.3.2) that the Belgian state has a special 
attitude towards the place and role of political parties within the democratic 
political system, which ultimately found its expression in the decision of the 
Belgian government not to adopt legal party ban mechanism against its non-
democratic opponents (Cf. Nandrin, 2000: 50).  
The following chapter will ascertain whether the patterns of formal-legal 
defensiveness observed across legal ban and freedom constraints categories 
are enhanced when the category of operational constraints is considered or 
whether the latter introduces additional complexity. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF VARIATIONS BETWEEN 
DEMOCRACIES IN THE PRESENCE OF OPERATIONAL 
CONSTRAINTS   
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will analyse the cross-national variations between the eight 
democracies studied within the last category capturing the operational 
constraints. As specified earlier, this category combines measures and 
provisions that are the least severe in terms of constraints they impose on the 
presence and operaton of non-democratic parties and groups. The category 
includes the following five constraints: state surveillance, constraints on the 
employment in civil service, electoral threshold, constraints on ballot access, 
and constraints on access to direct state funding for non-democratic parties. As 
specified earlier, the first two constraints belong to the classic repertoire of 
militant democracy, although unlike other measures of militant democracy, they 
affect the presence and operation of non-democratic parties and groups rather 
indirectly. The remaining constraints have been derived from the electoral and 
party finance laws. As argued earlier, these measures were not intended by 
governments as tools to defend democracy from non-democratic parties and 
groups. This notwithstanding, they help defend democracy de facto by turning 
the access of non-democratic parties and groups to democratic institutions 
more difficult and their ability to access the state financial resources more 
demanding.  
This chapter will present a systematic assessment of the differences and 
similarities in the operational constraints between the eight democracies 
studied. I will conclude with a review and discussion of all empirical results 
presented in the last three chapters to arrive to a better understanding of the 
key profiles of democratic defensiveness across the countries studied.  
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6.2 Systematic assessment of variations across operational 
constraints  
The following Table 9 offers a systematic mapping of variations between the 
eight democracies across the operational constraints.  
Table 9: Mapping of democracies across operational constraints 
Indicator/ country DE NL AT BE UK SE DK FR 
 
1. Constraints through 
state surveillance 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2. Constraints on employ-
ment in civil service  
 
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
3. Constraints on ballot 
access 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
4. High electoral threshold 
 
 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 
5. Constraints on access 
to direct state funding 
for non-democratic 
parties 
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Standardized score: 
 
1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 
Level of defensiveness: High defensiveness 
 
Medium defensiveness 
Note: 1 = legal mechanism is present; 0 = legal mechanism is absent. The countries are 
ordered according to the standardized score they achieved across individual indicators. Grey 
shading is added to indicate democracies in high defensiveness category. Legend: AT-Austria; 
BE-Belgium; DE-Germany; DK-Denmark; FR-France; NL-Netherlands; SE-Sweden; UK-United 
Kingdom. Source: Information about electoral threshold was compiled using data from the Inter-
Parliamentary Union website at: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/mod-electoral.asp (accessed 
20.08.2013).  
Table 9 reflects that Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium fall in the 
range of democracies with a high defensiveness in this category having all or 
the majority of operational constraints within their legal arsenals. The remaining 
four democracies the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, and France build the 
second group with a medium defensiveness in this category having fewer 
operational constraints at their disposal. There are no democracies falling in the 
low defensiveness range which underscores the importance of formal-legal 
mechanisms of democratic defensiveness as already revealed in earlier 
chapters. The following sections discuss each group of countries in turn starting 
first with the democracies with a high defensiveness in operational constraints.    
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6.2.1 Democracies with high defensiveness in operational 
constraints 
Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium have a high defensiveness 
within this category. As in the earlier chapters, I will start with an analysis of the 
most defensive country in this group, Germany, and move to the less defensive 
ones. 
6.2.1.1 Operational constraints in Germany 
Germany is the only democracy among democracies covered in this study 
which has all operational constraints within its legal arsenal. As far as the state 
surveillance is concerned, the evolution of state bodies dedicated to the 
surveillance of the state internal enemies can be traced back to the time after 
the end of World War II. The emergence of the Federal Agency for the 
Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz, BfV), which 
is the main federal state body tasked with the surveillance and gathering data 
about potentially dangerous groups and political parties, was predicated on the 
necessity to prevent the Communist Party from undermining the new German 
state (Cf. Schmalenbach, 2009: 421). The agency was set up in 1951 and has 
since that time acquired a reputation of being a “guardian of democracy” in 
Germany. Furthermore, the agency has also acquired a role model for other 
countries in setting up similar agencies for the surveillance of potentially 
dangerous parties and groups (see Austria later) (Cf. More, 1994: 285; Canu, 
1997: 180). The legal grounds for the functioning of the BfV are laid down within 
the Federal Law for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesverfassungs-
schutzgesetz, BVerfSchG)144. According to this law, the BfV is authorised to 
conduct a monitoring and gathering of information about political groups and 
actors who can represent a potential danger to the survival of the state and its 
democratic constitutional order. According to Article 3(1) of this law, the main 
goal of the new body is to combat those efforts “which are directed against the 
free democratic basic order, the existence and security of the Federation or one 
                                                          
144
 Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit des Bundes und der Länder in Angelegenheiten des 
Verfassungsschutzes und über das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Bundes-
verfassungsschutzgesetz-BverfSchG (Law concerning the Cooperation between the Federation 
and the Länder in relation to the protection of the constitution and about the Federal Agency for 
the Constitutional Protection), available at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bverfschg/ 
BJNR029700990.html (accessed 06.03.2013) 
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of its states, or which aim to unlawfully interfere with the execution of the public 
office by members of the constitutional organs of the Federation or the Länder” 
(own translation)145. Regarding the methods that the BfV is allowed to use, 
Article 8 stipulates the BfV is authorised to employ “methods, objects and 
instruments as well as undercover agents, observations, audio and video 
recordings” necessary to retrieve the information about individuals or groups 
aiming to subvert the democratic order. In its operation, the BfV is directly 
accountable to the Ministry of the Interior and works closely with similar 
agencies for the protection of the constitution created within each of the sixteen 
states (Länder) of the Federal Republic of Germany (Cf. More, 1994: 285). 
According to Article 2 Paragraph 2, all German Länder are obligated to set up 
similar state bodies responsible for the protection of the constitution. Thereby, 
each Landesamt für Verfassungschutz (state agency for the protection of the 
constitution) has its own statute stipulating its powers for gathering information 
and intelligence (Cf. More, 1994: 286). The scope of their activities is confined 
to the territorial borders of respective states, whereas the Federal Agency for 
Constitutional Protection is authorised to gather information all over the country 
(Cf. Schmalenbach, 2003: 422). Following the amendment in 1990, a new 
Paragraph 3 was added to Article 4 which stipulates the collection and 
evaluation of information about groups suspected by the state can only start 
after the federal and state agencies have “concrete, factual grounds” for a 
suspicion that activities of these groups are directed against the free basic 
democratic order (“Voraussetzung für die Sammlung und Auswertung von 
Informationen im Sinne des § 3 Abs. 1 ist das Vorliegen tatsächlicher 
Anhaltspunkte”) (Cf. More, 1994: 285). Since the start of the international 
campaign against international terrorism after the terrorist attacks on the United 
States in September 2001, the functions of the BfV have been considerably 
expanded. The adoption of the Law on Combatting Terrorism (Terrorismus-
bekämpfungsgesetz) in 2002 has increased the functional responsibilities of the 
BfV (Cf. Schmalenbach, 2003: 423)146. According to the new Paragraph 4 in 
Article 3, the agency has now the power to collect and evaluate any information 
                                                          
145
 BVerfSchG, Article 3(1).  
146
 Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus (Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz), 
9 January 2002, Bundesgesetzblatt, Vol. 2002, Part I, Nr. 3, pp.361-395, available at: 
http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Gesetzestexte/Terrorismusbekaempfungs
gesetz_pdf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile (accessed 16.03.2013) 
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which is directed “against the idea of international understanding” and “pieceful 
coexistence of nations” (Cf. Schmallenbach, 2003: 423).  
Moving to the second constraint which assesses the presence of legal 
constraints upon the employment in civil service of members of non-democratic 
parties and groups, Germany has such regulation available within both the 
Basic Law and statutory law. According to Article 33 Paragraph 4 of the Basic 
Law,  “the exercise of sovereign authority on a regular basis shall (…) be 
entrusted to members of the public service who stand in a relationship of 
service and loyalty defined by public law” (Cf. Rudolf, 2003: 210, 217). 
Furthermore, according to Article 7 Paragraph 2 of the Federal Law on Civil 
Servants (Bundesbeamtengesetz, BBG), adopted in 2009, only those are 
eligible for the work in civil service, “who provide the guarantee at any time to 
stand up for the free democratic basic order”147. A similar provision is contained 
within the Law on the Status of Civil Servants in the Länder (Beamtenstatus-
gesetz, BeamtStG), which regulates the status and function of civil servants on 
the level of German states148. According to Rudolf, in Germany the duty of a 
civil servant to support the free democratic basic order starts from the time of 
his entry in the civil service and terminates with his resignation. Those civil 
servants who receive pensions are obligated to keep this duty even after their 
retirement (Cf. Rudolf, 2003: 210-211). Another important law is the ‘radicals 
decree’ (‘Extremistenbeschluss’), which was adopted in 1972149. This rule was 
introduced primarily to prevent the members of the former Nazi party to take an 
employment in the civil service. Although this clause was critised by many and 
even abandoned in the majority of German states150, it is still in force in some 
states, for example, the state of Bavaria (Cf. Rudolf, 2003: 221). 
                                                          
147
 Article 7(2) of the Bundesbeamtengesetz (BBG) (Federal law on civil servants), available at: 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/bbg_2009/gesamt.pdf (accessed 06.03.2013). 
The relevant provision reads “Only those can be appointed in the civil service, who (...) provide 
the guarantee at any time to stand up for the free democratic basic order within the meaning of 
the Basic Law“ ( own translation).  
148
 Article 7(2) of the Gesetz zur Regelung des Statusrechts der Beamtinnen und Beamten in 
den Ländern (Beamtenstatusgesetz, BeamtStG), available at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de 
/bundesrecht/beamtstg/gesamt.pdf (accessed 16.03.2013) 
149
 The copy of the Extremistenbeschluss (Radicals decree), BVerfGE 39, 334, can be viewed 
at: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv 039334.html (accessed 26.03.2013) 
150
 The clause was objected not only because of the carelessness with which it was conducted, 
but also because of its ineffectiveness (Cf. Backes & Jesse, 1989: 292-293; Monson, 1984). 
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Moving to the constraints on the ballot access, Germany requires all political 
parties to collect signatures before they appear on the ballot. According to 
Article 20 Paragraph 2 of the German Law on Elections (Wahlgesetz, BWahlG), 
political parties must submit at least 200 signatures of eligible voters 
(‘Unterstützungsunterschriften’) in every of its 299 constituencies for direct 
mandates. Only those political parties are exempt from this requirement which 
have at least 5 representatives sitting already in the Bundestag or in one of its 
sixteen state parliaments (Landtag)151. This amount of signatures is the second 
highest among the eight countries studied after Denmark (analysed later). 
During the last federal elections to the Bundestag in 2013, many small parties 
including non-democratic parties, such as the Republikaner and the 
Bürgerbewegung pro Deutschland, faced many difficulties to gather the required 
amount of signatures among the electorate in support of their parties (Cf. 
Dammann, 2013; Bernard & Kaufmann, 2013). As a result, these parties could 
not place their candidates in the selected constituencies. The German system 
does not require a deposit. 
Germany falls in the group of countries with a high threshold for parliamentary 
entry - using 3 per cent of the national vote as the boundary between high and 
low thresholds (see for details Chapter 3.4). According to the current provision 
within the Federal Elections Act (Bundeswahlgesetz, BWahlG)152, all political 
parties must obtain at least 5 per cent of the national vote in order to get a seat 
in the parliament. This threshold is applied for both the federal elections to the 
national parliament, the Bundestag, and the state elections in the state 
parliaments (Cf. Norris, 2005: 53). In the past, such high threshold has already 
prevented many small parties, including the non-democratic parties, such as the 
National Democratic Party of Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands, NPD), from entering the federal and state regional 
                                                          
151
 Article 20 Paragraph 2 of the Federal Law on Elections (Bundeswahlgesetz, BWahlG), 
available at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bwahlg/ (accessed 16.03.2013). For electoral 
lists the law requires for 2000 signatures. That is in case if a party wants to place its candidates 
in every single constituency that makes that is has to collect in total 59.800 of valid signatures 
(calculated on the basis of 299 constituencies × 200 signatures of eligible voters in every 
constituency. 
152
 Bundeswahlgesetz (BwahlG) (Federal Law on Elections), available at: http://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/bwahlg/ (accessed 16.03.2013). Paragraph 6 states that “During distribution of 
seats among the regional lists only those political parties are considered which have received at 
least 5 percent of the valid second votes in the electoral district or won a seat in at least three 
constituencies (my own translation).  
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parliaments153. Typically, if political parties fail to pass the threshold, they lose 
automatically the entitlement for a direct state funding, which as said earlier 
builds an important source of income for contemporary political parties.  
Moving to the final constraint, Germany has several rules on base of which a 
non-democratic party can be withdrawn from the access to the direct state 
funding. According to Article 18 Paragraph 7 of the German Party Law, political 
parties lose automatically the right to receive the direct state funding if they 
have been declared unconstitutional and banned by the Federal Constitutional 
Court154. According to this Article there is a link between the ability to receive 
the direct state funding and the democratic character of a political party. 
Furthermore, according to Article 18 Paragraph 2 of the Federal Elections Act, if 
any political organisation decides to participate in the parliamentary elections 
and become eligible for the direct state funding, they must be recognized 
beforehand as political parties by the Bundeswahlleiter (federal chief election 
commissioner). Thereby, the party law specifies in detail which requirements 
political organisations have to meet in order to be recognized as political 
parties. According to Article 6 Paragraph 2 of the Party Law, political parties 
must submit their party statutes to the election authorities for their review. If it 
turns out during the review that the statute of a political party contains any goals 
that go contrary to the constitutional principles, such organisations cannot be 
recognised as political parties (Cf. Saalfeld, 2000: 90). 
6.2.1.2 Operational constraints in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands’s arsenal of operational constraints also qualifies for a high 
defensiveness within this category. With regard to the first constraint of state 
surveillance, the country has been continuously conducting a surveillance of its 
non-democratic parties and groups. The AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingen- en 
                                                          
153
 For example, during the last elections in the German Bundestag 2013 all four right-wing 
extremist parties (National Democratic Party (NPD), The Right Party (Die Rechte), For Germany 
(pro Deutschland), and the Republican Party (Die Republikaner) participating in the elections 
achieved only 1.8% together (NPD: 1.3%, Die Rechte: 0.1%, pro Deutschland: 0.2%, 
Republikaner: 0.2). For the results of the parliamentary elections in 2013 see:  
http://www.wahlrecht.de/news/2013/bundestagswahl-2013.html (accessed 06.08.2013). 
However, the NPD party could pass the threshold of 5% during the last parliamentary elections 
in the state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern where the party achieved 6% in 2011. 
154
 Article 18 Paragraph 7 of the Party Law which reads “[i]f a party is dissolved or banned, it 
shall lose its eligibility for support under the state partial funding program from the date of its 
dissolution”. 
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Veiligheidsdienst), established after the end of World War II, is the key security 
and intelligence service within the country (Cf. van Donselaar & Wagenaar, 
2009: 399). The AIVD’s statutory responsibilities are outlined within the 
Intelligence and Security Services Act, adopted on 7 February 2002. According 
to Chapter 3, Article 13, Paragraph 1a of this act, the main duties of the AIVD 
include to “process personal data relating to persons who give cause to serious 
suspicion for being a danger to the democratic legal system, or to the security 
or other vital interests of the state” (Cf. CODEXTER, 2008: 4; van Donselaar & 
Wagenaar, 2009: 399)155. According to van Donselaar and Wagenaar, this also 
involves the surveillance of political parties which have been defined as 
dangerous to the constitutional order of the state (Cf. van Donselaar & 
Wagenaar, 2009: 399). At the local level, the service has several branch offices 
which are integrated within the police force. Initially, there were more than 100 
local intelligence services (Plaatselijke Inlichtingendiensten) and 20 district 
intelligence services (Districtsinlichtingen-diensten). In 1993, all these services 
were converted into 25 regional intelligence services (Regionale 
Inlichtingendiensten) (Cf. van Donselaar & Wagenaar, 2009: 399). Since 1993, 
the AIVD has published the annual reports summing up the development of 
non-democratic threats in the country. Typically, the AIVD processes this 
information and shares it with the appropriate partners, enabling them to take 
the necessary measures. Similar to Germany, the AIVD members do not have 
the law enforcement authority and cannot investigate criminal offences.  
Moving to the next constraint which assesses the presence of legal constraints 
upon the employment in civil service, the Dutch law contains a provision on 
base of which the members of non-democratic parties or groups can be 
suspended from their duty in civil service. The first rule was introduced in the 
Dutch law as early as in 1934. This law permitted “the exclusion from 
representation in political bodies (national, provincial, and communal) of 
adherents of subversive parties who advocate alteration of the existing form of 
government by unlawful means” (Cf. Loewenstein, 1937b: 650)156. However, at 
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 Chapter 3 Article 13 Paragraph 1a of the Intelligence and Security Services Act of 7 
February 2002 (Wiv 2002), available at: http://www.st-ab.nl/wetten/0662_Wet_op_de_ 
inlichtingen-_en_veiligheidsdiensten_2002.htm (in Dutch) (accessed 16.05.2013). 
156
 Loewenstein mentions the Ordinance from April 5, 1934. The earlier law of 12 December 
1929 laying down rules concerning the legal status of Dutch civil servants makes no explicit 
reference to such possibility. See Law of December 12, 1929, containing regulations governing 
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present the key provision regulating the employment of the members of non-
democratic parties or groups is stipulated within the Dutch Penal Code. 
According to Article 28 (1-5) of the code, the state has the right to exclude the 
members of non-democratic parties or groups from an employment in the army 
and holding “certain professions”, particularly so if that person has been 
convicted of racial discrimination157. According to van Donselaar and 
Wagenaar, the law refers specifically to articles 137c, 137d, 137f, and 137g of 
the Penal Code which prohibit racial discrimination (Cf. van Donselaar & 
Wagenaar, 2009: 396). 
Moving to the constraints upon the ballot access, the Dutch law requires all 
political parties which participate in parliamentary elections to submit both 
signatures and deposit in support of their nominees. According to Section H4 
Para 1 of the Dutch Elections Act, “[i]n the case of an election to the House of 
Representatives or to a provincial or municipal council with at least 39 seats to 
be filled, the minimum number of declarations of support shall be 30; in the case 
of an election to a municipal council with fewer than 39 but more than 19 seats 
to be filled, the minimum number of declarations of support shall be 20, and in 
the case of an election to a municipal council with fewer than 19 seats to be 
filled the minimum number of declarations of support to be submitted shall be 
10”.158 Although the number of signatures that political parties in the 
Netherlands are required to collect in support of their nominees is relatively 
low159 in comparison with many other democracies where signatures are 
required, it has presented a formidable barrier for many non-democratic parties 
in the past. For example, the right-wing extremist party Conservatieven.nl was 
only able to participate in a few numbers of districts because of the problems 
faced by this party in collecting the enough number of signatures (Cf. van 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the legal status of civil servants, available  at: http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0001947/ 
geldigheidsdatum_24-02-2014#TitelIV (in Dutch) (accessed 18.05.2013) 
157
 Article 28, Paragraph 5 of The Dutch Penal Code reads “The rights (…) may be dismissed by 
a court judgment 1. to occupy certain posts; 2. to serve in armed forces; 3. to elect members of 
general representative bodies and to be elected as a member of these bodies; 4. to be elected 
as a legal counsel or administrator; or 5. to exercise certain professions” (translated by Google 
translator). The Dutch Penal Code is available at: http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/ 
eur/lxwened.htm (in Dutch). (accessed 19.05.2013) 
158
 Act of 28 September 1989 containing new provisions governing the franchise and elections 
(Elections Act), available at: http://www.government.nl/files/documents-and-publications/leaflets/ 
2010/06/25/elections-act/pdf-voor-engelse-site-elections-act-2010.pdf (accessed 20.05.2013) 
159
 If calculated across all of its 19 electoral districts political parties in the Netherlands have to 
submit the total of 570 signatures which is comparatively low as compared with many other 
democracies such as for example Germany (Cf. Bischoff, 2006: 70). 
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Donselaar & Wagenaar, 2009: 396). According to van Donselaar and 
Wagenaar, there were many other political parties which were discouraged to 
participate in the elections because of this formal requirement. In addition to the 
signature requirement, the Dutch law also requires its political parties to pay a 
monetary deposit in order to stand for election. According to Section H12 of the 
Dutch Elections Act, at present the amount of a deposit for an individual 
constituency is set at 11.250 Euro160. Thereby, the party can claim its deposit 
back only if it has achieved at least 75 per cent of votes of the electoral quota 
(or 0.5 per cent of the national vote) (Cf. Adebi, 2004: 94-95)161. 
In contrast to its strict regulation of ballot access, the Netherlands’ current 
electoral threshold is comparatively low. Along with the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands has the lowest threshold among the eight democracies covered in 
this study (Cf. Downs, 2012: 34). According to Chapter U Article 2 of the 
Elections Act, the seats in the Dutch parliament are distributed on the basis of 
an effective threshold 100% divided by the total number of seats (that is 150). 
That sets the current threshold used in the Netherlands at 0.67 per cent162. That 
makes the Dutch threshold below 3 per cent which has been defined as the 
boundary between the high and low threshold for this constraint.  
Regarding the final constraint, the Netherlands has special legislation at its 
disposal to control the access of non-democratic parties to the direct state 
funding. As a result of an increased criticism during the 1990s, that many non-
democratic parties received hefty subsidies and used this money for broadening 
their antidemocratic activities within the country, the Dutch parliament has 
introduced a rule within the Political Subsidies Act163 permitting to withdraw 
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 Section H12 of the Elections Act, available at: http://www.government.nl/files/documents-
and-publications/leaflets/2010/06/25/elections-act/pdf-voor-engelse-site-elections-act-2010.pdf 
(accessed 16.05.2013) 
161
 According to Section P5 of the Elections Act (Act of 28 September 1989 containing new 
provisions governing the franchise and elections) the electoral quota is equivalent to the sum of 
the total votes cast for all the lists divided by the number of seats to be allocated. “The quotient 
thus obtained shall be known as the electoral quota”. 
162
 Chapter U, Article 2 Section U3, U7 of the Dutch Elections Act. Section U 3 reads “For each 
province the central electoral committee shall multiply the number of votes cast for each 
candidate and the total vote cast for the lists by the vote value for that province. In order to 
determine the result of the election, the products thus obtained shall serve as the numbers of 
votes cast for each candidate or the total votes cast for the lists”. 
163
 The Subsidies Act for Political Parties (as valid on July 22, 2011), available at: 
http://www.stab.nl/wetten/0813_Wet_subsidiering_politieke_partijen.htm. English translation is 
available at: www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl (both accessed 02.04.2013). The relevant article 
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those political parties which violate the principles of the Dutch antiracist 
legislation from receiving the direct state funding (Cf. van Donselaar & 
Wagenaar, 2009: 395). The current provision within Section 5, Article 16 states 
“[i]n case that one political party on the grounds of articles 137c, d, e, f, of g, or 
article 429quater of the Penal Code, is sentenced to an unconditional fine, the 
claim for subsidies expires legally during a period that starts on the day on 
which the sentence has become irrevocable”. Articles 137 (c-g) and 429quater 
of the Dutch Penal Code refer specifically to the acts of inciting a racial 
discrimination.   
6.2.1.3 Operational constraints in Austria 
Austria’s range of operational constraints also qualifies for a high defensiveness 
within this category, although like the Netherlands it also has fewer operational 
constraints at its disposal than Germany. Regarding the first constraint, Austria 
actively uses the state surveillance of its non-democratic parties and groups. 
Following the example of Germany, Austria founded the Federal Agency for 
Constitutional Protection and Combatting Terrorism (Bundesamt für 
Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung, BVT) in 2002, which is the 
key state body responsible for conducting state surveillance of internal and 
external non-democratic threats to the country. The BVT is directly responsible 
to the Ministry of Inner Affairs and is incorporated within it as a separate 
department. The functional responsibilities of the BVT are split between the 
Bundesamt (federal agency) and 9 Landesämter für Verfassungsschutz (state 
agency for the protection of the constitution, LV), created within each Austrian 
state. As outlined within Articles 20 to 27a of the Bundesgesetz über die 
Organisation der Sicherheitsverwaltung und die Ausübung der 
Sicherheitspolizei (Sicherheitspolizeigesetz, SpG) (Federal Law about the 
organisation of the security administration and the exercise of the security 
service)164, the BVT has the goal to protect the democratic constitutional order. 
This includes combatting extremist and terrorist threats, espionage, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
regulating the amount of subsidies granted to political parties in the Netherlands is Article 6 
Paragraph 1 and 2.  
164
 Bundesgesetz über die Organisation der Sicherheitsverwaltung und die Ausübung der 
Sicherheitspolizei (Sicherheitspolizeigesetz - SPG) StF: BGBl. Nr. 566/1991 (NR: GP XVIII RV 
148 AB 240 S. 41. BR: 4119 AB 4122 S. 545.), available at: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/ 
GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10005792 (accessed 
16.09.2013) 
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international arms trade, trade with nuclear weapons, and organised crimes. 
Furthermore, the BVG has the duty to publish annual reports with a detailed 
analysis of the main threats to the state and its democratic institutions (Cf. 
Verfassungschutzbericht, 2013). In doing so the BVG raises the awareness 
about groups that threaten the Austrian democracy and exposes them to a 
general contempt.  
Moving to the next constraint, Austria has strict rules for the employment in the 
civil service of the former members of the NSDAP party and any other national-
socialist organisations. The former members of the NSDAP party have no 
chance of employment in the civil service165. The legal basis is provided by the 
Law on the National-Socialists, adopted in 1947 and amended in 1957. 
According to Part II Paragraph I (1-5) of this law, all former members of the 
NSDAP party are forbidden to take any posts in the civil service. Additionally, all 
employers with the links to the national-socialist organisations must be 
suspended from their duty166. Only “lesser offenders” (‘minderbelastete 
Personen’), that is those who were not actively engaged in the National-
Socialist party or have no links with national-socialist organisations, could be 
accepted “only at the request and only by special examination of their political 
behaviour prior to 27 April 1945” in the civil service (Part II Paragraph I (1)). 
With regard to the next constraint on the ballot access, Austria requires its 
political parties to submit signatures in support of their party nominees. 
According to the Austrian Electoral Act (Nationalrats-Wahlordnung, NRWO), 
introduced in 1992, political parties are required to provide at least 2600 
signatures in support of their party nominees167. According to some experts, 
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 However, when the ‘extremism clause’ was introduced in Germany the Austrian Federal 
Chancellor Bruno Kreisky (1970-1983) was quoted saying that the issue of a similar rule in 
Austria is “out of discussion” and that the solution of such problem can only be solved politically 
but not administratively (Cf. Schäffer & Stadler, 1981: 444). 
166
 Bundesverfassungsgesetz vom 6. Februar 1947 über die Behandlung der Nationalsozialisten 
(Nationalsozialistengesetz), available at: http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung/Bundes 
normen/10000215/Nationalsozialistengesetz%2c%20Fassung%20vom%2019.02.2014.pdf 
(accessed 10.04.2013) 
167
 See Article 42 Paragraph 2 of NRWO which states „The party nomination list must have 
been signed by at least three members of the National Council or of those registered in the 
electoral register on the record date in the provincial constituency and entitled to vote (§ 21 
para. 1). In particular, the nominees must be supported in the country constituencies 
Burgenland and Vorarlberg by 100 voters each; in the country's electoral districts of Carinthia, 
Salzburg and Tyrol by 200 voters each; in the country's constituencies upper Austria and Styria 
by 400 voters each; and in provincial constituencies Lower Austria and Vienna by 500 voters 
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many small parties in Austria, including the non-democratic parties such as the 
Communist Party of Austria had many difficulties during the last parliamentary 
elections in 2013 to find enough number of supporters and criticised the rule for 
its exclusionist nature (Cf. Fellner, 2013). That said, Austria does not require its 
political parties to file a monetary deposit in order to stand for elections. 
However, parties have to pay a fee in the amount of 435 Euro (called 
“Druckkostenbeitrag”) for printing ballots, which is not refundable168.   
Moving on the next constraint, Austria has a high threshold that political parties 
have to pass to obtain a seat in the parliament (Nationalrat). As stipulated within 
Article 100 Paragraph 1 of the Austrian Electoral Act (Nationalrats-
Wahlordnung, NRWO), only those political parties can take part in the allocation 
of mandates which received at least 4 per cent of the valid votes cast, while 
political parties which obtained less than 4 per cent of the votes cannot be 
involved in the allocation of mandates169.     
Regarding the next constraint assessing the availability of legal restrictions to 
receiving the direct state funding for the non-democratic political parties, there 
are no rules in Austria that would allow the state to withdraw its non-democratic 
parties from the access to the direct state funding, even if these parties violate 
the democratic principles. According to Section II Paragraph 2(1) of the Federal 
Act on the Functions, Financing and Election Campaigning of Political Parties 
(PartG), all political parties which are represented in the National Council have 
unrestricted access to the direct state funding, “for the purposes of public 
relations activities”. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
each“ (own translation). Austria has 11 multi-member constituencies broken down in 43 regional 
constituencies. 
168
 See Article 43 Paragraph 4 which states that „The campaigning political parties have to 
contribute for the cost of preparing the official ballot in regional constituencies in the amount of 
435 Euros to the federal government. The contribution is to submit in bar simultaneously with 
the submission of the nomination list (Paragraph 1) to the State Election Commission. If the 
contribution is not paid, the submission of a list is considered as not valid” (own translation).  
169
 „Article 100 Paragraph 1 reads “In the second round (that is during the allocation of 
mandates, S.B.) only those political parties take part which scored at least 4% of the valid votes 
cast”. Article 107(2) adds “Parties which have received no mandate in a regional constituency 
and have obtained less than 4% of the valid votes cannot participate in the allocation of 
mandates“ (own translation). 
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6.2.1.4 Operational constraints in Belgium 
Lastly, the range of operational constraints of Belgium places this country also 
firmly within the group of democracies with a high defensiveness. As far as the 
state surveillance is concerned, it has always been one of the key strategies 
used by the Belgian authorities against political extremism. (Cf. Keunings, 1989: 
59-60; van Outrive & Cappelle, 1995: 141). Similar to other democracies in 
Western Europe, the evolution of the Belgian surveillance system was very 
much predicated on the efforts of the Belgian state to counter the pro-
Communist tendencies in the country after the end of World War II (Cf. van 
Outrive, 2003: 39-40). The current Belgian State Security Service, known in 
Dutch as Veiligheid van de Staat and in French as Sûreté de l'État, is the key 
intelligence and security body in Belgium (Cf. van Outrive, 2003: 32; Matthijs, 
2008: 552)170. It is a civilian agency put under the authority of the Ministry of 
Justice. Its main tasks, as laid down in Article 7 of the Organic Law on 
Intelligence and Security Services (Loi organique des services de 
renseignement et de sécurite), adopted on 30 November 1998, include the 
collection and analysis of information related to all activities threatening the 
internal and external security of the state, the continued existence of its 
democratic and constitutional order, the performance of democratic insitutions, 
and the public security171.  
Moving to the next constraint assessing the presence of formal restrictions for 
the employment in the civil service, Belgium has no special law that would allow 
it to ban the members of non-democratic groups or political parties from the 
duty in civil service, although in the past its government tried to introduce such 
law several times (Cf. Nandrin, 2000: 46). For example, on 2nd October 1937 a 
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 See the website of the institution at: http://justice.belgium.be/fr/service_public_federal 
_justice/organisation/services_et_commissions_independants/surete_de_l_Etat/ (accessed 16. 
04.2013) 
171
 Article 7(1) reads  «La Sureté de l’Etat a pour mission: de rechercher, d’analyser et de traiter 
le renseignement relatif a` toute activite´ qui menace ou pourrait menacer la sureté intérieure de 
l’Etat et la pérennité de l’ordre démocratique et constitutionnel, la sureté extérieure de l’Etat et 
les relations internationales, le potentiel scientifique ou économique défini par le Comité 
ministériel, ou tout autre intéret fondamental du pays défini par le Roi sur proposition du Comité 
ministériel”. The full text of the Loi organique des services de renseignement et de securité 
(Organic law concerning the intelligence and security services) is available at: 
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/loi_a.pl?=&sql=(text+contains+(''))&rech=1&language=fr
&tri=dd+AS+RANK&numero=1&table_name=loi&F=&cn=1998113032&caller=image_a1&fromta
b=loi&la=F&pdf_page=1&pdf_file=http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/mopdf/1998/12/18_2.pdf 
(accessed 23.05.2014)   
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Royal Decree was adopted which prohibited the state servants to engage in any 
activities which contradicted the state constitution or the laws under Article 9 of 
this act (“Ils [les agents de l’état] ne peuvent se livrer à aucune activité qui serait 
en opposition avec la Constitution et les lois du peuple belge”)172. This rule was 
adopted mainly against the members of the Belgian Communist Party 
(Kommunistische Partij van België / Parti Communiste de Belgique) to prevent 
them to enter the civil service. However, this law was suspended on 16th 
October 1944 due to the positive role that the Communists played within the 
Resistance Movement during the World War II (Cf. Nandrin, 2000: 46-47). After 
the end of World War II, the circumstances of the Cold War moved the 
Communists again in the camp of the state enemies. Therefore, on 13th 
September 1950, the Council of Ministers took a decision to reanimate the 
Royal Decree from 2nd October 1937 once again (Cf. Nandrin, 2000: 46-47). 
This provision remained in force until 4th August 2004 when the government 
decided to suspend it once again173. Today rather informal admission rules are 
applied within the Belgian civil service (Cf. Suetens et. al, 1981: 50; also Klamt, 
2012: 50). According to the new rules, the public sector employees can join any 
political party inasmuch as this does not conflict with an effective operation of 
the state.  
With regard to the constraints on the ballot access, Belgium requires its political 
parties to collect signatures in order to place their candidates for the elections in 
the national parliament (Chamber of Representatives). According to Article 116 
§1er of the Electoral Code political parties must submit their candidates’ lists to 
the main constituency office. Thereby, political parties must endorse their 
candidatures’ lists with the support signatures ranging from 200 to 500 voters 
depending on the size of a constituency174. Alternatively, candidates’ lists must 
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 Arrete Royal du 2 octobre 1937 portant le statut des agents de l’état, available at: 
http://www.fedweb.belgium.be/fr/reglementation/19371002_ar_statut.jsp#.VJMZUPNtLcs 
(accessed 20.04.2014)   
173
 Arrêté royal du 4 aout 2004  relatif à la carrière du niveau A des agents de l'Etat, available 
at: http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/doc/rech_f.htm (accessed 20.05.2014)   
174
 Belgian Election Code 2007, available at: http://aceproject.org/ero-
en/regions/europe/BE/belgium-election-code-2007/view (accessed 12.04.2014).  Article 116 
§1er reads “Pour l'élection de la Chambre des Représentants, la présentation doit être signée 
soit par cinq cents électeurs au moins lorsqu'au dernier recensement, la population de la 
circonscription électorale est supérieure à un million d'habitants, par quatre cents électeurs au 
moins lorsque ladite population est comprise entre 500.000 et un million d'habitants et par deux 
cents électeurs au moins dans les autres cas, soit par trois membres sortants au moins”.  
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obtain the support of three retiring members of the parliament (‘membres 
sortants’). There is no requirement for a deposit payment.  
Moving to the next constraint, Belgium’s current threshold for obtaining a seat in 
the parliament is higher than 3%, thus qualifying it for a high defensiveness 
within this constraint. According to Article 165bis of the Electoral Code only 
those political parties can obtain a seat in both the Chamber of Representatives 
and Senate which have received at least 5 per cent of votes cast within each 
constituency (currently 11 multi-member constituencies)175. This high threshold 
was introduced in 2003 as a result of an electoral reform and had the goal to 
prevent a further fragmentation of the political party system (Cf. Hooghe & 
Deschouwer, 2011: 637-638). Following the example of Germany, it was hoped 
that through this new threshold many small political parties, including the non-
democratic ones, would face more difficulties to contest a seat during the 
elections, thus leaving the mainstream political parties to form the government. 
(Cf. Hooghe & Deschouwer, 2011: 638).  
With regard to the next operational constraint, Belgium has a special provision 
within its Party Finance Law, adopted in December 1998, which gives the state 
the right to withdraw the direct state funding for a minimum of three months and 
a maximum of one year from those political parties which regularly break the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), adopted by the European 
Council on November 4, 1950 (Cf. Swyngedouw, 2009: 71-72)176. This provision 
was adopted mainly against the Vlaams Blok party (Flemish Blok) which was 
known for frequently breaking the Belgian anti-racist legislation. According to 
Articles 15bis and 15ter of the Party Finance Law, the direct state funding is 
given to all political parties on the condition that they observe the rights and 
                                                          
175
 The full text of the Electoral Code can be viewed at: 
http://www.verkiezingen.fgov.be/fileadmin/user_upload/Elections/communales2012/fr/20120822
-news/code-electoral-kieswetboek-20120901.pdf Article 165bis of the Code reads “1. pour 
l’élection de la Chambre des représentants, les listes qui ont obtenu au moins 5 % du total 
général des votes valablement exprimés dans la circonscription électorale ; 2. pour l’élection du 
Sénat, les listes qui ont obtenu au moins 5 % du total général des votes valablement exprimés 
en faveur des listes présentées pour le collège électoral français ou le collège électoral 
néerlandais, selon le cas”.(accessed 15.04.2014) 
176
 In general, all political parties in Belgium are entitled to the direct state funding if they are 
represented in either of the two representative bodies the Chamber of Representatives and the 
Senate by a directly elected member of parliament. See Chapter III, Article 15 of the Belgium 
Party Finance Law which reads “The Chamber of representatives and of the Senate, each on 
their own behalf, shall grant, for each represented political party (within one of the) Assemblies 
by at least one member of Parliament directly elected”. Belgian Party Finance Law of 4th July 
1989, available at: www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl (accessed 22.05.2014) 
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freedoms guaranteed under the ECHR177. In order to launch a formal procedure 
of a withdrawal of the direct state funding from a political party, five members of 
a parliamentary commission on party financing have to submit their formal 
complaint to the Council of State about a political party breaching the ECHR 
(Cf. Swyngedouw, 2009: 72). The Council of State decides then the case. In 
2000, this provision was invoked by two anti-racist groups to file an indirect 
attack on the Vlaams Blok party. On April 21, 2004 the Ghent Court of Appeal 
declared illegal the financial support granted to this party by three key 
organisations which were providing financial support to  this political party for 
training of leadership and media relations, on the ground that the party was a 
racist organisation (Cf. Erk, 2005; Brems, 2006; Bleich & Lambert, 2013: 133). 
Having lost the source of income, the Vlaams Blok dissolved itself 
subsequently.   
6.2.2 Democracies with medium defensiveness within the 
operational constraints category  
The United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, and France fall in the group of 
democracies with a medium defensiveness, when their range of operational 
constraints is considered. In what follows, the legal situation within each of 
these countries is analysed in greater detail, moving from higher to lower 
scores.  
6.2.2.1 Operational constraints in the United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom’s scope of operational constraints places this democracy 
firmly within the range of medium defensiveness. As far as the first constraint of 
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 Chapter III, Articles 15bis reads “In order to benefit from the subsidy specified at article 15, 
each party shall, (...), include in its statutes or program a provision according to which it commits 
to observe the political action it intends to conduct and make its different components and 
elected representatives observe at least the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of November 4, 
1950 as approved by the law of May 13, 1955 and amended by additional protocols in force in 
Belgium”. The next article 15ter §1 adds that “§ 1. When a political party, by its own act or by 
the act of its components, lists, candidates or elected representatives, proves itself, in a clear 
manner and based upon several corresponding signs, hostile towards the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
of November 4, 1950 as approved by the law of May 13, 1955 and amended by additional 
protocols in force in Belgium, the subsidy, that, according to the provisions set forth in this 
chapter, is granted to the institution specified at article 22 shall be, if (the general assembly 
within the administrative division) of the State Council decides thereupon, cut off within fifteen 
days by the Commission of control up to the amount decided by the State Council”.  
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state surveillance is considered, the United Kingdom has by far the most 
comprehensive legal basis related to the regulation of the security services, as 
compared with other democracies covered in this study. The key legal 
document is the Security Service Act 1989 which was adopted to put the work 
of the UK’s main security intelligence agencies, the MI5 (Military Intelligence, 
Section 5), MI6 (Military Intelligence, Section 6), and the GCHQ (Government 
Communications Headquarters), on a statutory ground (Cf. Gill, 2003: 270; 
Eatwell, 2010: 216)178. According to Section 1 Paragraph 2 of this act,  “[t]he 
function of the Service shall be the protection of national security and, in 
particular, its protection against threats from espionage, terrorism and 
sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions 
intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, 
industrial or violent means”179. Other key legal documents include the 
Intelligence Services Act 1994 and Security Service Act 1996. Both acts were 
adopted to add “the prevention or detection of serious crime” to the functional 
duties of security services in the country (Cf. Gill, 2003: 277)180. Furthermore, 
the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11th September 2001 and the series 
of terrorist attacks on the London transportation system on 7th July 2005 have 
prompted the British government to increase the powers of its security services. 
According to Moran and Phythian, the security services were seen as the key to 
combating the new terrorism threat in the country (Cf. Moran & Phythian, 2008: 
2; also Klausen, 2009: 412). The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
adopted in 2001 has among other things empowered the security agencies to 
gather intelligence about groups involved in the illicit production and trade with 
weapons of mass destruction under Sections 43 to 57 of this Act181. The 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, adopted after the terrorist attacks in London 
on 7th July 2005, gave the security services additional powers for enhanced 
surveillance of groups and individuals who were put under the so called ‘control 
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 From these three security agencies the MI5 is responsible for gathering intelligence about 
domestic threats while the other two MI6 and the GCHQ are responsible for gathering foreign 
secret intelligence in the interest of national security (Cf. Gill, 2003: 267; CODEXTER, 2007: 8).  
179
 Section 1 Paragraph 2, Security Service Act 1989, Chapter 5, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov. uk/ukpga/1989/5/contents (accessed 24.12.2013) 
180
 Section 1 Paragraph 2, Intelligence Services Act 1994, Chapter 13, available at: 
http://www.legislation. gov.uk/ukpga/1994/13/contents and Section 1(4) of the Security Service 
Act 1996, Chapter 35, available at:  http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/35/pdfs/ukpga_ 
19960035_en.pdf (both accessed 12.11.2013) 
181
 See the full text of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Chapter 24,  available 
at:  http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/24/contents (accessed 12.11.2013) 
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orders’ by the Home Secretary according to Section 1 of the Act (Cf. Moran, 
2008: 20). The imposition of a control order entailed further obligations for 
individuals or groups affected for purposes connected with protecting members 
of the public from a risk of terrorism. Finally, under the government strategy 
called CONTEST (an abbreviation for ‘the counter-terrorism strategy’), adopted 
by the Home Office in 2006, the security services were given additional powers 
for the surveillance of Muslim organisations and communities operating in the 
country (Cf. Walker, 2008: 54; Gregory, 2010: 85ff; Spalek & Lambert, 2010: 
103). The CONTEST strategy consisted of four interrelated strategies 
PREVENT, PURSUE, PROTECT, and PREPARE, always written in capital 
letters, and has further increased the powers of the police and state bodies for 
tackling domestic terrorism and radicalization among Muslim communities, of 
which the state surveillance was considered as “vital to defeating terrorism” (Cf. 
Home Office, 2006: 43; Walker, 2008: 54).  
Moving to the next constraint, the UK has specific provisions that can be used 
to expel the members of non-democratic parties or groups from the duty in civil 
service. Thereby, unlike highly defensive democracies Germany, Austria or the 
Netherlands, the relevant provisions are found not in the constitution or 
statutory law, but in the case-law (Cf. Umbach & Harlow, 1981: 226; 
Woodhouse, 2013: 82). The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 
which is the main legislation for regulating the civil service in the UK does not 
refer to the political affiliation of a candidate as a ground for his or her rejection 
to enter or a dismissal from the duty in the civil service182. According to Section 
10(2) of this Act, “a person’s selection must be on merit on the basis of fair and 
open competition”. Similarly, the Employment Equality Act 2010 which is the 
main law regulating the discrimination in the workplace on the base of disability, 
gender, race, religion or belief, and sexual orientation does not also refer to the 
membership in a hostile party or an organisation as a ground for a dismissal 
from a job, meaning that such membership cannot be practically tuned against 
a particular person (Cf. Husbands, 2009: 272)183 However, there is a significant 
body of case-law which provides an evidence that some employers in the UK 
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 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, Chapter 25, available at:   
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/25/pdfs/ukpga_20100025_en.pdf (accessed 12.06. 
2013) 
183
 Equality Act 2010, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukpga/2010/15/pdfs/ukpga_ 
20100015_en.pdf (accessed 12.07. 2013) 
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can dismiss their employees if they are affiliated with the right-wing extremist 
British National Party (BNP). According to Husbands, the courts in the UK 
consider the membership in the BNP as a “reasonable ground for a dismissal” 
(Cf. Husbands, 2009: 273).  
For example, in a famous Baggs v. Fudge case184 where a person applying for 
a job of a practice manager in a small medical practice was suspended from the 
job interview because of his active membership in the right-wing extremist 
British National Party (BNP), the court has decided that the membership in the 
BNP was not a religion or belief, what the dismissed person has claimed before 
the court, but a membership in a “peculiar political party” which “restricts its 
membership on ethnic grounds” (Cf. Baggs v. Fugge, 2005: 2). Thus, his claim 
before the court tribunal that he was treated in violation of the Employment 
Equality Act 2003185 was finally dismissed by the court. According to the court’s 
judgement the membership in the BNP “was sufficient for the claim to fail” (Cf. 
Baggs v. Fugge, 2005: 3).  
The next evidence provides the case of Redfearn v. Serco Ltd in which an 
employee Arthur Redfearn was refused an employment in a transport firma as a 
driver because of his election as a local councilor for the British National Party 
(BNP) in West Yorkshire186. The company justified its decision for the reason 
that most of its customers were of Asian origin and that the membership of a 
colleague in the BNP can threaten the safety and welfare of its customers (Cf. 
Husbands, 2009: 272).  
Other cases includes the Association of Chief Constables and Police Officers 
which in 2004 issued a ban on the membership in the BNP party because it 
held that such membership would be in conflict with the duty of the police forces 
to promote racial equality. A similar regulation was enforced on the UK’s 
teachers in 2009 by the Department for Children, Schools and Families formally 
banning them from joining the BNP party (Cf. Eatwell, 2010: 214).  
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 The transcript of the full text of the case Baggs v. Fudge (1400114/05 (ET)) can be viewed at 
the website of the employment tribunal at: http://uk.practicallaw.com/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata 
&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1247478068
637&ssbinary=true (accessed 24.10.2013) 
185
 The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Act 2003 was finally revoked while some of its 
provisions were included in the Equality Act 2010. See Schedule 27, Part II of the Equality Act 
2010. (accessed 20.10.2013) 
186
 The transcript of the case Reffearn v. Serco Ltd (A2/2005/1845) can be viewed at: 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/659.html (accessed 25.12.2013) 
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Moving to the constraints on the ballot access, the British law requires its 
political parties to pay a monetary deposit to nominate their candidates for 
elections. Currently the amount of the deposit is 500 British pounds which is 
only returned if a party has obtained at least 5 percent of the valid votes cast 
within a single constituency. While political parties pay a deposit, there is no 
formal requirement to file signatures for nomination. According to Part II Section 
22 of the Political Parties, Referendums and Elections Act 2000 (which replaced 
the Registration of Political Parties Act 1998) only those candidates who stand 
in elections as independents must collect signatures of at least ten voters within 
their respective constituencies (currently the UK has 650 single-member 
constituencies)187.  
As regards the next constraint, there is no formal threshold in the UK that 
political parties have to pass in order to gain a seat in the parliament (Cf. 
Downs, 2012: 34-35). According to the UK’s current electoral system, what is 
important for winning a seat in the parliament is not a total proportion of votes 
that a political party has gained but the amount of the concentrated support it 
obtained within a constituency. This is why it is possible for any political party, 
including a non-democratic one, to win a seat in the parliament with less than 1 
per cent of votes, provided these votes are concentrated within a particular 
constituency (Cf. Downs, 2012: 34)188.  
With regard to the next constraint assessing the presence of formal restrictions 
for the access to the direct state funding for non-democratic parties, the UK 
does not have such constraint. The direct state funding for political parties is 
provided in the UK since 2000 in form of Policy Development Grants (PDG). 
The legal basis is stipulated within the Political Parties, Referendums and 
Elections Act 2000 (Part I Article 12(b))189. As it stands, the rules for receiving 
such grants are not strict, as all political parties are only required to have at 
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 Political Parties, Referendums and Elections Act, 2000, available at: http://www.legislation. 
gov.uk/ukpga/2000/41/contents (accessed 24.10.2013). 
188
 This is why during the General Elections in 2010 the Green Party won 1 seat in the 
parliament with only 285,616 (or 1%) votes while the United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP) won no seat even though it received in total 919,546 votes (or 3.1%). Unlike the Green 
party, the votes of the UKIP party were not concentrated within a constituency, while the Green 
party received a concentrated support in the constituency Brighton Pavilion (8.4% of votes) (Cf. 
Mitchell, 2010: 157-185). 
189
 Part I Article 12(a) (1) of the Political Parties, Referendums and Elections Act 2000 defines 
the Development Policy Grant as “a grant to a represented registered party to assist the party 
with the development of policies for inclusion in any manifesto”. 
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least two members represented in the House of Commons in order to be eligible 
to receiving them.  
6.2.2.2 Operational constraints in Sweden 
Sweden’s repertoire of operational constraints puts it also firmly in the group of 
countries with a medium defensiveness. As regards the first constraint 
assessing the presence of the state surveillance, Sweden is the only democracy 
which does not have a separate civilian security agency in charge of conducting 
a surveillance of non-democratic threats inside the country. Internal security 
remains a matter of the Security Police (commonly referred to as Säpo) which 
has the power to conduct surveillance and intelligence about groups and 
political parties that threaten the state and its democratic constitutional order 
(Cf. Cameron & Töllborg, 2003: 182)190. In this the Security Police is different 
from the ordinary police and has a greater degree of autonomy from it albeit 
both are formally under the control of the National Police Board (NPB) (Cf. 
Cameron & Töllborg, 2003: 175). The main purpose of the Security Police as 
laid down within Section 1 of the Police Act (1984: 387) consists in “its efforts to 
support justice and maintain public safety”191. As stipulated further within 
Section 7 of this Act, this includes the prevention and discovery of crimes 
against national security. According to Cameron and Töllborg, one of the most 
important instruments in the work of the Security Police is their security 
intelligence files. The purpose of these files is to identify the members of 
political groups and parties who might pose a potential threat to the internal and 
external security of the state, or who seek to subvert the state’s democratic 
order (Cf. Cameron & Töllborg, 2003: 184; also Töllborg, 1995: 252ff). As 
discussed at length by Cameron and Töllborg, in this task the Security Police 
follows the instructions issued by the government concerning as which groups 
and political parties should be put in the security intelligence files. Typically, the 
criteria for the inclusion in the security files include “conviction from a crime of 
violence connected to political activity, or bearing of weapons during a 
demonstration”, as well as “building or participating in secret cells in the work 
                                                          
190
 Another security body called military intelligence agency, Informationsbyrån, IB, is in charge 
of military intelligence work abroad and does not deal with internal security (Cf. Cameron & 
Töllborg, 2003: 175).  
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 The Police Act (1984: 387) (with commentary), available at: www.legislationonline.org 
(accessed 14.09.2013) 
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place, taking part in a political (re)education course and (…) ‘having, or having 
had, a leading position in the party” (Cf. Cameron & Töllborg, 2003: 185). Often 
the information about the filed person is forwarded to his or her employer and 
according to Cameron and Töllborg “the release of information from the Security 
Police files almost always led to a negative result for the filed person” (Cameron 
& Töllborg, 2003: 186).  
Moving to the next constraint, there is no legislation in Sweden empowering the 
state authorities to dismiss their civil servants because of their political 
affiliation. In Sweden the appointment of civil servants is generally regulated by 
the Public Employment Act which sets out the rules concerning the employment 
of civil servants in the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament), the Government, the 
municipal bodies, as well as the county councils and municipal associations192. 
According to Section 4 of this Act, the employers shall pay attention only to 
objective factors such as service merits and competence when making 
appointments: “Competence shall be a primary consideration, unless there are 
special reasons for doing otherwise”. There are no provisions within this act 
forbidding the civil servants a membership in any political organisation, even if 
they are considered a threat to the state. Section 7 of the Act states rather 
generally “An employee may not have any employment or any assignment or 
exercise any activities that may adversely affect confidence in his or any other 
employee’s impartiality in the work or that may harm the reputation of the 
authority”.  
Moving to the constraints on the ballot access, Sweden requires its political 
parties to submit signatures in support of their candidates for the election. 
According to Chapter 2 Section 3 of the Elections Act, all new political parties 
which are not represented in the Swedish parliament Rigsdag have to submit 
1500 signatures in support of their nominees193. There is no requirement to file 
a deposit in support of the party nominees. 
With regard to the next constraint assessing the strictness of the electoral 
threshold, according to Chapter 14 Section 5 of the Elections Act the current 
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 Public Employment Act (1994: 260), available at: http://www.government.se/sb/d/6278/ 
a/72001 (accessed 20.10.2013) 
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 Chapter 2 Section 3 of the Elections Act (2005:837), available at: http://www.government.se/ 
sb/d/6822/a/64445 (accessed 20.10.2013) 
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electoral threshold in Sweden is 4 percent. Therefore Sweden falls in the group 
of countries with a high threshold. This high threshold is applied in the elections 
in the national parliament Rigsdag, in the elections in 20 county councils 
(landsting) and 290 municipal assemblies (kommunfullmäktige), as well as in 
the elections in the European parliament.  
Moving to the final constraint assessing the presence of legal resrictions for 
receiving the direct state funding for non-democratic parties, Sweden does not 
have any legislation prohibiting its political parties the access to the state 
subsidies on the ground of their antidemocratic ideology or activities. According 
to the current provisions within the Act on State Financial Support to Political 
Parties, the direct state funding is given to all political parties, provided they 
received at least one seat in the parliament or more than 2.5 per cent of the 
votes nationwide in either of the last two elections (Section 2 and 3)194.  
6.2.2.3 Operational constraints in Denmark 
The arsenal of operational constraints in Denmark is lower than in the United 
Kingdom and Sweden but still qualifies for a medium defensiveness within this 
category. Looking at the first constraint of the state surveillance, Denmark has a 
special law that gives the state the power to surveille its non-democratic parties 
and groups. The Danish Security and Intelligence Service, for short DSIS 
(Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (PET)), is the key state body authorised to 
conduct the surveillance of non-democratic actors who are active in the country. 
This institution was created on 1st January 1951 and is put under the authority 
of the Ministry of Justice195. The statutory provisions for the PET are laid down 
within the Security and Intelligence Service Act, adopted on 24th January 1952 
and amended in 2013. According to Article 1st of this Act, the Security and 
Intelligence Service has the task “to prevent, investigate and combat crimes 
against the independence and security, and crimes against the Constitution and 
the supreme authorities; and to prevent, detect and prevent other serious 
crimes that threaten the national or international social order”. Furthermore, 
Chapter 7 Paragraph 11 adds the PET’s activities can extend to “processing of 
                                                          
194
 The Act on State financial support to political parties (1972:625), available at: http://www. 
government.se/sb/d/6822/a/107860 (accessed 20.10.2013) 
195
 See the website of the organization at: https://www.pet.dk/English.aspx (accessed 10.01. 
2014) 
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information about political associations and organisations to include information 
about who represents management”196. During the time of Cold War, the PET 
was actively conducting the surveillance of the Danish Communist Party and 
other left-wing organisations (such as the Danish Communist Youth 
organisation) (Cf. Mariager, 2013: 60-75). Since the end of the Cold War the 
PET has refocused its activities on the right-wing extremist and terrorist groups 
(Cf. CODEXTER, 2012: 3).   
Moving to the next constraint assessing the presence of legal restrictions for the 
employment in civil service for the members of non-democratic parties and 
groups, the Danish law does not have such provision.  According to the Danish 
Civil Servants Act of 2004, the civil servants are only required to “scrupulously 
adhere to the rules applicable to his position, and both inside and outside the 
service prove worthy of the esteem and confidence required by the position” 
(Chapter 3, Article 10)197. According to Hansen, a candidate’s political 
affiliations are not considered during the employment (Chapter 2, Article 5) (Cf. 
Hansen, 2013: 10-11). However, the constitution of Denmark states those 
officials appointed by the King are obliged to make a “solemn declaration of 
loyalty to the Constitutional Act”198.  
With regard to the constraints on the ballot access for the non-democratic 
parties and groups, Denmark requires its political parties to collect signatures in 
support of their party nominees. According to Article 12 of the Parliamentary 
Election Act (PEA)199, adopted in 1987 and amended in 2002, all political 
parties registered with the Minister for Social Welfare have to enclose with their 
application the declarations signed by voters whose number must correspond to 
1/175 of all valid votes cast during the last general election. Given that during 
the last parliamentary elections in 2011 the total of 3.588.919 voters cast their 
votes, the number of signatures required from political parties at present 
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 The Danish Security and Intelligence Service Act (Lov om Politiets Efterretningstjeneste), 
available at: https://www.retsinformation.dk/forms/r0710.aspx?id=152182 (accessed 06.01. 
2014) 
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 The Civil Servants Act, Consolidation Act No. 488 of 06/05/2010 (Bekendtgørelse af lov om 
tjenestemænd (Tjenestemandsloven), available at: https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/ 
R0710.aspx?id=130606&exp=1 (in Danish) (accessed 14.01.2014) 
198
 See Article 27(1) of the Constitutional Act of Denmark of June 5, 1953, available at: 
http://www.thedanishparliament.dk/democracy/the_constitutional_act_of_denmark.as  
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 Parliamentary Election Act of Denmark, available at:  http://www.thedanishparliament.dk/ 
Democracy/~/media/Pdf_materiale/Pdf_publikationer/English/valgloven_eng_web_samlet%20p
df.ashx (accessed 10.01.2014) 
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amounts to 20508 signatures200. This amount of signatures is the highest 
among the eight democracies studied. According to Article 11 Paragraph 1 and 
2 of the PEA, only those political parties are exempt from this requirement 
which are already represented within the Danish parliament (Folketing). 
Independent candidates must be recommended by at least 150 and at most 200 
voters of the nomination district as supporters (Part 6, Article 32(1)). There is no 
formal requirement to pay a monetary deposit at nomination.   
Moving to the next constraint assessing the strictness of the electoral threshold, 
according to Articles 75 to 77 of the Parliamentary Election Act, the current 
electoral threshold in Denmark is only 2 per cent201.  Therefore Denmark falls in 
the group of democracies with a low threshold.  
Regarding the last constraint assessing the presence of legal restrictions to 
receiving the direct state funding for non-democratic political parties, the Danish 
law has no such provision within its law.  According to Article 2 Paragraph 1 of 
the Grants to Political Parties (Consolidation) Act No. 1291 of 8 December 
2006, all political parties which participated in the most recently held general 
election are entitled to receiving a financial grant to cover their costs for political 
work202.  
6.2.2.4 Operational constraints in France 
France’s repertoire of operational constraints is also lower than in the United 
Kingdom and Sweden but still qualifies for a medium defensiveness within this 
category. With regard to the first constraint looking for the presence of the state 
surveillance, France has this legal constraint available within its defensive 
arsenal. The Direction centrale du renseignement intérieur (DCRI) is the 
France’s key surveillance and intelligence body responsible for collecting 
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 In the general election in September 2011, the total of 3588919 voters cast their votes. 
Divided by 175, it makes approximately 20508 signatures that would be required for a 
registration of a new party for the next parliamentary elections (retrieved from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Folketing#Latest_election_results). 
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 According to Articles 75, 76 and 77 of the Parliamentary Election Act, the seats in the 
parliament are allocated only to political parties which have obtained either at least one 
constituency seat, or obtained in two of the three regions at least a number of votes equivalent 
to the average number of valid votes per constituency seat in the region, or which obtained at 
least two per cent of the valid votes cast in all Denmark. 
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 Grants to Political Parties (Consolidation) Act No. 1291 of 8 December 2006, available at: 
http://www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl/party-law (accessed 24.09.2013) 
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relevant information about its internal and external enemies (Cf. Brodeur & 
Dupeyron, 2013: 14-15). The DCRI was built in 2008 after a mergence of the 
two separate former intelligence agencies “Direction du la surveillance du 
territoire” (DCT) and “Direction Centrale des Renseignements Généraux” 
(DCRG) (Cf. Monjardet & Lévy, 1995: 29ff; Canu, 1997: 171ff; Brodeur & 
Dupeyron, 2013: 14-15). The DCRI operates under the authority of the 
Ministère de l’Intérior (Interior Minister). The legal basis for its work is provided 
by the special Decree issued on 27 June 2008203. According to Article 1 of this 
decree the key role of the DCRI consists in fighting all activities aimed at the 
destruction of the territorial integrity of the state and threatening its fundamental 
national interests (“pour lutter, sur le territoire de la République, contre toutes 
les activités susceptibles de constituer une atteinte aux intérêts fondamentaux 
de la nation”).  
Moving to the next constraint assessing the availability of legal restrictions for 
the employment in the civil service, France does not have any legislation that 
could be used to prevent the members of non-democratic parties or groups to 
work in the civil service (Cf. Waline, 1958: 6-7; Canu, 1997: 160; Camus, 2009: 
151-152; Buis, 2009: 94-95). Today the civil service in France is regulated by 
the Law on the public service (‘fonction publique de l’Etat’)204. This law does not 
mention that civil servants are obliged to support the democratic constitutional 
order, or must be restricted in their political membership. According to Article 19 
of this law, candidates are hired primarily on the basis of their educational and 
professional records (‘certains diplômes ou de l’accomplissement de certaines 
etudes’)205. According to Canu, in France „the membership in an enemy political 
party should not be taken as a reason for a rejection of a candidate“ (Canu, 
1997: 246; also cf. Camus, 2009: 151-152). 
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 Décret n° 2008-609 du 27 juin 2008 relatif aux missions et à l'organisation de la direction 
centrale du renseignement intérieur, NOR: IOCX0811987D, available at: http://www.legifrance. 
gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=CF89DC7C86982C2DC05AF4478A5056C5.tpdjo01v_2?cidTe
xte=JORFTEXT000019078545&dateTexte=&oldAction=rechJO (accessed 10.10.2013) 
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 Loi n° 84-16 du 11 janvier 1984 portant dispositions statutaires relatives à la fonction 
publique de l’Etat, available at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte= 
JORFTEXT000000501099 (accessed 12.10.2013) 
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 Article 19 reads « Des concours ouverts aux candidats justifiant de certains diplômes ou de 
l'accomplissement de certaines études. Lorsqu'une condition de diplôme est requise, les 
candidats disposant d'une expérience professionnelle conduisant à une qualification 
équivalente à celle sanctionnée par le diplôme requis peuvent, lorsque la nature des fonctions 
le justifie, être admis à se présenter à ces concours. Un décret en Conseil d'Etat précise la 
durée de l'expérience professionnelle prise en compte en fonction de la nature et du niveau des 
diplômes requis ». 
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With regard to the legal constraints on the ballot access, France has no 
requirements which political parties need to fulfil before they appear on the 
ballot (Cf. Ehin et al., 2013: 22). Following the rules stipulated within Chapter V 
Article L157 of the Electoral Code, adopted in 1964 and last amended in March 
2012, all candidates have only to submit to the Interior Ministry (préfecture) a 
declaration of the candidate’s registration in the voter list of any constituency 
and a proof that a financial representative was designated206. No signatures or 
deposit are required to enclose with the declaration.    
Although France does not impose any constraints on the ballot access, it has 
the highest electoral threshold among the democracies studied (Cf. Downs, 
2012: 34).  According to Article 24 of the Constitution of 1958 and Part II, 
Chapter I, Article L.O. 119 of the Electoral Code the members of the National 
Assembly are elected according to a two-round majority system207. According to 
this electoral system a candidate is elected in the first round if he or she obtains 
an absolute majority of the total votes cast. If they do not obtain the absolute 
majority of votes, they must obtain at least 12.5% of the total number of 
registered voters in order to be eligible for the second round (Cf. Downs, 2012: 
34). According to Fisichella and others, this electoral system was particularly 
problematic for non-democratic parties such as the National Front (Front 
Nationale, FN) to pass into the second round (Cf. Fisichella, 1984: 182ff; 
Downs, 2012: 134).  
Moving to the last constraint, France does not impose any legal constraints on 
receiving the direct state funding for the non-democratic parties. The direct state 
funding for political parties was introduced in 1988, when the new Law on Party 
Finance208 was adopted by the French parliament (Cf. Pujas & Rhodes, 1999: 
                                                          
206
 Chapter V Article L.157 of the French Code Electoral (Version en vigueur pour l’élection 
présidentielle et pour les élections législatives de 2012), available at: http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/dossiers_thematiques/presidentielle_ 
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 Article 24 of the Constitution de la République Française du 4 Octobre 1958, available at: 
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 Law no. 88-227, of March 11, 1988 on financial transparency in political life, (copyrighted 
translation) available at: http://www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl/party-law (accessed 12.10.2013). 
Before 1988 the conditions related to funding to political parties were governed by the 1901 law 
on associations (‘Loi du 1er juillet 1901 relative au contrat d’association’). For example, Article 6 
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52)209. According to Article 9 of this law the direct state funding is provided to all 
political parties irrespective of their political ideology, provided their candidates 
have obtained at least 1 percent of the votes cast in at least fifty constituencies. 
The distribution is performed proportionately to the number of votes obtained 
during the first round of elections.  
6.3 Summary of findings and conclusion: patterns of formal-
legal democratic defensiveness  
The preceding three chapters have provided a systematic and comprehensive 
examination of the cross-national variations across the three categories of 
democratic defensiveness between the eight democracies focusing on the 
presence or absence of legal constraints. This section will discuss the evidence 
of cross-national variations between democracies while considering the three 
categories simultaneously. As it was argued earlier, it was important to assess 
the cross-national variations between the eight democracies within each 
category separately since each category includes constraints of differing 
severity, which made it difficult to assess the degree of democratic 
defensiveness by simply adding up the standardised scores for each category 
to have one country score (see Chapter 3.7 for details). After the differences 
across individual constraints within each category have been systematically 
examined, it is now possible to evaluate the overall patterns of formal-legal 
democratic defensiveness between the democracies studied. Table 10 provides 
an overview of the key country configurations found across the three categories, 
which will be followed by a descriptive analysis of each configuration. 
Table 10: Country configurations of democratic defensiveness across three 
categories 
               
          Dimensions 
 
Level of defen-
siveness 
Legal  
ban 
A 
Freedom  
constraints 
B 
Operational 
constraints 
C 
                                                                                                                                                                          
of the 1901 law prohibited the acceptance of donations for political parties (Cf. Pujas & Rhodes, 
1999: 53). 
209
 Before 1988 all political parties in France except probably the Communist Party which could 
raise its funds from membership fees, were funded mostly by donations and gifts from 
individuals as well as from legal and neutral entities such as endowments (Cf. Pujas & Rhodes, 
1999: 53).  
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High 
defensiveness 
(1-0.7) 
Germany  
Austria 
 
France 
 
 
Germany 
Austria 
 
France 
 
Belgium 
Germany 
Austria 
 
 
 
Belgium 
 
Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
Medium 
defensiveness 
(0.6-0.4) 
Belgium  
 
Netherlands  
 
UK 
Sweden 
Denmark 
  
 
 
Netherlands 
 
UK 
Sweden 
Denmark 
 
 
France 
 
 
 
UK 
Sweden 
Denmark 
  
 
Low 
defensiveness 
(0.3-0) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Note: Shading added to indicate patterns of defensiveness. The countries in bold fall in the 
same group of defensiveness across all three categories. 
Table 10 reflects the democracies are characterised by either high or medium 
defensiveness while there is no democracy within the low defensiveness group, 
supporting the previous observation that the eight democracies included in this 
study tend to adopt fairly constraining legal frameworks against internal non-
democratic enemies. Furthermore, a majority of democracies (5 out of 8) cluster 
around the same groups of high or medium defensiveness when considering 
the three categories simultaneously, also supporting the previous argument that 
there is a certain trade-off pattern between the three categories. Specifically, 
the first group of democracies with high defensiveness across all three 
categories includes Germany and Austria which implies these two democracies 
are the most defensive among all eight democracies studied. In comparison 
with other democracies, they have both legal measures for banning non-
democratic parties and groups, all legal measures for constraining political 
freedoms, and all or the majority of legal measures for imposing operational 
constraints. The second group includes the United Kingdom, Denmark, and 
Sweden which have medium defensiveness across the three categories. In 
comparison with the highly defensive Germany and Austria, these democracies 
have no legal mechanisms for party bans but do have legal mechanisms for 
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group bans, they have fewer measures for constraining political freedoms, and 
have also fewer operational constraints.  
However, France, Belgium and the Netherlands do not fit within these two key 
patterns of defensiveness, as they clearly reveal differing preferences across 
the three categories. Specifically, these democracies tend to range highly 
defensive in one category while medium defensive in another. France, for 
instance, combines high defensiveness in legal bans and freedom constraints, 
while it has medium defensiveness upon operational constraints. However, 
given the first two categories capture the most severe constraints as compared 
with operational constraints, it can be argued France is similar to Germany and 
Austria in terms of its formal-legal defensiveness and can be considered highly 
defensive. Ascertaining Belgium’s degree of defensiveness is less 
straightforward. Belgium combines medium defensiveness in legal bans with 
high defensiveness in freedom constraints and operational constraints. 
However, since Belgium ranges highly defensive within freedom constraints and 
operational constraints categories, it can be argued Belgium is similar to France 
in terms of its democratic defensiveness and can also be considered highly 
defensive. By contrast, the Netherlands combines medium defensiveness in 
legal bans and freedom constraints with high defensiveness in operational 
constraints, and is therefore similar to the UK, Sweden and Denmark in terms of 
its democratic defensiveness and can be considered as medium defensive. 
Table 11 summarizes these overall profiles of formal-legal democratic 
defensiveness as discussed. 
Table 11: Overall profiles of formal-legal democratic defensiveness among 8 
European democracies 
Democracies 
 
Overall profiles of democratic defensiveness 
Germany 
Austria 
France 
Belgium  
High defensive: 
High defensiveness across all or the majority of 
categories  
Netherlands 
UK 
Denmark 
Sweden 
Medium defensive:  
Medium defensiveness across all or the majority of 
categories  
Note: Grey shading added to differentiate high and medium defensive democracies. 
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As shown in Table 11, the two overall profiles of formal-legal democratic 
defensiveness can be identified among the democracies studied. Germany, 
Austria, France, and Belgium all form the first profile of high defensive 
democracies, as they combine high defensiveness across all or the majority of 
defensive categories. Specifically, these democracies have all or the majority of 
measures for party or group bans, for constraining political freedoms, and for 
applying operational constraints. The remaining democracies including the 
Netherlands, UK, Denmark, and Sweden form the next profile of medium 
defensive democracies as they combine medium defensiveness across all or 
the majority of categories. In comparison with high defensive democracies, 
these democracies have legal mechanisms to administer group bans only, use 
the majority of provisions for constraining freedom of assembly and association 
but fewer measures for constraining the freedom of expression, and have the 
majority of measures for imposing operational constraints.    
These empirical findings of the existing variations in democratic defensiveness 
between the eight democracies are similar to the earlier analyses of defensive 
practices in Europe. For instance, the finding that Germany is a highly defensive 
democracy correlates strongly with previous studies. Van Donselaar, for 
example, stated, “Germany’s legal armoury against internal threats is among 
the heaviest in Europe” (Cf. van Donselaar, 2003: 276; also cf. Backes, 2006: 
280-281; Klamt, 2012: 167ff; Bleich & Lambert, 2013: 136). As stated earlier, 
Germany is commonly viewed as a “quintessential example of militant 
democracy” (Cf. Minkenberg, 2006: 26).  
Similarly, the finding of France’s degree of democratic defensiveness is also 
clearly evident within previous literature, as France was commonly portrayed by 
scholars as highly defensive and similar to Germany (Cf. Boventer, 1987: 
Chapter 4; Fox & Nolte, 1995: 27ff; Canu, 1997: Chapter 2; Backes, 2006). 
Although the militant democracy concept was largely unknown by the founding 
fathers of the Fifth French Republic on the model it evolved in Germany, the 
modern democracy in France is typically described “not only as a liberal regime 
in the sense that it protects the individuals against the state, but also as a 
system where the Republic is protected against potential dangers” (Buis, 2009: 
88). 
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Also similar to earlier studies, the assessment of the UK’s level of democratic 
defensiveness resonates with the portrayal of its defensiveness within literature 
(Cf. Mullender, 2009: 311ff; Husbands, 2009: 265ff; Klamt, 2012: 105-108). 
Following Klamt’s assessment, the UK has “comparatively strong 
defensiveness” (Cf. Klamt, 2012: 108). According to Mullender,  despite lacking 
the doctrine of militant democracy as it exists in Germany, the UK has 
developed “the piecemeal approach toward defence of constitutional 
fundamentals”, as the country’s democratic defensiveness has evolved in 
response to the new challenges (Cf. Mullender, 2009: 313; 349).  
However, these empirical findings shed new light on the level of democratic 
defensiveness of several democracies in this study. For example, Austria was 
considered by some scholars as an example of “a neutral democracy” whereby 
lacking militancy against its non-democratic forces (Cf. Auprich, 2009: 54-55). 
The findings in this study rather point in a different direction. In reflecting upon 
the arsenal of legal constraints across the three categories, Austria has without 
doubt a quite comprehensive arsenal of constraints similar to those found in 
Germany.  
Similarly, the findings contradict the general perception of Belgium’s state of 
democratic defensiveness also. According to van Donselaar, “Belgium’s system 
of latent instruments of repression is relatively weak, as is its application of that 
system” (van Donselaar, 2003: 276). Comparing Belgium with Germany, 
France, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, he concluded that “Belgium’s 
democracy is (…) the most vulnerable of the five” (van Donselaar, 2003: 276; 
also cf. Klamt, 2012: 47ff). This depiction of the country’s defensiveness must 
be corrected. As the findings have demonstrated, Belgium has a relatively 
comprehensive arsenal of legal mechanisms for constraining non-democratic 
parties and groups and therefore should be characterised as a highly defensive 
democracy.  
Additionally, the Scandinavian countries Denmark and Sweden were commonly 
portayed as low defensive (Cf. Jesse, 2008a: 340; Meret, 2009; Lööw, 2009). 
For example, Kirchheimer indicated Sweden has a long tradition of tolerance 
which made it unnecessary for them to adopt strict laws (cited in Capoccia, 
2013: 217). Klamt ranked these two countries as “democracies with low or 
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moderate defensiveness” (Cf. Klamt, 2012: 62, 70). However, the empirical 
analysis reveals by contrast that both countries have medium defensiveness 
across all three categories.  
Furthermore, scholars tended to overestimate the state of democratic 
defensiveness of the Netherlands. Bleich and Lambert, for example, placed the 
country next to Germany of ‘highly repressive democracies’ in their ranking of 
ten democracies on a scale of repression against racist associations (Cf. Bleich 
& Lambert, 2013: 134-135). This classification is not in line with the findings of 
this analysis, revealing a different degree of democratic defensiveness for this 
country.  
The key reason for these differences in the assessment of states’ degree of 
democratic defensiveness has arisen due to scholars focusing previously either 
on a limited range of legal measures, most prominently so the legal ban of 
political parties, or focusing on the frequency of usage of legal measures rather 
than their actual presence to account for different patterns of formal-legal 
defensiveness. While doing so scholars either overrated or underestimated a 
state’s degree of defensiveness (see for such approach e.g. Fox & Nolte, 1995; 
van Donselaar, 2003; Bleich & Lambert, 2013).  For example, in his analysis of 
militant democracy in Austria, Auprich pointed out that Austria has never used 
Article 1 of the Prohibition Act of 1947 except for the banning of the NSDAP 
following the end of World War II. Based on this he argued “Article 1 of the 
Prohibition Act did not constitute a shift to a militant democracy” (Auprich, 2009: 
47).  
To summarise, the presentation of the overall profiles of democratic 
defensiveness has demonstrated the fruitfulness of constructing an 
encompassing assessment of variations by analysing the variations across 
each category separately and, secondly, by focusing on a broader spectrum of 
formal-legal measures dividing them into three categories according to their 
constraining severity upon non-democratic parties and groups. Through this 
approach, this analysis has offered a more plausible reconstruction of the 
formal-legal democratic defensiveness within the democracies studied, as 
compared with many unconnected case-studies previously. Building on this 
overview, the subsequent chapter will turn to the question which basic factors 
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identified within the literature are relevant to varying patterns of defensiveness 
to help us understand the cross-national differences revealed by this analysis.   
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CHAPTER 7: 
FACTORS SHAPING FORMAL-LEGAL DEMOCRATIC 
DEFENSIVENESS: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES  
7.1 Introduction 
After previous chapters have provided a systematic overview of the differences 
and similarities in formal-legal defensiveness between eight democracies, this 
chapter will address the question what broader factors can help us understand 
the cross-national variations in democratic defensiveness. To provide an 
understanding of all factors driving democratic defensiveness is not a simple 
task, therefore this chapter will not attempt to develop a theoretical framework 
providing an exhaustive answer to the question why democracies react “in the 
ways they do and with what consequences” (Downs, 2012: 53). Instead, this 
chapter will endeavour to contribute to the debate discussing the key factors 
determining democratic defensiveness by examining some of the central claims 
made in the literature in light of the empirical evidence presented in preceding 
chapters.  
This chapter will draw on historical institutionalism to account for the broader 
factors driving democratic defensiveness. Historical institutionalism is an 
approach to the study of politics which emphasizes that political and societal 
evolution is mediated in decisive ways by the institutional setting in which it 
takes place (Cf. Hall & Taylor, 1996: 937). Thereby historical institutionalists use 
a definition of institutions which refers to both organisational characteristics of 
the state and the rules and norms that guide the relationship between the actors 
(Cf. Ikenberry, 1994: 7). Thus defined, relevant institutions can vary widely in 
their scope and character. On the one hand, institutions can be conceived 
narrowly and include specific configurations of political system such as the 
electoral system, structure of party system, or the relations between various 
branches of the government. On the other hand, institutions can be conceived 
more broadly and include cultural, political and social norms and orientations 
(Cf. Thelen & Steinmo, 1992: 7; Ikenberry, 1994: 12-13; Hall & Taylor, 1996: 
938). Although the definition of what constitutes an institution is still a matter of 
some controversy in the literature (Cf. Steinmo & Thelen, 1992: 2), what is 
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common to all historical institutionalists is the key assumption that these 
institutional settings provide a context which shapes and constrains the goals 
and capacities of groups and individuals who operate within them (Cf. Thelen & 
Steinmo, 1992: 9; Ikenberrry, 1994: 7). An important characteristic of historical 
institutionalism is that it places an exclusive value on historical development to 
explain how political and societal institutions evolved. According to this view, 
contextual features of a state are path dependent in a sense that they represent 
“the outcome of a confluence of historical forces that shape and reshape the 
state’s organizational structure” (Ikenberry, 1994: 7).  
Historical institutionalism provides a convenient lens to understand what 
broader factors could be in place to explain why democracies are different in 
terms of democratic defensiveness. Drawing on historical institutionalism as an 
approach one can reason that a country’s democratic defensiveness is not 
developed in a vacuum, but is decisively influenced by a confluence of various 
historical, political and systemic factors which are unique in each country (Cf. 
Downs, 2012: 53). Just which factors could be decisive variables driving state 
variations in democratic defensiveness has remained a matter of some 
controversy within preceding literature (Cf. Downs, 2012: Ch.3, Bleich & 
Lambert, 2013: 136ff). For example, there is broad literature which suggests 
that understanding state variations in responses to non-democratic parties 
requires attention to the territorial construction of a state (federal or unitary), the 
design of the electoral system (majoritarian or proportional), and the spikes of 
political violence (Cf. Downs, 2012: 61ff; Bleich & Lambert, 2013: 139-140; 
Capoccia, 2013: 220). However, most scholars consider the historical context 
the most important factor driving democratic defensiveness. According to 
Downs the historical context provides “an environment that defines and 
constrains strategic imperatives and alternatives for democratic acors” (Downs 
2012: 54). Even when the events are distant in the past and “seemingly 
forgotten”, they leave traces which can significantly shape the democratic 
reactions against their enemies (Downs, 2012: 55). Similarly, Bleich and 
Lambert stated the history of non-democratic regime is “the most significant 
factor that predisposes a country to increased levels of repression against racist 
associations” (Bleich & Lambert, 2013: 123).  
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This chapter will ascertain these determining factors by theorizing and 
examining two particular factors in their relation to democratic defensiveness: 
firstly, the type of democracy, either substantive or procedural, and, secondly, 
the historical experience of internally triggered or supported breakdown of 
democratic regime during the 20th century. Both perspectives are compelling on 
theoretical grounds and have been frequently cited by scholars as alternatives 
to explain how and why democracies react to their internal threats (Cf. Fox & 
Nolte, 1995: 14; Backes, 2006: 279-280; Klamt, 2007: 135; Downs, 2012: 50; 
Bleich & Lambert, 2013: 127ff). Downs, for example, stated “how actors in 
contemporary political systems respond to illiberal but institutionalized parties 
speaks to a country’s democratic self-understanding and historical memory” 
(Downs, 2012: 59). Thereby the goal of this analysis is not to ascertain the 
causal relationship between these two factors in their relation to democratic 
defensiveness. Given that the literature does not explain which of these two 
factors accounts for more democratic defensiveness, this analysis will only 
attempt to contrast and examine them separately in light of the cross-national 
evidence that was presented in previous chapters. That also means that I do 
not use deliberately the comparative qualitative analysis (QCA) as a research 
strategy here. Although QCA is a compelling approach for studying comparative 
politics210, it is an inappropriate research strategy in the context of this study. 
Unlike QCA which seeks configurations of causal factors to explain how they 
lead to a certain political and societal outcome (Cf. Rihous, 2006: 682), this 
chapter will examine the role of historical experience of an internally triggered or 
supported breakdown of a democratic system in the past and the division into 
the two types of democracies separately, and not as configurations, and will not 
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 Central to QCA is the use of set-theory and Boolean logic to analyze combinations of causal 
conditions associated with an outcome of interest. To conduct such analysis a researcher needs 
first to identify the outcome in which he is interested (for example, in my case state variations in 
democratic defensiveness), and the conditions which could potentially cause that outcome. In 
the next step the researcher assesses the presence or absence of these conditions in each of 
the cases in the analysis. Thereby, the goal is to identify what combinations of factors have 
occurred, which of these have produced the outcome in which he is interested and which have 
not produced that outcome. The researcher then uses Boolean logic to identify necessary and 
sufficient conditions which produce the outcome of interest. The researcher takes this result and 
attempts to interpret what it means by going back to the cases and relating the outcome to the 
actual circumstances seen in the cases. Charles Ragin who developed QCA in the 1970s 
described this back-and-forth process a “dialogue between theory and evidence” (Cf. Rihous, 
2006: 681-682; Arvind & Stirton, 2010: 5-6). 
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ascertain whether some factors might only have an effect on defensiveness in 
combination with other factors.  
The subsequent analysis will reveal that among two factors only the historical 
experience with the internally triggered or supported breakdown of democratic 
regime is more helpful to explain the existing cross-national differences in the 
level of democratic defensiveness between the eight democracies studied while 
the type of democratic government is less useful. At the same time, it will be 
found out that the historical perspective is not sufficient to account for all types 
of variations. In particular, contradictions exist in case of Denmark, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom. In case of Denmark it will be found that this democracy 
has lower defensiveness than its historical experience (in that case externally 
triggered but internally supported breakdown of democracy) might suggest. By 
contrast, in case of Sweden and the UK it will be found that these democracies 
have medium defensiveness while their historical experiences (in that case 
continuity of democratic system) should have invited lower defensiveness. 
Having reached this conclusion, it will be argued in the end that in order to 
arrive at a fuller picture attention is needed to the overtime changes in 
defensive legislation. This conclusion will form the basis of the analysis in the 
subsequent final chapter of one of the cases that is more defensive than its 
historical experience would suggest.   
7.2 Theorizing the influence of the type of democratic 
government on shaping the formal-legal democratic 
defensiveness 
There are a number of studies which support the causal connection between 
how democracies respond to non-democratic political parties and groups and 
their type of democratic government (Cf. Fox & Nolte, 1995: 14; Klamt, 2007: 
135; Downs, 2012: 59). Two main conceptions of liberal democratic 
governments were posited here at the center of scholarly discussion, 
substantive and procedural democracies. According to Fox and Nolte and other 
proponents of this perspective, it is believed that these two types of 
democracies have differing rationales and perspectives for developing 
democratic defensiveness as a means to defend their democratic order from its 
enemies (Cf. Fox & Nolte, 1995: 14; also Thiel, 2009: 387; Bourne, 2011: 9). 
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What are procedural and substantive democracies and how these two models 
of democratic governments influence democratic states’ reactions and the 
formal-legal mechanisms they adopt to combat the challenge of antidemocratic 
forces within their democratic system? In what follows I introduce the two types 
of democratic government, followed by an analysis of if and how they affect 
democratic defensiveness.  
The main line of distinction between the two forms of democratic government 
lies in the possibility for governing majorities in the parliament to amend the 
core democratic principles in the constitution, such as democratic institutions 
and basic political rights and freedoms (Cf. Fox & Nolte, 1995: 24). Following 
the classification developed by Fox and Nolte in their seminal study of 
‘intolerant democracies’, procedural democracy is a form of a democracy which 
provides at least basic procedures and institutions to make decisions and 
realize opinions (Cf. Fox & Nolte, 1995: 14). Within their definition of procedural 
democracy, both authors draw on the classic definition of a democracy by Peter 
Schumpeter as an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions 
which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues 
through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its 
will” (cited in Fox & Nolte, 1995: 14). In line with this definition, both authors 
argued in procedural democracies all political opinions are given “equal moral 
worth” (Cf. Fox & Nolte, 1995: 15). This refers also to political parties, as all 
political parties, irrespective of their political stance, shall be given an equal 
opportunity to compete freely in the electoral arena and consequently only the 
voter can decide which political forces they want to see represented in the 
government (Cf. Thiel, 2009: 385). As Fox and Nolte stated, even “[t]he 
enemies of democracy will be among the likely participants” (Fox & Nolte, 1995: 
15). Thus, tolerance builds the “fundamental organizing principle of 
government” in procedural democracies (Cf. Fox & Nolte, 1995; 17). 
Concerning this fundamental feature of procedural democracies, Wise stated 
“[a] procedural democracy thus exists only so long as there is a political will to 
be democratic” (Wise, 1998: 305; also Fox & Nolte, 1997: 16). To give a 
historical parallel for a procedural democracy, the Weimar Republic is frequently 
cited by scholars as an example of a procedural democracy. The first 
democratic republic in Germany (1918-1933) was based on the principle of 
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popular sovereignty, allowing every basic principle within the state constitution 
of the Weimar Republic including the constitutional form of the government be 
subjected to change at any time by law-makers (Cf. Wise, 1998: 305; Backes, 
1998: 31). Furthermore, all political forces, including the Nazi parties and 
movements, were free to compete with other political parties in the political 
arena provided they followed the democratic rules (Cf. Backes, 1998: 30-31). 
The breakdown of the Weimar Republic in 1932-1933 orchestrated by the Nazis 
is an indication of how vulnerable procedural democracies are when faced with 
parties and groups that seek to destroy them once elected into government (Cf. 
Backes, 1998: 31).    
By contrast, substantive democracy is a form of democracy where democratic 
procedure is not an end in itself, but a means to create “a society in which 
citizens enjoy certain essential rights, primary among them the right to vote for 
their leaders” (Fox & Nolte, 1995: 16). To define substantive democracy, Fox 
and Nolte draw on the definitions of democracy developed by John Rawls and 
Carl Schmitt (Cf. Fox & Nolte, 1995: 17-20), decalring that a substantive 
democracy is based on the principle that democratic institutions and freedoms 
should not be used to allow some individuals or collective forces to subvert the 
same democratic institutions and basic freedoms (Cf. Fox & Nolte, 1995: 17). 
Consequently, unlike procedural democracies, tolerance does not constitute 
“the transcendent norm of a democratic society” in substantive democracies (Cf. 
Fox & Nolte, 1995: 17). Drawing on Schmitt’s conception of a democracy as a 
set of democratic values and principles that cannot be changed or amended at 
any times by a governing majority, Fox and Nolte add the most important 
characteristic of substantive democracies is the core democratic values and 
principles enshrined in the constitution cannot be altered or amended “even if 
the formal procedures for the constitutional amendment have been followed” 
(Fox & Nolte, 1995: 19; also see Bourne, 2011: 7).  
Against the background of these definitions of substantive and procedural 
democracies, how the two forms of democratic government can expand our 
understanding of the existing variations in democratic defensiveness between 
democracies? It should be noted scholars have acknowledged the utility of 
relating these two theoretical concepts of democratic governments to the 
empirically observable variations between democracies in legal responses to 
172 
 
the problem of political extremism (Cf. Thiel, 2009: 389; Bourne, 2011: 9). Fox 
and Nolte themselves applied this classification to evaluate the differences in 
terms of ‘tolerance’ and ‘militancy’ towards non-democratic actors between ten 
established democracies in Europe and elsewhere (for the critic of the approach 
see Thiel, 2009: 385-395; Bourne, 2011: 6-10). Given that tolerance towards 
the presence and participation of non-democratic actors on the political scene 
constitutes one of the main distinction lines between substantive and procedural 
democracies, the distinction between the two raises the expectation that 
substantive democracies are more inclined to respond aggressively to their non-
democratic actors than procedural ones (Cf. Thiel, 2009: 395; Bourne, 2011: 9; 
Downs, 2012: 59). Downs, for example, argued that “[f]or the proceduralist, to 
do anything else – even in the name of defending the liberal order – is to 
abdicate democracy without warrant” (Downs, 2012: 59). In the same vein, Thiel 
stated because procedural democracies are not reliant on specific substantial 
values written within their constitutions, they are not likely to provide defensive 
mechanisms “to protect these principles and values from attacks or the intention 
to change them” (Cf. Thiel, 2009: 387). In line with these arguments, it can be 
thus expected that procedural democracies would generally have a weak 
disposition toward formal-legal democratic defensiveness. By contrast, 
substantive democracies are expected to have a strong disposition towards 
democratic defensiveness. As tolerance does not constitute the transcendent 
norm in substantive democracies, it can be expected that they would not 
unreservedly tolerate those political actors which seek to destroy them from 
within in one form or another (Cf. Wise, 1998: 305; Thiel, 2009: 387). The idea 
that democratic order must be preserved at any costs will force democratic 
governments to be more vigilant in the face of potential dangers and force them 
to respond more aggressively to parties and groups which seek to harm or 
abolish it (Cf. Downs, 2012: 58). As stated by Wise, “a substantive democracy 
is the militant democracy” (Cf. Wise, 1998: 305). 
It is important to note that not all democracies that suffered a traumatic 
experience of the defeat of their democratic regimes in the past – the case 
which is discussed further below – develop a substantive view of democracy in 
the future as some scholars have postulated (i.e. the two factors discussed in 
this chapter as possibly favourable factors for developing democratic 
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defensiveness are not necessarily related) (Cf. Downs, 2012: 58-59). Among 
fourteen substantive democracies that Sánchez counted within the fourty-seven 
member-states of the European Council, only Germany, France and Italy 
experienced the breakdown of their democratic regimes before World War II 
(Cf. Sanchez, 2003: 5)211. Alternatively, it can be argued not all democracies 
defeated by non-democratic forces in the past have embraced the substantive 
view of democracy upon the reconstruction of their democracy. The 
Netherlands and Belgium, for example, knowingly experienced their democratic 
institutions suspended during World War II due to military occupation by Nazi 
Germany. In spite of this traumatic experience, these democracies have 
developed an expressly procedural view of democracy after the end of World 
War II. I will return to this point later when exploring the different forms of the 
breakdown of democratic regimes and how such events shaped the country’s 
defensiveness against non-democratic actors. 
Against the background of the preceding discussion of the distinction between 
substantive and procedural democracies and how these two forms of 
democracy are expected to influence the democratic defensiveness, the next 
Table 12 places the democracies studied according to the criterion of 
substantive and procedural democracy. Following Fox and Nolte, as the main 
line of distinction between substantive and procedural democracies, the table 
was constructed by using the possibility “whether the national constitution can 
be amended to alter or eliminate democratic institutions” (Fox & Nolte, 1995: 
24). The last column summarises the theoretically expected level of democratic 
defensiveness as discussed above.   
Table 12: Theoretically expected level of democratic defensiveness of 
substantive and procedural democracies 
Type of democratic 
government 
 
Democracies  
 
Theoretical expectation of 
democratic  defensiveness 
Substantive democracies Germany  
France 
→ are expected to have a 
strong disposition toward 
democratic defensiveness  
Procedural democracies Austria 
Belgium 
→ are expected to have a weak 
disposition toward democratic 
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 According to Sanchez these democracies include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Moldova, Norway, Portugal, Romania, 
Turkey, and Ukraine (Cf. Sanchez, 2003: 5). 
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Denmark 
Netherlands 
Sweden  
United Kingdom 
defensiveness   
 
Table 12 reflects among the eight democracies studied within this thesis, only 
Germany and France can be considered substantive democracies. As 
mentioned earlier, following the end of World War II, these two democracies 
have developed an expressly substantive view of democracy, clearly reflected 
within several articles of their state constitutions (Cf. Fox & Nolte, 1995: 32; 
Wise, 1998: 306-307).  In Germany, the substantive view is stipulated expressly 
in Article 79 Section 3 of the Basic Law which is otherwise called the “eternity 
clause” (“Ewigkeitsklausel”) (Cf. Thiel, 2009: 127). This article stipulates that 
“[a]mendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation into 
Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or the 
principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible”212. Additionally, 
Article 18 of the Basic Law stipulates that basic democratic freedoms 
guaranteed by several articles of the constitution, such as freedom of 
expression (Article 5), freedom of assembly (Article 8), freedom of association 
(Article 9), and freedom of movement (Article 11) among others can be forfeited 
by Federal Constitutional Court if they are used to combat, undermine or 
abolish “the free basic democratic order” (Cf. Wise, 1998: 307).  
Similarly, France is a clear example of a substantive democracy. According to 
Article 89 of the French Constitution of 1958, no amendments could be made to 
change the state territory and the republican form of government (Cf. Fox & 
Nolte, 1995: 27; Buis, 2009: 81)213. This substantive provision was introduced in 
response to the attempt of the Marshal Pétain to amend the constitution on 10th 
of July 1940 shortly after the state territory was occupied by Nazi Germany (Cf. 
Canu, 1997: 113). Another substantive feature is enshrined in Article 4 of the 
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 See Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, available at: http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/ englisch_gg/ (accessed 10.03.2014). Note that Article 1 of the Basic Law 
emphasizes the legally binding force of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed in the 
constitution while Article 20 declares Germany as a democratic and social federal state. 
213
 See the full text of the Constitution de la République Française du 4 Octobre 1958, available 
at: http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/constitution.asp (accessed 10.03.2014). 
Article 89 reads « Aucune procédure de révision ne peut être engagée ou poursuivie lorsqu’il 
est porté atteinte à l’intégrité du territoire. La forme républicaine du Gouvernement ne peut faire 
l’objet d’une révision ».  
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constitution, stating all political parties must respect the principles of national 
sovereignty and democracy214. According to Fox and Nolte, this principle 
originated from the concern of General de Gaulle’s government due to the 
threat posed by the French Communist Party after the end of World War II (Cf. 
Fox & Nolte, 1995: 27; also Backes, 2006: 274).   
By contrast, the remaining democracies included in this study can be 
considered procedural democracies following the definition given above. Unlike 
substantive democracies, these democracies have no explicit reference to the 
legally binding force of democratic principles or the fixed character of the 
democratic form of government in their constitutional documents. In Austria, for 
instance, the constitution does not contain any rules that would entitle any of the 
core democratic principles to a special protection from an amendment or 
alteration (Cf. Auprich, 2009: 50-51; also Klamt, 2007: 34). According to Article 
44 Paragraph 3 of the Austrian Federal Constitutional Act (Bundes-
Verfassungsgesetz) of 1920, revised in 1929 and reintroduced in 1945, the 
constitution can be partially or completely revised215. For a partial amendment 
of the constitution or of any of its constitutional laws a mere two-thirds majority 
in the lower house with at least half the members present is required, while a 
complete revision of the constitution is possible if a referendum is held (Cf. 
Maddex, 2008: 34; Auprich, 2009: 45-46).  
Similarly, Belgium foresees no substantial hurdles to changing its constitution in 
order to eliminate its democratic fundamentals. According to Article 195 of the 
Belgian constitution from 1831 which was amended significantly over the last 
decade, the legislature “has the right to declare that” an amendment is 
necessary. In such case the two houses of the legislature are dissolved 
automatically and reconvene after new elections. Any revisions agreed to by the 
newly convened houses of the legislature must then be adopted by at least two-
thirds of the total votes cast in each house216.  
                                                          
214
 Article 4 reads in the original “Les partis et groupements politiques concourent à l’expression 
du suffrage. (…) Ils doivent respecter les principes de lasouveraineté nationale et de la 
démocratie”. 
215
 See the full text of the Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz (B-VG) (Federal Constitutional Act) at: 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_1930_1/ERV_1930_1.html (accessed 18.03. 
2014). 
216
 The Belgian Constitution, Title VIII, Article 195, available at: http://www.fed-parl.be 
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In Denmark too, the fundamental principles in the constitution may be subjected 
to a formal change. According to Article 88 of the Danish Constitution, in order 
to amend the Constitutional Act a formal bill of the parliament is required. Once 
it is adopted, a new election takes place. If the new parliament passed the bill 
without change, it must then be approved in a referendum by majority of the 
persons taking part in the voting or at least by 40 per cent of the electorate. It 
becomes effective after receiving the royal assent217.  
In the Netherlands, there are also no substantial hurdles to changing the 
fundamental principles enshrined in the constitution. According to Article 137 of 
the Dutch Constitution, if a formal act of parliament is passed stating that an 
amendment to the constitution in the form proposed is necessary, the 
constitution can be changed. Such a bill may be divided into two or more bills by 
the lower house, which is dissolved after the proposed act has been published. 
After a newly elected lower house has met, both houses then consider the 
proposed amendment on second reading, and it must be passed by “at least 
two-thirds of the votes cast.” Article 139 states amendments “passed by the 
legislature and ratified by the King shall enter into force immediately after they 
have been published”218.  
Similarly, Sweden represents an example of procedural democracy as well. 
Following the provisions in Chapter 8, Article 14 to 16 of the Swedish 
constitution, any of its fundamental laws as stipulated in the constitution can be 
amended if the legislature approves the relevant proposal twice in identical 
form219. Similar to the procedural democracies analysed before, a referendum is 
held if the proposal is declined due to the majority of those taking part in the 
referendum voted against it.  
Finally, in the United Kingdom there is no written constitution along with the bill 
of rights at all. The system is distinct through the supreme position of its 
parliament (Cf. Fox & Nolte, 1995: 22; Mullender, 2009: 313). Therefore, any 
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 Part X, §88 of the Danish Constitution, available at: http://www.thedanishparliament.dk/ 
democracy/the_ constitutional_act_of_denmark.as 
218
 Article 139 of The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, available at: 
http://www.government.nl/documents-and-publications/regulations/2012/10/18/the-constitution-
of-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-2008 .html 
219
 See Chapter 8, Articles 14 to 16 of the Constitution of Sweden, available at: 
http://www.government.se/sb/d/ 2707/a/15187 .   
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law, even fundamental law, can be changed through a simple move of the 
parliament and thus are not bound by any substantive rules.  
Following the claim that substantive and procedural democracies have varying 
rationales for developing democratic defensiveness, it should be expected that 
Germany and France would both have a strong disposition towards high 
defensiveness while Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and 
the United Kingdom would all have a weak disposition towards democratic 
defensiveness (see Table 12). Before examining this perspective, the next 
section will question if and how the historical experience of democratic 
breakdown in the past can expand our understanding of the differences 
between democracies in the defensiveness of their legal structures today. 
7.3 Theorizing the relationship between the historical 
experience with the breakdown and stability of democratic 
regime and formal-legal democratic defensiveness 
There is a broad literature supporting the causal relationship between the 
historical experience of a breakdown of democratic regime in the past and 
country’s democratic defensiveness (Cf. Issacharoff, 2007: 1430; Klamt, 2007: 
151; Downs, 2012: 55-61; Bleich & Lambert, 2013: 137-138). Downs, for 
example, stated “a national past blemished by democracy defeated or 
significantly compromised by extremism may increase incentives to respond 
aggressively to contemporary threats from pariah parties” (Downs, 2012: 57). 
Similarly, Bleich and Lambert found that a country’s willingness to suppress the 
political freedoms of non-democratic parties and groups increases with the 
centrality of the non-democratic regime in its past history. According to the 
authors, “having a history of non-democratic regime serves as a predisposing 
factor which significantly increases a state’s likelihood of taking repressive 
measures against racist associations” (Bleich & Lambert, 2013: 138). Backes in 
his turn argued the reason Germany and France impose stricter constraints 
upon the political rights and freedoms of their non-democratic parties and 
groups than the United States is because these democracies had lived through 
a traumatic experience of a violent subversion of their democratic systems 
during the 1930s and 1940s, while the United States did not have such 
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experience at all (Cf. Backes, 2006: 279; also Gordon, 1985-1986: 377ff; 
Michael & Minkenberg, 2007: 1119). 
Although there is a broad literature suggesting a causal relationship between 
the historical experience of democratic breakdown and democratic 
defensiveness, there are only a few studies examinining how the varied 
historical experiences of democratic breakdown in the past have influenced the 
differing constellations towards democratic defensiveness (Cf. Capoccia, 2005: 
71ff; Downs, 2012: 57-61). Drawing on this literature, it is possible to classify 
democracies according to the form of their past democratic breakdown (Cf. Art 
in Downs, 2012: 59). The main line of distinction is whether the breakdown of 
democratic regime was triggered internally or externally, and in case if the 
breakdown of democratic regime was triggered externally, whether it was 
supported by internal non-democratic forces or not. Each historical constellation 
has its own rationales for developing democratic defensiveness.  
There are four broad possibilities that can be expected from the historical 
constellation of a breakdown of democratic regime in the past and democratic 
defensiveness (Cf. Downs, 2012: 57). Countries that experienced the 
breakdown of their democracy triggered internally, that is by non-democratic 
forces nourished within their society, it can be anticipated they would have a 
very strong disposition towards democratic defensiveness. Since such 
democracies already have a tragic experience when a relative openness of their 
political system was abused by internal non-democratic forces, their political 
actors will be extremely concerned about the survival of their democratic 
institutions and freedoms in the future and make every precaution to surround 
their political institutions and freedoms with a maximum legal protection to 
preclude their non-democratic enemies have another chance to undermine their 
democratic institutions and freedoms (Cf. Backes, 2006: 279ff; Fennema, 2000: 
127; Downs, 2012: 57-58; Bleich & Lambert, 2013: 138). As stated by Downs, 
“the once defeated democracy is today’s wary and defensive democracy” 
(Downs, 2012: 59).  
Similarly, a stronger disposition towards democratic defensiveness can also be 
anticipated from democracies where the breakdown of democratic regime was 
triggered externally, that is by a foreign non-democratic regime, but with the 
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active support of non-democratic forces within the society. Since these 
democracies were already compromised by active collaboration with a foreign 
non-democratic regime, it can be anticipated that their democratic governments 
would also be concerned about the presence of non-democratic forces within 
the political system in the future. Consequently, it can be anticipated that their 
democratic governments would have more incentives to adopt legal measures 
constraining the presence and operation of non-democratic forces within their 
political systems.  
By contrast, in democracies where the breakdown of democratic regime was 
triggered externally but without active support by internal non-democratic forces 
or where the democratic governments remained stable, these democracies are 
expected to be more complacent about the presence and participation of non-
democratic actors within their democratic political system in the future. As such 
democracies have little or no experience of non-democratic forces attempting to 
destroy their democratic regimes and were not compromised by collaborating 
with a foreign non-democratic regime, it can be anticipated such democracies 
would face less political and societal pressure to develop a wide-ranging 
arsenal of defensive measures and provisions to constrain them (Cf. Downs, 
2012: 57). 
Drawing on these insights, this section will examine the validity of the 
arguments presented above in light of the cross-national evidence surrounding 
the variations in democratic defensiveness between the democracies studied. 
The eight democracies covered in this study provide a solid basis to examine 
the validity of these arguments, since they all represent different constellations 
regarding experiences of internally triggered or supported breakdown of their 
democratic regimes in the past as discussed. Table 13 classifies the main four 
configurations of historical experiences of the breakdown or stability of 
democratic regime along with democracies included in each of them. 
Table 13: Overview of configurations of experience and nature of democratic 
breakdown among eight democracies 
 
         
Configuration 
 
 
A  
Internally 
triggered 
suspension of 
democracy 
B 
Suspension of 
democracy by 
foreign non-
democratic regime 
C 
Suspension of 
democracy by 
foreign non-
democratic regime 
D 
No suspension of 
democracy  
180 
 
 Democracy  
 
with support by non-
democratic forces 
within the 
government and the 
society 
but without support 
by non-democratic 
forces within the 
government and the 
society  
Austria  Yes    
Belgium   Yes   
Denmark  Yes    
France  Yes    
Germany Yes     
Netherlands   Yes   
Sweden    Yes  
United Kingdom    Yes  
Expected level of 
democratic 
defensiveness  
→ A and B are expected to invoke 
strong disposition towards democratic 
defensiveness  
→ C and D are expected to invoke 
weaker disposition towards democratic 
defensiveness 
Note: Grey shading in configurations A and B was added to indicate their strong disposition 
towards democratic defensiveness. 
Table 13 reflects overall four configurations can be classified based on the form 
and nature of the democratic breakdown in the past among democracies 
covered in this study: internally triggered suspension of democracy 
(configuration A), suspension of democracy by a foreign non-democratic regime 
with the active support of internal non-democratic forces (configuration B); 
suspension of democracy by foreign non-democratic regime without the support 
of internal non-democratic forces (configuration C), and, finally, no suspension 
of democracy (configuration D). If the arguments presented above hold, 
countries falling in configurations A and B should be much more inclined to 
invoke stronger disposition towards democratic defensiveness and develop a 
wide-ranging arsenal of forma-legal mechanisms to defend themselves against 
internal threats than countries falling in configuration C and D. More so, as the 
configurations A and D capture radically different experiences (that is the 
breakdown of democratic regime by internal forces through utilising institutions 
and freedoms and the lack of such experience at all) it should be expected that 
democracies falling in the first configuration are among the most defensive 
while democracies falling in the last configuration are among the least 
defensive. Before turning to the examination of each of these perspectives, the 
next two sections will present the composition of each configuration in turn. 
The first configuration A includes Germany as the only democracy among the 
eight countries studied where the breakdown of democratic regime was 
triggered internally by non-democratic forces nourished within the society. As 
documented in many studies, the first democratic Weimar Republic was 
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formally destroyed between 1930 and 1933, when after a series of unsuccessful 
minority governments with the German Centre Party (‘Deutsche 
Zentrumspartei’) in the lead220 the Reich President Paul von Hindenburg invited 
Adolf Hitler to become the next Reich Chancellor of the Weimar Republic (Cf. 
Broszat, 1987: 93). When in the beginning of March 1933, the last 
parliamentary elections took place for the Weimar Republic, Adolf Hitler’s 
NSDAP party received 43% of the votes becoming the strongest party in 
parliament (Reichstag). Having received parliament’s full support, Hitler 
immediately started to expand his power grip. The parliament was dissolved 
while leaders and members of other political parties within the parliament were 
physically intimidated or killed. The “Enabling Act” (“Ermächtigungsgesetz”) 
issued on 24th of March 1933 formally symbolised the end of the Weimar 
democracy (Cf. Broszat, 1987: 105). The new law transferred absolute power to 
Adolf Hitler allowing him to abridge the democratic constitution and suspend the 
freedoms formerly guaranteed. All political parties except the NSDAP were 
prohibited and state censorship was introduced (Cf. Broszat, 1987: 105-106).  
The configuration B reflects the experiences of Austria, Denmark, and France. 
Within these countries the democratic regime was formally defeated as the 
result of the foreign occupation by Nazi Germany between 1938 and 1940, and 
the national governments were severely compromised by the active support and 
collaboration with occupied Nazi Wehrmacht authorities. In Austria, the first 
democratic republic created in 1918 after the end of World War I was formally 
suspended in 1938 after its annexation by Nazi Germany with the active support 
of internal non-democratic forces. Since its founding, as documented at length 
by Simon, the First Austrian Republic was always burdened by the widespread 
disloyalty of its population toward the new state and its democratic institutions 
as well as the strong polarisation of its political forces of which the pro-socialist 
parties, the clerical conservative parties, and the various German-nationalist 
parties represented the three powerful competing parties in the country (Cf. 
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 The last three years before the seizure of power by Adolf Hitler (“Machtergreifung”) the Reich 
Chancellors were Hienrich Brüning (March 1930- Mai 1932), Franz von Papen (June 1932-
December 1932), and Kurt von Schleicher (December 1932-January 1933). All of them were the 
members of the Centre Party (Deutsche Zentrumspartei) which represented the interests of the 
German Catholics. Franz von Papen played an important role during fateful months in the end 
of 1932 and the beginning of 1933 trying to persuade the ageing Reich President Paul von 
Hindenburg to offer the office of the Reich Chancellor to Adolf Hitler. For the history of the 
Weimar Republic before the rise of Adolf Hitler and the process of “Machtergreifung” (seizure of 
power) after his appointment as Reich Chancellor (Cf. Broszat, 1987: 93). 
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Simon, 1978: 84ff). The election of the Christian Social Party (Christlich-Soziale 
Partei) with its leader Engelbert Dolfuss as the new Chancellor into government 
in 1932 was the first victory for the clerical conservative camp. This government 
sought to build close relationships with the authoritarian regime of Mussolini in 
Italy, much to the anger of the German-nationalists led by Austrian NSDAP 
party which sought the unification with Germany (Cf. Simon, 1978: 91). During 
the fateful 1933-1934, the political tensions between the three parties increased 
and resulted in a civil war. In response, the Chancellor Dolfuss banned several 
opposition parties including Communists, Social-Democrats and National 
Socialist parties, abolished the democratic constitution of 1920, and dissolved 
the parliament (Cf. Simon, 1978: 113-114). Effectively an authoritarian one-
party state was created with the Christian-Social party in the lead which shortly 
afterwards renamed itself into Fatherland party (Vaterländische Front), forging 
an alliance with the pro-Italian fascist Fatherland’s Defence party (Heimwehr)221 
(Cf. Simon, 1978: 117). After the assassination of Dolfuss in 1934, Kurt 
Schuschnigg of the conservative party became the next Chancellor. Like his 
predecessor, he sought to keep Austria under the authoritarian rule. All political 
forces were supressed, including those from the German-nationalist camp (Cf. 
Simon, 1978: 118). During 1938, under the direct pressure of Hitler, 
Schuschnigg released Austrian Nazis from prison and took several of them in 
the government. When Schuschnigg attempted to organise a referendum on the 
state sovereignty, Hitler commanded his troops to invade pre-emptively on 
March 1938. After this act, Austria formally ceased to exist as an independent 
state and became a part of Germany (Cf. Simon, 1978: 118).  
The fate of the democratic regime in Denmark during the 1930s and 1940s also 
fits this configuration. The democracy in Denmark formally ceased to exist from 
April 1940 when Nazi Germany occupied the country within the matter of just 
two hours. That said, both the Danish government and the king Christian X 
were allowed to stay in the country fostering an uneasy alliance with the new 
Nazi Wehrmacht authorities. In response to the mild treatment of the 
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 The Heimwehr was composed of diverse social elements from Roman Catholic young 
farmers to anticlerical German nationalist urban bourgeoisie. Some wished the return of the 
monarchy, others supported Hitler, many more looked to Mussolini for support (Cf. Simon, 1978: 
96).  
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government and the Danish population by the Nazis222, the Danish government 
had actively supported the Nazi authorities until 1943 when it was formally 
dissolved by the Nazis (Cf. Deák, 2000: 6). For example, the government was 
actively involved in the recruitment of Danish citizens in the Nordland and 
Wiking Waffen SS divisions (Cf. Dethlefsen, 1990: 194). In November 1941, the 
government of Denmark joined the German led Anti-Comintern pact. The 
economy of Denmark was completely at the service of Nazi Germany, more so 
than other European countries, even those of the direct German allies during 
World War II, such as Hungary (Cf. Deák, 2000: 9).   
In France, the democratic government was reorganised during May-June 1940 
after the Nazi troops invaded. Although Charles de Gaulle formed a government 
in exile in London, the “legitimate” French government was that of Marshal 
Philippe Pétain that was built shortly after the German invasion (Cf. Jackson, 
2003: Ch.4). After the armistice was signed between the government of Pétain 
and the new Wehrmacht authorities in June 1940, the French territory was 
divided into an Occupied Zone in the North and an Unoccupied Zone in the 
South with the town of Vichy as the capital and the seat of the new government 
(Cf. Jackson, 2003: 232). On 10th July, the French Parliament voted with an 
overwhelming majority to grant Marshal Pétain full powers to revise the 
constitution, who immediately issued a number of constitutional acts giving him 
absolute power. The parliament was suspended until further notice. The French 
motto of the Republic “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” was immediately replaced by 
a new motto: “Work, Family, Fatherland” marking the complete transformation 
of the French Third Republic into an authoritarian regime of the Marshal Pétain 
who collaborated actively with the German Wehrmacht authorities occupying 
Paris (Cf. Jackson, 2003: 232-233).  
The configuration C encompasses the countries that experienced a democratic 
breakdown triggered by a foreign non-democratic regime but without active 
support from political forces within their government and society. Among eight 
countries, this configuration meets the experiences of democratic governments 
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 According to Deák “in occupied Denmark the German army felt so confident of popular and 
official compliance that within a few weeks of the country’s invasion in April 1940, it reduced the 
number of occupation forces to half of an infantry division, less than thousand men. This was 
less than the total number of Danish army and armed police forces in the country, both of which 
the German occupiers had allowed to continue to function” (Cf. Deák, 2000: 6) 
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in Belgium and the Netherlands during World War II. Within these two countries, 
the national governments did not support and collaborate with the occupying 
Nazi Germany and escaped into exile, thus remaining formally intact and even 
organised resistance from abroad. In Belgium, after the invasion of the territory 
by Nazi Germany, the legitimate democratic government led by Hubert Marie-
Eugène Pierlot managed to escape to the United Kingdom where she built an 
exile government in London to lead the resistance within the occupied country. 
Only the King Leopold III as commander-in-chief of the Belgian armed forces 
capitulated to the Nazis and remained in the country during the occupation 
years until its liberation in 1944 by allied troops (Cf. Conway, 2000: 135). 
Despite the King receiving a genteel imprisonment in the Palace of Laeken 
outside Brussels and initially seeking to develop some sort of relationship with 
the German authorities by travelling to Berchtesgaden in November 1940 to 
meet Hitler, scholars did not consider these attempts a collaboration (Cf. 
Conway, 2000: 135). Later, while captive by German forces, the King refused to 
support the German authorities and even became the integrative figure during 
the resistance for many Belgian people against the Nazi army. Additionally, the 
Wehrmacht authorities who governed occupied Belgium provided their support 
to more emphatically collaborationist groups such as the Rexist movement in 
Francophone Belgium led by Léon Degrelle and the Vlaams Nationaal Verbond 
(VNV) in the Flemish part of Belgium whose members were quickly promoted 
by German authorities to prominent positions in the central and local 
bureaucracy (Cf. Conway, 2000: 135).  
Also in the Netherlands, despite the democratic government being formally 
suspended due to the defeat of the resistance and the occupation of the 
territory by Nazi army in May 1940, the entire Dutch government including the 
Queen Wilhelmina managed to escape into exile thus remaining formally intact 
(Cf. Warmbrunn, 1963: 8). London was proclaimed the seat of the exile 
government and upon her arrival, the Queen stated she will continue to protect 
the interests of her country and fight against the enemy. By doing so, the Queen 
assured the legal existence of the Dutch democratic government and made it 
possible for the country to continue their war alongside the Allies (Cf. 
Warmbrunn, 1963: 9). Within the country itself the German Wehrmacht 
authorities, after a short period of military rule, placed the country under the 
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authority of a civil German government with the Reichskommissar Dr. Arthur 
Seyss-Inquart as supreme authority (Cf. Romijn, 2000: 175-176).  
Finally, the last configuration D describes countries that did not experience the 
collapse of their democratic regime, specifically the United Kingdom and 
Sweden. In both countries the democratic governments remained intact before 
and during World War II. Within the United Kingdom, the democracy remained 
intact before and during World War II, although during the 1930s it was severely 
challenged by the presence of the British Union of Fascists (BUF), the main 
right-wing extremist party formed in 1932 by Oswald Mosley, through a series of 
legal acts, including the Public Order Act 1936 allowing the expansion of police 
force powers. While doing so the government was able to turn the party into a 
marginal political force (Cf. Mullender, 2009: 325-329; Husbands, 2009: 252-
253). During World War II, the British government under the leadership of 
Winston Churchill (1940-1945) was the leading ally in the fight against Nazi 
Germany on the European mainland (1944-1945). 
Similarly, in Sweden, the democratic government lead by the Socialdemokratic 
Workers’ Party (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetare parti) under the 
leadership of Per Albin Hansson (1932-1946) was kept intact throughout the 
war. Their pro-fascist groups within the country, including the proto-type party of 
Adolf Hitler’s NSDAP, Nationalist Socialist Workers’ Party (Nationalsocialistiska 
Arbetarpartiet) led by Sven Olof Lindholm, was a minor force not capable of 
winning the masses’ support and significantly challenging the democratic 
government. Toward the end of the 1930s, the party moved itself away from the 
national-socialist ideals of NSDAP and even renamed itself into Swedish 
Socialist Unity (Svensk Socialistisk Samling) (Cf. Payne, 2001: 305-307). 
Although during the summer of 1941 shortly after Nazi Germany invaded the 
Soviet Union, the Swedish government allowed German troops to pass through 
its territory, a short period commonly referred to as a “mid-summer crisis” (Cf. 
Scott, 2002: 371), it is not considered a collaboration by scholars223. During 
World War II, despite its neutrality status, Sweden actively assisted other 
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 On 22nd June 1941, Hitler presented the government in Stockholm with a petition to transport 
one armored division across Sweden into Finland. After discussions took place between four 
main political parties in the coalition government, the government including the King Gustav V 
complied with the German petition and allowed its troops to pass the Swedish territory (Cf. 
Scott, 2002: 371).  
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European countries in their war against Nazi Germany and offered its territory 
as a refuge for many European Jews. 
7.4 Comparing theoretical perspectives with the empirical 
findings 
Thus far, this chapter has discussed the role of the democratic government 
types and the role of historical experience of an internally triggered or supported 
breakdown of democratic regime during the 1930s and 1940s. I will now 
examine each theoretical perspective in great detail. To facilitate this, each 
theoretical perspective will be compared against the levels of democratic 
defensiveness identified in Chapter 6. The analysis will find out that among two 
perspectives only the historical experience of an internally triggered or 
supported breakdown of democratic regime is more helpful to understand the 
given differences between the eight democracies in the level of their formal-
legal democratic defensiveness, while the type of democratic government can 
only partially account for such variations.  
7.4.1 Examining the role of the type of democratic government 
in shaping the formal-legal democratic defensiveness 
According to this theoretical perspective, it is expected that substantive 
democracies would have a strong disposition towards developing democratic 
defensiveness while procedural democracies are expected to have a weak 
disposition towards democratic defensiveness. Table 14 compares the type of 
democracy with the cross-national evidence of defensiveness to ascertain if the 
former has an influence upon the latter, a subject of much previous scholarly 
debate (Cf. Thiel, 2009: 395; Bourne, 2011: 9-10).  
Table 14: Examining the relationship between the type of democratic 
government and the two main profiles of democratic defensiveness 
                      
          Pattern of    
   defensiveness  
 
Type of democ-
racy 
High defensive:  
 
High defensiveness across 
all or the majority of 
dimensions 
Medium defensive: 
 
Medium defensiveness across 
all or the majority of 
dimensions 
Substantive 
democracy 
France  
Germany 
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Procedural 
democracy 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
UK  
Sweden 
Note: for the description of the two defensive profiles see Chapter 6.3 
Table 14 reflects the linking of the type of democracy and the cross-national 
evidence provides no strong support for the claim that the type of democracy 
has influence on the level of democratic defensiveness. According to the table 
and the evidence thus far, Germany and France are both substantive 
democracies and thus are expected to have a strong disposition towards 
democratic defensiveness, which seems to be true as both countries have 
highly defensive democracies, therefore meeting this theoretical expectation. 
However, with the exception of Belgium, Table 14 does not reflect procedural 
democracies meetings its theoretical expectation. According to the theoretical 
perspective, procedural democracies are expected to have a weak disposition 
towards democratic defensiveness. However, according to the cross-national 
evidence presented, the procedural democracies included in this study do not 
meet this theoretical expectation, as Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom are procedural democracies by definition but have been found 
to have medium defensiveness. The most direct contradiction to this 
perspective bring the cases of Austria and Belgium. These democracies are 
both procedural democracies and therefore should have a weak disposition 
towards democratic defensiveness. However, as shown in Table 14, both 
democracies are highly defensive which is an obvious contradiction to the 
theoretical expectation.  
In conclusion, the type of democracy seems to be less significant in furthering 
our understanding of the existing differences in democratic defensiveness 
between the eight democracies studied, as there is no clear connection 
between the type of democracy and the level of a democracy’s democratic 
defensiveness.  
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7.4.2 Examining the role of historical experience with the 
breakdown of democratic regime in shaping formal-legal 
democratic defensiveness  
This section will now analyse the role of historical experience of an internally 
triggered or supported breakdown of democracy in shaping democratic 
defensiveness. Table 15 compares configurations representing differing 
histroical experiences (A, B, C, and D) with their corresponding level of 
democratic defensiveness. 
Table 15: The relationship between the historical experience with the 
breakdown of democracy and the level of democratic defensiveness 
 
             Historical    
           experience 
 
 
Patterns of 
democratic 
defensiveness  
A  
Internally triggered 
suspension of 
democracy 
 
 
B 
Suspension of 
democracy by foreign 
non-democratic regime 
with support by non-
democratic forces 
within the government 
and the society  
C 
Suspension of 
democracy by 
foreign non-
democratic regime 
without active 
support by non-
democratic forces 
within the 
government and the 
society  
D 
No suspension of 
democracy  
High defensive 
High 
defensiveness 
across all or the 
majority of  
dimensions 
Germany Austria 
France 
Belgium  
Medium 
defensive  
Medium 
defensiveness 
across all or the 
majority of  
dimen-sions 
 
Denmark Netherlands 
 
UK 
Sweden 
 
Note: A and B are expected to invoke stronger disposition towards democratic defensiveness 
while democracies in configuration C and D are expected to have weaker disposition towards 
democratic defensiveness. Cases that do not fall in the theoretically expected categories of 
defensiveness are highlighted in bold. 
Table 15 indicates the linkage of differing historical experiences with cross-
national evidence of differences in democratic defensiveness among these 
eight democracies is more useful in understanding the existing differences in 
democratic defensiveness. As reflected in Table 15, the democracies where the 
breakdown of democratic regime was triggered internally (configuration A) or 
externally with the support of internal non-democratic forces (configuration B) 
are more defensive than democracies where the democratic breakdown was 
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triggered externally without the support of internal non-democratic forces 
(configuration C) or democracies where there was no breakdown at all 
(configuration D).  
That said, however, this comparison is not sufficient in explaining all kinds of 
variations between democracies studied. For example, Belgium is expected to 
have a weaker disposition towards democratic defensiveness according to its 
historical experience and have outcomes similar to the Netherlands. However 
according to Table 15, Belgium is highly defensive which does not meet the 
theoretical expectation. This deviation can be explained by the instances of 
collaboration which took place during the time of occupation between the Nazi 
Wehrmacht authorities and the local non-democratic groups such as Rexist 
movement and the Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (VNV) (for details see the section 
7.3). Given that such collaboration took place during World War II between 
individual internal non-democratic groups and the Wehrmacht authorities, the 
authorities in Belgium sought to undertake more efforts and adopt a wider range 
of laws than one would expect from it given its historical experience. 
Multiple deviations from our theoretical expecatations exist, including Denmark, 
the United Kingdom and Sweden. In Denmark, according to its historical 
experience with internally supported breakdown of democratic regime during 
World War II, it should be similar to Austria and France in terms of democratic 
defensiveness. However, according to the evidence, Denmark is medium 
defensive and is similar to the Netherlands, contradicting the theoretical 
expectation. Additionally, the United Kingdom and Sweden were theoretically 
expected to have a weaker disposition toward democratic defensiveness 
because both had their democratic governments remained intact before and 
during World War II and neither was compromised collaborating with Nazi 
Germany. However, contrary to these theoretical expectations both countries 
are medium defensive across all three categories which directly contradicts the 
theoretical claim and needs further explanation.  
To summarise, historical experience of an internally triggered or supported 
breakdown of democracy in the past is a helpful factor to explain the differences 
in defensiveness between the democracies studied. That said, however, 
Denmark, the United Kingdom and Sweden have revealed simply focusing on 
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historical experience before and during World War II alone is not sufficient to 
account for all variations in democratic defensiveness between contemporary 
democracies and must be complemented by a detailed account of the evolution 
of democratic defensiveness since the end of World War II.   
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined various factors that can help us understand the 
cross-national variations in democratic defensiveness between democracies 
covered in this study. Drawing on the common argument within historical 
institutionalist literature that the context matters, this chapter focused on the role 
of two particular factors in their relation to democratic defensiveness: the 
division of democracies into two types of substantive and procedural 
democracies and the historical experience of an internally triggered or 
supported breakdown of their democratic regime in the past. Several scholars 
claimed these two factors are very important to ascertain how democracies 
react to their enemies and which legal instruments they adopt to counter them 
(Cf. Fox & Nolte, 1995: 14; Klamt, 2007: 135; Downs, 2012: 59). After 
examining the role of these two factors using cross-national evidence presented 
in previous chapters, it was found that among these two factors, historical 
experience was more helpful in understanding a country’s disposition towards 
democratic defensiveness while the type of democracy is less helpful. That 
said, however, it was also found that while internally triggered or supported 
democratic breakdown helps us understand some of the cross-national 
differences better, it cannot account for all kinds of variations between the 
democracies studied. Specifically, Denmark is medium defensive while the 
historical experience of this country (in this case subversion of democracy by an 
external force with support of internal non-democratic forces) should presently 
result in a higher level of democratic defensiveness. Additionally, the United 
Kingdom and Sweden also have higher levels of democratic defensiveness than 
one would expect given their past experiences (in that case long-term 
democratic stability and continuity). In an effort to explain these deviations from 
theoretical expectations, the final Chapter 8 will analyse the United Kingdom as 
a case-study for a detailed analysis of the evolution of democratic 
defensiveness from the 1930s till 2013. This analysis is underpinned by the 
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assumption common to the historical institutionalist perspective that formal-legal 
defensiveness of a democracy as in place in 2013 (which chapters 4-6 focused 
on) can be partially accounted for by long-term historical dispositions toward 
developing defensive laws. The chapter will focus on ascertaining the factors 
that influenced this democracy into developing a higher level of democratic 
defensiveness than its historical experience would have expected. To do so, 
Chapter 8 will explore the critical political and historical junctions in the United 
Kingdom during the 20th century which stimulated the adaptation and 
development of laws within the three analytical categories of formal-legal 
defensiveness used in this cross-national analysis.  
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CHAPTER 8: 
CASE-STUDY: WHY UNITED KINGDOM HAS HIGHER 
DEFENSIVENESS THAN THEORETICALLY EXPECTED? 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter found that the historical experience of an internally 
triggered or supported breakdown of a democratic system in the past can help 
us understand why democracies are different in terms of democratic 
defensiveness. However, this particular historical experience does not provide 
us a fully comprehensive understanding as some democracies deviated from 
the historically grounded expectation of their level of democratic defensiveness. 
This chapter will provide a detailed analysis of the over-time evolution of the 
defensive legislation in the United Kingdom and how it was shaped and 
adopted, specifically discussing why the United Kingdom is more defensive in 
its formal-legal arsenal than one would expect given the lack of a historical 
experience with internally triggered or supported breakdown of its democracy in 
the past, reflecting my broader historical institutionalist perspective. Specifically, 
this chapter will focus on the main threats to the democratic state and 
government in Britain during the 20th century and how the government and law-
makers of the United Kingdom responded to these threats in form of what legal 
measures and provisions. The goal of this analysis is to ascertain if and how 
these legal responses ’moved’ the country along the key indicators of 
democratic defensiveness across three categories. The analysis is underpinned 
by the assumption, derived from literature focusing on the politics of policy 
change, that formal-legal defensiveness of a democracy as in place in 2013 can 
be partially explained by an analysis of long-term historical dispositions toward 
developing defensive laws (Cf. Finn, 1990: 9; 2000: 55; Bleich, 2011: 42). Thus, 
while democracies, due to their historical experiences with the breakdown of 
their democratic regimes during the 1930s and 1940s, might show a stronger 
disposition towards adopting certain defensive measures as this research has 
illustrated so far, certain crises within society such as increased spikes of racist 
violence after the end of the World War II, or grown instances of terrorism in 
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more recent times, can decisively change the dispositions of democratic states 
towards democratic defensiveness.  
There is broad literature which suggests focusing on the role of objective 
problem indicators upon policy outcomes can also be a fruitful endeavour to 
explain why countries differ in their democratic responses to the threat from 
non-democratic parties and groups inside the political system. Some scholars 
have reasoned that focusing on historical context only as a predisposing factor 
can obscure the changes that take place within individual polities over time (Cf. 
Bleich & Lambert, 2013: 144). Often democracies change their original 
dispositions towards defensive legislation due to certain crises or political 
upheavals taking place within them in the course of certain time, prompting their 
governments to adopt new defensive laws in response to them (Cf. Finn, 1991: 
55; Bleich & Lambert, 2013: 129, 140). In particular, it is believed that those 
crises threatening the survival of a democratic state, provide states with the 
occasion to develop new legislation (Cf. Bleich & Lambert, 2013: 129). For 
example, Bleich and Lambert, in their analysis of cross-national variations in 
state responses to racist associations, found that for a fuller explanation of why 
countries differ in their responses to racist associations, attention is also 
required to objective events that triggered democratic responses over time (Cf. 
Bleich & Lambert, 2013: 140-141).  
 
Drawing on these insights it can be argued that in order to develop a casual 
framework for understanding why the United Kingdom’s level of democratic 
defensiveness deviates from the historically grounded expectation, would 
require an integration of long-term dispositions and events that shaped its 
defensive regime over time. Together these factors can provide a probabilistic 
explanation of why this democracy is more defensive than its historical 
experience would have suggested. This chapter will provide a more detailed 
analysis of the over-time evolution of defensive legislation in the United 
Kingdom. Based on the careful examination of primary legislation and the 
literature dedicated to the political development of the UK during the 20th 
century, particularly concentrating on the study of political conflict in the UK’s 
history since 1930s and the timing of laws enacted during this period, this study 
identified four critical junctures in the UK’s 20th century history: the evolution of 
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pro-fascist movements in the 1930s and after the end of World War II, the 
sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland (1968-1998), the miners’ strike (1984-
1985), and the resurgence of radical Islamism and international terrorism in the 
new millennium (Cf. Boyle et al., 1975; Walker, 1992: 31ff; Milne, 2014). Each 
of these events represented an important and critical juncture in United 
Kingdom’s history since 1930s till present and signifies a time when their 
democracy was perceived to be in particular jeopardy. The central argument of 
this chapter is within each event, the scale of political violence arising from the 
particular conflict spurred the country’s willingness to enact fairly restrictive laws 
with the result that it advanced ‘further’ along the key indicators of formal-legal 
democratic defensiveness. For example, during the fascist movements in the 
1930s the government responded by enacting fairly constraining public order 
legislation which advanced the country’s level of defensiveness to having key 
indicators of the legal ban of non-democratic groups and constraints of freedom 
of assembly and association. During the conflict in Northern Ireland the state 
was prompted to enact antiterrorism legislation which enforced further the 
power of proscription of terrorist and other extremist groups (Cf. Finn, 2000: 55). 
Additionally, the miners’ strike prompted the government to change its public 
order legislation hardening the restrictions of the freedom of assembly and 
expression. The new threat of radical Islamism forced the government to enact 
new antiterrorism legislation, upgrading the power of proscription of extremist 
and terrorist groups and giving the police additional powers for arrest and 
surveillance of extremist movements. Table 16 schematically maps the 
advancing of Britain’s legal democratic defensiveness between 1930 and 2013.  
 
Table 16: Core legislation in the UK increasing formal-legal defensiveness 
Time period 1930s-1960s 1968-1989 1984-1985 Post-9/11, 
2001 and post 
7/7, 2005 
Historical 
context 
British fascism  Conflict in 
Northern Ireland 
Miners’ strike Terrorist 
attacks  
Main 
legislation  
enacted  
Public Order 
Act 1936; 
Racial Act 
1965  
PTA 1974-1998; 
Terrorism Act 
2000;  
Public Order 
Act 1986 
Anti-terrorism 
legislation 
Areas of legal 
democratic 
defensiveness 
enforced  
Enforcement of 
legal ban of 
paramilitary 
organisations; 
Enforcement of 
legal ban of 
terrorist and 
extremist 
Enforcement 
of stricter 
constraints on 
the freedom of 
Enforcement of 
state 
surveillance of 
religious 
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enforcement of 
legal 
constraints on 
the freedom of 
assembly 
groups; 
enforcement of 
comprehensive 
state 
surveillance 
assembly groups ; 
religious hatred 
laws;   
 
This chapter will firstly separately discuss each historical event introducing the 
historical context. This discussion shall build the background for the ensuing 
discussion of the legal framework that evolved in response to the conflict in 
each case. While this discussion is structured chronologically, it will regularly 
refer to my analytical framework of democratic defensiveness to make it clear in 
which time period and which particular event prompted the government to 
strengthen which particular category of legal constraints.   
8.2 British fascism and legal responses to it: advancing 
defensiveness in legal ban and freedom constraints 
The rise of pro-fascist movements during the 1930s was an important critical 
juncture in the UK’s interwar history (Cf. Mullender, 2009: 324-334). Albeit the 
scale of the fascist threat in the UK was not comparable to its counterparts on 
the European mainland and the chance for them of taking over the democratic 
government was very low, it had nevertheless represented an immense 
challenge for the government to overcome (Cf. Thurlow, 1996: 30-31). In 
reaction, the British government enforced the fairly constraining Public Order 
Act 1936 which gave the state the power to ban para-military groups and to 
enforce a range of rules which in effect could apply constraints upon the public 
meetings and processions of far right groups in the country. This section firstly 
focuses briefly on the rise of pro-fascist movements in interwar Britain and will 
then analyse how the POA 1936 shaped the state’s democratic defensiveness.  
8.2.1 Far right pro-fascist movements in Britain     
The rise of fascism in interwar Britain is often linked with the name of Sir 
Oswald Mosley (1896-1980). After serving as a member of the British 
Parliament between 1918 and 1931 and then as a member of the government 
responsible for the problem of unemployment, Mosley built in 1932 the British 
Union of Fascists, for short BUF (Cf. Thurlow, 1996: 32; Mullender, 2009: 324-
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325; Morgan, 2003: 93). With financial support from Benito Mussolini and the 
backing of the media baron Lord Rothermere, the movement established itself 
quickly as the major fascist organisation in Britain (Cf. Morgan, 2003: 93). At the 
height of its popularity in 1933-1934, the Mosley’s movement comprised around 
50.000 members (Cf. Morgan, 2003: 96). The movement’s main goal enshrined 
in Mosley’s manifesto Great Britain was to establish a one-party dictatorship 
and build a corporate state, as he believed that without a corporate state, the 
country could quite possibly drift into disaster (Cf. Morgan, 2003: 94-96; 
Mullender, 2009: 326). Mosley saw the liberal-democratic nature of state as 
impotent in solving its existing problems as it prevented the leaders from 
governing in “a suitably decisive fashion” (Cf. Mullender, 2009: 326). Based on 
this belief, he advocated a totalitarian state as the solution. An important feature 
of his antidemocratic propaganda was the Anti-Semitism of the kind that was 
propagated by Nazis in Germany (Cf. Mullender, 2009: 326). Increasingly so 
since 1934 and 1935, Mosley portrayed Jews as culturally alien and parasitic, a 
“nation within the nation”, feeding off and exploiting their host community (Cf. 
Morgan, 2003: 97).  
Apart from the appalling manifesto, the BUF quickly became the major “law and 
order” problem for state and local authorities. Through the early 1930s the 
name of the movement became notorious for major disturbances of the public 
order in London and other parts of Britain. Throughout the 1930s, Mosley’s 
political rallies in London and elsewhere stirred up anti-Semitic propaganda and 
caused clashes with anti-fascist groups formed in response to their actions. The 
apogee of the militancy of Oswald Mosley and his movement emerged in 1936. 
During that year two large events took place that revealed the real danger of the 
BUF and of its leadership. On October 4, 1936, Oswald Mosley organised a 
march of BUF members dressed in black shirts which was the uniform of the 
movement through the centre of East London where there was a large Jewish 
community as well as many BUF supporters. The march which was dubbed 
“Battle of Cable Street” after the street where the march took place ended up in 
cruel violence with 106 people left injured and 85 people arrested (Cf. 
Mullender, 2009: 327-328). A week later another “The Mile End Pogrom” took 
place during which the fascists smashed windows of Jewish shops and houses 
and assaulting all those who looked Jewish (Cf. Mullender, 2009: 328).    
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8.2.2 The enactment of the Public Order Act 1936: advancing 
defensiveness in group ban   
Prior to 1936 the police forces were not empowered to take actions against 
political meetings held in halls unless called by meeting stewards (Cf. Moore, 
1990: 66). This is why, as it often happened at political meetings of BUF, the 
police were standing by lamely while fascist and anti-fascists engaged in acts of 
blanket violence (Cf. Moore, 1990: 66). Similarly the demonstrations and 
marches in public places organised by BUF and other extremist movements 
could freely occur as the police had little power to stop them or ban completely. 
For example, when Mosley announced its readiness to organise the march 
through Cable Street, the Home Secretary could not ban it completely because 
the march was seen as lawful (Cf. Mullender, 2009: 327-328). This problem 
partly occurred due to the strong commitment of those in charge of public order 
maintenance to the overarching value of fundamental freedoms (Cf. Poole, 
1996: 55). As explained by the Home Office during the discussion in February 
and March 1934 of the “Bill to Prohibit the Wearing of Uniform” which was 
proposed to prohibit the BUF wearing the black shirts in public processions, 
suppressing the BUF would be “contrary to the long established traditions of 
allowing people in this country to hold and to express what views they like so 
long as they do not breach the law or incite others to do so” (cited in Moore, 
1990: 66). Based on this belief the bill was rejected.  
However, with the sheer number of incidents of political violence committed by 
the BUF, the voices became loud expressig concerns of the adequacy of the 
current law in dealing with the BUF. The chief of British Security agency MI5, Sir 
Vernon Kell, warned the senior police and Home Office civil servants they were 
not treating the BUF with the gravity it warranted and stated  “it is impossible to 
resist the impression that taken as a whole they tend to underestimate the 
growth and importance of the Movement led by Sir Oswald Mosley” and such 
situation could lead “to the [fascist] capture of power as a general election, 
followed by the suppression of all opinion (…) [contrary] to the policy of the 
Fascist Government” (cited in Moore, 1990: 66). The above named events in 
October of 1936 thus muted the initial opposition to the launch of a more 
resolute legal treatment of the BUF and other extremists.  
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The legal response to the actions and movements of British Union of Fascists 
was eventually introduced as the Public Order Act 1936 (thereafter POA 1936). 
According to Moore, the two last events in East London in particular played an 
important role in helping the government change their doubts surrounding 
whether the BUF and similar movements must be suppressed or not (Cf. 
Moore, 1990: 67). The government had commissioned two reports which were 
drafted by Sir Philip Game in October 1936, who had become one of the central 
figures in drafting the new legislation during the course of events. In his capacity 
as the new head of the London Metropolitan Police, Game recommended in his 
reports to outlaw fascist organisations as he believed that “Private armies even 
if they start out as small and somewhat farcical organisations, are always apt to 
induce the other side to arm” (cited in Moore, 1990: 67). Additionally, he 
advised to forbid the BUF using Anti-Semitic paroles, as he believed Anti-
Semitism was the most important feature of the BUF and “the only real danger 
of Fascism”. To counter this menace, he recommended “the only real solution, if 
a practical method of doing so can be devised, is to supress the Fascist 
organisations” (cited in Moore, 1990: 68). As Moore argued, the 
recommendations given by Sir Philip Game had particularly influenced the 
government in its decision to act decisively against the BUF. The Cabinet met 
on 14 October 1936 and acted swiftly upon his recommendations. The bill was 
passed through the Parliament on 16 November 1936 (Cf. Moore, 1990: 68).  
The new legislation meant that Mosley and his followers could no longer 
engage in profile-raising paramilitary displays. It not only prohibited fascist 
movements’ unrestrictive use of their freedom of assembly but also severely 
constrained their freedom of expression (Cf. Mullender, 2009: 329). To 
summarise its main mechanisms briefly (see Chapter 4.3.3 for more details), 
this Act introduced the provision which empowered the state to ban “quasi-
paramilitary organisations” under Section 2(1). Any person was prohibited under 
the Act to train and equip an association “for the purpose of enabling them to be 
employed in usurping the functions of the police or of the armed forces of the 
Crown” (…) “for the purpose of enabling them to be employed for the use or 
display of physical force in promoting any political object”224. Furthermore, the 
POA 1936 enhanced the state’s powers to prohibit the non-democratic groups 
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the wearing of political uniforms “in any public place or at any public meeting” 
under Section 1(1).  
Apart from banning para-military organisations, the Act introduced three 
important statutory mechanisms to deal with public demonstrations (Cf. Ewing & 
Gearty, 1990: 86). Section 3 of the Act allowed the chief officer of police, when 
a procession was believed to cause serious public disorder, to impose such 
conditions “as appear to him necessary for the preservation of public order”. If 
such conditions were insufficient, then the chief officer could apply for a banning 
order from the Home Secretary in London, or from the local council in any other 
part of the country, which would ban all or any class of processions in a given 
area for a duration of three months. According to Ewing and Gearty, the 
purpose of this imposition of blanket bans was “to prevent the temptation to 
discriminate against particular marches” (Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 87). 
Furthermore, Section 5 contained another important statutory mechanism which 
according to Ewing and Gearty was for decades “one of the central tools in the 
control of political assembly and public non-conformity” (Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 
87). This section prohibited offensive conduct causing the breach of public 
order, including the use of threatening, abusive and insulting words225. After its 
amendment in 1965, this section applied to anyone in public using threatening, 
insulting words or behaviour or distributed signs or other materials which were 
threatening, abusive, or insulting. Finally, the third provision within the POA 
1936 banned the wearing of uniforms and offensive weapons while at meetings 
or in public processions. The relevant bid to ban uniforms was ostensibly 
propelled since 1934 when the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police in 
London Lord Trenchard called on the government of Baldwin to forbid the BUF 
the wearing of blackshirt uniforms (Cf. Mullender, 2009: 329). Thereby, 
Trenchard took the view that BUF members while wearing their blackshirt 
uniforms participated in “unauthorized exercises, movements or evolutions” 
prohibited earlier by Unlawful Drilling Act 1819 (Cf. Mullender, 2009: 329). The 
new POA took up on Trenchard’s recommendation incorporating the new ruling 
banning the wearing of prohibited uniforms together with offensive weapons226.  
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8.2.3 The threat of fascism in post-war Britain: advancing 
defensiveness on banning anti-racist speech 
During the post-war period, the scale of fascist groups in the United Kingdom 
had significantly subsided although they were still present in the country (Cf. 
Mullender, 2009: 330-331). The rise of anti-immigrant sentiments following the 
increased immigration of Indian and Asian population groups in the 1940s and 
1950s made it possible for Oswald Mosley and similar groups to found a niche 
in the British politics after the end of World War II (Cf. Mullender, 2009: 331; 
Husbands, 2009: 252). In 1948 Mosley founded the Union Movement (UM), the 
purpose of which was to gain support for the idea that Europe should become a 
nation and to advance an extreme right-wing political agenda (Cf. Mullender, 
2009: 331). When the riots erupted between white youths and immigrants in 
Notting Hill area of London in 1958, Mosley took it as a chance to seek support 
for the UM. Thereby, he made repeatedly inflammatory statements insulting 
national minorities such as “Every white man in a job knows that he has got a 
coloured man at his elbow, ready to take his job at a cheaper rate” (Cited in 
Mullender, 2009: 331). Although the campaign experienced little public support 
and the court took actions against the rioters themselves, the state 
counteractions did not reduce Mosley’s endeavour to campaign against the 
“coloured invasion” (Cf. Mullender, 2009: 331).  
In response to Mosley’s anti-immigrant campaigns, the Labour government of 
Harold Wilson issued the Race Relations Act in 1965 which was the first 
legislation in the United Kingdom to address the issue of racial discrimination 
(Cf. Mullender, 2009: 331; Bleich, 2011: 120-121). The government hoped the 
introduction of this act would help to counter the spread of anti-immigrant 
propaganda and integrate the immigrants within the country (Cf. Bleich, 2011: 
20). According to Section 6 of the Act, it was illegal to intentionally use 
threatening, abusive, or insulating language that was likely to stir hatred against 
national minorities (Cited in Mullender, 2009: 331)227. The cases related to the 
prosecution of inflammatory speech can only be raised by the Attorney-General. 
However, as noted by Bleich, this law was relatively “tepid” because it 
prohibited racial discrimination only in limited public places and in home sales 
while containing weak enforcement provisions (Cf. Bleich, 2011: 121). As 
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previously detailed in Chapter 5, legislators sought to strengthen this section on 
several occasions and succeeded. The first amendment occured in 1968 
resulting in an expansion to include discrimination in employment and housing 
under Sections 3 and 5 of the Act (Cf. Bleich, 2011: 121). During the mid-1970s, 
the Act was further extended mainly to emulate the much harder race relations 
legislation of the United States (Cf. Bleich, 2011: 121). The new Race Relations 
Act of 1976 prohibited more forms of racial discrimination and developed more 
effective enforcement mechanisms than ever before. More recently, the act was 
expanded through the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 to cover religion-
based hatred. According to the new Act, it is an offence to distribute words or 
behaviour or display of written material with intent to stir racial hatred or if in the 
circumstances racial hatred is likely to be stirred (see chapter 5.3.1 for more 
details). 
Overall, the emergence of BUF and rise of incidents of political violence 
perpetrated by Mosley and his supporters during public marches and 
demonstrations heightened the willingness of the British government to respond 
more aggressively to non-democratic groups which was primarily reflected in 
the enactment of the POA 1936 and the Race Relations Act of 1965. These 
enacted provisions have significantly changed the defensiveness of the country 
to encompass the key indicators of legal ban and constraints upon hate 
propaganda.  
8.3 The conflict in Northern Ireland (1968-1998): advancing on 
key indicators in legal ban dimension 
The sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland lasted nearly thirty years from 1968 till 
1998 and was the most serious challenge for the stability and integrity of the 
British state and its authority during the post-war period. This section will focus 
on the origin of the conflict, the main forces involved and the ensuing legislation 
enacted by the government to abate it. The efforts of the British government to 
restore order and peace in the region have spawned a great variety and 
quantity of laws giving the state authorities comprehensive powers in dealing 
with terrorist and other extremist groups. This section will particularly focus on 
the power of the legal ban that was promulgated through new legislation. The 
first section will describe the political background of the conflict, focusing briefly 
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on the main features and the main political forces involved. This discussion is 
followed by a detailed account of the legislation that was enacted in response to 
the conflict.   
8.3.1 Political background of the conflict in Northern Ireland 
The conflict in Northern Ireland spans over many centuries since at least the 
17th century when the Ulster plantation was forcibly settled (Ulster was the 
name of the northern part of the island of Ireland) with Scottish colonists in 
1607, causing the local Catholics communities to begin incessant uprising that 
continued over time into the 20th century (Cf. Boyle et al., 1975: 162-178). In 
1920, the state of Northern Ireland was formally created with the the 
Government of Ireland Act partitioning Ireland into Northern and Southern 
Ireland. The two states represented two distinct legal states each with its own 
parliament, executive, and judiciary, but both subordinate to the Parliament in 
Westminster, at least so until 1922 when the Southern Ireland was founded as 
the Free Irish State (later the Republic of Ireland). Since this time, the conflict 
has been confined to the northern part of Ireland. The state was ruled from 
Stormont (the Parliament of Northern Ireland) which was beset by a pro-British 
Unionist party that was supported by a majority of the Protestant community (Cf. 
Boyle et al., 1980: 15; Finn, 1991: 51)228. At the time of the conflict there were 
around one million Protestants who supported the link with Britain and just over 
a half a million Roman Catholics who supported the reunification of Ireland (Cf. 
Boyle et al., 1980: 8). The nationalist Catholic minority generally felt excluded 
and alienated and their unwillingness to accept the new realities led to the rise 
of confrontation between the two communities. 
The conflict involved several guerrilla and paramilitary groups on both sides of 
the conflict. For the Catholics, their most formidable power was the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA). The IRA came from the militant faction within the 
guerrilla army which fought the British state in the Irish war of independence in 
1919 and 1920 (Cf. Boyle et al., 1980: Chapter 3; Finn, 1991: 67). The result of 
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 The Northern Ireland Parliament could legislate on matters concerning the law and order, the 
police, the courts other than the Supreme Court, the civil and criminal law, local government, 
health and social services, planning and development, commerce and industrial development 
and internal trade, agriculture and finance. The Parliament of Westminster retained the right to 
legislate on matters concerning foreign policy, defense, taxation, external trade, and all matters 
relating to the Crown (Cf. Finn, 2000: 51).  
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the war, the partition of Ireland in 1920, ignited the IRA into becoming a force to 
end the partition and to complete the process of British withdrawal from Ireland 
(Cf. Boyle et al., 1980: 15). Further escalation of the conflict followed on 
December 12 1956 when the IRA issued a formal declaration of war against the 
state of Northern Ireland229. In the 1960s, the leaders of the Republican 
movement decided to abandon the strategy of pursuing their goals by military 
means. Instead they started the general campaign for civil rights and social 
justice within Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association 
(NICRA) was created composed of several large national organisations and a 
series of local groups (Cf. Boyle et al., 1980: 16; Finn, 1991: 56-58)230. In 
contrast to IRA, the NICRA campaigned peacefully for political reforms within 
the province. Among claims they put forward were, for example, the right to 
participate in the election of central and local government through a 
scrupulously fair electoral system, the right to pursue legitimate political and 
social objectives without government interference, the right to share equitably in 
the allocation of state resources, and the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest 
and detention (Cf. Finn, 1991: 55-56). Many Protestants believed these claims 
were targeting their dominant position in the region and responded with hostility 
which resulted in further escalation of the crisis (Cf. Finn, 2000: 55). Among the 
Republicans the number of people in support for the repudiation of a political 
solution and resuming the military campaign in Northern Ireland grew 
exponentially. When the Irish nationalist party Sinn Féin, the political wing of the 
official IRA, repudiated this policy at a conference in Dublin in 1970, the 
militants broke away from the official movement and established a rival 
‘provisional’ movement. Due to this, two wings of the IRA emerged during the 
conflict: official and provisional. The Provisional IRA had created and sustained 
its campaign both in Northern Ireland and Britain, with the goal of creating a 
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 The bombing activities of IRA were however not confined to the province of Northern Ireland 
only but also took place throughout the whole of the United Kingdom’s territory. One such case 
involved the bombing of a pub in Birmingham in 1974 (Cf. Boyle e.a., 1980: 15).  
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 The leaders of the civil rights movement pursued first their goals through peaceful political 
and legal actions in the hope that their actions would force the governments in Stormont and 
Westminster to undertake political, economic, and social reforms. When those efforts failed, its 
more aggressive members began marches and protests. The first such march took place in 
1968 and arose from a cause of overt discrimination of members of Catholic community in 
public housing. The first such march on August 24 in Dungannon, for example, attracted over 
2500 participants. The members of protestant community in their turn organized counter-
demonstrations which often led to violent clashes and casualties among participants (Cf. Boyle 
et al. 1980: 15-16). 
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united Roman Catholic Ireland (Cf. Finn, 1991: 67). The official IRA were 
Marxists and maintained its separate existence carrying out its own distinct 
guerrilla campaign, although much less intensely than the Provisionals, while 
seeking a united workers’ republic. In 1972 the official IRA declared a unilateral 
cease-fire on the grounds that no further political purpose existed to continue 
the fighting (Cf. Boyle et al., 1980: 16; Finn, 1991: 67). Some members of the 
official IRA were not satisfied with this notion and left the party to build the 
radical Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) which was regarded as the military 
wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP) (Cf. Boyle et al., 1980: 16). 
These three groups, the Provisionals, the Officials and the IRSP/INLA were 
often engaged in fighting against each other.   
Apart from organisations built by members of the Catholic minority, there were 
also several paramilitary organisations drawn from members of the Protestant 
community. Among them the Ulster Voluntary Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence 
Association (UDA) were the two major organisations more or less openly 
engaged in paramilitary activities (Cf. Boyle et al., 1980: 19). Both organisations 
re-emerged or were newly created as underground terrorist groups during the 
1960s and early 1970s. As their names implied, both organisations stood to 
defend the status of Ulster as integral part of the United Kingdom.  
Against the background of the conflict in Northern Ireland, the British 
government was forced to adopt antiterrorism legislation to effectively fight 
against the growing challenge of Irish terrorism. Clearly everyone in the state 
had apprehended the conflict as the major threat to the stability of the state and 
its constitutional order. As one member of the British Parliament described, the 
conflict in Northern Ireland was “the greatest threat [to the country] since the 
end of the Second World War” (Cited in Walker, 1992: 31). According to one 
estimate, around 3600 people died since the conflict began in 1969 until 1998 
when the Good Friday agreement was signed ending the conflict (Cf. Summers, 
2009). In response to this conflict, the government issued a great variety and 
quantity of legislation, among them the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary 
Provisions) Acts 1989 was the central response of the British government to still 
the conflict (Cf. Walker, 1992: 31). The next section turns to a more detailed 
account of the legislative response of the British government.        
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8.3.2 The legal response to the conflict in Northern Ireland:  
new framework for legal ban of extremist and terrorist groups  
The conflict in Northern Ireland led to a great variety and quantity of laws to give 
the state sweeping powers in dealing with terrorist and other extremist groups. 
Among such laws, there were a number of emergency laws such as the Civil 
Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) of 1922. This Act was 
passed by the Parliament of Northern Ireland shortly after its establishment in 
response to the ensuing conflict caused by the partition of Ireland. Initially 
enacted for one year, it was re-enacted from year to year until 1933 when it was 
made permanent. The statute was designed, according to its preamble, “to 
empower certain authorities of the Government of Northern Ireland to take steps 
for preserving the peace and maintaining order” (Cited in Finn, 2000: 53). The 
important matters regulated by the act included demonstrations in public under 
Section 4 which gave the right to impose blanket bans on public processions 
such as demonstrations and meetings. Another important Act was the Public 
Order Act (Northern Ireland) 1951 issued by the Parliament of Northern Ireland. 
The Act covered meetings and 'non-traditional' parades, although the 
amendment in 1970 considerably broadened the Act's scope to include 
paramilitary groups and weaponry. 
However, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts (hereafter 
referred to as PTA) represented the key response of the British government to 
quell the resurgence of terrorist threats in Northern Ireland (Cf. Walker, 1992: 
31). Despite its name, the Act has long survived the conflict in Northern Ireland 
that generated it and applies to the whole of the United Kingdom. There are 
altogether four PTAs since 1974 when the first PTA was passed through the 
Parliament (Cf. Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 213). The Act emerged as a direct 
response from the government to IRA’s campaign of violence in Britain since 
early 1972 (Cf. Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 213). The immediate cause for its 
enactment was the bombing of two pubs in Birmingham in 1974 in which 21 
people died and 184 were injured (Cf. Boyle et al., 1980: 15; Ewing & Gearty, 
1990: 213-214). As frequently cited by scholars, the Parliament was ravaged by 
these acts of violence. One member of the Parliament, for example, observed 
“The House wants blood” (Cited in Walker, 1992: 31). After the bombing, many 
MPs in the Parliament urged the government to act swiftly and harshly in 
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response to these acts. The new legislation was to become an instrument by 
which the most MPs had sought to retaliate on the perpetrators.  In urging his 
fellow members to pass the PTA 1974 Bill, the Lord Hailsham, for example, 
stated “Apart from [the Bill’s] practical value (…) its moral impact is hardly less 
important and would, I fear, be considerably blunted if we do not accede to the 
Government’s request to enable the Bill to receive the Royal Assent so as to 
place it on the Statute Book tomorrow. (…) I would suggest to pass it without 
amendment” (Cited in Donohue, 2003: 425). He later added “If one yields to 
terrorism of this kind other terrorists in Britain will draw the obvious moral that 
the gun and the bomb pay off because the British did not have the courage to 
resist them” (Cited in Donohue, 2003: 425). The conception of the Bill was 
announced on 25th November. The bill was passed in just two days and almost 
without amendment or dissent (Cf. Walker, 1992: 32). Since its conception, the 
Act, initially conceived as temporary, underwent a series of amendments and 
re-enactments (Cf. Walker, 1992: 33-40). The amendment in 1984, for example, 
added international terrorism as target of the proscription. As justified by one 
MP at that time, it was vital for Britain to “continue to have on the statute book 
legislation which will enable a democratic society to respond to the ever-present 
threat of international terrorism, regardless of the situation in Northern Ireland” 
(Cited in Donohue, 2003: 428). The following amendment of the PTA 1989 
introduced financing terrorism and terrorist groups as an offence and as such 
prohibited under the Act. The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) 
Act 1989 represented the latest version of antiterrorism laws adopted since the 
start of the conflict231. It provided Britain’s state and police forces with a more 
permanent and comprehensive code containing more safeguards against 
domestic and international terrorism that the Act defined as “the use of violence 
for political ends, and (…) for the purpose of putting the public or any section of 
the public in fear”232.  Although passed specifically for Northern Ireland, the act 
applies both in Northern Ireland and in Great Britain (Cf. Finn, 1991: 86).  
The Prevention of Terrorism Act of 1989 gave the state sweeping powers for 
dealing with extremist and terrorist groups. As noted by the then Home 
Secretary Roy Jenkins, the powers granted were “draconian” and 
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“unprecedented in peacetime” but “fully justified to meet the clear and present 
dangers” (Cited in Walker, 1992: 31). Among such powers, the right to proscribe 
any organisation concerned in acts of terrorism represented the most significant 
power within this Act (Cf. Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 215). It should be noted that 
the Public Order Act 1936 was the main legal source to regulate extremist 
groups until it was perceived to be inadequate in dealing with the special nature 
of the conflict in the province (Cf. Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 212). Donohue, for 
example, stated “[t]he long history of Republicanism and Loyalism and their 
respective ideologies made it difficult for Westminster to respond to the conflict 
through ordinary legislation” (Donohue, 2003: 419). On a formal level, Section 
2(1) of the POA 1936 empowered the state to ban “quasi-paramilitary 
organisations” but did not affect the right to proscribe paramilitary groups in 
Northern Ireland under Section 10(2) (Cf. Walker, 1992: 54-55). Furthermore, 
while the act made it an offence for any person “who takes part in the control or 
management of an association” whose members are “organised or trained or 
equipped for the purpose of enabling them to be employed in usurping the 
functions of the police or of the armed forces” or “for the purpose of enabling 
them to be employed for the use or display of physical force in promoting any 
political object”233, it did not forbid the mere membership in such organisations 
(Cf. Walker, 1992: 55).  
The PTA 1989 established a new legal framework for banning extremist and 
terrorist organisations. To summarise it briefly (see chapter 4.3.3 for details), 
the PTA introduced three groups of crimes of relevance to the general power of 
proscription (Cf. Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 216ff). First, the act made it a criminal 
offence if someone “belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed 
organisation”. It was punished with imprisonment for up to ten years while 
publicly displaying or inviting support for these organisations was punishable by 
an imprisonment or a fine, or both. Thereby this power extends to groups 
related to the conflict in Northern Ireland as well as international terrorist 
groups. Secondly, the Act made it a crime to arrange, manage, or address any 
meeting of three or more persons (whether private or public) if it is known that 
the meeting is to support or to further the activities of proscribed organisations 
or is to be addressed by someone belonging to proscribed organisations. As 
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previously mentioned, the PTA of 1989 added the financing of proscribed 
organisations (Cf. Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 216)234. Thirdly, the act made it a 
criminal offence if anyone wears, carries or displays any item of dress or any 
article “in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable 
apprehension that he is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation”. 
While the POA 1936 mentioned only uniforms “signifying his association with 
any political organisation or with the promotion of any political object”, the PTA 
provides for more comprehensive powers as it prohibits not only wearing 
uniform but also small badges and emblems which cannot be designated as the 
wearing of a uniform as well as prohibits the carrying of banners of proscribed 
organisations (Cf. Walker, 1992: 56). 
Apart from groups “concerned in, or in promoting or encouraging terrorism”, the 
Act can also be used to ban any group which subscribes to the use of violence. 
As noted by Walker, the Act intentionally used a very broad definition of what is 
an organisation (Cf. Walker, 1992: 47). According to Subsection 6 of the Act, an 
‘organisation’ is defined as including “any association or combination of 
persons” which in effect means that bans are not confined to terrorist 
associations only (Cited in Walker, 1992: 47; cf. also Finn, 1991: 133). The 
definition of terrorism given in the Act as “violence for political ends” also implies 
that the legal ban can apply toward both terrorist and non-terrorist groups. The 
key criterion remains however the use of violence.  
As noted by several scholars, the main purpose of the enforcement of 
proscription within the PTA was to assure “the public should no longer endure 
the affront of public demonstrations in support of proscribed organisations” (Cf. 
Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 216). Finn stated the power of proscription represented 
a strong effort by the British government “to end or (…) to change the nature of 
the conflict” (Finn, 1991: 55; also cf. Donohue, 2003: 425-426). The Jellicoe 
Report issued in 1983 reviewed the Operation of the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1976 and made this point even more forcefully. The 
Report noted that proscription may have some additional practical side-effects, 
including the prevention of public disorder and the stemming of the flow of funds 
and support (Cf. Walker, 1992: 56). However, as the report continued, it was 
more so the presentational value that was placed in it from the outset. Notably 
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so it was expected that the proscription would generate “public aversion to 
organisations which use, and espouse, violence as a means to a political end” 
(Cited in Donohue, 2003: 426). In other words, the knowledge that an 
organisation was put under the proscription clause would discourage people to 
join or otherwise support such organisations in the first instance.  
To summarise, the conflict in Northern Ireland was another triggering event 
spurring further the evolution of democratic legal defensiveness in Britain. When 
faced with the direct threat to its constitutional fundamentals the state enrolled 
its most constraining mechanism, the legal ban of non-democratic groups as 
reflected in the enforcement of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts allowing the 
state to proscribe terrorist and other extremist organisations.  
8.4 The Miners’ strike (1984-1985): advancing defensiveness in 
freedom constraints category   
Another ‘triggering’ event forcing the British government to respond in a way 
that advanced the country along the indicators of democratic defensiveness 
was the miners’ strike which endured from March 1984 till March 1985 (Cf. 
Mullender, 2009: 318). The miners’ strike became an important watershed in 
the post-war history of the state. In its core, the conflict occured between the 
most powerful and politicised trade union of miners (National Union of 
Mineworkers, NUM) and the government of Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990). 
The decision of the government to close several coal mines across the country 
led thousands of coal workers to confront the government policies on the streets 
led by the NUM. The intensity of the ensuing confrontation between miners and 
the police forces was unprecedented in Britain itself and in the whole of 
Western Europe (Cf. Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 103). It reached its peak in the 
summer 1984 during the so called Battle of Orgreave when up to 8.000 riot 
police forces were mobilised and 39 miners were taken in custody (Cf. Milne, 
2014: 22). Due to the conflict’s intensity, the Prime-Minister compared the 
confrontation with the miners to the war against the Argentine junta over the 
Falklands islands two years earlier. At a gathering of Conservative MPs in the 
Parliament she stated “We had to fight an enemy without in the Falklands. We 
always have to be aware of the enemy within, which is much more difficult to 
fight and more dangerous to liberty” (Cited in Milne, 2014: 23; cf. also Travis, 
210 
 
2013). As implied by this quotation, the government’s key response to the 
conflict was overwhelmingly repressive. Some commentators described the 
state response during the miners’ strike as a process of “militarisation” (Cf. 
Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 85; Reiner, 1998: 44). Reiner stated the fundamental 
essence of this process was the availability and occasional use of riot control 
hardware and protective uniforms and equipment for the maintenance of the 
public order (Cf. Reiner, 1998: 44). Additionally, this process concurrently 
occurred with changes in training, organisation, intelligence, and routines of 
mobilisation to facilitate rapid deployment of police squads intended to maintain 
or restore the public order and if necessary with force (Cf. Reiner, 1998: 44). 
The legal basis for all these changes was supplied by the new Public Order Act 
of 1986.   
8.4.1 The Public Order Act 1986: push for stricter laws for the 
control of assemblies and demonstrations   
To manage the increased accidents of political violence during the miners’ 
strike, the government responded by enforcing the new Public Order Act 1986 
(hereafter referred to as POA 1986)235. According to some commentators, this 
act was adopted in response and as a direct consequence of the crisis (Cf. 
Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 113). Before going into details, it is important to reiterate 
the most important statute in controlling demonstrations before 1986 was the 
Public Order Act of 1936. As mentioned before, the POA 1936 was adopted by 
Britain’s inter-war government to respond to the increased breaches of public 
order by many far right groups during the 1930s (see above chapters 5.3.1 and 
8.2.2). After World War II and before the new public order act was adopted in 
1986, the POA of 1936 remained the main instrument in dealing with public 
demonstrations. According to Ewing and Gearty, the expansive provisions of 
the POA 1936 were sufficient to respond effectively to the major threats to the 
public order in the first decades after the end of World War II. For example, 
during the first half of the 1980s the authorities used Section 3 of the POA of 
1936 to ban many more marches than they had done before. In 1981 alone, 
there were 42 banning orders and this number in the following years was also 
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high: 13, 9, and 11 in 1982, 1983, and 1984 respectively (Cf. Ewing & Gearty, 
1990: 113).  
However, despite its expansive powers, the miners’ strike had revealed the 
inadequacy of the preceding public order legislation to cope with this immense 
kind of public disorder which occurred during the miners’ strike. According to 
Ewing and Gearty, the miners’ strike had revealed the “malleability and breadth 
of the law that was available to the authorities” (Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 117; 
also cf. Smith, 1987: 157). The Home Office itself argued that the existing law 
was “complex and fragmented” and there were “important points where the law 
[could] helpfully be extended and clarified” and these related mainly to 
“improving the opportunities for the police to try to prevent disorder or disruption 
before it occurs” (Cited in Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 117). As result of such 
considerations, the new POA 1986 was introduced to further enhance police 
powers for maintaining the public order (Cf. Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 117)236. 
What additional changes have been introduced by the new Public Order Act of 
1986? 
According to Ewing and Gearty, the Act addresses and expands three areas, 
including the preventive powers of the police, the public order offences 
contained in Section 5 of the POA 1936, and includes a provision for the serious 
public order offences such as riot and unlawful assembly (Cf. Ewing & Gearty, 
1990: 118). Firstly, the new POA extended the powers of the police to impose 
total bans on demonstrations and other public processions in case if “at any 
time the chief officer of police reasonably believes” that such procession may 
result in “serious public disorder” (Cf. Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 118)237. Secondly, 
the existing public order legislation was modified in three important respects. 
First, the new act demanded an advance notice of all public processions at least 
6 days before they are due to take place (Section 11). If such requirement had 
existed before only for some territories, this new provision applies now 
throughout England and Wales (Cf. Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 118).  According to 
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Subsection 11(7) “each of the persons organising” a public procession is guilty 
of an offence if the requirement for advance notice was not satisfied. Secondly, 
the Act introduced within Section 14 the provision which allowed the police 
authorities to impose conditions on public assemblies. As previously mentioned, 
the POA 1936 dealt only with conditions concerning processions and 
demonstrations. The new act permitted the imposition of such constraining 
conditions on both demonstrations and meetings (Cf. Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 
118). Thereby, the new act has extensively expanded the range of criteria on 
the basis of which conditions could be imposed on demonstrations and 
meetings. From now on, they have been extended beyond the apprehension of 
serious public disorder (Cf. Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 118-119). Under Sections 12 
and 14, such criteria included: (a) “serious damage to the property”; (b) “serious 
disruption to the life of the community”; and (c) “the intimidation of others with a 
view to compelling them not to do an act they have a right to do, or to do an act 
they have a right not to do” (Cf. Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 119)238. If one of these 
criteria was fulfilled and if it was a demonstration, the senior police officer was 
authorised to impose such conditions “as appear to him to be necessary to 
prevent such disorder, damage, disruption or intimidation, including conditions 
as to the route of the procession”. The officer may prohibit it “from entering any 
public place specified in the directions” (Cf. Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 119). If it 
was a meeting, the senior police officer “present at the scene” was authorised to 
give directions “imposing on the persons organising or taking part in the 
assembly such conditions as to the place at which the assembly may be (or 
continue to be) held, its maximum duration, or the maximum number of persons 
who may constitute it, as appear to him necessary to prevent such disorder, 
damage, disruption or intimidation”239.  
Additionally the Act introduced new provisions concerning the serious public 
order offences such as riot and unlawful assembly (Cf. Smith, 1987: 158ff; 
Ewing & Gearty, 1990: 119-120). The previous POA of 1936 foresaw the 
possibility for a constable to arrest anyone who was found in violation of 
carrying an offensive weapon at a public procession, or wearing a uniform of a 
prohibited organisation, or using threatening, abusing or insulting words at any 
public place or during a public meeting (Section 7(3)). The new act expanded 
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these powers to arrest anyone without a warrant who organises or participates 
in an unlawful assembly, as well as anyone who incites someone to organise an 
unlawful assembly (Section 14(7)). Thereby a mere suspicion from “a constable 
in uniform” that such meeting is due to take place may suffice for an arrest. 
Thereby, if someone disobeys the instructions issued under the Act by police 
may be charged guilty of a criminal offence for which an offender may be either 
imprisoned “for a term not exceeding 3 months” or fined (Section 14(8, 9, 10)).  
To summarise, the miners’ strike was another important and critical juncture in 
the United Kingdom’s post-war history which considerably spurred Britain’s 
government to upgrade its public order legislation to expand police powers in 
substantially constraining the right to demonstrate and the right of assembly, 
also including rules imposing the outright ban on both demonstrations and 
meetings, expanded the range of public order offences which included not only 
those raising the serious public disorder, but also those affecting damage to the 
property, and intimidation of public, and introduced the novel offence of 
organising unlawful assemblies.   
8.5 Post-9/11 and 7/7: advancing defensiveness in operational 
constraints 
Certainly, another important critical juncture in the post-war history of the United 
Kingdom was the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001 
(commonly referred to as 9/11) which killed nearly 3000 people (Cf. Moran, 
2008: 15). After these attacks, the US government led by George Bush 
declared a war on international terrorism and proceeded to carry out a military 
invasion in Afghanistan and Iraq. The United Kingdom stood by the US from the 
outset with the result that the UK itself became the target of terror following their 
invasion in Iraq (Cf. Moran, 2008: 16; Phythian, 2008: 45). In November 2003, 
the British Consulate and the HSBC bank in Istanbul were bombed killing three 
British citizens among the twenty-eight dead (Cf. Moran, 2008: 16). 
Subsequently, on 7th of July 2005 (often referred to as 7/7), the bombings in 
London took place plotted by four British citizens killing 52 and injuring more 
than 700 people (Cf. Moran, 2008: 16).  
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Both attacks, in particular the attack in London, put severe political pressure 
upon the British government to reconsider its policy towards extremists and 
terrorists (Cf. Moran, 2008: 16; Phythian, 2008: 45). The key response, as 
Moran and others have asserted, was in the form of new legislation to change 
the techniques of counter-terrorism (Cf. Moran, 2008: 20; Mullender, 2009: 
340). Among powers enhanced through new legislation, was the power of its 
security and intelligence services to conduct surveillance and gather intelligence 
about suspect groups and individuals, as police and security services were 
considered the key to combatting terrorist threats within the country (Cf. Moran, 
2008: 21; Foley, 2009: 984; Gregory, 2010: 85). For example, according to 
Moran and Phythian, “[t]he events of 9/11 were to transform the fortunes of the 
security and intelligence agencies in the United Kingdom. Having struggled 
throughout the post-Cold War 1990s to identify a legitimating threat (…), the 
‘war on terror’ bestowed on these agencies a centrality that they had never 
previously enjoyed” (Moran & Phythian, 2008: 2). With regard to the London 
bombings of 7/7, Klausen asserted similarly the “perception that the terrorism 
had become “home-grown” provided a powerful motive for changing the way 
counter-terrorism enforcement was conducted” (Cf. Klausen, 2009: 412). This 
section will focus on the surveillance powers that were enhanced and increased 
in the aftermath of the two terrorist plots, with the purpose of ascertaining 
whether and how the new counter-terrorism policy has changed the powers of 
security agencies in the United Kingdom and strengthened its operational 
constraints.  
8.5.1 Legal response to terrorism: strengthening operational 
constraints  
As mentioned, one of the United Kingdom’s key responses to 9/11 and 7/7 was 
increasing the powers of its security agencies in gathering the intelligence and 
surveillance of suspected and non-democratic groups. Before going into details, 
it is important to mention, the surveillance of suspected and non-democratic 
groups by security services was not a new venture for the United Kingdom. 
According to Gregory, the surveillance of such groups has always been a 
priority strategy of the British state authorities in their fight against its enemies 
(Cf. Gregory, 2010: 85). For example, at the end of the 19th century policing was 
215 
 
used to monitor anarchists and Irish republican groups. In 1909, the 
government set up the security organisation MI5 (Military Intelligence, Section 
5), primarily responsible for gathering intelligence surrounding domestic threats 
to the state’s national security. For example, during the 1920s and 1930s the 
MI5 was actively involved in surveillance of ‘bolsheviks’, ‘communists’ and 
‘fascist’ groups, and political parties within the country (Cf. Gregory, 2010: 85; 
Eatwell, 2010: 216). During the Cold War, MI5 was actively engaged in the 
surveillance of communists and Irish separatists such as IRA, national terrorist 
groups, animal-rights organisations, anti-capitalist groups, anarchists groups, 
and right-wing extremist groups (Cf. Gregory, 2010: 85). For example, as some 
analysts have argued, the partial success against republican and loyalist 
paramilitaries during the conflict in Northern Ireland was due to  high-level 
British military intelligence or police informants penetrating these groups and 
actively helped in the disruption of terrorist activities as well as undermining 
internal confidence within the paramilitary groups during the 1980s (Cf. Moran, 
2008: 21). Other security intelligence agencies in the country include the MI6 
(Military Intelligence, Section 6) and GCHQ (Government Communications 
Headquarters) which are both responsible for gathering intelligence and 
surveillance of threats coming from abroad (Cf. Gill, 2003: 267).  
As previously mentioned within chapter 6, in comparison with the other 
countries studied, the UK has by far the most comprehensive and elaborated 
legal basis regulating the activities of its security services. The available legal 
sources cover a wide range of legal acts.The Security Service Act adopted in 
1989 and amended in 1994 and 1996 set out the rules and responsibilities of 
the domestic security services and put their functions on a statutory footing. 
Additionally, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 gave security 
services additional powers for gathering intelligence surrounding activities 
related to terrorism. Furthermore, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 gave 
the Home Secretary powers to impose ‘control orders’ upon suspected 
extremist and terrorist groups and individuals whether British or foreign. Finally, 
the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 gave the Security Service enhanced powers to 
gather intelligence and share information on suspected groups with other 
security agencies in the country (Cf. Moran, 2008: 20; Walker, 2008: 58-59; 
Mullender, 2009: 339-340). 
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However, as noted by Innes and others, after the bombings of 7/7 there was 
concern across the police and security sector “whether established 
methodologies for generating intelligence on possible terrorist organisations, of 
the type used in Ireland for example, are suitable to deal with the new risks 
posed by a morphing, fluid, and decentered al-Qaeda” (Innes, 2006: 224; also 
cf. Klausen, 2009: 405). According to Innes, it was much easier for security 
services to organise and carry out surveillance and intelligence gathering about 
groups such as IRA, which were based upon “fairly traditional hierarchical 
organisational structures”. Consequently, as Innes continued, “if a human 
intelligence source could penetrate the organisation at a particular level, or an 
existing member be (sic) persuaded to inform on colleagues, then intelligence 
on a range of other members and their activities could be collected fairly readily” 
(Innes, 2006: 232). By contrast to IRA, the social organisation of the Islamic 
terrorist groups responsible for the London bombings was based “upon largely 
autonomous, disparate cells and groups that are not connected by any formal 
command and control structures” (Innes, 2006: 232). Therefore a successful 
penetration of such groups would not yield considerable intelligence and thus 
required the police and security services to change their surveillance methods.  
These considerations resulted in new surveillance strategy introduced by the 
Home Office in 2006 called CONTEST, an abbreviation from the term ‘counter-
terrorism strategy’ (Cf. Home Office, 2006). CONTEST is not law but rather a 
government strategy statement surrounding international terrorism. However, 
since its inception in 2006, this strategy has become an official guide and 
manual for all institutions involved in the fight against international terrorism. 
The strategy consist of ‘Four Ps’ which are always capitalized in official 
documents: PREVENT, PURSUE, PROTECT, and PREPARE (Cf. Home 
Office, 2006: 9; also cf. Walker, 2008: 54; Klausen, 2009: 406; Spalek & 
Lambert, 2010: 103). The area of state surveillance and intelligence gathering 
falls within the PURSUE strategy and is said to be “vital to defeating terrorism” 
(Cf. Home Office, 2006: 16; Walker, 2008: 54). As set out in the document:  
“[a]ll disruption operations depend upon the collection and exploitation of information and 
intelligence that helps identify terrorist networks, including their membership, intentions, 
and means of operation. The Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), 
and Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) – known collectively as the 
security and intelligence agencies – are therefore critical to the work of PURSUE, as the 
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work of the police, both special branches and neighbourhood policing alike, for the UK-
based terrorist networks” (Home Office, 2006: 16).  
Unlike previous surveillance policies, the new strategy was different in several 
respects. According to Innes, the new policy replaced the traditional intelligence 
with “community intelligence” (Cf. Innes, 2006: 230). In essence, the new policy 
paradigm for state surveillance encouraged security agencies to seek greater 
cooperation and engagement with Muslim communities residing within the 
country rather than working undercover. Therefore the intelligence was acquired 
from open sources rather than acquired “from covert human sources and is 
often provided by ordinary members of the public, rather than those who have 
some connection to criminal activity” (Innes, 2006: 230). As underlined by many 
critics and supporters of this new strategy, the incentive was “to facilitate a 
better understanding of the makeup of different communities – in terms of the 
social networks to which individuals and groups belong and the intra-community 
tensions that may exist between them” (Innes, 2006: 230-231). In hindsight, 
however, it has been acknowledged by several scholars that through the new 
policy security agencies have acquired additional powers in conducting 
surveillance of many Muslim organisations resulting in, as Pantazis and 
Pemberton have argued, “now Muslims have replaced the Irish as the main 
focus of the government’s security agenda whilst also recognising that some 
groups have been specifically targeted for state surveillance” (Cf. Pantazis & 
Pemberton, 2009: 646).   
To sum up, the efforts of the British government to counter the threat of radical 
Islamism and terrorism in the country have spurred their willingness to 
strengthen their operational constraints. This section has emphasised that one 
of the benchmarks of such a heightened disposition towards defensiveness was 
clearly visible in the expansion of their state surveillance laws. The terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 and particularly 7/7 have forced the government to reconsider 
how the original surveillance of suspected Muslim groups was conducted within 
the country. Instead of covert intelligence gathering and infiltration of groups by 
secret agents, the current trend is to acquire information by stronger 
engagement with targeted groups.           
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8.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provided a conclusive argument to explain why the United 
Kingdom has higher defensiveness than theoretically expected, given that the 
country had no previous experience with the collapse of its democratic 
institutions. This was carried out by focusing on the historical context in which 
the defensive legislation was shaped and mobilised within the United Kingdom, 
particularly the incidents of political conflict throughout its history since the 
1930s. Following the perspective proposed by Bleich and others, this chapter 
emphasised despite the lack of experience with the collapse of democratic 
institutions in the past and consequently the low disposition towards democratic 
defensiveness, the United Kingdom has a rich history of political conflicts which 
ultimately called for state legal intervention aimed at securing the state and its 
constitutional order (Cf. Mullender, 2009: 349). Each time the state of Britain 
faced a threat to its democratic order, it responded by crafting and mobilising 
new laws which gradually moved it towards a higher level of democratic 
defensiveness. In other words, the low disposition of the UK toward democratic 
defensiveness, as historical expectations would dictate, was simply ‘overridden’ 
by governmental efforts to effectively manage their key challenges faced 
throughout its history.  
In reaching this conclusion, we find support for the “piecemeal approach” 
toward democratic defensiveness that was intimated earlier by Mullender (Cf. 
Mullender, 2009: 313). According to Mullender, the British state’s approach 
towards defensiveness was piecemeal in a sense that “the government and 
associated agencies have sought to gather knowledge of and gain experience 
concerning the relevant threat before acting intended to counter it” (Mullender, 
2009: 349). The examples examined in this chapter include the rise of pro-
fascist movements during the 1930s, the sectarian conflict in Northern Ireland, 
the miners’ strike in the mid-1980s, and the threat of Islamic terrorism and 
radicalism in the new century. As argued within this chapter, each of these 
selected events represented a grave challenge to the constitutional order and 
security of the British state. The discussion made clear whenever Britain’s 
government and law-makers felt that their constitutional fundamentals were 
jeopardised, they responded with the enactment of new laws designed to 
counter that particular threat. In doing so the state of Britain has gradually 
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advanced across key indicators of democratic defensiveness. In case of fascist 
movements in the 1930s, the government responded with the enactment of 
fairly constraining public order legislation which significantly affected the 
country’s ‘progress’ on the group ban constraint and constraints on the freedom 
of assembly. As a result of the sectarian conflict in the Northern Ireland, the 
state responded by enforcing a new superior kind of antiterrorism legislation 
which propelled the right to ban terrorist and other extremist groups. The 
miners’ strikes elicited the government to respond with new public order 
legislation including new offences constraining the freedom of assembly and the 
right of public demonstration. Lastly, this chapter has clearly demonstrated the 
events perpetrated by Islamic terrorist groups significantly advanced the state’s 
defensiveness within the operational constraints category concerning the state 
surveillance of suspect Muslim groups.   
To conclude, this chapter has positively demonstrated that an encompassing 
account of the formal-legal defensiveness found today should consider a 
country’s long-term disposition towards and against the use of measures 
constraining non-democratic actors in conjunction with the specific problems it 
faced over time. The UK could have responded to the crises it experienced with 
more severe measures than it did. At the same time, to generate a deeper 
understanding of the adoption of the range of available formal-legal 
mechanisms that led to medium defensiveness within the categories legal ban, 
freedom constraints and operational constraints asked for a more in-depth 
analysis of legislative change. This, in turn, suggests that the cross-national 
assessment of the degrees of democratic defensiveness in eight European 
democracies should be the foundation of future work that systematically links 
cross-national patterns of defensiveness we find today with over-time analysis.  
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CHAPTER 9:  
CONCLUSION 
9.1 Introduction 
This dissertation has set out to explore how liberal democracies defend 
themselves against those political parties and groups that seek to undermine or 
destroy them from within through utilising the institutions and freedoms the 
democratic state has granted them. Despite previous considerable efforts to 
study this complex question, there are significant gaps in the literature that need 
more systematic attention. To reduce these gaps, this study has focused on the 
formal-legal side of ‘defensive democracy’, a concept which “encompasses all 
activities, be these formal provisions or political strategies, which are explicitly 
and directly aimed at protecting the democratic system from the threat of its 
internal opponents” (Capoccia, 2001: 2; 2005: 47-48). The focus on this 
particular aspect of defensive democracy was justified for the reason of the 
relative importance of formal-legal measures in defending democracy from its 
internal enemies as the most effective defensive strategy and the fact that they 
have remained relatively understudied within political science literature, 
particularly so from a comparative perspective. This study has endeavored to 
find answers to the set of three particular questions: firstly, what formal-legal 
measures are at the disposal of democratic states to safeguard their democratic 
institutions and freedoms; secondly, what are the differences and similarities 
between democracies in terms of the degree of their formal-legal democratic 
defensiveness; and, thirdly, what broader factors can further our understanding 
of the existing variations in formal-legal democratic defensiveness between 
contemporary democracies. This concluding chapter will synthesise the 
analytical and empirical contribution of this study thus far to answer these three 
questions and, on that basis, conclude by outlining avenues for further 
research.  
9.1 Summary of the main findings and original contribution 
This dissertation has provided an important analytical and empirical contribution 
to literature through the systematic and encompassing assessment of the cross-
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national variations in the degree of formal-legal defensiveness between eight 
European democracies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. This was a fruitful endeavour 
since cross-national analyses of state variations in democratic defensiveness 
have been rare in the past, while none of them focused on such a broad range 
of legal measures which are important for defending democracy from its internal 
threats. This study firstly conducted a critical review of the original concept of 
militant democracy, which was until recently the main paradigmatic concept for 
the study of cross-national variations in democratic defensiveness. While this 
research provided many good foundations, it was argued this concept is 
insufficient to conceptualise the differences in formal-legal defensiveness 
between democracies as it does not encompass the broader range of formal-
legal measures that contemporary democracies use in their fight against non-
democratic parties and groups. It was argued an important limitation of the 
concept of militant democracy is that it focuses too narrowly on the repressive 
instruments only, such as legal ban, whereas many contemporary democracies 
use many non-repressive instruments as well, which although not intended to 
be defensive, help defend democracies de facto.  
Drawing on these drawbacks of the concept of militant democracy, in the next 
step I sought to define and organise the range of formal-legal measures 
adopted by the democracies included in this analysis. I did so by taking the 
organisation-centred perspective on formal-legal measures. The principal 
advantage of using this perspective on forma-legal measures is it allowed me to 
broaden the focus of relevant formal-legal measures beyond those explicitly 
repressive measures of militant democracy toward those legal measures and 
provisions which help defend democracy de facto by constraining the non-
democratic parties and groups in their presence and operation in a democratic 
state. In line with these considerations, formal-legal democratic defensiveness 
was defined as a concept which encompassed not only explicitly repressive 
instruments of militant democracy but also those legal measures and provisions 
that constrain the presence of non-democratic parties and groups de facto. In 
this thesis the following legal mechanisms were defined as relevant de facto 
constraints: electoral threshold, ballot access rules (signature collection 
requirement and/or deposit payment), and the provisions for the withdrawal of 
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direct state funding from non-democratic parties. These mechanisms help 
defend democracy from non-democratic parties and groups de facto by making 
their access to political institutions more costly and their access to direct state 
funding more demanding.  
After defining the range of relevant legal constraints, in the next step I 
developed an analytical framework to study the cross-national variations in 
democratic defensiveness between democracies. Using the organisation-
centred perspective on formal-legal measures as an underlying approach, the 
entire range of formal-legal measures as applicable for constraining the non-
democratic actors (that is militant democracy provisions and de facto 
constraints) were divided into three analytical categories, depending on the 
severity of constraints they impose on the presence and operation of non-
democratic parties and groups in a democracy. Moving from the most to the 
least constraining categories, I distinguished legal ban, freedom constraints, 
and operational constraints. The principal advantage of this categorisation is it 
allowed a more plausible reconstruction of cross-national variations in formal-
legal democratic defensiveness between the democracies studied. The relative 
formal-legal defensiveness of a democracy was captured in a decreasing order 
from the highly constraining category of legal ban to the least constraining 
category of operational constraints. Additionally, it highlighted the variations 
across a broader range of formal-legal measures, not just only focusing on legal 
ban as frequently done in previous literature.  
The democratic defensiveness of a democracy was assessed through noting 
the presence or absence of the specified legal mechanisms, not the frequency 
of their usage. The advantage of this approach is it allowed the analysis to 
maintain the consistency in assessing the differences between democracies 
while using various legal sources from the eight countries. The formal-legal 
defensiveness of a democracy was captured using an index constructed on the 
basis of a standardised score from 0 to 1 and divided into three categories of 
high defensiveness (1-0.7), medium defensiveness (0.6-0.4), and low 
defensiveness (0.3-0) respectively.  
Drawing on the analytical framework and underlying coding methodology, this 
dissertation provided an empirical analysis of the differences and similarities 
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between the eight democracies in the degree of their formal-legal 
defensiveness. The eight countries were selected on the basis of two key 
predisposing factors for shaping formal-legal defensiveness being the varied 
historically grown state traditions reflected in the division of democratic states in 
substantive and procedural democracies and differing historical experiences of 
democratic instability in the past, as detailed in chapter 7. The key empirical 
findings are chapter specific and have been summarised within the three 
empirical chapters (chapters 4, 5, and 6). Overall, the empirical evidence 
ascertained the eight democracies studied in this analysis correspond to two 
prevailing profiles of formal-legal democratic defensiveness. Germany, Austria, 
France, and Belgium are highly defensive democracies adopting all or the 
majority of defensive constraints across three defensive categories (that is legal 
ban, freedom constraints, and operational constraints), while the remaining the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are medium 
defensive democracies having fewer defensive constraints at their disposal 
across three categories. Additionally, it was found there are no democracies 
characterised by low defensiveness, outlining the general tendency among the 
democracies studied to adopt fairly constraining legal frameworks against their 
non-democratic groups and political parties.  
On the basis of the existing differences in democratic defensiveness between 
eight democracies found within the empirical chapters, the penultimate chapter 
analysed the broader factors to expand our understanding of why democracies 
are different in terms of democratic defensiveness. Drawing on a historical 
institutionalism as a theoretical perspective, this study sought to ascertain the 
validity of two particular factors in their relation to democratic defensiveness: 
firstly, the type of democracy being substantive or procedural; and, secondly, 
the varied historical experiences of an internally triggered or supported 
breakdown of democratic system in the past. Having examined these two 
factors in detail, it was found that the historical experience of an internally 
triggered or supported breakdown of democratic system in the past is more 
useful to explain why democracies are different in terms of democratic 
defensiveness, while the type of democracy was found to be less useful. At the 
same time, it was found that the historical experience cannot fully account for all 
kinds of variations, particularly why the UK, Sweden, and Denmark deviated 
224 
 
from their historically grounded expectation. In order to ascertain why, the last 
chapter focused on the critical junctions in the UK’s history since 1930s that 
shaped its defensive regime over time. The focus on the events shaping the 
defensive regime over time in conjunction with the detailed analysis of long-term 
disposition toward democratic defensiveness was fruitful as it provided a clearer 
picture of the causal factors driving the UK’s democratic defensiveness.    
9.2 Theoretical and empirical implications 
What are the broader theoretical and empirical implications of this study for our 
understanding of defensive democracy, particularly the variations between 
democracies in the degree of formal-legal democratic defensiveness?   
The theoretical findings of this study have convincingly demonstrated that the 
defensiveness of a democracy is not characterised by designated legislation of 
militant democracy alone, but also encompasses legal mechanisms that assist 
in defending democracies de facto by constraining non-democratic parties and 
groups in their presence and operation in the political system. This finding has 
an important implication for future studies of defensive democracy, as it implies 
militant democracy as a paradigmatic concept to study the range of formal-legal 
measures and the state variations in their usage has a limited utility as a 
theoretical and empirical framework in the study of democratic defensiveness 
and should be revisited (Cf. Bourne, 2011: 3). As previously noted, the concept 
of militant democracy was introduced during the 1930s and thus, as argued by 
Thiel and several others scholars, it is naturally outdated and less suitable to 
circumscribe the broader spectrum of legal mechanisms used by contemporary 
democracies in their fight against political extremism (Cf. Thiel, 2009: 401; also 
Buis, 2009: 77; Pedahzur, 2004: 109; Mudde, 2004: 197). With regard to these 
considerations, the analytical framework developed in this thesis provides a 
strong starting point in the study of democratic defensiveness.  
There is further need to construct a broader comprehensive framework for the 
study of defensive democracies. This dissertation has demonstrated that all 
democracies are either high defensive or medium defensive, while none fall in 
the range of low defensiveness. This finding demonstrates that democratic 
defensiveness has become a wide-spread phenomenon among contemporary 
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democracies. Even those democracies which were commonly perceived as less 
predisposed toward strong defensiveness due to the explicit procedural nature 
of their democratic systems and a lack of historical experiences with a 
breakdown of their democratic system in the past, such as Sweden or the 
United Kingdom in this study, they in fact demonstrate stronger dispositions to 
democratic defensiveness than anticipated earlier. While this finding confirms 
the assumption made by scholars earlier, including Sajo’s contention that “the 
state’s most natural characteristic is self-defense” or that “democracy is about 
constitutional risk-aversion” (Sajo, 2004: 213), it also introduces the question 
what are the broader factors that elicit defensive mechanisms and institutions 
within contemporary democratic states, despite the procedural nature of most 
democracies in Europe or the lack of historical legacy of democratic instability in 
the past. The research in this dissertation suggests that an understanding of the 
causal mechanisms driving democratic defensiveness would require an 
integration of democracies’ long-term dispositions towards democratic 
defensiveness and events that shaped their defensive regimes over time. 
However, further research is required to elaborate further this causal 
relationship (Cf. Downs, 2012: 56-57).  
This brings me to the question why we should care about democratic 
defensiveness today. The relevance of democratic defensiveness has never 
been so salient than today. After 70 years since the end of the WWII, many 
democracies in Europe are confronted by new challenges and threats to their 
democratic order and values. Almost everywhere in Europe we see once again 
the rise in popularity of political parties and groups propagating anti-immigrant, 
EU-sceptic, and other anti-democratic values and ideals. Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, Hungary, and the Netherlands, all have non-democratic 
political parties making various inroads into their parliaments and governments 
in recent years. Even in long-lived democracies such as the United Kingdom 
and Sweden we see the rise of populist anti-democratic sentiments gaining 
popularity among average voters. In face of these alarming occurrences, more 
and more academic circles are asking if democracies within Europe are 
experiencing another crisis similar to the crisis 70 years ago when several 
democracies saw their democratic regime break down under the pressure of 
Nazi and fascist parties and groups (Cf. Ercan & Gagnon, 2014: 1; Merkel, 
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2013: 4; Papadopoulos, 2008: 5). Of course, the present growth in support for 
various political parties with strong anti-democratic values and ideals has been 
fed by the economic crisis Europe is currently suffering. Mass unemployment 
and decreasing living standards have created ideal conditions for the rise of 
such parties. These economic problems seem to be aggravated by increased 
‘democratic deficit’ of democratic institutions in Europe. According to 
Papadopoulos, the lack of accountability has become one of the most pervasive 
problems of contemporary democracies (Cf. Magnette & Papadopoulos, 2008: 
13-16). The root of this problem appears to lie in the relative remoteness of 
democratic institutions from average citizens, the lack of visibility in political 
decision-making, the increased role of experts rather than elected 
representatives, to name just few. This problem is further aggravated by an 
increased complexity of decision making due to the grown interdependencies 
between supranational, international, and national institutions in contemporary 
democracies (Cf. Papadopoulos, 2008: 10ff). In this situation it is consequential 
that citizens become increasingly alienated from democratic institutions, leading 
in turn to the rise of anti-democratic sentiments, and finally turning them to 
various populist and extremist parties and groups which seem to offer simpler 
solutions. In such situations it is very easy for extremist political parties to 
advance from the fringe into the mainstream through capitalising on the inability 
of mainstream parties and democratic institutions to cope with current economic 
and social problems. As noted by Papadopoulos, “political systems suffering 
from an atrophy of mechanisms of democratic accountability are more subject 
to attacks on their legitimacy by anti-establishment political entrepreneurs” 
(Papadopolous, 2008: 4).  
 
The discussion of the changes in the disposition toward democratic 
defensiveness over-time has convincingly demonstrated that major crises and 
political upheavals can powerfully dispose political actors toward developing 
new laws. Building on this discussion, it can be anticipated that in face of the 
current crises many European democracies will initiate new laws or reactivate 
old laws as a precaution to preserve democratic institutions and freedoms from 
all those who seek to use the current problems to increase their presence in the 
political system. Thereby it is likely that appeals to the collective memory of the 
previous struggles with non-democratic actors or the historical experience of a 
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breakdown of their democratic regime in the past will be used instrumentally to 
mobilise voters eliciting new laws. In sum, understanding the conditions and the 
modes by which defensive legislation develops constitutes an important domain 
for future research.  
9.3 Conclusion: avenues for further research 
Overall, this study has significantly contributed to reducing the gaps in literature 
through providing a systematic and comprehensive assessment of state 
variations in democratic defensiveness. However, as with any study, there are 
several directions in which this study can be fruitfully expanded by future works. 
This section will briefly outline some avenues for further research. 
Firstly, this dissertation only considered the presence and absence of legal 
mechanisms. Observing the availability of legal measures was very useful in the 
context of this study because it ensured that the same categories were applied 
to very diverse legal texts across eight democracies and in doing so led to a 
more reliable assessment of cross-national variations in formal-legal democratic 
defensiveness between them. Future works can build on this and develop 
further more refined categorisations to assess variations in measures that are 
present in countries. For example, it may be appropriate to observe not just if 
there are legal ban laws, but also on what legal grounds and how procedurally 
the legal ban is invoked. A detailed account such as this could provide 
additional insights into the relative severity of individual legal mechanisms 
between democracies and on this basis provide more refined classifications of 
defensive democracies.  
For example, this dissertation has ascertained some democracies have 
numerous comprehensive grounds for enactment of legal ban while other 
democracies are less informed. To illustrate this, two highly defensive 
democracies Austria and France, can be referred to. While they are similar in 
democratic defensiveness, they are distinctly different due to the number of 
legal grounds that each requires for the enactment of a party ban. In France the 
legal grounds are narrowly grounded in the substantive features such as the 
republican form of the government and state territory thereby without specifying 
what they mean. By constrast, in Austria the legal grounds are more ‘targeted’ 
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specifying the explicit reasons for its enactment, such as the association with 
the NSDAP, or violation of the principles of the United Nations Organisation, or 
the incitement to violence, as well as specifying which political parties are likely 
to be banned, including those which act in the spirit and form of the NSDAP 
party. On the basis of these two examples, it would seem the legal ban in 
Austria is more severe and thus Austria is more defensive than France. There 
are strong reasons for believing this is the case. The more legal grounds 
specified within legislation, the easier it is for the government to enact a legal 
ban, as it will be likely that one of the conditions will be met by a targeted 
organisation. In addition to legal bans, further research could also consider 
other legal mechanisms in the framework provided and how easily procedurally 
they can be enacted, to ascertain further variations in democratic 
defensiveness.   
This notion has already been considered by some scholars, particularly so 
those dealing with the regulation of legal bans upon political parties (Cf. 
Rosenblum, 2007; Capoccia, 2007; Issacharoff, 2007; Navot, 2008). Capoccia, 
for example, when analysing legal bans tried to distinguish  between two legal 
paradigms of legal ban, either ‘neutral’ or ‘targeted’ (drawing on Niesen, 2002), 
stating  “the nature of legal paradigm that is used to ban a party matters in 
explaining variations across different kinds of bans” (Capoccia, 2007: 6). 
According to Capoccia, the key difference between these two paradigms lies “in 
how clearly the extremists are defined in the law” (Capoccia, 2007: 3). Drawing 
on this distinction, he defined the neutral paradigm whereby the legal grounds 
for enactment of party ban are broadly defined or tied to certain substantive 
principles in the constitution, such as the form of government or certain 
democratic values. By contrast, a targeted paradigm exists when the law is 
more specific listing the types of political parties which can be banned on the 
basis of certain characteristics defined in law (Cf. Capoccia, 2007: 7). Due to 
this, he stated party bans are more difficult and costly under neutral paradigm 
while they are easier to enact under the targeted paradigm (Cf. Capoccia, 2007: 
7). This example of Capoccia’s work is a good illustration as how my framework 
can be further refined. 
Another fruitful endeavour where future studies can build upon this study is to 
analyse whether and how the individual legal mechanisms are used in practice. 
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As it was frequently noted in the literature, some democracies despite having 
clear legal provisions to constrain the activity of non-democratic actors do not 
use them in practice due to some normative considerations or because of fear 
that the application of such provision can exacerbate the public peace or lead to 
the radicalisation of members of an organisation targeted by a legal sanction 
(Cf. Virchow, 2004; Minkenberg, 2006; Erk, 2005). In Germany, for example, 
there was fear among some mainstream political parties that the initiated ban 
against the NPD in 2003 will result in “ghetto-formation” and “hardening of 
ideology” among members of the party (Cf. Minkenberg, 2006: 40; 
Schellenberg, 2009: 539). On the other hand, it was noted that Austria has 
never used the provision in Article 1 of its Prohibition Act of 1947, which allows 
it to ban political parties. Because of this, some scholars have even suggested 
that the presence of such law does not represent a shift of Austrian democracy 
toward militant democracy (Cf. Auprich, 2009: 45). These two examples can 
illustrate how different democracies can be in terms of their orientations toward 
the application of their legal provisions. In light of these considerations, it can be 
useful to investigate whether and how democracies use individual legal 
measures. For example, the following questions would be particularly important 
to address: how frequently democracies use particular mechanisms; what are 
the particular targets of these mechanisms (that is right-wing extremist or left-
wing extremist parties and/or groups); and why democracies often do not use 
certain legal measures despite having them at their disposal within their legal 
arsenals.  
An important step in this direction was made by Bourne (Cf. Bourne, 2011; 
2012; also see Bourne & Casal, 2014). In her study of the legal proscription of 
political parties, Bourne made a distinction between democracies which ban 
political parties for anti-system behaviour or anti-system ideology and ideas, 
and those that ban them only for anti-system behaviour, while on the other 
hand, also distinguishing between democracies which use legal proscription 
actively and those which abstain from using legal ban at all or use it rather 
passively (Cf. Bourne, 2011; Bourbe & Casal, 2014). On this basis, she 
developed a more refined classification of legal ban regimes among 
democracies in Europe. This example of Bourne’s study can be a good 
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illustration as how the analytical framework developed in this study can be 
further elaborated.  
The third issue where future research can build upon my research is to consider 
other case-studies covered within my analysis. This study carefully analysed the 
United Kingdom providing an in-depth analysis of the events that shaped its 
defensive regime over time complementing so the detailed analysis of the long-
term development of its dispositions toward democratic defensiveness. This 
analysis was useful to learn why the UK has higher defensiveness than 
theoretically expected. Another interesting case-study to explain a deviation 
from theoretical expectations would be Denmark. As previously ascertained, 
Denmark was found to range medium defensive across all three categories 
while the historical experience of this country (in this case, the experience with 
an externally triggered but internally supported breakdown of its democratic 
regime in the past) should have caused a higher level of democratic 
defensiveness today. Therefore, it is important to understand why Denmark has 
a lower degree of democratic defensiveness than theoretically expected. Similar 
to the analysis of the UK, an analysis of the contextual evolution of the 
defensive laws in Denmark would greatly assist in achieving this. The profile of 
medium defensiveness as in place today in Denmark can be surprising given 
the more recent developments in this country, such as the resurgence of right-
wing extremism and racist-related violence since the 1970s (Cf. Björgo, 1993: 
32-34; Rydgren, 2004; 474; Meret, 2009: 82-83). As stated by Rydgren, in the 
early 1970s Denmark became the “the home of the strongest right-wing populist 
party on the continent” (Rydgren 2004: 475). The Progress Party founded in 
1972 and known for its anti-immigration rhetoric, succeeded to made several 
inroads into the Danish politics causing fear among the political elites and the 
public. Even when the party withered away during the 1990s, its place was 
taken by another and more extreme right-wing extremist Danish People’s Party 
built in 1995 and led by Pia Kjærsgaard (Cf. Rydgren 2005: 480). Like its 
predecessor, this new party is famous for its ethno-pluralist stance, xenophobic 
nationalism and its anti-political establishment strategy (Cf. Rydgren, 2004: 
481). So, why Denmark is medium defensive despite their historical experience 
of democratic instability in the past and their current contemporary challenges? 
Further research is needed to ascertain the answer. 
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Another question that could be explored in future research is whether and how 
‘spatial-interdependence’, that is the degree to which countries are dependent 
on each other (Cf. Franzese & Hays, 2007: 1), might have spurred the 
development of democratic defensiveness across countries over time. This 
perspective could determine how countries emulated defensive strategies after 
having observed them in other countries. There are studies which have 
positively demonstrated that sometimes laws adopted in one country against 
non-democratic groups are emulated by other countries, either due to similar 
democratic challenges they are facing, or because they are held effective (Cf. 
Fox & Nolte, 1995: 38). This can be briefly illustrated by recalling the example of 
the German model of militant democracy which served as a model of defensive 
democracy to be emulated by Japan, Chile, and many new democracies in 
Eastern Europe (Cf. Boventer, 1985: 182ff; for democracies in Eastern Europe 
see Brunner, 2002: 17ff; for Japan see Sakaguchi 2009: 219-220; for Chile see 
Lizana, 2009: 60).  Within this context, it would also be interesting to investigate 
if and how international norms and institutions influence the adoption and 
enforcement of defensive laws across democratic countries. To give an 
example, the International Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, ICERD, adopted by the UN in 1965, urged its signatory member-
states to adopt stricter regulations against political parties and groups promoting 
and inciting racial discrimination, including the legal ban of such organisations 
(see Article 4) (Cf. Fennema, 2000: 128; Bleich & Lambert, 2013: 124). As 
frequently mentioned within empirical chapters, several countries have followed 
this recommendation either drafting new laws or enforcing the existing antiracist 
legislation. However, while this perspective might be an interesting avenue for 
future research, requiring a longitudinal analysis of the interdependencies 
between the processes leading to the adoption of defensive mechanisms, 
Bleich and Lambert have recently found that international treaties and 
institutions have little significance in terms of increasing disposition among 
democratic states to adopt stronger defensiveness. In other words, while 
‘spatial inter-dependence’ may be influential in some respect it is not a powerful 
alternative to the argument developed in this thesis.    
Finally, it would also be beneficial if further research could analyse a larger 
number of democracies. This study investigated only eight countries which 
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allowed for a more detailed account of the legal situations in each democracy 
and a better account of the cross-national variations between selected 
democracies across the range of legal constraints. It also allowed the analysis 
to single out the ‘outliers’ among the democracies including Denmark, the UK 
and Sweden which did not meet their theoretical expectations regarding the 
historical breakdown of their democracy and then focusing in greater detail on 
the sources of the unexplained variances by providing an in-depth case study of 
the UK. Overall, while focusing on a small number of countries was fruitful in the 
context of this study, a focus on a larger number of democracies would probably 
give more opportunities for making generalisations. In addition, it could probably 
allow us to find democracies with low defensiveness. For example, it could be 
useful to look at democracies outside Europe such as the United States and 
Australia. Both countries have no historical experiences with the breakdown of 
their democratic regimes in the past and have been stable throughout. In 
addition, these two countries were far from the main ideological influences that 
troubled Europe during the 20th century. Therefore, in line with the histrorical 
institutionalist perspective used in this study, it can be anticipated that these two 
democracies have developed lower levels of democratic defensiveness than 
their counterparts in Europe. For example, some scholars have observed that in 
the United States there are no substantial restrictions upon the freedom of 
association and freedom of expression which are both protected by the First 
Amendment (Cf. Backes, 2006: 276; Michael & Minkenberg, 2007: 1110). It 
could be useful to examine this assumption by using the analytical framework 
developed in this thesis to compare against the full range of legal mechanisms 
to see if this observation holds. 
Ultimately, I hope this research has provided a strong starting point for future 
possibilities in the study of the formal-legal defensiveness of democratic states. 
Similarly, it is hoped that this study has made its unique contribution towards 
the ever-growing discourse of the phenomenon of defensive democracy.   
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APPENDIX 
 
1. Legal documents and case-laws consulted for each country 
 
Austria 
 Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz (B-VG) (Federal Constitutional Law), 
available at: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_1930_1/ERV 
_1930_1.html 
 Bundesgesetz vom 5. April 1960, mit dem bestimmte Abzeichen 
verboten werden (Abzeichengesetz 1960), available at: 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen
&Gesetzesnummer=10005262 
 Vereinsgesetz (VerG) (Law on Associations), available at: 
https://www.jusline.at/Vereinsgesetz_(VerG).html  
 Versammlungsgesetz 1953 (VersG), StF: BGBl. Nr. 98/1953 (WV) (Law 
on Assemblies), available at: http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung. 
wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10000249&ShowPrint
Preview=True  
 Strafgesetzbuch (Penal Code), available at: http://www.jusline.at/ 
Strafgesetzbuch(StGB).html 
 Bundesabgabenordnung (BAO), available at: http://www.jusline.at/ 
Bundesabgabenordnung(BAO).html  
 Federal Act on the Financing of Political Parties (Bundesgesetz über die 
Finanzierung politischer Parteien, PartG), available at: 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Erv&Dokumentnummer
=ERV_1975_404 
 Verbotsgesetz 1947 Stf: Stgbl. Nr. 13/1945, available at: 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen
&Gesetzesnummer=10000207 
 Staatsvertrag betreffend die Wiederherstellung eines unabhängigen und 
demokratischen Österreich,  Bundesgesetzblatt für die Republik 
Österreich, Vienna: 30. Juli 1955, available at: 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Doku
mentnummer =NOR30002357 
 Bundesgesetz vom 27. Juni 1979 über das Dienstrecht der Beamten 
(Beamten-Dienstrechtsgesetz 1979 - BDG 1979), available at: 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Geltende Fassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen 
&Gesetzesnummer=10008470 
 Bundesverfassungsgesetz vom 6. Februar 1947 über die Behandlung 
der Nationalsozialisten (Nationalsozialistengesetz), available at: 
http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung/Bundesnormen/10000215/Nati
onalsozialistengesetz%2c%20Fassung%20vom%2019.02.2014.pdf 
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 Bundesgesetz über die Wahl des Nationalrates (Nationalrats-
Wahlordnung 1992 - NRWO) (Act regulating the elections to the National 
Council (Parliament), available at: http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument. 
wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Dokument nummer=NOR11001205 
 Bundesgesetz vom 27. Juni 1979 über das Dienstrecht der Beamten 
(Beamten-Dienstrechtsgesetz 1979 - BDG 1979) (Law on Civil Servants),  
available at: http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage= 
Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10008470 
 Bundesgesetz über die Wahl des Nationalrates1992 (Nationalrats 
Wahlordnung, NRWO), available at: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Geltende 
Fassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10001199 
 Bundesgesetz über die Organisation der Sicherheitsverwaltung und die 
Ausübung der Sicherheitspolizei (Sicherheitspolizeigesetz - SPG) StF: 
BGBl. Nr. 566/1991 (NR: GP XVIII RV 148 AB 240 S. 41. BR: 4119 AB 
4122 S. 545.), available at: https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung. 
wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10005792  
 
Belgium 
 The Belgian Constitution, available at: http://www.fed-parl.be 
 Loi interdisant les milices privées, 29 Juillet 1934. Coordination officieuse 
en langue allemande, Belgisch Staatsblad, 30.05.2012, Ed. 3, Moniteur 
Belge, 30995, available at : http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/ 
cgi_loi/arch_a1.pl?=&sql=(text+contains+(''))&rech=1&language=fr&tri=d
d+AS+RANK&numero=1&table_name=loi&F=&cn=1934072930&caller=
archive&fromtab=loi&la=F&ver_arch=005  
 Loi sur les associations sans but lucratif, les associations internationales 
sans but lucratif et les fondations(2 mai 2002, MB : 11 décembre 
2002),available at : http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl? 
language=fr&la=F&table_name=loi&cn=1921062701 
 Loi de la securité publique et de la commodité du passage (Law on 
Public Safety and Convenience of Passage), available at : 
http://www.legislationline.org/topics/country/41/topic/15  
 Loi sur la fonction de police, 1992 (Law about the Working of Police 
Forces) (as for 31.01.2013), available at: http://www.legislationline.org 
/topics/country/41/topic/15 
 Loi tendant à réprimer la négation, la minimisation, la justification ou 
l'approbation du génocide commis par le régime national-socialiste 
allemand pendant la seconde guerre mondiale, 23 March 1995, available 
at:  http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi_loi/change_lg.pl?language=fr&la 
=F&table_name=loi&cn=1995032331 
 Code Electoral 2007, available at : http://www.verkiezingen.fgov.be 
/fileadmin/user_upload/Elections/communales2012/fr/20120822-
news/code-electoral-kieswetboek-20120901.pdf 
 Loi tendant à réprimer certains actes inspirés par le racisme ou la 
xénophobie (Law aiming at punishing certain acts inspired by racism and 
xenophobia), 30 July 1981, available at: 
http://legislationline.org/topics/country/41/topic/84 
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 Belgium Party Finance Law [July 4, 1989. – Law related to the restriction 
and control of election expenses [used in the federal chambers 
elections], as well as to the financing and open accounting of political 
parties],available at: www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl 
 Code Pénale, 8 June 1867, available at:  
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=262695 
 Arrete Royal du 2 Octobre 1937 Portant le Statut des Agents de l'Etat, 
available at : http://www.fedweb.belgium.be/fr/binaries/AR%20du%2002. 
10.1937%20-%20KB%2002.10.1937 _tcm119-9641.pdf 
 
Denmark 
 Act on Ethnic Equal Treatment, available at: 
http://www.lexadin.nl/wlg/legis/nofr/eur/lxweden.htm 
 Criminal Law of Denmark, available at: https://www.retsinformation.dk/ 
Forms/R0710.aspx?id=142912 
 Folketing (Parliamentary) Election Act, Act No. 271 of May 13th 1987, 
latest amendments added on April 10th 1991, available at: 
www.legislationonline.org/documents/action/ 
 Grants to Political Parties (Consolidation) Act No. 1291 of 8 December 
2006, available at: http://www.partylaw.leidenuniv.nl/party-law 
 Danish Security and Intelligence Service Act, available at:  
https://www.retsinformation.dk/forms/R0710.aspx?id=152182#Kap7 
 Civil Servants Act, Consolidation Act No. 488 of 06/05/2010 
(Bekendtgørelse af lov om tjenestemænd (Tjenestemandsloven), 
available at: https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=13 
0606&exp=1 
 
France 
 Law on Contract for Associations (Loi du 1er juillet 1901 relative au 
contrat d’association. Version consolidée au 6 mai 2009), available at: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006
069570&dateTexte=20090506 
 Penal Code, available at: www.legifrance.gouv.fr/content/download/ 
1957/13715/.../Code_33.pdf     
 Loi du 10 janvier 1936 sur les groupes de combat et milices privées, 
available at:  http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=3C 
FAD2B681F1BDB366E7E67A1539770A.tpdjo12v_1?cidTexte=JORFTE
XT000000325214&dateTexte 
 R645-1 of the Penal Code is available in French at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI00
0006419560&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070719 
 Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse (Law on the freedom of 
the press), available at:  http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte. 
do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070722&dateTexte=20080312 
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 Loi n° 72-546 du 1 juillet 1972 relative à la lutte contre le racisme (Law of 
Pleven), available at:   http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cid 
Texte=JORFTEXT000000864827 
 Loi n° 90-615 du 13 juillet 1990 tendant à réprimer tout acte raciste, 
antisémite ou xénophobe (Law of Gayssot), available at: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT00000
0532 990 
 Law No. 94-665 of 4 August 1994 relative to the use of the French 
language (Toubon Law), available at: 
http://www.dglf.culture.gouv.fr/droit/loi-gb.htm 
 Loi n° 84-16 du 11 janvier 1984 portant dispositions statutaires relatives 
à la fonction publique de l’Etat (1), available 
at :http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000
00050 1099 
 Code électoral (version en vigueur pour l’élection présidentielle et pour 
les élections législatives de 2012), available at : http://www.conseil-
constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/ 
dossiers_thematiques/presidentielle_2012/code_electoral_2012.pdf 
 Constitution de la République Française du 4 Octobre 1958, available at: 
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/constitution.asp 
 Loi n° 2013-1168 du 18 décembre 2013 relative à la programmation 
militaire pour les années 2014 à 2019 et portant diverses dispositions 
concernant la défense et la sécurité nationale (1), available at : 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=2CCB92C547B43
741903A00036A25B1E5.tpdjo16v_2?cidTexte=JORFTEXT00002833882
5&dateTexte=20140412 
 Loi n° 2003-88 du 3 février 2003 visant à aggraver les peines punissant 
les infractions à caractère raciste, antisémite ou xénophobe (1) 
(Lellouche law), available at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ 
affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000781920&dateTexte=&catego
rieLien=id 
 Décret n° 2008-609 du 27 juin 2008 relatif aux missions et à 
l'organisation de la direction centrale du renseignement intérieur, NOR: 
IOCX0811987D, available at: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr 
/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=CF89DC7C86982C2DC05AF4478A5056C5.tp
djo01v_2?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000019078545&dateTexte=&oldAction=r
echJO 
 
Germany 
 Abgabenordnung (AO) (The Fiscal Code of Germany),available at: 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_ao/index.html#gl_p0008 
 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, available at: 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/ 
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 Bundesverfassungsgerichts-Gesetz, BverfGG (Federal Constitutional 
Court Act), available at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/ 
bundesrecht/bverfgg/gesamt.pdf  
 Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz (BVerfGG) (Federal Constitutional 
Court Act), available at: http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/bundesrecht/bverfgg/gesamt.pdf 
 Bundesbeamtengesetz (BBG) (Federal law on civil servants), available 
at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/bbg_2009/gesamt.pdf 
 Extremistenbeschluss (Radicals decree), BVerfGE 39, 334, available at:  
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/ dfr/bv039334.html 
 Federal Law on Elections (Bundeswahlgesetz, BWahlG), available at: 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bwahlg/ 
 German Criminal Code, (transl. by Michael Bohlander), available at: 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/ 
 German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), transl. by Langenscheidt 
Übersetzungsservice, available at:  http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_bgb/ 
 Gesetz über die politischen Parteien (Parteiengesetz, PartG) 
(Parteiengesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung vom 31. Januar 
1994 (BGBl. I S. 149), das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des Gesetzes vom 23. 
August 2011 (BGBl. I S. 1748) geändert worden ist), available at: 
www.juris.de; the English version of the Law on Political Parties is 
available at: http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/parteien/downloads/ 
parteiengesetz_engl.pdf 
 Gesetz über Versammlungen und Aufzüge (Versammlungsgesetz) (Law 
on assemblies and marches), available at: http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/versammlg/BJNR006840953.html 
 Gesetz zur Regelung des öffentlichen Vereinsrechts (Vereinsgesetz) 
(Law on regulation of the right of public associations), available at: 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/ vereinsg/gesamt.pdf 
 Gewerbeordnung (Business Act) (GewO), available at: 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gewo/ 
 Gesetz zur Regelung des Statusrechts der Beamtinnen und Beamten in 
den Ländern (Beamtenstatusgesetz - BeamtStG) (The Law on the status 
of civil servants in the Länder), available at: http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/bundesrecht/ beamtstg/gesamt.pdf 
 Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus 
(Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz) (Law on Combatting Terrorism), 9 
January 2002, Bundesgesetzblatt, Vol. 2002, Part I, Nr. 3, pp.361-395, 
available at:  http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/ 
Gesetzestexte/Terrorismusbekaempfungsgesetz_pdf.pdf?blob=publicatio
nFile 
 Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit des Bundes und der Länder in 
Angelegenheiten des Verfassungsschutzes und über das Bundesamt für 
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Verfassungsschutz (Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz - BVerfSchG) (the 
Law concerning the Cooperation between the Federation and the Länder 
in relation to the protection of the constitution and about the Federal 
Agency for the Constitutional Protection), available at: 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bverfschg/BJNR029700990.html  
 Vereinsgesetz (Law on Associations), available at:  http://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/bundesrecht/ vereinsg/gesamt.pdf 
 
Sweden 
 The Swedish Constitution, available at: http://www.government.se/ 
sb/d/2707/a/15187 
 The Penal Code, available at: http://www.government.se/sb/d/3926/a/ 
27777 
 Foundation Act (1994:1220), (unofficial translation by Maria Bideke, Law 
Association Justice International), available at: 
http://legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/3698 
 The Elections Act (2005:837), available at: http://www.government.se/ 
sb/d/6822/a/64445 
 The Act on State Financial Support to Political Parties (1972:625), 
available at:  http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/10/78/60/b7508720. 
pdf 
 The Act on Criminal Responsibility for Terrorist Offences (2003:148), 
available at: http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/01/95/68/d6d398b4. 
pdf  
 The Regulation of Public Assemblies (a summary of regulations on the 
public assembly from Penal Code, Public Order Act, Police Act), 
available at: http://www.legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/ 
7308 
 The Public Order Act(1993: 1617), available at: 
http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Dokument-Lagar/Lagar/Svenskforfattningss 
amling/Ordningslag-19931617_sfs-1993-1617/ 
 The Police Act (1984: 387) (with commentary), available at: 
www.legislationonline.org 
 The Public Employment Act (1994:260), available at: 
http://www.government.se/sb/d/ 6278/a/72001 
 The Discrimination Act (2008:567), available at: 
http://www.government.se/sb/d/3926/a/118187 
 
The Netherlands 
 Act of 28 September 1989 containing new provisions governing the 
franchise and elections (Elections Act), last amended by Act of 29 
October 2009, Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2009, no. 452, 
AVT10/BZK98296, available at:  http://www.government.nl/files/ 
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documents-and-publications/leaflets/2010/ 06/25/elections-act/pdf-voor-
engelse-site-elections-act-2010.pdf 
 Act of 7 February 2002, providing for rules relating to the intelligence and 
security services and amendment of several acts (Wiv 2002) (Intelligence 
and Security Services Act 2002), available at: http://www.st-
ab.nl/wetten/0662_Wet_op_de_inlichtingen-en_veiligheidsdiensten 
_2002.htm  
 Besluit ontbinding landverraderlijke organisaties (Resolution concerning 
the Dissolution of Treasonable Organisations), available at: 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0002010/geldigheidsdatum _ 20-01-2014 
 The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, available at: 
http://www.government.nl/documents-and-publications/regulations/2012 
/10/18/the-constitution-of-the-kingdom-of-the-netherlands-2008.html 
 Public Assemblies Act, Act of 20 April 1988, Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 
157, containing provisions concerning the exercise of the right to profess 
a religion or belief and of the right of assembly and demonstration, as 
last amended by Act of Parliament of 22 June 1994, Bulletin of Acts and 
Decrees 573 (entered in force 27-04-1988), available at: 
http://legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/4703 
 The Subsidies Act for Political Parties (as valid on July 22, 2011), 
available at: http://www.st-ab.nl/wetten/0813_Wet_subsidiering_politieke 
_partijen.htm. Copyrighted translation is available at: www.partylaw. 
leidenuniv.nl 
 The Civil Code of the Netherlands, edited and translated by Hans 
Warendorf, Richard Thomas, Ian Curry-Sumner, Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Kluwer Law International, 2009 
 The Civil Law (online), is available at: http://www.dutchcivillaw.com 
/civilcodebook022.htm 
 Besluit ontbinding landverraderlijke organisaties (Resolution concerning 
the dissolution of treasonable organisations), available at: 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0002010/geldigheidsdatum_20-01-2014 
 Dutch Penal Code (1881, amended 1994), excerpts in English are 
available at: http://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/4693; the full 
collection of the Dutch Penal Code in Dutch language is available at: 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0001854/geldigheidsdatum_22-08-2014 
 Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering), available 
at:http://www.wetboek-online.nl/wet/Sv.html 
 General Tax Act (Algemene wet inzake rijksbelastingen), available at: 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0002320/HoofdstukI/Artikel5b/geldigheids
datum_23-01-2014 
 Law of December 12, 1929, containing regulations governing the legal 
status of civil servants, available  at: 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0001947/geldigheidsdatum_24-02-
2014#TitelIV 
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United Kingdom 
 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Chapter 24, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ ukpga/2001/24/contents 
 Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, Chapter 28, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/28/pdfs/ukpga_20080028_en.p
df 
 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/37/contents 
 Equality Act 2010, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/2010/15/pdfs/ukpga_20100015_en.pdf 
 Intelligence Services Act, Chapter 13, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1994/13/ contents 
 Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1991, Chapter 24, available 
at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1991/24/contents 
 Political Parties, Referendums and Elections Act 2000, Ch.41, available 
at: http://www.legislation. gov.uk/ukpga/2000/41/contentsPrevention of 
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, Chapter 56, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1974/56/pdfs/ukpga_19740056_en.p
df 
 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, Chapter 4, 
available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/4/contents 
 Public Order Act, 1936, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/Edw8and1Geo6/1/6/ contents 
 Public Order Act, 1986, available at : http://legislationline.org/ 
topics/country/53/topic/15 
 Race Relations Act, 1968, Chapter 71,available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1968/71/ enacted 
 Race Relations Act, 1976, Chapter 74, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1976/74 
 Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006, Chapter 1, available at: 
http://www.legislation. gov.uk/ukpga/2006/1/contents 
 Representation of People 1981, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/34/pdfs/ukpga_19810034_en.p
df 
 Security Services Act 1989, available at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1989/5/contents 
 Security Service Act 1996, Chapter 35, available at:  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/35/pdfs/ukpga_19960035_en.p
df 
 Serious Organized Crime and Police Act of 2005, Chapter 15, available 
at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/15/pdfs/ukpga_20050015 
_en.pdf 
 Terrorism Act 2000, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/2000/11/contents 
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 Terrorism Act 2006, Ch.11, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
ukpga/2006/11/pdfs/ukpga_ 20060011_en.pdf 
 
2. Other legal sources: 
 Council of Europe, Resolution 1547 (2007), available at: 
http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta07/ER
ES1547.htm  (accessed 07.11.2013)  
 Bundersverfassungsgericht (BVerfG), 23.10.1952, 1 BvB 1/51, available 
at: http://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Gericht=BVerf 
G&Datum=23.10.1952&Aktenzeichen=1%20BvB%201/51   
 Baggs v. Fudge, 1400114/05 (ET), available at the website of the 
employment tribunal at: http://uk.practicallaw.com/cs/Satellite?blobcol 
=urldata&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=Mungo
Blobs&blobwhere=1247478068637&ssbinary=true 
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